Hall v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles CA4/1
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketD085840
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/16/26 Hall v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JASON DOUGLAS HALL, D085840
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2024-
00028663-CU-MW-NC)
v.
DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES
et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael D. Washington, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Assistant Attorney
General, Jodi L. Cleesattle, Rebecca M. O’Grady and Rishi S. Bhatt, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Defendants and Appellants.
Joseph K. Seipel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jason Douglas Hall filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the trial
court, alleging that the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) violated his due
process rights by conducting an administrative per se (APS) hearing
regarding the suspension of his driver’s license utilizing a single hearing
officer as both an advocate and the trier of fact. The trial court granted the
petition, without prejudice to the DMV conducting another administrative
hearing with two separate individuals, one acting in the adjudicative capacity
and another in the capacity of an advocate. The trial court also granted
Hall’s request for attorney fees under Government Code section 8001 in the
amount of $5,600.
The DMV appeals and asserts that Romane v. Department of Motor
Vehicles (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1002, review granted August 13, 2025,
S291093 (Romane)—in which another panel of this court concluded that a
hearing officer does not act as an advocate by merely collecting and
introducing evidence that is routinely admitted in such hearings—is
instructive in this case, and that the DMV did not violate Hall’s due process
rights. (See id. at p. 1018.) Likewise, the DMV asserts that the trial court’s
order awarding Hall attorney fees must be reversed because the DMV did not
act in an arbitrary and capricious manner by holding the hearing with a
single hearing officer.
Pending guidance from the Supreme Court, we see no reason to depart
from this court’s reasoning in Romane. We conclude that the DMV did not
violate Hall’s due process rights in the APS hearing and therefore reverse the
judgment granting the petition and the associated award of attorney fees.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Hall’s Arrest and Refusal to Submit to a Chemical Test
On February 15, 2024, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Officer Erik Plocki
of the San Diego Sheriff’s Department observed Hall driving approximately
22 miles per hour over the posted speed limit. Officer Plocki conducted a
traffic stop and observed that Hall exhibited signs of being under the
influence of alcohol, including an odor of alcohol coming from his person, red,
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Government Code.
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watery eyes, and slurred speech. Hall refused to attempt any field sobriety
tests.
Officer Plocki arrested Hall and transported him to the North Coastal
Station for processing. He read Hall the “Chemical Test Admonishment”
from the DS 367 form, which advised Hall that his driving privileges would
be suspended for one year or revoked for two to three years if he refused to
provide either a breath or blood sample to measure his blood alcohol content
(BAC). In the arrest report, Officer Plocki stated, “I explained the
admonishment several different ways because Hall talked over me as I read
it and claimed he disagreed with having to provide a chemical sample. I
advised Hall to choose to provide either a breath or blood sample numerous
times, but he refused to provide a voluntary sample. I advised Hall I would
obtain a warrant for his blood, and he still refused.”
Officer Plocki obtained a judicial warrant, and a phlebotomist collected
two vials of blood from Hall’s arm at 11:22 p.m. Subsequent testing
confirmed that Hall’s BAC was .25, well above the legal limit. The police
report noted that Body Worn Cameras (BWCs) were recording during the
incident.
B. Suspension and APS Hearing
The DMV suspended Hall’s license but stayed the suspension pending
an APS hearing, which was set for June 6, 2024. Before the hearing, a DMV
employee sent a “Request for Records” to the San Diego Sheriff’s Department,
seeking officer’s statements, a copy of the breath and blood test results, and
the report related to Hall’s arrest. The Driver Safety Branch Chief, Veronica
Bowie, also sent a subpoena to the San Diego Sheriff’s Department records
division seeking the BWC footage from the incident. Both were dated March
6, 2024.
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On June 4, 2024, Hall’s counsel sent the DMV hearing officer a written
letter of objection regarding the DMV’s procedures for APS hearings. The
letter noted that the DMV was permanently enjoined from having an APS
hearing officer function as an advocate for the DMV and objected to the
ongoing practice of a single DMV representative introducing evidence while
also serving as an allegedly impartial trier of fact Hall’s attorney made the
same objection at the outset of the hearing. Hearing Officer Veronica Arias
noted the objection and continued with the hearing.
