R. Kent Livesay and the Law Office of R. Kent Livesay, PC v. Kaster, Lych, Farrar & Ball, LLP, Farrar & Ball, LLP, Kyle Farrar and Wesley Todd Ball
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston)
Date FiledNovember 5, 2026
Docket14-25-00393-CV
JudgeMcLaughlin
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Reversed and Remanded and Opinion filed November 5, 2026.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-25-00393-CV
R. KENT LIVESAY AND THE LAW OFFICE OF R. KENT LIVESAY, PC,
Appellants
V.
KASTER, LYNCH, FARRAR & BALL, LLP, FARRAR & BALL, LLP,
KYLE FARRAR AND WESLEY TODD BALL, Appellees
On Appeal from the 152nd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2022-74206
OPINION
Appellants R. Kent Livesay, a disbarred attorney, and his law firm, the Law
Office of R. Kent Livesay, PC (Livesay and his law firm will be referred to
singularly in this opinion as “Livesay”) sued appellees Kaster, Lynch, Farrar &
Ball, LLP, Farrar & Ball, LLP, Kyle Farrar and Wesley Todd Ball (appellees are
referred to collectively herein as the law firms) to recover attorney’s fees and
expenses that Livesay alleges were owed to him under a fee-sharing agreement and
that were earned before his law license was revoked. The law firms moved for
summary judgment on all Livesay’s claims asserting that paying Livesay any
attorney’s fees would be illegal and that Livesay did not complete his work on the
client matters before his license was revoked. The trial court granted that motion
and ultimately rendered a final judgment in favor of the law firms.
On appeal, Livesay argues in a single issue that the trial court erred by
granting summary judgment and advances eight different arguments to support his
position. We conclude that Livesay raised and preserved his objection to one of the
summary-judgment affidavits, and that the trial court erred by not sustaining that
objection and excluding the affidavit from evidence. We further conclude that
although the law firms filed a summary judgment motion on all of Livesay’s
claims and causes of action that there was no competent summary judgment
evidence establishing the date on which the client matters at issue were concluded.
Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s final judgment and remand for further
proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
R. Kent Livesay was a Texas attorney until the Texas Supreme Court
revoked his law license on July 6, 2018. Appellees Kaster, Lynch, Farrar & Ball
and Farrar & Ball are law firms that practice plaintiff-side personal-injury law.
Farrar & Ball is based in Houston, Texas, and Kaster, Lynch, Farrar & Ball is
based in Ocala, Florida. When he was actively working as an attorney, Livesay
referred client matters to the law firms over the course of many years pursuant to
fee agreements and subject to which Livesay admits that he agreed to “assume
joint responsibility for the representation of the clients.”
Livesay’s law license was first suspended as of January 2017, and remained
suspended until his license was revoked in 2018. In December 2016, he wrote to
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the law firms advising that his license was suspended and he could no longer
represent any clients. After receiving his letters, the law firms signed new
representation agreements with the affected clients that removed Livesay from
their representation.
In 2022, Livesay filed suit against the law firms asserting breach of contract,
quantum meruit, money had and received, unjust enrichment, constructive trust,
and breach of fiduciary duty because he was not paid by the law firms for
attorneys’ fees and expenses that he alleges he earned under his fee agreements
with the law firms. Livesay also asserted a declaratory judgment relating to his
right to collect fees or expenses pursuant to the fee agreements. Specifically,
Livesay identified seven client matters which he alleges were referred to the law
firms and for which he should have received payment.
In October 2024, the law firms filed a traditional summary-judgment motion
arguing that they were entitled to summary judgment on all Livesay’s claims. In
April 2025, the trial court heard the summary judgment motion on submission and
granted the motion. After this court requested clarification as to whether the
summary judgment ruling was interlocutory or final, the trial court rendered a final
summary judgment in December 2025. Livesay timely appealed the judgment.
