Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals Thomas Kirk Tanis, Appellant, v. Susan Corley Tanis, Respondent. Appellate Case No. 2023-001471 Appeal From Charleston County Spiros S. Ferderigos, Family Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-458 Heard October 6, 2026 – Filed October 21, 2026 REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED Alexandra DeJarnette Varner, of Mount Pleasant, Alexia Pittas, of Charleston, and Leslie Therese Sarji, of Charleston, all for Appellant. Ainsley Fisher Tillman, of Ford Wallace Thomson LLC, of Charleston, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Appellant Thomas Tanis appeals the family court's refusal to hold his ex-wife, Respondent Susan Tanis, in civil contempt for alleged violations of the parties' 2011 divorce agreement. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand. FACTS Thomas and Susan's divorce agreement was memorialized by a family court order on November 14, 2011. The agreement gave Susan decision-making authority over all matters involving the couple's two children 1 "after reasonable consultation with [Thomas]." It also provided that each parent (1) "shall have the right to access the minor children's academic, extracurricular, healthcare, and all other records, and facilities," (2) "shall be entitled and encouraged to participate in and attend school and extracurricular events, healthcare appointments, and other scheduled events of importance in the minor children's lives," and (3) shall "keep each other apprised in a timely manner of any significant developments in each child's life, including religious, health, and education matters." In April 2023, Thomas filed a petition for a rule to show cause with the family court alleging that Susan willfully and intentionally violated several provisions of their divorce agreement relating to their two children.2 Rather than file a return to the rule to show cause, Susan filed a motion for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e), SCRCP. 3 The family court issued an order on the motion for a more definite statement on May 8, 2023—the same day the hearing began for the rule to show cause petition. 4 1 One child was born in 2004 and the other was born in 2006. 2 In addition to seeking civil contempt, Thomas originally requested that Susan be held in criminal contempt and be "incarcerat[ed] . . . in the Charleston County Jail," though this request was withdrawn. 3 Rule 12(e) provides, "If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading." 4 The family court stated in the order that it held a hearing on the Rule 12(e) motion on May 1, 2023, though no transcript for this hearing appears in the record. Because of the timing, Susan never filed a return to the rule to show cause raising any defenses or asserting an intent to seek attorney fees. See Rule 14(f), SCRFC ("If at the contempt proceeding the responding party intends to seek counsel fees and costs, or other appropriate relief permitted by law, then he shall serve a return to the rule to show cause prior to the commencement of the hearing, unless a [f]amily [c]ourt judge requires a return to be served at some other time."); see also Rule 2(a), SCRFC ("[T]he South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (SCRCP) shall be applicable in domestic relations actions . . . ."); Rule 8(c), SCRCP (requiring that affirmative defenses be set forth in responsive pleadings); Rule 12(b), SCRCP ("Every defense, in law or fact, to a cause of action in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required."). Thomas's case centered primarily around establishing that Susan had violated various provisions of the divorce decree, including three instances that are now before this court on appeal. Specifically, Thomas argued that Susan violated the agreement by (1) placing the older child on birth control without notifying Thomas, (2) placing the older child in counseling without notifying Thomas, and (3) failing to notify Thomas about one of the children's scholarship ceremonies in April 2022.5 Thomas argued that these instances violated the mandates of the divorce agreement that (1) each parent keep the other apprised of "any significant developments" in the children's lives, including health matters; (2) each parent "encourage, support, and nurture their children's positive and loving relationship with the other parent"; and (3) each parent "use their best efforts to support and encourage the minor children's relationship with the other parent." In response, Susan introduced evidence of Thomas's horrific conduct to and in front of the children. Susan argued this evidence accounted for many of the alleged violations that centered primarily around the assertion that Susan had turned the children against Thomas. The family court was particularly concerned by a video, recorded by one of the children, taken over one Labor Day weekend wherein Thomas is heard intensely shouting expletives at the other child. Other uncontested evidence established that Thomas called the children and Susan a litany of names, 5 Thomas does not appeal the family court's rejection of his numerous other allegations that Susan violated the order, and thus, they are not relevant to this appeal. and that Thomas used racial slurs in front of the children. On appeal, Thomas admits in his brief that his behavior was "boorish." Following the trial, the family court entered an order declining to find Susan in contempt for any of the alleged violations of the agreement. The family court acknowledged that Susan violated the agreement but refused to hold her in contempt based on the doctrine of unclean hands. The family court explained that "[t]he doctrine of unclean hands is a self-imposed ordinance that closes [the] door of the [c]ourt of equity to one tainted with inequity or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief." To the family court, Thomas's conduct was so egregious that it (1) could be blamed for all of the violations and (2) foreclosed any right he had to any redress for any established violations. Thomas filed a motion to reconsider thereafter, which the family court denied. This appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW Appellate courts review family court matters de novo. See Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 596, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018) ("[T]he proper standard of review in family court matters is de novo[.]"); see also Fennell v. Fennell, 447 S.C. 604, 607 n.2, 929 S.E.