Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana No. 06-26-00006-CV IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF TAMMY RENEE PAINTER AND KEVIN LAWRENCE PAINTER, SR., AND IN THE INTEREST OF A.G.P., A CHILD On Appeal from the 62nd District Court Franklin County, Texas Trial Court No. 13301 Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens MEMORANDUM OPINION Kevin Lawrence Painter, Sr., and Tammy Renee Painter were divorced by a Franklin County court on January 14, 2026. The trial court ordered that each party retain what property it had in its possession. It made no determinations regarding custody of their minor child, who had lived in the Kingdom of Thailand with Kevin for six years. Kevin appeals across five points of error. He claims that the trial court erred by (1) entering conservatorship and child-removal orders, (2) violating the Americans with Disabilities Act by denying accommodation requests for Kevin’s attendance at hearings, (3) ordering his Social Security benefits be redirected to Tammy as child support, (4) failing to order Tammy to pay him child support for their minor child under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, and (5) entering a final decree after merely continuing the final hearing. Because we find that no final hearing was conducted in this matter and no evidence was presented to prove-up the material allegations in the petition, we sustain Kevin’s final point of error and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. I. Background Kevin and Tammy were married in 2010, in Franklin County, Texas. Their child was born in 2012 in Hopkins County, Texas. The family moved to Thailand in 2019. Tammy left Thailand and returned to the United States by herself after about six months, while Kevin and their child remained in Thailand. After numerous initial divorce filings that were nonsuited by both parties, Tammy filed the underlying divorce proceeding in Franklin County. Throughout 2 the case, Kevin filed motions attempting to specially appear, abate, or stay the proceedings. The trial court, and the higher courts Kevin petitioned to, denied these motions. The trial court set the case for a hearing on temporary orders on October 2, 2025. Kevin requested disability accommodations to submit evidence by writing, alleging that he had a variety of serious medical conditions and used strong medications. The trial court denied his request but allowed him to attend the hearing via an online teleconferencing service, Zoom. Kevin did not attend the hearing. The case was set for final hearing on November 20, 2025. Kevin was provided a link to attend via Zoom but, again, failed to attend. Kevin instead filed mandamus petitions with this Court and then the Texas Supreme Court. This Court denied his petition on October 22 for failing to comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, specifically Rules 52.3(j) and 52.7(a)(2). In re Painter, No. 06-25-00094-CV, 2025 WL 2972415, at *1–2 (Tex. App.— Texarkana Oct. 22, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(j), 52.7(a)(2)). The Texas Supreme Court denied his petition on December 12. At the November 20 hearing, Tammy suggested that the case needed to be reset pending the resolution of Kevin’s writ filed with the Texas Supreme Court. The trial court agreed and stated, “So I’ll grant the continuance” “and you just get back with the court.” Tammy told the trial court, “We’ll reset the final hearing as soon as we hear from the [Texas] Supreme Court.” No evidence was presented at the November 20 hearing. Without further hearing, a final decree of divorce was signed and entered on January 14, 2026. It was not an agreed decree, and Kevin did not sign it. The decree states that “[o]n 3 November 20, 2025, the [trial court] heard this case.” It further states that Kevin was “duly and properly cited,” yet “did not appear and wholly made default.” The trial court divorced the parties, changed Tammy’s last name, and ordered that each party retain the property in their name or possession. Regarding child custody and support, the trial court found that it did not have jurisdiction, as the minor child had resided in Thailand. The trial court issued findings of fact upon Kevin’s request, reiterating that the case “came on for trial before the [trial court] without a jury on November 20, 2025.” The findings further state that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the minor child due to the child’s length of residence in Thailand. The trial court found that “[t]here were no property issues before the [trial court]. Accordingly, the respective parties were awarded the property in their separate possession.” Kevin filed his appeal alleging five points of error. II. Insufficient Evidence to Support Decree of Divorce In his fifth point of error, Kevin urges that the trial court abused its discretion by entering a final decree of divorce when the only “Final Hearing” ended in a continuance with no evidence presented. In his brief, Kevin states, “No testimony was given. No exhibits were admitted. No evidence was received. . . . Despite this, a Final Decree was signed.” “In a suit for divorce, the pleadings are not deemed admitted by the defendant’s failure to appear, so the plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to support the material allegations in the petition.” In re Marriage of Williams, 646 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.701). Additionally, “legal and factual sufficiency challenges do not 4 constitute independent grounds for asserting error, but they are relevant factors in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Id. (citing Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991)). Thus, [t]o determine whether a trial court abused its discretion because the evidence was legally or factually insufficient to support its decision, a court must consider (1) whether the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and, if not, (2) whether the trial court’s division of the community estate was so unjust and unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” Id. (citing Lynch v. Lynch, 540 S.W.3d 107, 127–30 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied)). “If the division of marital property lacks sufficient evidence in the record to support it, then the trial court’s division is an abuse of discretion.” Lynch, 540 S.W.3d at 127. Here, a final hearing was originally set for November 20, the parties were notified of the hearing, and Kevin failed to appear. However, before any testimony or other evidence was presented at the November 20 hearing, the case was continued by the trial court. Nothing in the record indicates that a second-final hearing was noticed or agreed to by Kevin, scheduled, or held. Nor is there any record of a subsequent hearing where Tammy presented evidence to support the material allegations in her petition. Because there was no evidence presented regarding the material allegations in Tammy’s petition, we find that the trial court erred by granting the divorce and dividing the parties’ marital estate without such evidence. See MacLellan v. MacLellan, No. 02-21-00304-CV, 2022 WL 17841862, at *3 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth, Dec. 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing B.K. v. T.K., No. 02-19-00472-CV, 2021 WL 2149621, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 27, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Heap-Welch v. 5 Welch, No. 05-19-01260-CV, 2020 WL 6304992, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 28, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)). III. Conclusion We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.1 Scott E. Stevens Chief Justice Date Submitted: July 14, 2026 Date Decided: November 16, 2026 1 Because we are remanding the case for a new trial, we do not address the remaining issues raised by Kevin. 6