II. ANALYSIS
In his sole issue on appeal, Livesay argues that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of the law firms. Livesay advances the
following arguments to support his claim that the trial court erred: (1) the law firms
failed to present any competent summary judgment evidence; (2) Livesay was
entitled to recover attorney’s fees; (3) conflicting summary judgment evidence
precludes summary judgment; (4) the Texas Supreme Court order revoking his
license does not bar his recovery; (5) the trial court granted more relief than
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requested, denying expenses and granting full summary judgment on a motion for
partial summary judgment; (6) summary judgment is improper because all causes
of action were not negated; (7) Livesay was denied adequate opportunity for
discovery; (8) granting summary judgment creates a windfall, would damage
contract rights and acts as retroactive punishment.
A. The law firms’ motion and Livesay’s response
In their traditional motion for summary judgment, the law firms ask that all
Livesay’s claims against them be dismissed because payment to Livesay of any
fees or expenses would violate the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. They also
argue that payment would violate a Texas Supreme Court order, which precludes
Livesay from “accepting any fee directly or indirectly for legal services.” The law
firms acknowledge that this court’s precedent allows a disbarred attorney to
recover fees that were earned, in their entirety, before the attorney was disbarred;
nevertheless, the law firms argue that once Livesay was disbarred that he could no
longer receive any fee for legal services on cases that were in progress at the time
of his disbarment. The law firms’ motion includes an affidavit from a partner at the
law firms, who averred that none of the settlement checks for the client matters at
issue were issued until after Livesay’s license was suspended or revoked. The law
firms do not attempt to disprove any element of Livesay’s causes of action.
Instead, they move on their affirmative defenses asserting Livesay is trying to
enforce illegal contracts and/or that any payment to Livesay would be illegal or
against the public policy of Texas. None of the applicable contracts were included
in the summary-judgment record.
In his response, Livesay argued that the law firms had no competent
summary-judgment evidence to meet their summary-judgment burden and that lack
of evidence precluded summary judgment. Livesay argued that he had completed
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all his work on the client matters before his disbarment. In a detailed affidavit, he
identified the duties he claims he was obliged to perform with respect to each
client matter and stated that those duties were completed. He further argued that
the law firms misconstrued statements in the Texas Supreme Court order to
suggest that Livesay was precluded from recovering attorney’s fees for services
performed before his law license was revoked. He further asserted that the law
firms’ contention that legal services were required up until the time settlement
checks were distributed was flawed. Finally, Livesay argued, alternatively, that
even if he is not entitled to attorney’s fees, he is entitled to recover his expenses
incurred on the cases.
B. Standard of review
A movant seeking traditional summary judgment must show that no genuine
issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(h)(2); Nassar v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 508 S.W.3d
254, 257 (Tex. 2017). When a party moves for summary judgment on an
affirmative claim, it must conclusively prove all elements of its cause of action as a
matter of law. Universal MRI & Diagnostics, Inc. v. Med. Lien Mgmt. Inc., 497
S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). Because the
law firms sought judgment in their favor on all of Livesay’s claims on the basis of
an affirmative defense, it was their burden to conclusively prove that paying
Livesay under his contract was illegal and/or against public policy in Texas. In
reviewing summary judgments, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could do so and
disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Merriman v.
XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013); Valence Operating Co. v.
Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005).
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C. Livesay did not establish a lack of discovery
One of Livesay’s arguments against summary judgment was that discovery
was incomplete and he did not receive adequate discovery before the trial court
ruled on the summary-judgment motion. A nonmovant who needs more time for
discovery in the face of a summary-judgment motion must file either an affidavit
or a verified motion for continuance explaining that need. See Joe v. Two Thirty
Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004); see former Tex. R. Civ. P.
166a(g). 1 Under Rule 166a(g), which was in effect at the time of the trial court’s
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consideration of the summary-judgment motion, the trial court could deny the
request for summary judgment or order a continuance of a summary-judgment
hearing “to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery
to be had” if it appears “from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition.” Former Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(g); see Rodriguez v. Acad., Ltd., 694
S.W.3d 780, 784 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied). However,
Livesay did not call attention to his claimed lack of evidence or affidavits in
responding to the law firms’ summary-judgment motion. Instead, Livesay attached
several volumes of evidence to his response. Neither his summary-judgment
response nor his affidavit identify any discovery necessary to raise a fact issue.
