Anderson v. State

Porsha Anderson v. State of Maryland, No. 1191, Sept. Term, 2024. Opinion by Tang, J. PROCESS – DEFECTS, OBJECTIONS, AND AMENDMENT – DEFECTS AND IRREGULARITIES IN SERVICE OR RETURN OR PROOF THEREOF The appellant filed a complaint against the State of Maryland under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Maryland Code Annotated, State Government §§ 12-101 to 116, which provides that service of a complaint is sufficient only if made on the Treasurer or the Treasurer’s designee. The caption of the appellant’s complaint named the “State of Maryland” as the defendant and indicated that service of process be made on the Attorney General, rather than the Treasurer or the Treasurer’s designee. The summons, complaint, and related papers were ultimately delivered to the Treasurer’s designee. Although the caption of the complaint directed service to the Attorney General rather than the Treasurer (or its designee), there was no dispute that the State of Maryland was properly identified as the defendant and was not misled in any way. Therefore, to the extent that the circuit court dismissed the action for insufficient service of process because of the alleged error in the caption in the complaint, the court erred in concluding that this error constituted insufficient service of process and abused its discretion in dismissing the action on that basis. PROCESS – SERVICE – PERSONAL SERVICE IN GENERAL – MODE AND SUFFICIENCY OF SERVICE The clerk issued a summons correctly naming the defendant in the caption and directory section in the summons but, for unknown reasons, included the wrong address. However, the private process server ultimately located the Treasurer’s designee at the correct address. It is undisputed that the server handed the papers to the Treasurer’s designee, who reviewed them and attempted to return them because the summons did not include the correct address for the State Treasurer’s Office. The server then dropped the papers and left the office. The circuit court erred in concluding that service of process was insufficient. The server effected service of process on the Treasurer’s designee despite her refusal to accept the summons and related papers. Similarly, the fact that counsel for the Treasurer later returned the papers to plaintiff’s counsel did not defeat service of process. The incorrect address in the summons did not invalidate service of process. There is no indication that the State was misled about the summons being directed to it; the summons (and complaint) clearly named the State as the defendant. Nor is there any indication that the State was otherwise prejudiced or denied substantial right by the incorrect service address in the summons. Because the dismissal of the complaint was based on the circuit court’s incorrect legal determination that service of process was insufficient, the court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint on that ground. Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 24-C-23-002837 REPORTED IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND No. 1191 September Term, 2024 ______________________________________ PORSHA ANDERSON v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Tang, Albright, Hotten, Michele D. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Tang, J. ______________________________________ Filed: October 5, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.10.05 15:45:44 -04'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk  The appellant, Porsha Anderson (“Anderson”), filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the State of Maryland under the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), Maryland Code Annotated, State Government (“SG”) §§ 12-101 to 110. After unsuccessful attempts to effect service on the State, Anderson’s private process server dropped the summons, complaint, and related papers at the State Treasurer’s Office, in the presence of the Treasurer’s designee. In response, the State filed a motion to dismiss the action for insufficient service of process, asserting, among other things, that the summons contained a clerical error. The court granted the motion and dismissed the action without prejudice. Anderson appealed, presenting one question for our review,1 which we rephrase: Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by dismissing the action for insufficient service of process? For the reasons that follow, we answer in the affirmative. Consequently, we shall reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. BACKGROUND On June 23, 2023, Anderson, through counsel, filed a complaint against the State of Maryland. She alleged that she was sexually harassed and assaulted by a correctional 1 Anderson’s brief presents the issue as follows: Whether an otherwise valid summons that is properly served on a defendant notifying them: a) that an action has commenced against them in the same court that issued the summons; and b) that failing to answer the complaint may result in the entry of judgment against the defendant; is rendered invalid because it contains a clerical error[.] officer while she was incarcerated at the North Branch Correctional Institution.2 Under the MTCA, she asserted two claims: one for negligence and another for negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision. The MTCA provides that “[i]n an action under this subtitle, service of the complaint and accompanying documents is sufficient only if made on the Treasurer.” SG § 12-108(a). The “Treasurer” is “the State Treasurer of Maryland or the Treasurer’s designee.” Md. Code Regs. 25.02.01.02B(6). The “Treasurer’s designee” includes “the Director of the Insurance Division of the State Treasurer’s Office.” Md. Code Regs. 25.02.01.02B(7)(a)(ii). During the relevant time, Joyce Miller served as the Director of the Insurance Division of the State Treasurer’s Office and was the Treasurer’s designee. The State Treasurer’s Office is located at 80 Calvert Street in Annapolis, Maryland. The caption of the complaint named the “State of Maryland” as the defendant. It indicated that service of process be made not on the Treasurer or the Treasurer’s designee, but on the Attorney General, as follows:3 2 The North Branch Correctional Institution is an institution of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, a principal department of the State government. See Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 2-101. 