Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals South Carolina Department of Social Services, Respondent, v. Mikel Johnson and Miriah Carrie Anderson (aka Forbes), Defendants, of whom Mikel Johnson is the Appellant. In the interest of a minor under the age of eighteen. Appellate Case No. 2025-001722 Appeal From Florence County FitzLee H. McEachin, Family Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-485 Submitted October 29, 2026 – Filed November 10, 2026 REVERSED AND REMANDED Nancy Carol Fennell, of Irmo, for Appellant. Christopher Craig Jackson, of Chris Jackson Law Firm LLC, of Mauldin, for Respondent. Stuart Wesley Snow, Jr., of Snow & Bailey Law Firm, P.A., of Florence, for Guardian ad Litem Taydra Powell. Frank Clayton Swaggard, of Wukela Law Office, of Florence, as Guardian ad Litem for Appellant. PER CURIAM: Mikel Johnson (Father) appeals a family court order terminating his parental rights to his minor child (Child). The family court found clear and convincing evidence showed Father failed to remedy the conditions that caused Child's removal and that Child had been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. The family court also found termination of parental rights (TPR) was in Child's best interest. Father argues (1) clear and convincing evidence did not support TPR on the ground Child had been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months because Father was incarcerated and was not provided a placement plan, (2) clear and convincing evidence did not support TPR on the ground Father failed to remedy the conditions that caused Child's removal because Father was not provided a placement plan, and (3) TPR was not in Child's best interest. We reverse and remand. "On appeal from the family court, the appellate court reviews factual and legal issues de novo." Klein v. Barrett, 427 S.C. 74, 79, 828 S.E.2d 773, 776 (Ct. App. 2019). Under the de novo standard of review, this court may make its own findings of fact; however, we continue to recognize the superior position of the family court to assess witness credibility. Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 595, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018). Moreover, de novo review does not relieve the appellant of the burden of showing that the preponderance of the evidence is against the family court's findings. Id. Based on the record presented to this court, we hold clear and convincing evidence did not support a statutory TPR ground. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2025) (providing the family court may order TPR upon finding a statutory ground for TPR is met and TPR is in the child's best interest); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Parker, 336 S.C. 248, 254, 519 S.E.2d 351, 354 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding the grounds for TPR must be proved by clear and convincing evidence); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Roe, 371 S.C. 450, 455, 639 S.E.2d 165, 168 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Because terminating the legal relationship between natural parents and a child is one of the most difficult issues an appellate court has to decide, great caution must be exercised in reviewing termination proceedings and termination is proper only when the evidence clearly and convincingly mandates such a result."); Loe v. Mother, Father, & Berkeley Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 382 S.C. 457, 465, 675 S.E.2d 807, 811 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief as to the allegations sought to be established." (quoting Anonymous (M–156–90) v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 329 S.C. 371, 374 n.2, 496 S.E.2d 17, 18 n.2 (1998))). The family court found clear and convincing evidence supported two statutory grounds: (1) Child had been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months under section 63-7-2570(8) and (2) Father failed to remedy the conditions that caused Child's removal under section 63-7-2570(2). We address each in turn. On this record, we hold clear and convincing evidence did not support the termination of Father's parental rights on the statutory ground that Child remained in foster care for fifteen of the previous twenty-two months. See § 63-7-2570(8) (explaining a statutory ground for TPR is met when "[t]he child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months"). Although Child had been in foster care for twenty-four months at the time of the TPR hearing, the evidence in the record did not show the delay in reunification was attributable to Father's actions because he was incarcerated and awaiting trial on pending charges during the pendency of the action and Father maintained contact with Child during his incarceration. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sarah W., 402 S.C. 324, 336, 741 S.E.2d 739, 746 (2013) ("[S]ection 63-7-2570(8) may not be used to sever parental rights based solely on the fact that the child has spent fifteen of the past twenty-two months in foster care."); id. ("The family court must find . . . the delay in reunification of the family unit is attributable not to mistakes by the government, but to the parent's inability to provide an environment where the child will be nourished and protected."); Charleston Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Marccuci, 396 S.C. 218, 227, 721 S.E.2d 768, 773 (2011) ("Where there is 'substantial evidence that much of the delay . . . is attributable to the acts of others,' a parent's rights should not be terminated based solely on the fact that the child has spent greater than fifteen months in foster care." (quoting S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Cochran, 356 S.C. 413, 420, 589 S.E.2d 753, 756 (2003))). Accordingly, we hold this statutory ground was not met. Further, we hold clear and convincing evidence did not support the termination of Father's parental rights on the statutory ground that Father failed to remedy the conditions that caused Child's removal. See § 63-7-2570(2) (explaining a statutory ground for TPR is met when the child has been removed from a parent pursuant to section 63-7-1660 of the South Carolina Code (2010 & Supp. 2025), and the child "has been out of the home for a period of six months following the adoption of a placement plan by court order or by agreement between the department and the parent and the parent has not remedied the conditions which caused the removal"). The evidence in the record did not show Father was court-ordered to complete a placement plan as part of the removal action, and no evidence suggested he agreed to complete a placement plan during its pendency. In addition, there was a lack of evidence in the record concerning the treatment plan given to Father prior to the initiation of the current removal action. See § 63-7-1660(A) ("Upon investigation of a report received under Section 63-7-310 or at any time during the delivery of services by the department, the department may petition the family court to remove the child from custody of the parent, guardian, or other person legally responsible for the child's welfare if the department determines by a preponderance of evidence that the child is an abused or neglected child and that the child cannot be safely maintained in the home in that he cannot be protected from unreasonable risk of harm affecting the child's life, physical health, safety, or mental well-being without removal."); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1680 (2010 & Supp. 2025) (explaining that "[i]f the court orders that a child be removed from the custody of the parent or guardian, the court must approve a placement plan. . . . The plan must be a written document prepared by the department. To the extent possible, the plan must be prepared with the participation of the parents or guardian of the child, the child, and any other agency or individual that will be required to provide services in order to implement the plan"). Accordingly, we hold this statutory ground was not met.1 Because we find the record presented to this court does not contain clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for TPR, we reverse the family court's termination of Father's parental rights. We remand this case to the family court for a new permanency planning hearing in conformity with section 63-7-1700 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2025). The permanency planning hearing in this matter shall be scheduled as expeditiously as possible. Pending the permanency planning hearing, the status quo concerning Child's placement existing at the time of the June 24, 2025 TPR hearing shall be maintained. Further, our disposition is without prejudice to any party seeking relief in the best interest of Child. 1 We decline to consider whether TPR was in Child's best interest. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing that an appellate court need not address remaining issues when resolution of a prior issue is dispositive); § 63-7-2570 (providing the family court may order TPR upon finding a statutory ground for TPR is met and TPR is in the child's best interest). REVERSED AND REMANDED.2 GEATHERS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur. 2 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.