1
This opinion generally cites the current Texas Rules of Civil Procedure for summary
judgment practice. However, the trial court considered and ruled on the summary judgment
motion before the current version of the rules took effect. Therefore, we quote the former version
of the rule with respect to this argument because the options for the trial court vary slightly
between the two versions of the rule. The current version of the rule does not allow a hearing on
the summary-judgment motion to be continued. A trial court now may “extend the time to file
the response, deny the motion without prejudice to permit additional discovery, or issue another
appropriate order.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(d)(3). However, this is not a substantive change as it
still effectively provides same relief to a nonmovant. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a, cmt. to 2026
change (the rewrite of Rule 166a did not change the substantive law, only the deadlines
involved).
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Livesay further attempts to tie the trial court’s failure to rule on a motion to
compel he filed into his argument that he was denied necessary discovery.
However, there is no indication in the record that the motion to compel was set for
hearing or consideration. Nor does the record reflect that Livesay made it known to
the court that he needed a ruling on his motion to compel to properly oppose
summary judgment. Therefore, Livesay’s alleged lack of discovery does not a form
a basis for reversing the summary judgment.
D. Livesay’s objections to summary-judgment evidence
To support their summary-judgment motion, the law firms include fourteen
exhibits intended to show that the payment of attorney’s fees to Livesay was
prohibited by law or public policy and that none of the client matters raised by
Livesay in the underlying lawsuit were completed when Livesay’s law license was
revoked. On appeal, Livesay argues that the law firms had no competent summary
judgment evidence.
1. Preservation of evidentiary complaints
In the trial court, Livesay only objected to one of the affidavits provided by
the law firms, exhibit 4. Livesay did not object to any of the other exhibits on any
other basis. 2 To preserve a complaint for appellate review, there must be a timely,
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specific objection and a ruling by the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). The same
is true in the context of summary-judgment proceedings. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
166a(h)(1). Therefore, Livesay waived any challenge to summary-judgment
2
Livesay also generally objected in his response to the summary-judgment motion to the
use of non-verified pleadings by the law firms. However, Livesay does not identify which
pleadings or exhibits that this objection was intended to address. Further, in the orders submitted
to the trial court, Livesay asks the trial court for a ruling on his objection to “Defendants’
Summary Judgment Motion considered as Summary Judgment Proof herein.” It is unclear what
evidence or purported evidence that Livesay sought to exclude. Therefore, these objections were
not specific enough to preserve any alleged error.
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exhibits 1-3, 5-14 by failing to present those arguments to the trial court below. See
Haase v. Abraham, Watkins, Nichols, Sorrells, Agosto & Friend, L.L.P., 499
S.W.3d 169, 176 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (“Generally,
a party forfeits an objection when the party fails to object to summary-judgment
evidence or fails to obtain a ruling on any objection to summary-judgment
evidence.”); In Estate of Guerrero, 465 S.W.3d 693, 706 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (“Defects in the form of authentication of
attachments in support of a motion for summary judgment are waived without a
proper objection in the trial court.”). Livesay did repeatedly seek a ruling on his
evidentiary objections to exhibit 4, and the trial court did not rule on those
objections. The trial court did sign an order denying Livesay’s Motion to Rule on
Objections, although this was not a ruling on the objections. Whether the trial
court’s actions are better characterized as an implied ruling or a failure to rule, we
conclude Livesay sufficiently requested and sought a ruling to preserve error as to
exhibit 4. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.
2. Farrar’s affidavit was not competent summary-judgment evidence
We therefore consider only Livesay’s objections to exhibit 4. In exhibit 4,
Farrar provided information about when settlement checks were issued in the client
matters contested by Livesay. Livesay objected that Farrar’s affidavit did not
explain how Farrar possessed knowledge of the facts in his affidavit. Although
Farrar’s affidavit stated that he is a founding partner of the law firms, Livesay
correctly challenged that Farrar does not state how he is familiar with the
information on the client matters.
The law firms argue Farrar is a founding partner of both law firms, and a
person with firsthand knowledge of the cases his firm handled, settled, and
disbursed. However, Farrar’s affidavit stated only that he was a founding partner.