During the hearing, the hearing officer marked four exhibits—Officer
Plocki’s sworn statement, the arrest report, the BWC footage, and a copy of
Hall’s driving record—and asked if there was any objection to moving them
into evidence. Hall’s counsel objected and stated the hearing officer was
acting as an advocate. Hearing Officer Arias overruled the objection. During
argument, Hall’s counsel referred extensively to the BWC footage as evidence
that Hall did not understand the admonishment.
In a written decision issued on June 7, 2024, Hearing Officer Arias
found that: (1) Officer Plocki had reasonable cause to stop Hall; (2) Hall was
placed under lawful arrest; (3) Officer Plocki told Hall that his driving
privilege would be suspended if he refused the required chemical testing; and
(4) Hall refused to complete that testing. As a result, the DMV reimposed the
suspension of Hall’s driving privilege.
C. Petition for Writ of Mandate
Hall filed a petition for writ of mandate with the trial court, alleging
that the DMV violated his due process rights by proceeding with a single
DMV hearing officer who acted as both an advocate and the trier of fact. In
addition, he asserted the DMV’s findings were not supported by the evidence,
because “his legitimate confusion [regarding the admonishment] was not
adequately cleared up by the arresting officer.” After briefing and argument,
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the trial court granted the writ without prejudice to the DMV holding a new
APS hearing with a separate advocate and trier of fact. The trial court also
awarded attorney fees to Hall under section 800.
The DMV filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Due Process Claims
1. Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“Under California’s implied consent law, any person who drives a motor
vehicle is deemed to have consented to chemical testing of their blood or
breath for the purpose of determining their blood-alcohol content if they are
lawfully arrested for driving under the influence.” (Romane, supra, 110
Cal.App.5th 1002, 1008.) “If a driver refuses to submit to or complete
chemical testing in this circumstance, the [DMV] may suspend the driver’s
license for one year.” (Ibid.)
However, the driver may then challenge the suspension by requesting
an APS hearing. (Romane, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1008.) “The APS
hearing is an informal proceeding” “designed ‘to provide an efficient
mechanism whereby those persons who drive after consuming dangerous
amounts of alcohol can have their driver’s licenses quickly suspended so as to
ensure they will not endanger the public by continuing to drive.’ ” (Ibid.)
As our high court has explained, “Both the federal and state
Constitutions compel the government to afford persons due process before
depriving them of any property interest.” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los
Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 212 (Today’s
Fresh).) Both “the United States Supreme Court and [the California
Supreme Court] have identified some aspects of due process as irreducible
minimums. For example, whenever ‘due process requires a hearing, the
adjudicator must be impartial.’ ” (Id. at p. 212.) “Beyond these broad
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outlines, however, the precise dictates of due process are flexible and vary
according to context.” (Ibid.)
“The requirements of due process extend to administrative
adjudications,” including the APS hearing at issue here. (Today’s Fresh,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 214.) “In many . . . respects, however, administrative
hearings need not be conducted with the same rigor demanded of judicial
proceedings: ‘[D]ue process allows more flexibility in administrative process
than judicial process.’ ” (Ibid.) “Instead, a legislature may adopt an
administrative procedure in which the same individual or entity is charged
both with developing the facts and rendering a final decision, and separate
adversarial advocates are dispensed with.” (Id. at p. 220.) “Proceedings of
this sort ‘are inquisitorial rather than adversarial’ ” and “[t]he federal
Constitution does not prohibit them.” (Id. at pp. 220–221.)
“To prove a due process violation based on overlapping functions thus
requires something more than proof that an administrative agency has
investigated and accused, and will now adjudicate.” (Today’s Fresh, supra,
57 Cal.4th at p. 221.) The party asserting such a violation, “must lay a
‘specific foundation’ for suspecting prejudice that would render an agency
unable to consider fairly the evidence presented at the adjudicative hearing
[citation]; it must come forward with ‘specific evidence demonstrating actual
bias or a particular combination of circumstances creating an unacceptable
risk of bias.’ ” (Ibid.)
