U. S. Bank, N. A., as Trustee v. Stephen M. Mink
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledMarch 20, 2020
Docket2D18-0958
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
U.S. BANK, N.A. in its capacity, )
as Trustee for the Registered )
Holders of HOME EQUITY ASSET )
TRUST 2006-2, HOME EQUITY )
PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, )
SERIES 2006-2, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D18-958
)
STEPHEN M. MINK )
a/k/a STEPHEN MINK and )
PIEDAD A. MINK, )
)
Appellees. )
)
Opinion filed March 20, 2020.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for
Pasco County; Linda H. Babb, Judge.
W. Bard Brockman and Christian J.
Bromley of Bryan Cave Leighton
Paisner, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia;
Zina Gabsi of Bryan Cave Leighton
Paisner, LLP, Miami, for Appellant.
Bryant H. Dunivan Jr. of Owen &
Dunivan, PLLC, Tampa, for
Appellee Piedad A. Mink.
No appearance for Appellee
Stephen M. Mink.
ATKINSON, Judge.
U.S. Bank, N.A., in its capacity as Trustee for the Registered Holders of
Home Equity Asset Trust 2006-2, Home Equity Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-
2 (U.S. Bank) appeals a final judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of Stephen M.
Mink a/k/a Stephen Mink and Piedad A. Mink (Mink)1 following a nonjury trial. U.S.
Bank argues that the trial court erred in finding that U.S. Bank lacked standing to
foreclose at the time the complaint was filed. We agree and reverse.
On November 10, 2005, Mink executed and delivered to Sebring Capital
Partners, Limited Partnership (Sebring), the original lender, a note and mortgage, in the
principal amount of $151,200. Mink defaulted on the note and mortgage by failing to
make the payment due on September 1, 2013, and all payments thereafter. On
October 16, 2013, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (Ocwen), the servicer of the loan,
provided notice of the default and an opportunity to cure. After the default was not
cured, U.S. Bank filed a foreclosure complaint on April 25, 2014. Ocwen verified the
complaint as the servicer for U.S. Bank. Attached to the complaint were copies of the
mortgage and the note bearing a blank indorsement by Sebring. In the complaint, U.S.
Bank alleged that it was the holder of the note and thus entitled to enforce the terms of
the note and mortgage pursuant to section 673.3011(1), Florida Statutes (2014).
At the ensuing bench trial, U.S. Bank introduced the following documents
into evidence through testimony of a senior loan analyst for Ocwen, who testified that
1The Minks jointly executed the note at issue in this appeal. However, Mr.
Mink passed away years after the underlying litigation was filed. As such, this appeal
affects Mrs. Mink who remains obligated under the note.
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Ocwen had been servicing Mink's loan since 2006: the original note bearing the blank
indorsement by Sebring; the original mortgage; an assignment of mortgage between
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee for Sebring, and
U.S. Bank; a notice of default dated October 16, 2013, from Ocwen to Mink; Ocwen's
Collection Notes for Mink's loan; a Bailee letter dated January 17, 2014, from Ocwen
tendering the original note to counsel for U.S. Bank; and the payment history and
judgment figures for Mink's loan. However, the trial court did not admit the Power of
Attorney between U.S. Bank and Ocwen.
Mink moved for an involuntary dismissal, arguing in part that U.S. Bank
failed to prove its standing as the holder of the note at inception of the action because
there was no evidence of an agency relationship between U.S. Bank and Ocwen. The
trial court agreed and dismissed the action. As further explained below, because the
bank filed suit and the record supports that it had the note in its possession when it did
so, any purported deficiency in evidentiary support for its agency relationship with its
servicer is immaterial to the issue of standing.
This court reviews de novo an order granting a motion for involuntary
dismissal. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Kummer, 195 So. 3d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2016) (citing Allard v. Al-Nayem Int'l, Inc., 59 So. 3d 198, 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)).
This court "must view the evidence and all inferences of fact in a light most favorable to
the nonmoving party" and will "affirm an involuntary dismissal only where no proper
view of the evidence could sustain a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party." Deutsche
Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Applewhite, 213 So. 3d 948, 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quoting
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Huber, 137 So. 3d 562, 563–64 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)).
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This court also reviews de novo a trial court's determination on standing. St. Clair v.
U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 173 So. 3d 1045, 1046 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (citing Boyd v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 143 So. 3d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)).
