William Gay v. City of Dunedin
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledNovember 10, 2021
Docket2D20-3433
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
WILLIAM GAY,
Appellant,
v.
CITY OF DUNEDIN, a municipal government;
JULIE WARD BUJALSKI; HEATHER GRACY;
DEBORAH KYNES; MAUREEN FREANEY;
and JEFF GOW, in their official capacities
as elected officials of the City of Dunedin,
Appellees.
No. 2D20-3433
November 10, 2021
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Amy M. Williams,
Judge.
Timothy W. Weber of Weber, Crabb & Wein, P.A., St. Petersburg, for
Appellant.
Erin J. O'Leary, Anthony Garganese, and Debra Babb-Nutcher of
Garganese, Weiss, D'Agresta & Salzman, P.A., Orlando, for
Appellees.
BLACK, Judge.
William Gay appeals from the order dismissing Julie Ward
Bujalski (mayor of the City of Dunedin), Heather Gracy (vice mayor
of the City of Dunedin), Deborah Kynes (commissioner of the City of
Dunedin), Maureen Freaney (commissioner of the City of Dunedin),
and Jeff Gow (commissioner of the City of Dunedin) from his action
for declaratory and injunctive relief. Because the trial court erred
in dismissing these individuals—who will hereafter be referred to
collectively as the City Commissioners—from the action without
affording Mr. Gay an opportunity to amend his complaint to state
causes of action against them, we reverse.
On May 20, 2020, Mr. Gay filed a two-count complaint naming
the City of Dunedin and the City Commissioners as defendants and
alleging violations of article 1, section 24(b) of the Florida
Constitution and sections 286.011 and 286.0114, Florida Statutes
(2019), resulting from the settlement of a lawsuit with a resident.
The City and the City Commissioners moved to dismiss the
complaint, and on November 3, 2020, the trial court entered an
order dismissing the City Commissioners from Mr. Gay's action
2
with prejudice.1 Mr. Gay argues on appeal that counts I and II of
his complaint sufficiently allege causes of action against the City
Commissioners and that to the extent there are any deficiencies in
his claims, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant
him leave to amend the claims.
We review de novo the trial court's decision to grant the
motion to dismiss. See Becklund v. Fleming, 869 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla.
2d DCA 2003). Despite naming the City Commissioners as
defendants in the action, counts I and II of the complaint sought
declaratory relief based only on the City's alleged violations of the
Florida Constitution and sections 286.011 and 286.0114 and
sought to enjoin only the City from further allegedly improper
conduct. As such, the trial court did not err in dismissing the City
Commissioners from the action. However, "[a] dismissal with
prejudice should not be ordered without giving the party offering
1 In that same order, the trial court dismissed Mr. Gay's action
against the City without prejudice and granted him twenty days to
amend his claims against the City. Mr. Gay does not challenge the
trial court's ruling in that regard on appeal, nor could he since such
an order is a nonfinal, nonappealable order. See Reynolds
Ventures, Inc. v. Sargent, 310 So. 3d 458, 458-59 (Fla. 2d DCA
2020).
3
the pleading an opportunity to amend unless it appears that the
privilege to amend has been abused or it is clear that the pleading
cannot be amended to state a cause of action." Becklund, 869 So.
2d at 4 (quoting Kapley v. Borchers, 714 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1998)). Mr. Gay has not abused the privilege to amend, and
because it is not apparent that he cannot state a cause of action
against the City Commissioners, the trial court abused its
discretion by dismissing the City Commissioners from the action
without granting Mr. Gay leave to amend. See Kapley, 714 So. 2d
at 1218 ("While it may have been proper to dismiss the complaint
against appellee individually for failure to state a cause of action,
we conclude it was an abuse of discretion to do so with prejudice
since it was not clear from the record that a cause of action could
never be alleged against appellee individually. Appellant should
have therefore been given an opportunity to amend."); cf. Paylan v.
Dirks, 228 So. 3d 679, 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ("[T]he trial court
erred in dismissing with prejudice Counts I and IV as to [Assistant
State Attorneys] Dirks and Brown. On remand, Paylan must be
given the opportunity to amend Counts I and IV to clearly identify
4
the particular defendant to which she attributes a particular
improper act.").
We therefore reverse the trial court's order to the extent it
dismissed the City Commissioners from Mr. Gay's action and
remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
KHOUZAM and SLEET, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
5