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Although a person’s position or job responsibilities can peculiarly qualify him to
have personal knowledge of facts and establish how he learned of the facts,
Farrar’s affidavit did not provide any explanation for how a “founding partner”
might have particular knowledge of the settlement checks or information at issue in
the client matters. See Southtex 66 Pipeline Co., Ltd. v. Spoor, 238 S.W.3d 538,
543 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). There are several ways
that Farrar could have established his knowledge without disclosing privileged
information. For example, had Farrar explained that he had responsibility for the
firms’ client accounts or that he personally signed all checks, his personal
knowledge would have been established. We cannot assume that every founding
partner of a law firm has personal knowledge of settlement information for every
case handled by that firm. The affidavit is, therefore, incompetent to prove the
facts about which Farrar testifies. See Valenzuela v. State & Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 317 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.)
(although affiant stated her job title was claims manager, she did not identify her
responsibilities or familiarity with claim made the basis of the lawsuit); Spoor, 238
S.W.3d at 543 (“Statements made in the affidavit need factual specificity such as
time, place, and the exact nature of the alleged facts.”).
Therefore, Farrar’s affidavit is not proper summary-judgment evidence.
Having reached this conclusion, we need not address Livesay’s other objections to
the affidavit. We agree with Livesay that the trial court erred by not sustaining his
objections to exhibit 4 and must now consider whether the remaining evidence in
the record supports the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
E. Trial court erred in granting summary judgment
The law firms had the burden to establish that paying Livesay on any of the
fee-sharing agreements at issue was illegal or against public policy.
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1. Disbarred attorneys may recover attorney’s fees for work
completed before their license was revoked
On appeal, Livesay argues that he can recover attorney’s fees for the client
matters at issue in his lawsuit. Rule 5.04(a) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct states that “a lawyer or law firm shall not share or promise to
share legal fees with a non-lawyer.” Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 5.04(a),
reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art.
X, § 9). The rationale behind this rule is to prevent solicitation by lay persons of
clients for lawyers and to avoid encouraging or assisting nonlawyers in the practice
of law. See id. at cmt. 1.
In interpreting Rule 5.04, this court held in Lee v. Cherry that a disbarred
attorney may receive referral fees as long as the attorney has completed the legal
work on the case prior to his disbarment. 812 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied). Lee, while licensed, referred a case to
Cherry. See id. at 361. There was a signed agreement to pay Lee a referral fee. See
id. Lee subsequently resigned his law license. See id. at 362. Thereafter, Cherry
settled the referred case but refused to pay Lee the referral fee asserting that the
agreement was void and unenforceable based on Rule 5.04. See id. Lee sued
Cherry on the referral contract, and Cherry asserted the affirmative defense that the
contract was void, and that Lee had waived any claim to attorney’s fees by
resigning his license. See id. The trial court granted Cherry’s summary judgment
motion. See id.
On appeal, Cherry relied on Rule 5.04 and the concept that disbarment was
tantamount to abandonment based on the holding in Royden v. Ardoin, 331 S.W.2d
206 (Tex. 1960). In Royden, the Texas Supreme Court held that where an attorney
is disbarred or suspended before the completion of a contingent fee contract, the
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attorney is not entitled to collect fees for services that had been rendered. See id. at
209. The attorney in Royden contracted to represent a client, agreeing to assist her
in recovering property from her deceased son’s estate. Id. at 207. He was to be paid
a portion of that recovery, but he was disbarred before he completed the work. See
id. The disbarred attorney then sued the client to recover in quantum meruit. Id.
The Texas Supreme Court held that his disbarment before completing the work
was tantamount to a voluntary abandonment of the client. See id. at 209. Thus, the
disbarred attorney was not entitled to recover for any services rendered. See id.
The Lee court, however, did not extend the Royden holding to the particular
referral fee contract at issue in that case, holding that voluntary abandonment only
applies to those situations where the attorney has not completed all legal services
prior to disbarment. See Lee, 812 S.W.2d at 363. And, in Lee, this court noted that
there was no dispute between the parties that Lee had performed all that was
required of him under a client-approved referral fee contract before his resignation.
Therefore, this court reversed the summary judgment granted on Cherry’s
affirmative defense. See id at 364.
This court had another opportunity to review a similar set of facts in A.W.
Wright & Associates, P.C. v. Glover, Anderson, Chandler & Uzick, L.L.P., 993
S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). In A.W.
