Roper v. North State Electrical Contractors, Inc. CA3

Filed 11/2/26 Roper v. North State Electrical Contractors, Inc. CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) ARTHUR ROPER, C103511 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 24CV007543) v. NORTH STATE ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., Defendant and Respondent. Arthur Roper worked for North State Electrical Contractors, Inc. (North State) until January 2021. Approximately three years later, Roper gave notice to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) that he intended to sue North State under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.)1 for several labor violations. The LWDA did not respond to the notice; Roper sued North State asserting a record production violation on behalf of himself and several other labor violations on behalf of himself and other current and/or former North State employees. Construing North State’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as a motion to strike, the trial court struck all claims in the complaint, except Roper’s record production claim, as 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code. 1 untimely because the alleged violations arose more than one year after Roper’s last day of employment. The question presented is whether Roper’s last day of employment with North State conclusively demonstrates that the labor violations asserted on behalf of the other employees are untimely.2 We answer the question in the negative and reject North State’s alternative argument that Roper does not have standing to assert the alleged violations on behalf of the other employees under section 2699, former subdivision (c).3 We accordingly reverse the order striking the claims asserted by Roper on behalf of other employees. LEGAL BACKGROUND “The Legislature enacted PAGA almost two decades ago in response to widespread violations of the Labor Code and significant underenforcement of those laws. [Citations.] Before PAGA’s enactment, tools for enforcing the Labor Code were limited. Some statutes allowed employees to sue their employers for damages resulting from Labor Code violations such as unpaid wages. [Citations.] Other Labor Code violations were punishable only as criminal misdemeanors, which local prosecutors tended not to prioritize. [Citation.] Additionally, several statutes provided civil penalties for Labor Code violations, but only state labor law enforcement agencies could bring an action for civil penalties and those agencies lacked sufficient enforcement resources.” (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1116 (Adolph).) 2 Roper does not appear to challenge the striking of the claims asserted on his own behalf as untimely. Roper indeed concedes that he suffered those violations “outside of the limitations period” and he presents no reasoned argument that the trial court erred in striking those claims. We accordingly deem any such unarticulated argument forfeited. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) 3 All statutory references to former subdivisions of section 2699 refer to the statute in effect prior to the 2024 amendments. (Stats. 2024, ch. 44, § 1.) 2  “To address these shortcomings, the Legislature enacted PAGA to create new civil penalties for various Labor Code violations and ‘ “to allow aggrieved employees, acting as private attorneys general, to recover [those] penalties.” ’ [Citation.] An employee who brings a PAGA action to recover civil penalties acts ‘ “as the proxy or agent” ’ of the state.” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1116.) Accordingly, a PAGA action “is an enforcement action between the LWDA and the employer, with the PAGA plaintiff acting on behalf of the government.” (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 86 (Kim).) “The employee may therefore seek any civil penalties the state can, including penalties for violations involving employees other than the PAGA litigant [themself].” (ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 185.) The civil penalties are intended “ ‘ “to punish the employer” for wrongdoing’ [citation] and ‘ “to deter violations” ’ [citation] rather than ‘compensate employees for actual losses incurred’ [citation].” (Adolph, at p. 1117.) There are generally three prerequisites to filing a PAGA action: notice, timeliness, and standing. (See Hargrove v. Legacy Healthcare, Inc. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 782, 791- 792.) A plaintiff must provide notice to the employer and the LWDA “ ‘of the specific provisions of [the Labor Code] alleged to have been violated, including the facts and theories to support the alleged violation.’ [Citations.] If the agency elects not to investigate, or investigates without issuing a citation, the employee may then bring a PAGA action.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545.) “The evident purpose of the notice requirement is to afford the relevant state agency, the [LWDA], the opportunity to decide whether to allocate scarce resources to an investigation, a decision better made with knowledge of the allegations an aggrieved employee is making and any basis for those allegations. Notice to the employer serves the purpose of allowing the employer to submit a response to the agency [citation], again thereby promoting an informed agency decision as to whether to allocate resources toward an investigation.” (Id. at pp. 545-546.) 