In California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 517 (DUI Lawyers), the court concluded that “the
DMV’s APS hearing structure [at that time, in 2022] violate[d] the California
and federal due process rights of drivers by combining the advocacy and
adjudicatory roles into a single DMV employee.” (Id. at p. 530.) The court in
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DUI Lawyers noted that “the DMV may task the same person with both
collecting and developing the evidence and rendering a final decision,” but
that the hearing officer must refrain “from advocating on behalf of the DMV
as the DSM [previously mandated] (i.e., present the DMV’s case and ‘promote
driver safety,’ with no corresponding duty to present any evidence that would
support the position of the driver at the hearing).” (Id. at p. 533, fn. 5; see
also, Romane, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1013–1014.)
“Ultimately, DUI Lawyers reversed and remanded with directions for
the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of CDLA, and include
language in its judgment permanently enjoining and restraining the DMV
‘from having its APS hearing officers function as advocates for the position of
the DMV in addition to being finders of fact in the same adversarial
proceeding.’ ” (Romane, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1014.) However,
“[s]ince DUI Lawyers was a taxpayer action challenging the DMV’s policies
and procedures in the abstract, the court had no occasion to apply its holding
to any particular APS hearing.” (Ibid.)
Since DUI Lawyers, appellate courts have presented different views as
to the legal framework that should be applied when reviewing challenges to
the DMV’s APS procedure. Some cases, including Romane, focused on
“assessing the administrative record and the revocation decision to see if the
public hearing officer actually acted as both an adjudicator and an advocate,
or merely acted as an adjudicator and a collector and developer of evidence.”
(Knudsen v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 186, 193
(Knudsen).) If the evidence demonstrated the hearing officer acted as an
advocate, the court would find “the driver’s due process right to an impartial
adjudicator [was] violated.” (See ibid.; Clarke v. Gordon (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 1267, 1270 [finding advocacy where the hearing officer cross-
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examined the driver]; Kazelka v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1255 (Kazelka) [finding no advocacy where the hearing
officer subpoenaed and introduced evidence]; Romane, supra,
110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1018–1020 [finding no advocacy where the hearing
officer simply collected and introduced evidence].)
The court in Chi v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2026) 119
Cal.App.5th 473, review granted May 13, 2026, S296201 (Chi) applied a
different framework, finding that the “controlling principle for determining
unconstitutional bias rests on the general concept that an adjudicator must
remain disinterested in the outcome of the case,” and that due process is only
violated “ ‘in the context of extreme facts,’ ” such as a “financial interest in
the outcome,” a “personal bias against a party,” or a “personal grudge against
a party based on a history of conflict.” (Id. at p. 481.) The Chi court went on
to criticize the Clarke line of cases, explaining “the focus [in those cases] is on
appearances rather than disqualifying interests. The court scrutinizes the
adjudicator’s actions and characterizes them as advocacy or not advocacy. If
it looks like advocacy, the implication is that the adjudicator appeared to
favor the department. But the court never identifies, or analyzes evidence of,
any circumstances that would tempt an average adjudicator to favor the
department.” (Id. at p. 486.)
Our Supreme Court granted review of Romane to consider:
“Under what circumstances . . . an [APS] hearing officer’s
relationship with the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)
violate[s] a driver’s due process right to an impartial
adjudicator by creating an unacceptable risk of bias during
a DMV driver’s license suspension hearing.” (Romane
v. Department of Motor Vehicles, S291093, Supreme Ct.
Mins., Aug. 13, 2025.)
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The court likewise granted review of Chi pending consideration of
Romane. (Chi, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th 473, review granted.)
Our review of these due process claims is de novo. (Chi, supra, 119
Cal.App.5th at p. 483, review granted; Romane, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1016, review granted.)