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Ct. App. 2026) (explaining that appellate courts review contempt actions in family court under a de novo standard of review). "De novo review allows the appellate court to make its own findings of fact, but the appellate court is not required to ignore the family court's superior position to make credibility determinations." Thompson v. Thompson, 428 S.C. 142, 148, 833 S.E.2d 274, 277 (Ct. App. 2019). LAW AND ANALYSIS We reverse the family court's order declining to hold Susan in contempt on the basis of Thomas's unclean hands because we hold that Thomas's conduct was not sufficiently connected to the three violations that are before this court on appeal. As an initial matter, we reject Susan's proposed reading of the family court's order as centering on whether Susan's violations were "willful." The family court clearly used unclean hands as its sole basis for refusing to hold Susan in contempt despite the fact that it agreed Susan had violated the divorce agreement. Further, Susan's violations were willful. "Contempt is a consequence of the willful disobedience of a court order." Tirado v. Tirado, 339 S.C. 649, 654, 530 S.E.2d 128, 131 (Ct. App. 2000). "A willful act is one 'done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent . . . to fail to do something the law requires to be done . . . .'" Id. (quoting Spartanburg County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Padgett, 296 S.C. 79, 82–83, 370 S.E.2d 872, 874 (1988)). "Unclean hands precludes a plaintiff from recovering in equity if he acted unfairly in a matter that is the subject of the litigation to the prejudice of the defendant." Ingram v. Kasey's Assocs., 340 S.C. 98, 107 n.2, 531 S.E.2d 287, 292 n.2 (2000) (emphasis added). The doctrine of unclean hands has been described as "a self-imposed ordinance that closes the door of the court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief." Straight v. Goss, 383 S.C. 180, 207, 678 S.E.2d 443, 457–58 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added); see also In re Uwimana, 274 F.3d 806, 810 (4th Cir. 2001) ("A court can [apply] the doctrine of unclean hands only when there is a close nexus between a party's unethical conduct and the transactions on which that party seeks relief."), abrogated on other grounds by Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 569 U.S. 267 (2013). Thomas alleged that Susan violated the agreement by failing to notify him that (1) one of the children started taking birth control medication, (2) one of the children started counseling, and (3) one of the children was to receive a scholarship at a ceremony. The divorce agreement required Susan to timely notify Thomas of "any significant developments in each child's life, including religious, health, and education matters," which plainly encompasses each of the above, and Susan undoubtedly violated these notification requirements by not giving Thomas any notification of these developments. Although Thomas's conduct with his children was often, by his own admission, "boorish"—and, from this court's perspective, reprehensible and worthy of severe admonition—his atrocious behavior did not sufficiently relate to any of these three violations of the divorce agreement to justify not finding Susan in contempt for these violations. For the failure to notify Thomas that one of the children had started taking birth control medication, Susan stated that she did not believe she was required to share this information with Thomas. She did not, for example, point to Thomas's boorish behavior as a basis for withholding this information. Consequently, there is no sufficient nexus in the record before this court to sustain the family court's refusal to find Susan in contempt for this violation. Likewise, for the failure to notify Thomas that one of the children started counseling, Thomas's poor behavior was not relative to Susan's decision not to notify him under the divorce agreement. Susan alleged that it was Thomas's behavior that caused the child to need counseling, but even if we accept this as true, it does not explain Susan's failure to notify Thomas as she was required to under the divorce agreement. Finally, for the failure to notify Thomas that one of the children was receiving a scholarship at a ceremony, we are again unable to discern a sufficient nexus between Thomas's behavior and Susan's violation of the divorce agreement. Susan said she chose not to tell Thomas because the child asked her not to. Like the family court, we disagree that the child asking her not to tell him absolved Susan of her obligations under the agreement. See generally Noojin v. Noojin, 417 S.C. 300, 311, 789 S.E.2d 769, 774 (Ct. App. 2016) ("Not only did [the m]other fail to require [the c]hildren to visit with [the f]ather, she imparted to [the c]hildren the idea that they did not have to visit with [the f]ather if they did not want to. We find [the m]other's actions in this regard constituted a willful disobedience of the divorce order."). 6 In light of our disposition on this issue, we vacate the award of attorney fees. We remand the matter to the family court to determine what sanctions, if any, are appropriate for Susan's violations of the agreement and to reassess the award of attorney fees in light of the changed disposition. See Hawkins v. Mullins, 359 S.C. 497, 503–04, 597 S.E.2d 897, 900 (Ct. App. 2004) (reversing the family court's refusal to find the respondent in contempt and remanding "for consideration of sanctions and attorney[] fees if the court deems them appropriate"). 7 REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED. GEATHERS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur. 6 We take care to emphasize that the family court employed the unclean hands doctrine to foreclose Thomas from relief for several other alleged violations by Susan. Those findings were not appealed and are not before this court; our holding is only that no sufficient nexus connected Thomas's unclean hands to the three violations that are before this court on appeal. 7 Because resolution of this issue is dispositive, we decline to address Thomas's remaining issues. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (noting that when resolution of an issue is dispositive, the appellate court need not address the remaining issues).