3 It is not clear why Anderson named the Attorney General as the person to be served. It is possible that she relied on Maryland Rule 2-124(j), which provides that 2  Anderson’s counsel filed a line with the complaint requesting that the circuit court clerk issue a summons and return it to counsel for service by private process server. Apparently, Anderson’s counsel did not receive the initial summons. Despite making additional requests, counsel remained unsuccessful in obtaining the summons. After several months, the court issued a notice of contemplated dismissal under Maryland Rule 2-507. Anderson’s counsel filed a motion to defer dismissal, explaining that the delay in serving the State was due to never receiving the summons from the clerk despite repeated requests. In January 2024, the court granted the motion, deferring its dismissal until June 10, and permitting additional attempts to serve the State. On February 5, 2024, Anderson’s counsel requested another summons and for it to be returned to him so service could be made by private process server. The clerk issued a summons on February 12. The caption of the summons named the “State of Maryland” as the defendant. The summons directed service on the “State of Maryland” but listed Anderson’s counsel’s office address as the service address for the State, as follows: “[s]ervice is made upon the State of Maryland by serving the Attorney General.” However, section (a) of that Rule states that the “provisions of this Rule do not abrogate any statute permitting or requiring service on a person.” Md. Rule 2-124(a). The Committee note following that section states that “[e]xamples of statutes permitting or requiring service on a person include the [MTCA], [SG] § 12-108(a) (service of a complaint is sufficient only when made upon the Treasurer of the State).” 3 wanted to coordinate service with her. Ms. Miller asked the server how the summons was addressed, and the server responded that it was “to the State of Maryland at 6205 Executive Blvd., Rockville, Maryland 20852.” Ms. Miller advised the server that she could not accept service because the summons contained the incorrect address for the State Treasurer’s Office. On April 10, 2024, the private process server went to the State Treasurer’s Office located at 80 Calvert Street in Annapolis and attempted to hand Ms. Miller an envelope with the summons, complaint, and related papers. After reviewing the summons, which was addressed to the “State of Maryland” but still contained the wrong address, Ms. Miller told the server that she could not accept service because the summons “was not addressed to the [State] Treasurer’s Office correctly.” When Ms. Miller “attempted to return the envelope back to [the server], [the server] dropped it and left the building.” In an affidavit of service, the process server affirmed that on April 10, 2024, she “served by delivering the Writ of Summons Issued February 12, 2024, Complaint, Exhibit, and Civil Non-Domestic Case Information Report to: Joyce Miller as State Treasurer for State Of Maryland, S/O Maryland State Treasurer, at the address of: 80 Calvert St, Annapolis, MD 21401.” On April 16, 2024, counsel for the Treasurer informed Anderson’s counsel of the private process server’s “appear[ance]” at the State Treasurer’s Office, asserting that the “process server cannot ‘drop and run’ for effective service, particularly where, as here, the summons [wa]s not correctly addressed.” Accordingly, counsel for the Treasurer said she was “returning the complaint and summons” to Anderson’s counsel. 5  On April 22, 2024, Anderson’s counsel filed the affidavit of service with the court. Motion to Dismiss On May 21, 2024, the State filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Maryland Rule 2- 322. Citing SG § 12-108(a), which requires that service of the complaint and accompanying documents be made on the Treasurer, the State explained that service of process was directed to the Attorney General, not the Treasurer. Additionally, the summons listed an incorrect address that was not the one for the State Treasurer’s Office. Relying on Ms. Miller’s affidavit detailing the April 10 encounter with the private process server, as recounted above, the State asserted that “service could not be accepted.” Accordingly, the State argued, the complaint was not served in compliance with SG § 12-108(a) and should be dismissed under Rule 2-322(a)(4) for “insufficient service of process.” Anderson filed an opposition to the motion. She argued that pursuant to Rule 2- 121(a) (governing service of process) and SG § 12-108(a), she had effectuated service on the State by having the required papers delivered to the Treasurer’s designee on April 10. Moreover, she argued that the State effectively acknowledged receipt of the summons and complaint through the Treasurer’s counsel’s correspondence attempting to return the documents. Accordingly, she contended that she had met the requirements under the Rule and SG § 12-108(a), and thus, service was effectuated on the State. Anderson further argued that the complaint and summons clearly identified the State as the