Wright & Associates, the referring attorney, Joseh Weiss, was licensed when he
made referrals to the Glover law firm. He later lost his license but sought payment
for certain referrals he made to the Glover law firm while he was licensed. Weiss
argued that his work on the files was complete at the time the referral was made.
But the Glover law firm argued that although its attorneys were responsible for
“day to day handling,” Weiss had not yet finished his legal work for the clients. Id.
at 470. This court concluded that the referral contracts at issue were ambiguous
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and that summary judgment in favor of the Glover law firm was improper.
Following Texas Supreme Court precedent, this court has repeatedly held
that payment of attorney’s fees to a disbarred attorney is not illegal so long as the
disbarred attorney completed all of his or her duties on the client matter while
working as a licensed attorney. But, if the work was not completed, the disbarred
attorney is determined to have voluntarily abandoned the client. Royden, 331
S.W.2d at 209.
2. Current rule for division of fees
Before 2005, lawyers could receive attorney’s fees solely by acting as a
forwarding or referring lawyer. After 2005, such a relationship is no longer
permitted. See Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 568 (Apr. 2006) (“Under the
amended rule, a referring lawyer’s duties cannot end with the referral.”). The
current rules allow attorneys, not in the same firm, to make a contractual division
of attorney’s fees only if: (1) the division is (i) in proportion to the professional
services performed by each lawyer; or (ii) made between lawyers who assume joint
responsibility for the representation; and (2) the client consents in writing to the
terms of the arrangement between the lawyers. Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct
1.04(f). This court has held that the Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct are
consistent with Texas law, as expressed in Royden and Lee, and that they are an
expression of public policy. Cruse v. O’Quinn, 273 S.W.3d 766, 776 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
Although the applicable fee agreements between Livesay and the law firms
are not in evidence, Livesay states in his petition that he agreed to “assume joint
responsibility for the representation of the clients.” We consider this statement a
judicial admission. See City of Webster v. Hunnicutt, 650 S.W.3d 792, 801 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. denied) (A “true” judicial admission is a
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formal waiver of proof usually found in pleadings or the stipulations of the
parties.). As a general proposition, pleadings are not competent summary-judgment
evidence, even if they are sworn or verified. Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dall.), Inc. v.
City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 660–61 (Tex. 1995). However, a
summary-judgment movant may rely on allegations in a petition as truthful judicial
admissions. Weekley Homes, LLC v. Paniagua, 646 S.W.3d 821, 827 (Tex. 2022).
A judicial admission negates the existence of a material fact regarding the ultimate
issue. See Galvan v. Pub. Utilities Bd., 778 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 1989, no writ). We consider the trial court’s ruling in light of the
fact that Livesay agreed to assume joint responsibility for the client matters with
the law firms. 3
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An assumption of joint responsibility “entail[s] ethical and perhaps financial
responsibility for the representation.” Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 1.04,
cmt. 13. “The ethical responsibility assumed requires that a referring or associating
lawyer make reasonable efforts to assure adequacy of representation and to provide
adequate client communication.” Id. Adequate attorney-client communication
requires that a referring or associating lawyer “monitor the matter throughout the
representation and ensure that the client is informed of those matters that come to
that lawyer’s attention and that a reasonable lawyer would believe the client should
be aware.” Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 1.04, cmt. 13. Livesay could not
have fulfilled his duties to monitor the matter throughout representation and
ensure the client was informed of important matters if he voluntarily abandoned
the client matters while they were pending. Although Livesay argues that he
completed his duties before disbarment, he could not have completed his duties
based on an assumption of joint responsibility if he withdrew before the client
3
We note that the expert affidavit provided by Livesay to oppose the law firms’
summary-judgment motion was also premised on Livesay’s assumption of joint responsibility.
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matters were resolved.
3. Texas Supreme Court order
Livesay argues that the Texas Supreme Court Order does not bar his
recovery. In this argument, Livesay seeks to address one of the bases of the law
firms’ summary-judgment motion: that the Texas Supreme Court order made any
payments to Livesay illegal. The law firms rely on the following language in the
order issued by the Texas Supreme Court revoking Livesay’s license:
Richard Kent Livesay is prohibited from practicing law in the State of
Texas. He is prohibited from holding himself out as an attorney at
law, performing legal services for others, giving legal advice to
others, accepting any fee directly or indirectly for legal services,
appearing as counsel or in any representative capacity in any
proceeding in any Texas court or before any Texas administrative
body (whether state, county, municipal, or other), or holding himself
out to others or using his name in any manner in conjunction with the
words “Attorney at Law,” “Counselor at Law,” or “Lawyer.”