A party seeking foreclosure must establish standing both at the time the
complaint was filed and at trial. Dickson v. Roseville Props., LLC, 198 So. 3d 48, 50-51
(Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (citing May v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 150 So. 3d 247, 248-49 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2014)). "A plaintiff who is not the original lender may establish standing to
foreclose a mortgage loan by submitting a note with a blank or special [i]ndorsement, an
assignment of the note, or an affidavit otherwise proving the plaintiff's status as the
holder of the note." Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Johnson, 250 So. 3d 808, 810 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2018) (quoting Focht v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 124 So. 3d 308, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA
2013)).
Here, U.S. Bank filed its complaint alleging its status as the holder of the
note and submitted a note with a blank indorsement. A "holder" is defined as a "person
in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an
identified person that is the person in possession." § 671.201(21)(a) (emphasis added).
The parties dispute whether U.S. Bank proved that it had possession of the original note
at the time the complaint was filed and thus was entitled to enforce the note as a holder
at inception; possession of the original note at the time of trial is uncontested.
Because U.S. Bank entered into evidence the original note containing the
same blank indorsement as the copy attached to the complaint, it presented sufficient
evidence to establish it had possession of the note at the time the complaint was filed
and thus had standing as a holder of the note. See Ortiz v. PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 188
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So. 3d 923, 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("[I]f the Bank later files with the court the original
note in the same condition as the copy attached to the complaint, then . . . the
combination of such evidence is sufficient to establish that the Bank had actual
possession of the note at the time the complaint was filed and, therefore, had standing
to bring the foreclosure action, absent any testimony or evidence to the contrary.").2
Moreover, there was no evidence or testimony presented below reflecting
that U.S. Bank lacked possession of the note at the time it filed suit. Therefore, this
combination of evidence was sufficient to establish that U.S. Bank had possession at
the time the complaint was filed and thus had standing to bring the foreclosure action as
the holder of the note. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Burgiel, 248 So. 3d 237, 239-40 (Fla.
5th DCA 2018) (holding that the combination of the copy of the note attached to the
complaint and the later-filed original sufficed to establish the bank's standing); Bank of
N.Y. Mellon ex rel. Registered Holders of Alt. Loan Trust 2007-OA7 v. Heath, 219 So.
3d 104, 106 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (holding that the trial court erred in granting an
involuntary dismissal because the bank established its standing as a holder); Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ousley, 212 So. 3d 1056, 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (same); U.S.
2Mink argues, for the first time on appeal, that the copy of the note
attached to the complaint was not in the same condition as the original note introduced
at trial because the copy "was marked up by an unknown party." This argument lacks
merit because a pertinent discrepancy in the condition of the note is one in the
indorsements. See Waters v. Wilmington Tr., Nat'l Ass'n for ARLP Securitization Tr.
Series 2015-1, 268 So. 3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) ("The note attached to the
complaint was not made payable to the plaintiff, and it contained no indorsements. . . .
Unlike the note attached to the complaint, the original note was indorsed in blank.");
Madl v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 244 So. 3d 1134, 1136 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) ("[T]he
copy of the note Wells Fargo attached to its complaint lacked the indorsement found on
the original note admitted into evidence; therefore, the copy does not prove standing at
the time suit was filed.").
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Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Clarke, 192 So. 3d 620, 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (reversing a
judgment finding lack of standing because the original note introduced into evidence at
trial matched the copy of the note attached to the complaint and there was no evidence
presented reflecting a lack of possession). Even without the benefit of the inference
described in Ortiz, U.S. Bank provided separate proof of its entitlement to enforce the
note as the holder through the testimony of the senior loan analyst for Ocwen, the
Collection Notes, and the Bailee letter. The Bailee letter sent from Ocwen to counsel for
U.S. Bank—dated January 17, 2014—established that U.S. Bank had possession of the
original note before U.S. Bank filed its foreclosure complaint against Mink on April 25,
2014. The Collection Notes further established that the original note was sent to
counsel for U.S. Bank prior to filing suit as reflected in the entries on January 17, 2014,
and February 14, 2014.
Viewing the evidence and all inferences of fact in a light most favorable to
U.S. Bank, U.S. Bank presented sufficient evidence of its entitlement to enforce the note
as the holder at inception. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's involuntary dismissal
and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
KHOUZAM, C.J., and KELLY, JJ., Concur.
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