Full Opinion

Filed 11/16/26 Hall v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA JASON DOUGLAS HALL, D085840 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2024- 00028663-CU-MW-NC) v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES et al., Defendants and Appellants. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael D. Washington, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Assistant Attorney General, Jodi L. Cleesattle, Rebecca M. O’Grady and Rishi S. Bhatt, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Appellants. Joseph K. Seipel for Plaintiff and Respondent. Jason Douglas Hall filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the trial court, alleging that the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) violated his due process rights by conducting an administrative per se (APS) hearing regarding the suspension of his driver’s license utilizing a single hearing officer as both an advocate and the trier of fact. The trial court granted the petition, without prejudice to the DMV conducting another administrative hearing with two separate individuals, one acting in the adjudicative capacity and another in the capacity of an advocate. The trial court also granted Hall’s request for attorney fees under Government Code section 8001 in the amount of $5,600. The DMV appeals and asserts that Romane v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1002, review granted August 13, 2025, S291093 (Romane)—in which another panel of this court concluded that a hearing officer does not act as an advocate by merely collecting and introducing evidence that is routinely admitted in such hearings—is instructive in this case, and that the DMV did not violate Hall’s due process rights. (See id. at p. 1018.) Likewise, the DMV asserts that the trial court’s order awarding Hall attorney fees must be reversed because the DMV did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner by holding the hearing with a single hearing officer. Pending guidance from the Supreme Court, we see no reason to depart from this court’s reasoning in Romane. We conclude that the DMV did not violate Hall’s due process rights in the APS hearing and therefore reverse the judgment granting the petition and the associated award of attorney fees. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Hall’s Arrest and Refusal to Submit to a Chemical Test On February 15, 2024, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Officer Erik Plocki of the San Diego Sheriff’s Department observed Hall driving approximately 22 miles per hour over the posted speed limit. Officer Plocki conducted a traffic stop and observed that Hall exhibited signs of being under the influence of alcohol, including an odor of alcohol coming from his person, red, 1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Government Code. 2 watery eyes, and slurred speech. Hall refused to attempt any field sobriety tests. Officer Plocki arrested Hall and transported him to the North Coastal Station for processing. He read Hall the “Chemical Test Admonishment” from the DS 367 form, which advised Hall that his driving privileges would be suspended for one year or revoked for two to three years if he refused to provide either a breath or blood sample to measure his blood alcohol content (BAC). In the arrest report, Officer Plocki stated, “I explained the admonishment several different ways because Hall talked over me as I read it and claimed he disagreed with having to provide a chemical sample. I advised Hall to choose to provide either a breath or blood sample numerous times, but he refused to provide a voluntary sample. I advised Hall I would obtain a warrant for his blood, and he still refused.” Officer Plocki obtained a judicial warrant, and a phlebotomist collected two vials of blood from Hall’s arm at 11:22 p.m. Subsequent testing confirmed that Hall’s BAC was .25, well above the legal limit. The police report noted that Body Worn Cameras (BWCs) were recording during the incident. B. Suspension and APS Hearing The DMV suspended Hall’s license but stayed the suspension pending an APS hearing, which was set for June 6, 2024. Before the hearing, a DMV employee sent a “Request for Records” to the San Diego Sheriff’s Department, seeking officer’s statements, a copy of the breath and blood test results, and the report related to Hall’s arrest. The Driver Safety Branch Chief, Veronica Bowie, also sent a subpoena to the San Diego Sheriff’s Department records division seeking the BWC footage from the incident. Both were dated March 6, 2024. 3 On June 4, 2024, Hall’s counsel sent the DMV hearing officer a written letter of objection regarding the DMV’s procedures for APS hearings. The letter noted that the DMV was permanently enjoined from having an APS hearing officer function as an advocate for the DMV and objected to the ongoing practice of a single DMV representative introducing evidence while also serving as an allegedly impartial trier of fact Hall’s attorney made the same objection at the outset of the hearing. Hearing Officer Veronica Arias noted the objection and continued with the hearing. During the hearing, the hearing officer marked four exhibits—Officer Plocki’s sworn statement, the arrest report, the BWC footage, and a copy of Hall’s driving record—and asked if there was any objection to moving them into evidence. Hall’s counsel objected and stated the hearing officer was acting as an advocate. Hearing Officer Arias overruled the objection. During argument, Hall’s counsel referred extensively to the BWC footage as evidence that Hall did not understand the admonishment. In a written decision issued on June 7, 2024, Hearing Officer Arias found that: (1) Officer Plocki had reasonable cause to stop Hall; (2) Hall was placed under lawful arrest; (3) Officer Plocki told Hall that his driving privilege would be suspended if he refused the required chemical testing; and (4) Hall refused to complete that testing. As a result, the DMV reimposed the suspension of Hall’s driving privilege. C. Petition for Writ of Mandate Hall filed a petition for writ of mandate with the trial court, alleging that the DMV violated his due process rights by proceeding with a single DMV hearing officer who acted as both an advocate and the trier of fact. In addition, he asserted the DMV’s findings were not supported by the evidence, because “his legitimate confusion [regarding the admonishment] was not adequately cleared up by the arresting officer.” After briefing and argument, 4 the trial court granted the writ without prejudice to the DMV holding a new APS hearing with a separate advocate and trier of fact. The trial court also awarded attorney fees to Hall under section 800. The DMV filed a timely notice of appeal. II. DISCUSSION A. Due Process Claims 1. Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review “Under California’s implied consent law, any person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have consented to chemical testing of their blood or breath for the purpose of determining their blood-alcohol content if they are lawfully arrested for driving under the influence.” (Romane, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th 1002, 1008.) “If a driver refuses to submit to or complete chemical testing in this circumstance, the [DMV] may suspend the driver’s license for one year.” (Ibid.) However, the driver may then challenge the suspension by requesting an APS hearing. (Romane, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1008.) “The APS hearing is an informal proceeding” “designed ‘to provide an efficient mechanism whereby those persons who drive after consuming dangerous amounts of alcohol can have their driver’s licenses quickly suspended so as to ensure they will not endanger the public by continuing to drive.’ ” (Ibid.) As our high court has explained, “Both the federal and state Constitutions compel the government to afford persons due process before depriving them of any property interest.” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 212 (Today’s Fresh).) Both “the United States Supreme Court and [the California Supreme Court] have identified some aspects of due process as irreducible minimums. For example, whenever ‘due process requires a hearing, the adjudicator must be impartial.’ ” (Id. at p. 212.) “Beyond these broad 5 outlines, however, the precise dictates of due process are flexible and vary according to context.” (Ibid.) “The requirements of due process extend to administrative adjudications,” including the APS hearing at issue here. (Today’s Fresh, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 214.) “In many . . . respects, however, administrative hearings need not be conducted with the same rigor demanded of judicial proceedings: ‘[D]ue process allows more flexibility in administrative process than judicial process.’ ” (Ibid.) “Instead, a legislature may adopt an administrative procedure in which the same individual or entity is charged both with developing the facts and rendering a final decision, and separate adversarial advocates are dispensed with.” (Id. at p. 220.) “Proceedings of this sort ‘are inquisitorial rather than adversarial’ ” and “[t]he federal Constitution does not prohibit them.” (Id. at pp. 220–221.) “To prove a due process violation based on overlapping functions thus requires something more than proof that an administrative agency has investigated and accused, and will now adjudicate.” (Today’s Fresh, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 221.) The party asserting such a violation, “must lay a ‘specific foundation’ for suspecting prejudice that would render an agency unable to consider fairly the evidence presented at the adjudicative hearing [citation]; it must come forward with ‘specific evidence demonstrating actual bias or a particular combination of circumstances creating an unacceptable risk of bias.’ ” (Ibid.) In California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 517 (DUI Lawyers), the court concluded that “the DMV’s APS hearing structure [at that time, in 2022] violate[d] the California and federal due process rights of drivers by combining the advocacy and adjudicatory roles into a single DMV employee.” (Id. at p. 530.) The court in 6 DUI Lawyers noted that “the DMV may task the same person with both collecting and developing the evidence and rendering a final decision,” but that the hearing officer must refrain “from advocating on behalf of the DMV as the DSM [previously mandated] (i.e., present the DMV’s case and ‘promote driver safety,’ with no corresponding duty to present any evidence that would support the position of the driver at the hearing).” (Id. at p. 533, fn. 5; see also, Romane, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1013–1014.) “Ultimately, DUI Lawyers reversed and remanded with directions for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of CDLA, and include language in its judgment permanently enjoining and restraining the DMV ‘from having its APS hearing officers function as advocates for the position of the DMV in addition to being finders of fact in the same adversarial proceeding.’ ” (Romane, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1014.) However, “[s]ince DUI Lawyers was a taxpayer action challenging the DMV’s policies and procedures in the abstract, the court had no occasion to apply its holding to any particular APS hearing.” (Ibid.) Since DUI Lawyers, appellate courts have presented different views as to the legal framework that should be applied when reviewing challenges to the DMV’s APS procedure. Some cases, including Romane, focused on “assessing the administrative record and the revocation decision to see if the public hearing officer actually acted as both an adjudicator and an advocate, or merely acted as an adjudicator and a collector and developer of evidence.” (Knudsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 186, 193 (Knudsen).) If the evidence demonstrated the hearing officer acted as an advocate, the court would find “the driver’s due process right to an impartial adjudicator [was] violated.” (See ibid.; Clarke v. Gordon (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1267, 1270 [finding advocacy where