3  As to timeliness, PAGA claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (a). (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1117.) “[T]he PAGA statute of limitations is an affirmative defense meant to facilitate the LWDA’s investigation [of] and the employer’s response [to the labor violations asserted by the plaintiff]. It is not jurisdictional.” (Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Management, LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 521, 543.) In contrast, standing is jurisdictional. (Cummings v. Stanley (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 493, 501.) “Standing requirements will vary from statute to statute based upon the intent of the Legislature and the purpose for which the particular statute was enacted.” (Midpeninsula Citizens for Fair Housing v. Westwood Investors (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1377, 1385.) Under PAGA, only an “aggrieved employee,” as that term is defined in section 2699, subdivision (c), has standing to sue an employer for representative labor violations. (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 84-85.) Because Roper’s notice to the LWDA and suit against North State were filed before June 19, 2024, the pertinent definition of an “ ‘aggrieved employee’ ” is “any person who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” (§ 2699, former subd. (c); § 2699, subd. (v) [limiting the 2024 amendments to notices and suits filed on or after June 19, 2024].)4 GLOSSARY As our colleagues in the Fifth District Court of Appeal recently noted, “[t]he vocabulary PAGA has generated has some unfortunate, frustrating features that create uncertainty rather than clarity.” (CRST Expedited, Inc. v. Superior Court (2025) 112 4 Section 2699, subdivision (c) now requires an aggrieved employee to have personally suffered the alleged labor violations within the one-year statute of limitations. (Osuna v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 516, 520, review granted July 30, 2025, S291614.) 4 Cal.App.5th 872, 890, review granted Sept. 17, 2025, S292005 (CRST).)5 Some of the terms used in PAGA cases “do not have a single definition uniformly applied by federal and California courts interpreting PAGA since its enactment.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, before we delve into the matter, we take a detour to set forth the glossary of terms used in this opinion with an eye toward ensuring clarity regarding the legal principles and analysis discussed herein. We define the pertinent terms in this opinion as follows: Violation means “ ‘a failure to comply with any requirement of the [Labor C]ode.’ ” (CRST, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 891, review granted; Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 82, fn. 2.) Civil penalty means a civil penalty “that could have been ‘assessed and collected’ by the LWDA” for an alleged violation. (CRST, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 890, review granted; § 2699, former subd. (a).) A “civil penalty” is not a form of “victim-specific relief that an employee could recover directly, such as restitution of unpaid wages, statutory damages, and statutory penalties.” (CRST, at p. 890.) PAGA action means the legal proceeding filed in court (generally referred to as the civil action, case, or lawsuit) that asserts one or more PAGA claims.6 A “ ‘PAGA 5 Our Supreme Court’s review of CRST is deferred pending consideration and disposition of related issues in Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001, review granted April 16, 2025, S289305 (Leeper). The issues to be briefed and argued in Leeper are limited to whether: (1) every PAGA action necessarily includes both individual and nonindividual PAGA claims, regardless of whether the complaint specifically alleges individual PAGA claims; and (2) a plaintiff can bring a PAGA action based solely on nonindividual PAGA claims. The issues pending before our Supreme Court are not pertinent here. 6 We diverge slightly from the CRST definition of “PAGA action” (CRST, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 893 [defining “ ‘PAGA action’ to mean the overall legal proceeding initially filed in court (i.e., the case or the lawsuit) that, as a practical matter, asserts 5 action’ ” is thus distinct from a “ ‘cause of action’ ” (CRST, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 893, review granted), the meaning of which “varies with the context in which it is used” (ibid.), as discussed next. Cause of action within the context of a PAGA action “is derived from the primary rights theory,” and refers to the concept that “each wrongful act by an employer—that is, each breach of an obligation imposed by the Labor Code—gives rise to a separate cause of action.” (CRST, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at pp. 893-894, review granted.) This makes sense because civil penalties under PAGA are imposed on a per-violation basis. (§ 2699, subd. (f); see Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 334, 348; Carrington v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 504, 517, 528; Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1125-1126.) Like CRST, we use the term “cause of action” and “claim” interchangeably. (CRST, at p. 894.) PAGA claims refers to the causes of action to recover civil penalties for violations committed against the plaintiff and/or other employees. Individual PAGA claims means the causes of action based on violations allegedly suffered by the plaintiff; Nonindividual PAGA claims means the causes of action based on violations allegedly suffered by one or more employees other than the plaintiff. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On December 18, 2023, Roper requested copies of his personnel file and payroll records from North State. When North State allegedly did not timely respond to the request as provided in sections 226 and 1198.5, Roper, on February 8, 2024, submitted written notice to the LWDA and North State that he intended to pursue litigation on behalf of himself and current and/or former employees for labor violations committed by North State since February 8, 2023. When the LWDA did not respond, Roper, on April multiple PAGA claims”]) because a plaintiff could assert one PAGA claim or several such claims. 6 16, 2024, filed a complaint alleging that he and other hourly-paid and non-exempt employees are “aggrieved employees” as defined in section 2699, former subdivision (c) “in that they are all current or former employees” who worked for North State “at any time during the period from February 8, 2023 to the present, and/or one or more of the alleged violations was committed against them by [North State] at any time during the period from February 8, 2023 to the present….” Roper alleged one individual PAGA claim—North State failed to timely produce his personnel file and payroll records in response to his December 18, 2023 request. He also alleged seven dual individual PAGA claims and nonindividual PAGA claims based on North State’s failures to: (1) pay minimum and overtime wages; (2) provide meal periods and rest breaks; (3) timely pay wages; (4) timely pay wages upon termination; (5) keep complete and accurate wage statements; (6) provide paid sick days as required by section 246; and (7) reimburse all necessary business expenses and losses. North State filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, challenging the timeliness of the complaint and arguing the record production claim failed to state a claim because it included only general allegations, contentions, and conclusions of law. North State requested that the trial court take judicial notice of a declaration that Roper submitted in another case, wherein he declared that he last worked for North State in January 2021.7 The trial court denied North State’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the sufficiency of the record production claim, granted North State’s judicial notice request, and then construed the motion for judgment on the pleadings as a motion to strike in considering the timeliness challenge. The trial court granted the motion to strike, striking the seven dual individual PAGA claims and nonindividual PAGA claims. The trial court 7 Roper does not dispute that his employment with North State ended in January 2021. 7 found the claims were untimely because Roper filed the LWDA notice more than one year after his last date of employment. The trial court also denied leave to amend the complaint because it found there was no reasonable possibility that Roper could cure the untimely PAGA notice. Roper filed a timely notice of appeal in April 2025. His opening brief was filed in January 2026, briefed was completed on April 15, 2026, and oral argument was held on September 22, 2026. DISCUSSION Roper argues the trial court erred in striking the nonindividual PAGA claims based on his last day of employment because he has standing to bring those claims. He asserts that, because it is undisputed the record production claim was timely, he has “broad standing to bring claims for violations of the Labor Code that other aggrieved employees suffered during the limitations period,” even if he “allegedly suffered the same violations outside of the limitations period.” North State argues standing is a red herring as to the timeliness of the stricken claims but challenges Roper’s standing as an alternative basis for affirming the order. We agree with North State that Roper conflates the timeliness and standing requirements pertinent to a PAGA action. The standing and statute of limitations requirements are different in nature and serve different purposes. (See Hutcheson v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 932, 939.) “ ‘Standing is a threshold issue necessary to maintain a cause of action’ ” and “ ‘concerns a specific party’s interest in the outcome of a lawsuit.’ ” (People ex rel. Becerra v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 486, 495.) The statute of limitations pertains to the remedy for a cause of action (see Reid v. City of San Diego (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 343, 362) and “exists to promote the diligent assertion of claims, ensure defendants the opportunity to collect evidence while still fresh, and provide repose and protection from dilatory suits once excess time has passed.” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 8 1185, 1191.) We thus address the statute of limitations defense separate from the issue of standing. Before doing so, however, we initially resolve the threshold dispute regarding appealability because Roper’s appeal does not arise from a final judgment. (Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 921 [generally, “ ‘an appeal may be taken only from the final judgment in an entire action’ ”].) We conclude the order is appealable, Roper has standing to assert the stricken nonindividual PAGA claims, and the trial court erred in finding the nonindividual PAGA claims are time-barred. I Appealability – The Death Knell Doctrine Roper argues the death knell doctrine exception to the final judgment rule applies. Appealability under the death knell doctrine requires “an order that (1) amounts to a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs, under circumstances where (2) the persistence of viable but perhaps de minimis individual [PAGA] claims creates a risk no formal final judgment will ever be entered.” (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 759.) The rationale underlying the death knell doctrine is “ ‘that without the incentive of a possible group recovery the individual plaintiff may find it economically imprudent to pursue his lawsuit to a final judgment and then seek appellate review of an adverse [representative] determination,’ ” thereby rendering the order “effectively immunized by circumstance from appellate review.” (Id. at p. 758.) North State argues the order is not appealable under the death knell doctrine because: (1) other employees can still bring timely PAGA claims; (2) a separate action is pending between Roper and North State, in which Roper’s individual “viable claims that are not de minimis” have been compelled to arbitration; and (3) Roper’s remaining record production claim in this case can be resolved expeditiously given North State “is open to 9 paying the alleged $1,500 penalty to dispose of the claim.”8 We find no merit in North State’s arguments and agree with Roper that the death knell doctrine exception applies. First, the trial court struck the nonindividual PAGA claims without leave to amend, which operates as a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs and is appealable. (Osuna v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc., supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 523, review granted.)9 That is because no other employee can now stand in for the LWDA to assert the nonindividual PAGA claims in Roper’s complaint. Second, although we grant North State’s request to take judicial notice of the class action complaint filed in the separate action pending between North State and Roper and a demand for arbitration filed by Roper against North State, we conclude the documents are irrelevant to the appealability analysis. North State provides no citation to authority that proceedings between the same parties in another action bears on the question of appealability in this action. The focus of the death knell doctrine is on the case in which the order is entered—i.e., whether the order amounts to “a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs” in this case and whether the circumstances create a risk that no formal final judgment will ever be entered in this case. (In re Baycol Cases I & II, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 759.) We fail to see how the separate complaint or request for arbitration informs either of the requirements related to the death knell doctrine and North State provides no reasoned legal argument as to why it should. (In re S.C., supra, 138 8 To support its arguments, North State requests that we take judicial notice of: (1) the class action complaint filed by Roper against North State on February 8, 2024, in another Sacramento County Superior Court case; and (2) Roper’s demand for arbitration of employment claims against North State filed with the American Arbitration Association. We grant the request to take judicial notice of the documents but only take notice of the documents’ existence and not the truth of anything stated therein. (Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145.) 9 Our Supreme Court’s review of Osuna is deferred pending consideration and disposition of related issues in Leeper, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th 1001, review granted. 