2. Hall Was Afforded Due Process at the APS Hearing
Relying on Romane and other similarly decided cases, the DMV asserts
that Hearing Officer Arias did not engage in advocacy. We agree. Hearing
Officer Arias began by explaining that she would not be acting as an advocate
for the DMV. She introduced four exhibits into evidence, each of which was
obtained from the San Diego Sheriff’s Department by other DMV employees
using standard procedures. Hearing Officer Arias did not cross-examine Hall
and did not call any witnesses or present any further evidence or argument
on behalf of the DMV.
As the court concluded in Romane, “where, as here, a hearing officer
merely introduces the documents that law enforcement duly forwarded to the
DMV, which are routinely admitted into evidence at APS hearings, the officer
is merely collecting and developing evidence, not advocating for the DMV.”
(Romane, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 1018.) Hall asserts that Romane is
not binding on this court, but pending further instruction from our high
court, we decline to depart from the reasoning in Romane.
Perhaps anticipating that this court would follow Romane, Hall asserts
further that this case is distinguishable because here, Driver Safety Branch
Chief Bowie subpoenaed the BWC footage so that the hearing officer could
use it in deciding the suspension issue.
Notably, the trial court’s written decision makes no reference to the
subpoenaed material. Hall argues that this court can affirm the trial court’s
judgment on any grounds, but, regardless, we are not persuaded that the
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issuance of a single subpoena by a DMV employee tips the scales into
advocacy. In Kazelka, the DMV issued six subpoenas related to the
calibration of a breathalyzer device. (Kazelka, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1245.) Kazelka argued that the hearing officer “ ‘acted as both an advocate
and an adjudicator when she served the California Highway Patrol a
subpoena for the maintenance records of the PAS device on August 2, 2019.’ ”
(Id. at p. 1255.) The court rejected that argument and found that the hearing
officer did not display any advocacy or bias. (Ibid.) Hall asserts that the
issuance of the subpoena here went beyond the “passive receipt” of documents
in Romane but provides no authority to support that assertion. The BWC
footage is noted in the police report and was part of the arrest record. It is
unclear why the subpoena was necessary to obtain the footage, but there is
no indication that there was any objection to the subpoena or that its
issuance was anything more than a routine procedure.
Hall also asserts that because Driver Safety Branch Chief Bowie signed
the subpoena, the DMV violated the injunction in DUI Lawyers by “allowing
ex parte communications or command control by DMV Driver Safety Branch
managers over Driver Safety Hearing Officers’ decisions.” But Hall provides
no authority suggesting that issuing a subpoena for BWC footage somehow
signifies or equates to either an ex parte communication or “command
control.” The fact that Bowie signed the subpoena in no way indicates that
Bowie and Arias had any communication, let alone improper ex parte
communications. The DMV routinely obtains the standard documents
related to an arrest for APS hearings, and BWC footage is now a standard
part of most police interactions. The record does not reveal why the subpoena
was used, in addition to the less formal request for records, but the materials
the DMV collected are nonetheless standard materials. Moreover, here, the
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defense directed the hearing officer’s attention to the BWC evidence and
asserted that it proved that Hall was not adequately admonished.
As a final matter, Hall asserts that the DMV failed to meet the
standard of proof because the transcript indicates the hearing officer did not
move the four exhibits into evidence.2 As the DMV points out, it appears
that this was merely a misstatement or scrivener’s error in the transcript.
The exhibits are listed as evidence in the written notification of findings and
decision and as noted, the defense also relied on the BWC footage during
argument at the APS hearing.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Hearing Officer Arias did not
act as an advocate and that the DMV did not violate Hall’s due process rights
as a result. The judgment granting Hall’s petition must be reversed and the
matter remanded for the trial court to consider Hall’s assertions regarding
the adequacy of the evidence in the first instance.
B. Attorney Fees
1. Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Vehicle Code section 13559 provides that “within 30 days of the
issuance of the notice of determination of the department sustaining an order
of suspension or revocation of the person’s privilege to operate a motor
vehicle . . . the person may file a petition for review of the order in the court
of competent jurisdiction in the person’s county of residence.”