the hearing officer cross- 7 examined the driver]; Kazelka v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1255 (Kazelka) [finding no advocacy where the hearing officer subpoenaed and introduced evidence]; Romane, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1018–1020 [finding no advocacy where the hearing officer simply collected and introduced evidence].) The court in Chi v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 473, review granted May 13, 2026, S296201 (Chi) applied a different framework, finding that the “controlling principle for determining unconstitutional bias rests on the general concept that an adjudicator must remain disinterested in the outcome of the case,” and that due process is only violated “ ‘in the context of extreme facts,’ ” such as a “financial interest in the outcome,” a “personal bias against a party,” or a “personal grudge against a party based on a history of conflict.” (Id. at p. 481.) The Chi court went on to criticize the Clarke line of cases, explaining “the focus [in those cases] is on appearances rather than disqualifying interests. The court scrutinizes the adjudicator’s actions and characterizes them as advocacy or not advocacy. If it looks like advocacy, the implication is that the adjudicator appeared to favor the department. But the court never identifies, or analyzes evidence of, any circumstances that would tempt an average adjudicator to favor the department.” (Id. at p. 486.) Our Supreme Court granted review of Romane to consider: “Under what circumstances . . . an [APS] hearing officer’s relationship with the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) violate[s] a driver’s due process right to an impartial adjudicator by creating an unacceptable risk of bias during a DMV driver’s license suspension hearing.” (Romane v. Department of Motor Vehicles, S291093, Supreme Ct. Mins., Aug. 13, 2025.) 8 The court likewise granted review of Chi pending consideration of Romane. (Chi, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th 473, review granted.) Our review of these due process claims is de novo. (Chi, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 483, review granted; Romane, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1016, review granted.) 2. Hall Was Afforded Due Process at the APS Hearing Relying on Romane and other similarly decided cases, the DMV asserts that Hearing Officer Arias did not engage in advocacy. We agree. Hearing Officer Arias began by explaining that she would not be acting as an advocate for the DMV. She introduced four exhibits into evidence, each of which was obtained from the San Diego Sheriff’s Department by other DMV employees using standard procedures. Hearing Officer Arias did not cross-examine Hall and did not call any witnesses or present any further evidence or argument on behalf of the DMV. As the court concluded in Romane, “where, as here, a hearing officer merely introduces the documents that law enforcement duly forwarded to the DMV, which are routinely admitted into evidence at APS hearings, the officer is merely collecting and developing evidence, not advocating for the DMV.” (Romane, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1018.) Hall asserts that Romane is not binding on this court, but pending further instruction from our high court, we decline to depart from the reasoning in Romane. Perhaps anticipating that this court would follow Romane, Hall asserts further that this case is distinguishable because here, Driver Safety Branch Chief Bowie subpoenaed the BWC footage so that the hearing officer could use it in deciding the suspension issue. Notably, the trial court’s written decision makes no reference to the subpoenaed material. Hall argues that this court can affirm the trial court’s judgment on any grounds, but, regardless, we are not persuaded that the 9 issuance of a single subpoena by a DMV employee tips the scales into advocacy. In Kazelka, the DMV issued six subpoenas related to the calibration of a breathalyzer device. (Kazelka, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 1245.) Kazelka argued that the hearing officer “ ‘acted as both an advocate and an adjudicator when she served the California Highway Patrol a subpoena for the maintenance records of the PAS device on August 2, 2019.’ ” (Id. at p. 1255.) The court rejected that argument and found that the hearing officer did not display any advocacy or bias. (Ibid.) Hall asserts that the issuance of the subpoena here went beyond the “passive receipt” of documents in Romane but provides no authority to support that assertion. The BWC footage is noted in the police report and was part of the arrest record. It is unclear why the subpoena was necessary to obtain the footage, but there is no indication that there was any objection to the subpoena or that its issuance was anything more than a routine procedure. Hall also asserts that because Driver Safety Branch Chief Bowie signed the subpoena, the DMV violated the injunction in DUI Lawyers by “allowing ex parte communications or command control by DMV Driver Safety Branch managers over Driver Safety Hearing Officers’ decisions.” But Hall provides no authority suggesting that issuing a subpoena for BWC footage somehow signifies or equates to either an ex parte communication or “command control.” The fact that Bowie signed the subpoena in no way indicates that Bowie and Arias had any communication, let alone improper ex parte communications. The DMV routinely obtains the standard documents related to an arrest for APS hearings, and BWC footage is now a standard part of most police interactions. The record does not reveal why the subpoena was used, in addition to the less formal request for records, but the materials the DMV collected are nonetheless standard materials. Moreover, here, the 10 defense directed the hearing officer’s attention to the BWC evidence and asserted that it proved that Hall was not adequately admonished. As a final matter, Hall asserts that the DMV failed to meet the standard of proof because the transcript indicates the hearing officer did not move the four exhibits into evidence.2 As the DMV points out, it appears that this was merely a misstatement or scrivener’s error in the transcript. The exhibits are listed as evidence in the written notification of findings and decision and as noted, the defense also relied on the BWC footage during argument at the APS hearing. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Hearing Officer Arias did not act as an advocate and that the DMV did not violate Hall’s due process rights as a result. The judgment granting Hall’s petition must be reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to consider Hall’s assertions regarding the adequacy of the evidence in the first instance. B. Attorney Fees 1. Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review Vehicle Code section 13559 provides that “within 30 days of the issuance of the notice of determination of the department sustaining an order of suspension or revocation of the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle . . . the person may file a petition for review of the order in the court of competent jurisdiction in the person’s county of residence.” Section 800 provides further: “In any civil action to appeal or review the award, finding, or other determination of any administrative proceeding under this code or under any other provision of state law . . . if it is shown 2 After defense counsel objected to all four exhibits, the transcript indicates that Hearing Officer Arias stated, “Thank you counsel. Your objections have been noted and have been overruled. I’m not [sic] moving these documents into evidence.” 11 that the award, finding, or other determination of the proceeding was the result of arbitrary or capricious action or conduct by a public entity or an officer thereof in his or her official capacity, the complainant if he or she prevails in the civil action may collect from the public entity reasonable attorney’s fees, . . .” (§ 800, subd. (a); italics added.) Thus, to be entitled to fees, Hall had to show the DMV’s determination was “the result of arbitrary or capricious action or conduct” by the hearing officer. (§ 800, subd. (a).) It is not enough that the official’s actions were erroneous. (Reis v. Biggs Unified School Dist. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 809, 823 (Reis).) Rather, the “ ‘phrase “arbitrary or capricious” encompasses conduct not supported by a fair or substantial reason [citation], a stubborn insistence on following unauthorized conduct [citation], or a bad faith legal dispute.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘The determination of whether an action is arbitrary or capricious is essentially one of fact, within the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” (Reis, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 823.) Accordingly, we review the trial court’s decision whether to award fees for an abuse of that discretion. (Doe v. Atkinson (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 667, 678.) 2. The DMV’s Actions Were Not Arbitrary or Capricious As we have explained, the DMV did not violate Hall’s due process rights by allowing the hearing officer to introduce evidence routinely obtained from the San Diego Sheriff’s Department prior to an APS hearing disputing a license suspension. Since we have reversed the judgment granting Hall’s petition, he has not prevailed on his civil action and is not entitled to attorney fees under section 800. Regardless, even if we had not reversed the trial court’s ruling on Hall’s petition, we would conclude that the DMV did not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner. The DMV’s decision to suspend Hall’s license was 12 reasonable and supported by the evidence. The BWC evidence that defense counsel relied on at the APS hearing demonstrates that Officer Plocki spent a significant amount of time attempting to read and explain the admonishment to Hall. Hall continued to interrupt and speak over Officer Plocki, asking why Officer Plocki pulled him over in the first instance. Officer Plocki told Hall more than once that he would need to decide between a breath or blood test, and that if he did not, it would be considered a refusal and Hall’s license would be suspended. The DMV’s decision to change its policy following DUI Lawyers to allow the hearing officer to admit evidence but not to act as an advocate also was not arbitrary or capricious. As DMV Driver Safety Manager Jeffrey Dill explained in a declaration in opposition to the attorney fee request, the DMV revised its policies and procedures following DUI Lawyers to clarify that DMV hearing officers act only as a neutral trier of fact during APS hearings. Under the new policy, hearing officers may “introduce any relevant evidence received from law enforcement, ask clarifying questions if necessary, and rule on objections,” but may not prepare a case or act as an advocate on behalf of the DMV. In addition, the DMV no longer subpoenas law enforcement officers to appear on behalf of the DMV at APS hearings. The DMV trained hearing officers on the new policy. Here, the DMV hearing officer acknowledged the new DMV policy and stated that she would not be acting as an advocate. She did not cross- examine Hall. Her only role outside of fact finder was to enter the evidence that had been collected and, as we have explained, doing so did not equate to advocacy. As several courts have refused to find a due process violation because a hearing officer introduced routinely gathered evidence, we cannot conclude that the DMV acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by 13 allowing the hearing officer to do so. Accordingly, Hall is not entitled to attorney fees under section 800. III. DISPOSITION The superior court’s judgment granting Hall’s petition for writ of administrative mandate and the order awarding Hall attorney fees are reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to consider the merits of Hall’s assertion that the DMV’s findings as to his refusal are not supported by the evidence. The DMV is entitled to costs on appeal. KELETY, J. WE CONCUR: MCCONNELL, P. J. BUCHANAN, J. 14