defendant. Although the clerk had included the wrong address for the State in the summons, it was a clerical error that did not undermine effective service. Furthermore, she 6 noted that the State had failed to explain how the alleged deficiencies deprived it of fair notice or opportunity to be heard in the case. The State filed a reply in response to Anderson’s opposition. It argued that, because “the summons [was] not correctly addressed to the [State] Treasurer’s Office,” it did not receive a “proper summons,” and therefore “service was insufficient.” The State suggested that it was Anderson’s duty to ensure that the summons contained the correct address for the State Treasurer’s Office. It further explained that the clerk’s clerical error of listing the wrong address on the summons was “intrinsically tied to [Anderson’s] ability to properly serve [the State], as the State of Maryland cannot accept a summons that is not properly addressed to it.” Moreover, the State argued that the State Treasurer’s Office had explicitly stated that it could not accept service of the summons containing an incorrect address and subsequently returned the documents to Anderson’s counsel. According to the State, since “service of process” was defective, it resulted in a jurisdictional defect that could not be cured notwithstanding the State’s actual knowledge of the proceeding. It added that making service on the Treasurer (or its designee) was a mandatory condition precedent for a plaintiff like Anderson to avail herself of the limited waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity for tort actions under the MTCA. Because Anderson did not serve a “proper summons” on the Treasurer’s designee, she failed to comply with the requirements under the MTCA, and thus, the State’s sovereign immunity had not been waived. Accordingly, the State argued, Anderson’s complaint must be dismissed. 7  On July 15, 2024, the court entered an order granting the State’s motion to dismiss without a hearing.4 In the order, the court stated that “for the reasons stated in the Motion [to Dismiss],” the motion was granted, and the action was dismissed “for insufficient service of process without prejudice.” Anderson noted this timely appeal.5 DISCUSSION Anderson argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint for insufficient service of process. She continues to maintain that she made service on the State by delivering to the Treasurer’s designee the summons, complaint, and other papers filed with it. Notwithstanding the incorrect address in the summons, she argues that the summons complied with the Rules. Moreover, she argues that the State did not 4 Maryland Rule 2-311(f) provides that “[a] party desiring a hearing on a motion . . . shall request the hearing in the motion or response under the heading ‘Request for Hearing,’” and “[t]he title of the motion or response shall state that a hearing is requested.” (emphasis added). The Rule continues: “Except when a rule expressly provides for a hearing, the court shall determine in each case whether a hearing will be held, but the court may not render a decision that is dispositive of a claim or defense without a hearing if one was requested as provided in this section.” (emphases added). The State did not include a request for a hearing in its motion to dismiss. In her opposition, Anderson included a request for a hearing on the last page under a heading titled “Request for Hearing,” located beneath counsel’s signature block. However, she did not include the request in the title of the opposition. Anderson does not challenge the court’s dispositive ruling without a hearing. 5 A plaintiff whose complaint is “dismissed without prejudice” has the right to note an appeal. Hariri v. Dahne, 412 Md. 674, 680 (2010); see Moore v. Pomory, 329 Md. 428, 431 (1993) (explaining that circuit court’s order dismissing complaint without prejudice and without expressly providing leave to amend the complaint or file an amended complaint was a final judgment because it “puts the plaintiff out of court and terminates the particular action in [that] court”). 8 contest that it had received the summons and related papers or that it had been deprived of fair notice. The State responds that the court properly dismissed the complaint, contending that Anderson had failed to properly serve the Treasurer’s designee. The State makes three contentions consistent with arguments made below. First, the State argues that the caption of the complaint was wrong; while it correctly named the State as the defendant, the caption incorrectly stated that service should be made on the Attorney General, rather than the Treasurer (or its designee). Second, the State argues that the service address for the State in the summons was wrong and thus did not comply with the Rule governing the content of process. Third, counsel for the Treasurer subsequently returned the summons and related papers to Anderson’s counsel, explaining that “drop and run” was not effective service, particularly where, as here, the summons was not correctly addressed. The State therefore maintains that there was “defective service of process” resulting in a jurisdictional defect, which cannot be cured notwithstanding the State having actual knowledge of the action. Because the court did not specify which argument(s) it relied on when it dismissed the complaint “for insufficient service of process” and instead stated that it did so “for the reasons stated in the [m]otion [to dismiss],” we shall assess whether any of the State’s three contentions justified dismissal. A. Overview of Relevant Law We highlight several Maryland Rules implicated in this case, many of which are modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”). As we will discuss 9 later, federal court