Moises Rios, Jr. v. Kathryn Hawkins D/B/A Safe Pet Rescue
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledAugust 28, 2026
Docket5D2025-1928
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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Case No. 5D2025-1928
LT Case No. 55-2024-SC-2869
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MOISES RIOS, JR.,
Appellant,
v.
KATHRYN HAWKINS d/b/a SAFE
PET RESCUE,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the County Court for St. Johns County.
Alexander R. Christine, Jr., Judge.
Jason A. Martorella, of Martorella Law, Coral Gables, for
Appellant.
David D. Naples, Jr. and Tiera L. Henry, of D. Naples Law,
PLLC, St. Augustine, for Appellee.
August 28, 2026
HARRIS, J.
In March 2024, Appellant, Moises Rios, Jr., was arrested
after a vehicle accident, with his dogs in his possession, and was
subsequently detained at Lee County and Sumter County
Detention Center. Law enforcement transported his dogs to the
Lee County animal shelter where they were placed in a five-day
holding period. During that period, the animal shelter
unsuccessfully attempted to make contact with Appellant. Animal
control then transferred possession of the dogs to Appellee,
Kathryn Hawkins d/b/a Safe Pet Rescue (“Safe Pet”), around April
9, 2024.
After learning that his dogs were transferred to Safe Pet,
Appellant sent Appellee an email on May 6, 2024 seeking to have
the dogs returned to him. Appellee informed Appellant that the
dogs had already been adopted.
Appellant subsequently filed a pro se statement of claim for
replevin against Appellee, seeking to reclaim possession of his
dogs. The court entered an order directing Appellee to show cause
as to why the property should not be taken from her possession
and delivered to Appellant. A hearing on the show cause order was
scheduled for July 19, 2024. However, four days before the hearing,
Appellee filed an answer and affirmative defenses to Appellant’s
claim, alleging Safe Pet lawfully obtained possession and
ownership of the dogs from animal control and that it was no
longer in possession of the dogs, who were legally adopted to a new
home.
On July 19, 2024, a few hours before the scheduled hearing
on the show cause order, Appellant filed a motion for continuance.
The hearing nevertheless proceeded. While there is no transcript
from this hearing in the record, the unsigned court notes indicate
that the court was “to dismiss case.”
Six months later, the court filed a notice of lack of
prosecution for no record activity, setting a hearing for March 28,
2025. The court notes following that hearing state “case to remain
open.” Appellee then filed a motion asking the court to enter a
written order dismissing the action in accordance with the court
notes from the July 19, 2024 hearing. On May 28, 2025, the court
entered an order of dismissal, nunc pro tunc to July 19, 2024.
Appellant argues the trial court violated his right to due
process by dismissing his claim without notice, after it had ruled
that the case would remain open. He emphasizes that there was
no order actually dismissing the case after the July 19, 2024
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hearing, and that the July hearing was not a hearing on a motion
to dismiss; rather, it was a hearing on the trial court’s order to
show cause. We agree.
Here, the July 19 hearing was for the court’s show cause
order directed at Appellee. There was no motion to dismiss or
objection pending, nor did the show cause order mention dismissal
or closing of the action. See McGhee v. Est. of McGhee, 373 So. 3d
417, 418–19 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023). Based upon the record before this
Court, there was nothing that gave Appellant notice or warning
that dismissal of the entire action would be considered at the
hearing noticed solely on the court’s show cause order. Thus,
Appellant was not given an opportunity to be heard prior to entry
of the dismissal order.
Accordingly, because Appellant was denied due process
before dismissal of his claim, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
EISNAUGLE and BOATWRIGHT, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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