(emphasis added). However, the language of the quoted order is general and
reflects a prospective intent. Nothing in the language of the order suggests that it is
intended to supersede existing law that allows a disbarred attorney to recover fees
that were earned on completed client matters while the attorney was licensed.
Therefore, we conclude that the Texas Supreme Court order does not support the
trial court’s rendition of summary judgment. We agree with Livesay that the Texas
Supreme Court order does not bar his recovery of attorney’s fees and expenses, if
and only if, he completed his joint responsibility on the client matters before his
suspension and subsequent loss of his law license.
4. Remaining summary-judgment evidence
The critical question raised in this appeal, then, is whether the law firms
proved as a matter of law that Livesay had not completed his duties to the clients at
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the time that he was suspended or disbarred. Our high court has held on multiple
occasions that “when a lawyer has contracted for a contingent fee, the lawyer is
entitled to receive the specified fee only when and to the extent the client receives
payment.” Levine v. Bayne, Snell & Krause, Ltd., 40 S.W.3d 92, 94 (Tex. 2001)
(quoting Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 35 (1998)).
Livesay, therefore, was not entitled to recover any fees until his clients received
their payments.
The summary-judgment record includes letters sent by Livesay to the law
firms regarding the client matters at issue in the lawsuit. In the letters, all dated
December 30, 2016, Livesay stated that he could “no longer represent the above
reference [sic] client because my license to practice law has been suspended.”
Livesay further stated that he was required to return any unearned monies. The
letters do not suggest that his work on any of the client matters was complete.
From that date forward, Livesay was unable to represent clients or work on cases.
Therefore, December 30, 2016 is the date on which Livesay voluntarily abandoned
any ongoing joint responsibility with the law firms.
The law firms had to establish that all of the client matters in which they
agreed to joint responsibility with Livesay concluded after December 30, 2016.
Kyle Farrar’s affidavit was an attempt to establish the date that the clients received
their settlement proceeds; however, his affidavit as discussed above was not
competent summary-judgment evidence and should not have been considered by
the trial court. Levine, 40 S.W.3d at 94. Therefore, there is no summary-judgment
evidence conclusively establishing the date on which the clients received their
payments, allowing attorney’s fees to be paid to the lawyers.
We sustain Livesay’s sole issue on appeal.
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5. Livesay’s expenses under the contingent-fee contracts
Livesay also sought the reimbursement of his expenses on the challenged
client matters in addition to his attorney’s fees. He argues on appeal that his
expenses reflect his extensive work on those client matters and asserts that the law
firms did not address his claim for his expenses in their summary-judgment
motion. However, the law firms did argue that all of Livesay’s claims and causes
of action were barred. They broadly argued that payment to Livesay, of any kind,
for his work on the client matters could not be supported. We conclude the law
firms did seek summary judgment on all Livesay’s claims and causes of action.
Livesay’s claims to recovery of attorney’s fees and expenses are premised
on contracts with the clients that allowed for payment of attorney’s fees and
expenses, if recovery was had on behalf of the client. The Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct make clear that the right of the attorney to recover expenses
is controlled by the agreement made with the client and the other attorney(s) or law
firm(s). Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 1.04(d) (“the agreement shall state the
litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such
expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated”).
Therefore, if Livesay voluntarily abandoned his clients as part of his suspension
and then later, disbarment, before the completion of his joint representation, then
his ability to recover expenses on those matters is also precluded. We further note
that Livesay cites no legal authority for the proposition that his entitlement to
recover expenses is distinct from his entitlement to recover attorney’s fees under a
contingent-fee contract. We disagree with Livesay’s argument that the law firms
filed only a partial summary-judgment motion.
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III. CONCLUSION
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/s/ Tonya McLaughlin
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Hart, McLaughlin and Antú.
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