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 408 [appellate courts may disregard arguments not supported by meaningful legal analysis with citations to authority].) Finally, North State’s assertion, without any citation to the record, that it is “open” to disposing of Roper’s individual claim by “paying the alleged $1,500 penalty” does not conclusively resolve the second question in the death knell analysis, as it suggests. North State cites no authority for the proposition that a defendant’s purported willingness to resolve a plaintiff’s individual claims negates the risk that the plaintiff may lack incentive to pursue their individual claims. Further, attorney arguments are not evidence. (Evid. Code, § 140; People v. Kiney (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 807, 815 [“ ‘unsworn statements of counsel are not evidence’ ”].) There is thus no evidence in the record that a single judgment on all claims “could have followed in the near future,” as North State asserts. We now turn to the merits of the appeal. II Standard of Review The parties disagree on the standard of review. Roper asserts our review is de novo because the appeal turns on a pure question of law; whereas North State argues we should apply an abuse of discretion standard because the trial court exercised its discretion to dismiss the nonindividual PAGA claims as untimely and the “appeal does not concern a statute or specific application of any single case.”10 We review the questions of timeliness and standing de novo. Although rulings on a motion to strike are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, the application of a statute to undisputed facts presents a question of law subject to de novo review. (Cal-Western Business Services, Inc. v. Corning Capital Group (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 304, 309; Gilkyson v. Disney 10 North State also argues that the trial court’s denial of leave to amend is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Roper does not, however, challenge the trial court’s denial of leave to amend. 11 Enterprises, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1340 [“The application of a statute of limitations based on facts alleged in the complaint is a legal question subject to de novo review”].) Here, it is undisputed that Roper’s employment ended in 2021 and that the stricken PAGA claims were alleged to have occurred on or after February 8, 2023. The questions before us turn on the application of the statutory requirements to those undisputed facts. III The Order Striking The Nonindividual PAGA Claims Is Reversed We address the issue of standing first because it is jurisdictional.11 As we can best glean, North State argues that, because Roper’s employment ended in 2021, he lacks standing to assert nonindividual PAGA claims on behalf of other employees for alleged violations committed thereafter. Roper disagrees, arguing PAGA “grants an aggrieved employee who experienced just one Labor Code violation standing to serve as a representative in a PAGA action, regardless of whether that individual personally experienced each and every alleged violation.” We agree with Roper. Roper has PAGA standing as an “aggrieved employee” if he was employed by North State and alleges that North State committed one or more of the alleged violations against him. (§ 2699, former subd. (c).) Roper has met these requirements. There is no dispute that the record production violation claim was timely. Roper thus has standing to assert the nonindividual PAGA claims irrespective of whether his individual PAGA claims based on those same types of violations are time-barred. (Adolph, supra, 14 11 Although North State raises standing as an alternate ground to affirm the trial court’s order, North State also confusingly asserts that we should not consider the question of standing because it was not at issue in the briefs before the trial court. We note, because standing is jurisdictional, an assertion that the plaintiff lacks standing may be raised at any time in the proceeding and even for the first time on appeal. (Blumhorst v. Jewish Family Services of Los Angeles (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 993, 1000.) 12 Cal.5th at p. 1121 [“a worker becomes an ‘aggrieved employee’ with standing to litigate claims on behalf of fellow employees upon sustaining a Labor Code violation committed by [their] employer”].) North State asks us to follow the “precedent that inspired the ultimate amendment to PAGA in July 2024,” and find “an employee must have personally experienced the violations they seek to pursue on a representative PAGA basis.” But the Legislature expressly limited application of the new standing requirement—which provides that a plaintiff must have personally suffered the violations asserted in a PAGA action within the one-year limitations period—to LWDA notices and civil actions filed on or after June 19, 2024. (§ 2699, subds. (c)(1), (v).) In other words, the Legislature decided to maintain the status quo as to standing for any notices and actions filed prior to that date, as here. We have no authority to override the Legislature’s express limitation regarding application of the 2024 amendments. (Dignity Health v. Local Initiative Health Care Authority of Los Angeles County (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 144, 165.) North State also asserts that Robinson v. Southern Counties Oil Co. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 476 “is directly on point.” North State believes the case stands for the broad proposition that an employee lacks standing to pursue nonindividual PAGA claims when the violations allegedly occurred after the plaintiff’s employment ended. Robinson stands for no such broad proposition. In that case, the court found that the plaintiff lacked standing because the plaintiff “was not affected by any of the alleged violations,” given that the violations allegedly occurred after the end of his employment. (Id. at p. 484, italics added.) Here, in contrast, the complaint alleges that Roper personally sustained the record production violation—which is a violation that can be and allegedly was committed after the last day of employment. Robinson is thus distinguishable. (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1127-1128 [distinguishing Robinson on its facts].) We now turn to and reject North State’s argument that the nonindividual PAGA claims are untimely because Roper did not provide the LWDA with written notice of, or 13 file the complaint asserting, those violations within one year of Roper’s last day of employment with North State. In that regard, North State urges us to follow Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 932, review granted July 9, 2025, S291199,12 in which the Second District Court of Appeal held that “the statute of limitations is tied to the PAGA plaintiff’s individual claims, and that the PAGA plaintiff must bring a PAGA action (… by serving notice on the [LWDA]) within one year of the last Labor Code violation he or she individually suffered.” (Id. at pp. 941-942.) The court also summarily stated that, “when a PAGA plaintiff is no longer employed by the violator-employer, the violation last occurred (and the cause of action accrues) on the PAGA plaintiff’s last day of employment.” (Ibid.) We respectfully disagree with Williams.13 Like the court in Esparza v. Safeway, Inc. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 42, we are unaware of authority “holding that a PAGA cause of action accrues because of the end of employment.” (Id. at p. 63, fn. 11.) We can conceive of no legal basis for adopting such a blanket requirement either. PAGA does not specify when a claim accrues (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1193) or contain its own statute of limitations provision; rather, the one-year general statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (a) applies. (Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 941-942, review granted; Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (a) [applies to any “action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, if the action is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except if the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation”].) Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (a) is silent as 12 Our Supreme Court deferred review pending consideration and disposition of related issues in Leeper, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th 1001, review granted. 13 We express no opinion as to the questions on review before our Supreme Court. 14 to the accrual date for a cause of action. North State cites no other pertinent statute tying accrual of the nonindividual PAGA claims to the PAGA plaintiff’s last day of employment. North State also does not identify a pertinent common law doctrine that prescribes such accrual. (Kahn v. Price (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 223, 236-237 [where a statute of limitations is silent as to an accrual date for a cause of action, generally settled common law accrual rules apply, unless otherwise provided].) Moreover, such a blanket conclusion is contrary to the fact that, as explained ante and acknowledged by North State, a Labor Code violation can accrue after an employee’s last day of employment, such as when the employer allegedly fails to comply with a record production requirement. We accordingly find no legal basis for concluding that the last date a PAGA cause of action may accrue is the PAGA plaintiff’s final date of employment. The context within which PAGA claims are litigated also cuts against North State’s argument. Roper is “a PAGA plaintiff (who is simply a proxy for state enforcement authorities),” he is not an individual plaintiff. (Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 745, 756.) The penalties that can be recovered in a PAGA action “are those that can be recovered by state enforcement agencies under the Labor Code; they are separate from the statutory damages that can be recovered by an employee pursuing an individual claim for a Labor Code violation.” (Id. at p. 753; id. at p. 760 [a PAGA plaintiff “has the authority to seek penalties for all known violations committed by an employer”].) If the PAGA plaintiff appropriately and timely noticed the employer’s alleged Labor Code violations to the LWDA, then “[t]he method of calculation under section 2699, subdivision (f) imposes penalties based on the total number of employees that have been affected by an employer’s Labor Code violations” during that period of time. (Id. at p. 759, italics added.) Because PAGA’s goal is to “achiev[e] maximum compliance with state labor laws, it would make little sense to prevent a PAGA plaintiff (who is simply a proxy for state enforcement authorities) from seeking penalties for all the violations an employer 15 committed” during the period identified in the LWDA notice based on the PAGA plaintiff’s last day of employment. (Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 756.) Indeed, tying the statute of limitations for nonindividual PAGA claims to the PAGA plaintiff’s dates of employment would create a “ ‘[h]urdle[] that impede[s] the effective prosecution of representative PAGA actions,’ ” thereby “ ‘undermin[ing] the Legislature’s objectives.’ ” (Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 87.) “Our Supreme Court has made clear that ‘allow[ing] employers to reduce their liability for civil penalties, without state oversight’ by curtailing a plaintiff’s ability to pursue PAGA claims is ‘contrary to PAGA’s goal of strengthening Labor Code enforcement.’ ” (Hutcheson v. Superior Court, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 942.) North State’s proposal is also at odds with a PAGA plaintiff’s broad role, which includes that they may substitute “a qualified plaintiff to take [their] place as the LWDA’s proxy.” (Id. at pp. 941, 942.) It is impractical and illogical to suggest that the timeliness of the nonindividual PAGA claims is tied to the identity of the PAGA plaintiff—the proxy of the state—who may later be substituted by another PAGA plaintiff whose employment dates will likely differ. We disagree with North State’s argument that “[i]t is critical that this Court align with the reasoning of Williams, because to hold otherwise will render the statute of limitations completely meaningless because any employee could bring a claim—even 20 years later—simply because they assert a claim for failure to produce employment records.” “[A] PAGA plaintiff does not collect penalties merely by alleging a Labor Code violation in the complaint. The plaintiff still must prove at trial that a violation in fact occurred.” (Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 761.) The one-year statute of limitations applicable to PAGA claims further limits the scope of the PAGA claims that are actionable. We agree with CRST that the statute of limitations for PAGA claims generally starts to run (and a cause of action accrues) when the Labor Code violation occurs. 16 (CRST, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at pp. 893-894, review granted [“each wrongful act by an employer—that is, each breach of an obligation imposed by the Labor Code—gives rise to a separate cause of action”].) Here, Roper alleged that North State committed seven types of nonindividual PAGA violations against other employees from February 8, 2023 to present. Those violations pertain to failing to pay wages and reimburse business expenses, providing inaccurate wage statements, and failing to provide meal period and rest breaks and paid sick days. Roper further alleged that he submitted the written notice to LWDA and North State pertaining to those violations on February 8, 2024. North State seeks judgment on or to strike the nonindividual PAGA claims as untimely based on the face of the complaint. The alleged facts are accordingly deemed true for purposes of analyzing whether the nonindividual PAGA claims are timely, irrespective of whether the motion is a motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion to strike. (Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital, Inc. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342 [“[a] motion for judgment on pleadings is made on the same grounds and decided on the same basis as a general demurrer”]; Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1034 [facts in pleading deemed true in considering merits of demurrer]; Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255 [allegations of pleading assumed true in “passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike”].) Because Labor Code violations allegedly occurred, on the face of the complaint, within one year of the filing of the LWDA notice, we conclude the nonindividual PAGA claims are timely. North State argues we should follow Esparza, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th 42, which it believes supports the trial court’s ruling. Esparza is not helpful to North State. In that case, the plaintiff’s PAGA action rested on “alleged violations occurring before June 17, 2007.” (Id. at p. 60, italics added.) The one-year statute of limitations thus expired on June 17, 2008, for the latest violations alleged. The plaintiff did not, however, file the notice with the LWDA until July 2008 or a PAGA action until February 2009. The 17 claims were accordingly untimely. (Ibid.) The allegations in this case differ materially from those in Esparza. The nonindividual PAGA claims that occurred within one year of Roper giving notice of those claims to the LWDA are timely. We accordingly reverse the order striking those claims. DISPOSITION The order striking the nonindividual PAGA claims is reversed. The order is otherwise affirmed. Roper shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)-(2).) /s/ BOULWARE EURIE, J. We concur: /s/ RENNER, Acting P. J. /s/ KRAUSE, J. 18