Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D19-4102 _____________________________ TIMOTHY L. MALDEN, Appellant, v. CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Virginia Norton, Judge. March 4, 2021 PER CURIAM. Timothy Malden has appealed the trial court’s dismissal of his civil complaint against Chase Home Finance, LLC (Chase), “with prejudice.” Because the face of Mr. Malden’s complaint states a claim for relief and does not reveal the applicability of any defense, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal. Mr. Malden’s complaint alleged that he was damaged by certain improper conduct by Chase in its efforts to collect on a mortgage. Although Mr. Malden’s complaint makes no reference to any earlier actions, he previously filed several actions against Chase regarding this incident. Records of the prior actions were not included in the record of the instant appeal; however, the records are contained in a prior appeal between the parties of a previous dismissal “with prejudice” by the trial court. We take judicial notice of said records here. See Schneider v. Schneider, 189 So. 3d 276, 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (taking judicial notice of this Court’s own records from a previous appeal in the case)). All of the prior actions were procedurally dismissed on motion from Chase. When this action was filed, Chase again moved for dismissal, arguing that Mr. Malden’s claims were precluded. Despite having moved for procedural dismissal in each previous action, Chase argued that the claims had been resolved on the merits, and that Mr. Malden had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims previously. Thus, Chase reasoned that res judicata and collateral estoppel applied and required dismissal of Mr. Malden’s most recent complaint. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss without expanding on its reasoning for doing so, a dismissal which Mr. Malden now appeals. Whether a complaint sufficiently states a cause of action is a question of law, reviewed de novo. Nero v. Cont'l Country Club R.O., Inc., 979 So. 2d 263, 267 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). The analysis must be confined to the four corners of the complaint. Newberry Square Fla. Laundromat, LLC v. Jim's Coin Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc., 296 So. 3d 584, 589 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). Because the analysis is so confined, complaints generally cannot be procedurally dismissed on motion based on an affirmative defense or excuse, as this would require the trial court to consider matters outside the four corners of the complaint. Id. The sole exception which allows dismissal of a complaint based on claim preclusion is the instance when a complaint “affirmatively and clearly shows the conclusive applicability of the defense” on its face, without reference to any outside information. Id. (quoting Williams v. Gaffin Indus. Servs., Inc., 88 So. 3d 1027, 1029 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). “[S]tated differently, ‘[a] motion to dismiss should not be granted on the basis of . . . defenses unless the . . . defenses appear on the face of the pleading.’” Newberry Square, 296 So. 3d at 589. (quoting Mettler, Inc. v. Ellen Tracy, Inc., 648 So. 2d 253, 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)). This is true regardless of the simplicity of any defense and regardless of how straightforward resolution based on the defense might be. Newberry Square, 296 So. 3d at 589. 2 In properly reviewing a motion to dismiss, the only question for the trial court is whether the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief requested, assuming all allegations in the complaint to be true. Id. If the face of the complaint demonstrates an affirmative defense, a plaintiff would not be so entitled, and the complaint may be properly dismissed on that basis. If the face of the complaint fails to demonstrate a defense, dismissal based on said defense would be error. Mr. Malden’s complaint does not reveal the applicability of any defense on its face. Accordingly, we reject Chase’s argument here that the dismissal should be affirmed because the claims are precluded. The only basis for affirming the trial court’s dismissal is a de novo determination that Mr. Malden’s complaint fails to state a claim. Taking the allegations made as true, as required in evaluating a motion to dismiss, we conclude that Mr. Malden’s complaint indeed states a claim for relief. Thus, the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint must be reversed. REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. ROBERTS, M.K. THOMAS, and NORDBY, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Donald L. Dempsey, II, Jacksonville, for Appellant. Elliot B. Kula and W. Aaron Daniel of Kula & Associates, P.A., Miami, for Appellee. 3