decisions offer valuable guidance in analyzing the issues here. See Allen v. Allen, 105 Md. App. 359, 369 (1995) (“Where Maryland rules of civil procedure are patterned after the federal rules, we will look to federal decisions interpreting the corresponding federal rules for guidance in construing the similar Maryland rule.”). Maryland Rule 1-301 governs the form of court papers. In relevant part, subsection (a) provides: (a) Caption and Titling. Every pleading and paper filed shall contain a caption setting forth (1) the parties or, where appropriate, the matter, (2) the name of the court, (3) the assigned docket reference, and (4) a brief descriptive title of the pleading or paper which indicates its nature. An original pleading[6] shall contain the names and addresses, including zip code, of all parties to the action if the names and addresses are known to the person filing the pleading. If the address of a party is unknown, the pleading shall so state. In other pleadings and papers, it is sufficient to state the name of the first party on each side with an appropriate indication of other parties. Md. Rule 1-301(a) (emphases added); see id. (source note) (explaining that section (a) is derived in part from the 1937 version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a), and the 1963 version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2)). “Upon the filing of the complaint, the clerk shall issue forthwith a summons for each defendant and shall deliver it, together with a copy of each paper filed and a blank copy of the information report form . . . to the sheriff or other person designated by the plaintiff.” Md. Rule 2-112(a) (emphasis added); see id. (source note) (explaining that section (a) is derived in part from the 1980 version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)). 6 As pertinent here, an “[o]riginal pleading” means “the first pleading filed in an action against a defendant.” Md. Rule 1-202(t). 10  A “summons” is “a writ notifying the person named in the summons that (1) an action against that person has been commenced in the court from which the summons is issued and (2) in a civil action, failure to answer the complaint may result in entry of judgment against that person.” Md. Rule 1-202(ee). Rule 2-114 governs the content of process. “Process” is “any written order issued by a court to secure compliance with its commands or to require action by any person and includes a summons.” Md. Rule 1-202(y) (emphasis added). Rule 2-114 states: (a) Generally. All process shall be under the seal of the court and signed by the clerk.[7] (b) Summons. A summons shall contain (1) the name of the court and the assigned docket reference, (2) the name and address of the party requesting the summons, (3) the name and address of the person to be served as set forth in the complaint,[8] (4) the date of issue, (5) the time within which it must be served, (6) the time within which the defendant must file a response to the complaint by pleading or motion, (7) notification to the defendant that failure to file the response within the time allowed may result in a judgment by default or the granting of the relief sought, and (8) the time within which the return of service shall be made. 7 This case does not implicate a violation of Rule 2-114(a). See PAUL V. NIEMEYER & LINDA M. SCHUETT, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY 211–12 (6th ed. 2026) (explaining that the requirement under Rule 2-114(a) is mandated by Article IV, Section 13 of the Maryland Constitution and a summons that violates this section is ineffective and must be reissued in proper form). 8 The language “as set forth in the complaint” was added to the rule to streamline the issuance of a summons by the clerk. See Commentary on the New Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 Md. L. Rev. 669, 703 (1984) (“[T]he Committee did not want issuance of the summons to be delayed simply because the plaintiff does not know the defendant’s address.” (citing Letter from Hon. John F. McAuliffe, Chairman of the Standing Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., to the Judges of the Ct. of Appeals of Md. (Sept. 22, 1983)). Thus, if the plaintiff does not know the defendant’s address and states so in the complaint, “the summons will issue without it, and the plaintiff can employ a private process server to locate and serve the defendant.” Id. 11 Md. Rule 2-114 (emphases added); see id. (source note) (“The Rule is derived from former Rule 103 f.”). Rule 2-121 governs service of process in personam. “A court obtains in personam jurisdiction over a defendant when that defendant is ‘notified of the proceedings by proper summons.’” Conwell L. LLC v. Tung, 221 Md. App. 481, 498 (2015) (citation omitted). “[T]he court has no jurisdiction over [a defendant] until such service is properly accomplished, or until service is waived by a voluntary appearance by the defendant, either personally or through a duly authorized attorney.”9 Id. (citation modified). “A party’s failure to comply with the Maryland Rules governing service of process ‘constitutes a jurisdictional defect that prevents a court from exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant.’” Id. (quoting Flanagan v. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 412 Md. 616, 624 (2010)). As relevant here, “[s]ervice of process may be made within this State . . . by delivering to the person to be served a copy of the summons, complaint, and all other papers filed with it.” Md. Rule 2-121(a)(1); see id. (source note) (explaining that section (a) is derived in part from the 1993 version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)). A defendant may raise various defenses for preliminary decision by the filing of a motion to dismiss under sections (a) and (b) of Rule 2-322, as follows: (a) Mandatory. The following defenses shall be made by motion to dismiss filed before the answer, if an answer is required: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (2) improper venue, (3) insufficiency of process, and (4) insufficiency of service of process. If not so made and the answer is filed, these defenses are waived. 