Section 800 provides further: “In any civil action to appeal or review
the award, finding, or other determination of any administrative proceeding
under this code or under any other provision of state law . . . if it is shown
2 After defense counsel objected to all four exhibits, the transcript
indicates that Hearing Officer Arias stated, “Thank you counsel. Your
objections have been noted and have been overruled. I’m not [sic] moving
these documents into evidence.”
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that the award, finding, or other determination of the proceeding was the
result of arbitrary or capricious action or conduct by a public entity or an
officer thereof in his or her official capacity, the complainant if he or she
prevails in the civil action may collect from the public entity reasonable
attorney’s fees, . . .” (§ 800, subd. (a); italics added.)
Thus, to be entitled to fees, Hall had to show the DMV’s determination
was “the result of arbitrary or capricious action or conduct” by the hearing
officer. (§ 800, subd. (a).) It is not enough that the official’s actions were
erroneous. (Reis v. Biggs Unified School Dist. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 809,
823 (Reis).) Rather, the “ ‘phrase “arbitrary or capricious” encompasses
conduct not supported by a fair or substantial reason [citation], a stubborn
insistence on following unauthorized conduct [citation], or a bad faith legal
dispute.’ ” (Ibid.)
“ ‘The determination of whether an action is arbitrary or capricious is
essentially one of fact, within the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” (Reis,
supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 823.) Accordingly, we review the trial court’s
decision whether to award fees for an abuse of that discretion. (Doe
v. Atkinson (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 667, 678.)
2. The DMV’s Actions Were Not Arbitrary or Capricious
As we have explained, the DMV did not violate Hall’s due process
rights by allowing the hearing officer to introduce evidence routinely obtained
from the San Diego Sheriff’s Department prior to an APS hearing disputing a
license suspension. Since we have reversed the judgment granting Hall’s
petition, he has not prevailed on his civil action and is not entitled to attorney
fees under section 800.
Regardless, even if we had not reversed the trial court’s ruling on Hall’s
petition, we would conclude that the DMV did not act in an arbitrary or
capricious manner. The DMV’s decision to suspend Hall’s license was
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reasonable and supported by the evidence. The BWC evidence that defense
counsel relied on at the APS hearing demonstrates that Officer Plocki spent a
significant amount of time attempting to read and explain the admonishment
to Hall. Hall continued to interrupt and speak over Officer Plocki, asking
why Officer Plocki pulled him over in the first instance. Officer Plocki told
Hall more than once that he would need to decide between a breath or blood
test, and that if he did not, it would be considered a refusal and Hall’s license
would be suspended.
The DMV’s decision to change its policy following DUI Lawyers to allow
the hearing officer to admit evidence but not to act as an advocate also was
not arbitrary or capricious. As DMV Driver Safety Manager Jeffrey Dill
explained in a declaration in opposition to the attorney fee request, the DMV
revised its policies and procedures following DUI Lawyers to clarify that
DMV hearing officers act only as a neutral trier of fact during APS hearings.
Under the new policy, hearing officers may “introduce any relevant evidence
received from law enforcement, ask clarifying questions if necessary, and rule
on objections,” but may not prepare a case or act as an advocate on behalf of
the DMV. In addition, the DMV no longer subpoenas law enforcement
officers to appear on behalf of the DMV at APS hearings. The DMV trained
hearing officers on the new policy.
Here, the DMV hearing officer acknowledged the new DMV policy and
stated that she would not be acting as an advocate. She did not cross-
examine Hall. Her only role outside of fact finder was to enter the evidence
that had been collected and, as we have explained, doing so did not equate to
advocacy. As several courts have refused to find a due process violation
because a hearing officer introduced routinely gathered evidence, we cannot
conclude that the DMV acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by
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allowing the hearing officer to do so. Accordingly, Hall is not entitled to
attorney fees under section 800.
III. DISPOSITION
The superior court’s judgment granting Hall’s petition for writ of
administrative mandate and the order awarding Hall attorney fees are
reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to
consider the merits of Hall’s assertion that the DMV’s findings as to his
refusal are not supported by the evidence. The DMV is entitled to costs on
appeal.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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