Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT LEA CRAWFORD, Appellant, v. TAMMY GRUBB, Appellee. No. 2D21-735 April 20, 2022 Appeal from the County Court for Pinellas County; John Carassas, Judge. Kristin M. Rhodus of Rhodus Law Firm, PLLC, St. Petersburg, for Appellant. Tammy Grubb, pro se. NORTHCUTT, Judge. Lea Crawford appeals a final judgment of eviction from her residence. We reverse because the lower court prematurely and summarily entered a default final judgment after Crawford filed a timely answer and affirmative defenses. The landlord, Tammy Grubb, filed a pro se eviction complaint against Crawford alleging various breaches of the lease such as parking and driveway violations, preventing landlord access for repairs, and so forth. Grubb did not allege that Crawford had failed to pay her rent. Five days later, Crawford filed an answer to the complaint pro se. She denied that she was in breach of the lease, affirmatively alleged that Grubb and her husband had harassed her, and requested a hearing. Despite Crawford's having timely filed an answer, Grubb moved for default on the basis that Crawford "failed to comply with lease agreement." Crawford promptly responded once more, in detail and with attached exhibits. Grubb then filed yet another motion for default, and Crawford filed another response with more exhibits. Notwithstanding Crawford's repeated prompt and substantive filings, the county court summarily entered a final judgment evicting Crawford from her home without having ever held a hearing of any kind. 2 On appeal, Crawford correctly complains that she was denied due process when the county court entered an eviction judgment without ever hearing the case. It should go without saying that due process requires that a defendant in a civil action must receive notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard before suffering a judgment. Pro-Art Dental Lab, Inc. v. V-Strategic Grp., LLC, 986 So. 2d 1244, 1253 (Fla. 2008); Hutchison v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 922 So. 2d 311, 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Crawford did not receive those rights in this case. Moreover, because Grubb did not seek to evict Crawford for failing to pay rent, the summary eviction procedure set forth in section 83.60, Florida Statutes (2021), cannot support the judgment issued here. That procedure permits a court to summarily enter a default judgment only in a dispute over nonpayment of rent when the defendant does not pay rent into the court registry. Id. Instead, section 83.59 applies to Grubb's action based on the grounds she raised in her complaint. That section approves the use of a different type of expedited determination, set forth in section 3 51.011, Florida Statutes (2021). But the procedure in section 51.011 expressly preserves the parties' rights to discovery and trial. Id. Crawford received neither here. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. VILLANTI and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. 4