Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT JESSICA MARLETTE, Appellant, v. ROXANNE M. CARULLO, Appellee. No. 2D22-947 November 30, 2022 Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Paul L. Huey, Judge. Sheila M. Lake of Lake Law Firm, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellant. Roxanne M. Carullo, pro se. ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge. Jessica Marlette appeals the trial court's nonfinal order denying her emergency motion to dissolve a temporary injunction. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(B). Because Roxanne M. Carullo did not allege, let alone establish, the requisite elements for a temporary injunction and because the court's order imposing the injunction did not comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(b) and (c), we reverse and remand for vacatur of the injunction. Marlette and Carullo own adjacent properties in Odessa, Florida. In 1997, the prior owner of Carullo's property granted a perpetual easement that granted the use, operation, and maintenance of a well and driveway to the prior owner of Marlette's property. Marlette believed that this easement gave her exclusive legal right over this well and driveway, and she sued Carullo, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Tensions between the parties grew as the suit progressed, and in February 2022, Carullo filed an emergency motion for injunctive relief. The trial court granted Carullo's motion without a hearing and issued a temporary injunction. Notably, the court's only findings in its order were that the court "has repeatedly stated its position on this matter" and that "the Motion [was] factually supported." The order did not require Carullo to post a bond. Marlette subsequently filed an emergency motion to dissolve the injunction, which the trial court denied by endorsed order and without a hearing. 2 We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction, see Cohen v. Zidon, 994 So. 2d 1163, 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (citing Sea Tow Servs. Int'l, Inc. v. Pontin, 973 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)), bearing in mind that such a denial is "an abuse of discretion where a party can demonstrate clear legal error or misapprehension of facts on the part of the trial court" in entering the injunction in the first instance, Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc. v. MMB Props., 211 So. 3d 918, 925–26 (Fla. 2017). Temporary injunctions "should be granted only sparingly and only after the moving party has alleged and proved facts entitling it to relief." Morgan v. Herff Jones, Inc., 883 So. 2d 309, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The moving party must establish a likelihood of irreparable harm, the unavailability of an adequate legal remedy, a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and that considerations of the public interest support the entry of the injunction. See, e.g., Salazar v. Hometeam Pest Def., Inc., 230 So. 3d 619, 621 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). Moreover, temporary injunctions must strictly comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610. Phelan v. Trifactor Sols., LLC, 3 312 So. 3d 1036, 1038 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (citing Salazar, 230 So. 3d at 620-21). Rule 1.610(c) requires that "[e]very injunction . . . specify the reasons for entry . . . ." And when issuing a temporary injunction, the trial court must include in its order "clear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings to support each of the four elements." Salazar, 230 So. 3d at 621 (quoting Liberty Fin. Mortg. Corp. v. Clampitt, 667 So. 2d 880, 881 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (alterations omitted)); McCue v. Heritage Farms Prop. Ass'n, 141 So. 3d 672, 673-74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ("This court has long held that [rule 1.610(c)] requires the injunction to include specific findings regarding the likelihood of irreparable harm, unavailability of an adequate remedy at law, substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and considerations of public policy."). Additionally, absent certain exceptions, "[a]n injunction is defective if it does not require the movant to post a bond." Forrest v. Citi Residential Lending, Inc., 73 So. 3d 269, 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (quoting Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n v. Mander, 932 So. 2d 314, 315–16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (reversing temporary injunction in part because order failed to require bond pursuant to rule 1.610(b))); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610(b) (providing that "[n]o 4 temporary injunction shall be entered unless a bond is given by the movant" but that no bond is required if petitioner is, e.g., a municipality or the state or if the injunction is issued "solely to prevent physical injury or abuse of a natural person"). The trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing to address the appropriate amount of a bond. Fla. Ga. Grove, LLP v. Collier County, 95 So. 3d 948, 949–50 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Although Carullo averred that she was afraid of what Marlette might do after Marlette allegedly had twice trespassed on Carullo's property with yellow paint, Carullo failed to plead, let alone prove, at least three of the four requisite elements. Moreover, the trial court's February 15, 2022, order—in which it expressed that it had "repeatedly stated its opinion," summarily deemed Carullo's motion to be "factually supported," and entered the injunction without any discussion of bond—wholly fails to comply with both subsections (b) and (c) of rule 1.610 and constitutes "clear legal error." See Phelan, 312 So. 3d at 1039 ("A temporary injunction that does not include specific findings on each of the required elements needed for issuance of an injunction must be reversed." (citing Salazar, 230 So. 3d at 621-22)); Williams v. Victim Justice, P.C., 198 So. 3d 822, 5 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (reversing trial court's issuance of a temporary injunction after trial court failed to specify reasons for entry and did not require a bond). Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Marlette's emergency motion to dissolve the temporary injunction and remand for the trial court to vacate the temporary injunction.1 KHOUZAM and STARGEL, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. 1 Given this decision, we deny Marlette's alternative request for mandamus relief compelling the trial court to hold a hearing on her amended motion to dissolve the temporary injunction. 6