9 Anderson does not argue that service was waived in this case. 12  (b) Permissive. The following defenses may be made by motion to dismiss filed before the answer, if an answer is required: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (3) failure to join a party under Rule 2-211, (4) discharge in bankruptcy, and (5) governmental immunity. If not so made, these defenses and objections may be made in the answer, or in any other appropriate manner after answer is filed. Md. Rule 2-322(a)–(b) (emphasis added); see PAUL V. NIEMEYER & LINDA M. SCHUETT, MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY 363 (6th ed. 2026) (“Maryland Rules Commentary”) (“The rule is derived, with some modification, from the 1966 version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), (d), (e), (f), and (g). The broad base of decisional authority constructing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12, as well as commentaries, such as Moore’s Federal Practice and Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure, are available as useful authority.”). This case implicates a motion to dismiss under section (a). Rule 2-322(a)(3)— “insufficiency of process”—concerns the form of the process, i.e., as relevant here, the content of the summons required under Rule 2-114. In contrast, Rule 2-322(a)(4)— “insufficiency of service of process”—concerns the manner or method of its service, i.e., as relevant here, the requirements under Rule 2-121(a). In discussing the federal analogues under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4) (insufficient process) and (5) (insufficient service of process), Federal Practice and Procedure provides as follows: Technically, . . . a Rule 12(b)(4) [insufficient process] motion is proper only to challenge noncompliance with the provisions of Rule 4(b) or any applicable provision incorporated by Rule 4(b) that deals specifically with the content of the summons. A Rule 12(b)(5) [insufficient service of process] motion is the proper vehicle for challenging the mode of delivery, the lack of delivery, or the timeliness of delivery of the summons and complaint. Other than those cases in which it is confused with a motion under Rule 12(b)(5), a motion under Rule 12(b)(4) is fairly rare. 13 5B WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1353 (4th ed. 2008), Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2026) (footnotes omitted). “In disposing of the motion, the court may dismiss the action or grant such lesser or different relief as may be appropriate.” Md. Rule 2-322(c). “For example, with respect to inadequate process or service of process, the court may quash the process and require its reissuance and service.” Maryland Rules Commentary, at 367; see id. at 363–64 (“Effective July 1, 1986, section (c) was amended to clarify that the court is not limited under this rule to dismissing the action and the court may instead grant lesser or different relief, such as quashing process or service of process . . . .”). B. Standards of Review The determination whether a person has been served with process is essentially a question of fact, which we review under the clearly erroneous standard. See Wilson v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, 217 Md. App. 271, 286 (2014). In contrast, the determination whether service of process was insufficient is a legal conclusion that we review de novo, without deference to the trial court. See United States ex rel. Walterspiel v. Bayer AG, 639 F. App’x 164, 166 (4th Cir. 2016) (“In reviewing an order to dismiss for insufficient service of process, we review de novo the determination that service of process was insufficient . . . .” (citation omitted)). A trial court’s decision to dismiss for insufficient service of process is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Md. Dep’t of Health v. Myers, 260 Md. App. 565, 610 (2024). “[T]here is an abuse of discretion where no reasonable person would take the view adopted 14 by the [trial court] . . . or when the court acts without reference to any guiding principles.” Conwell L. LLC, 221 Md. App. at 499 (citation omitted). “[T]o be reversed ‘[t]he decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.’” Hariri v. Dahne, 412 Md. 674, 687 (2010) (quoting Aventis Pasteur, Inc. v. Skevofilax, 396 Md. 405, 418–19 (2007)). Moreover, “[a] decision that is legally incorrect is an abuse of discretion.” U.S. Life Ins. Co. in City of N.Y. v. Wilson, 198 Md. App. 452, 464 (2011); see Caffrey v. Dep’t of Liquor Control for Montgomery Cnty., 370 Md. 272, 290 (2002) (“[A]bsent a showing of abuse of that discretion or a predicate erroneous legal conclusion, [the court’s discretionary decision] generally will not be disturbed on appeal.” (emphasis added)); Guidash v. Tome, 211 Md. App. 725, 735 (2013) (explaining that a court can abuse its discretion when it “makes a decision based on an incorrect legal premise”); Cunningham v. Balt. Cnty., 246 Md. App. 630, 700 (2020) (“An abuse of discretion will be found when a court bases a decision on an incorrect legal standard.”). C. Analysis In its motion to dismiss, the State specifically invoked Rule 2-322(a)(4) (insufficiency of service of process). It did not move for dismissal under Rule 2-322(a)(3) (insufficiency of process). Rather, it incorporated its challenge to the content of the process within its primary challenge to the service of process, asserting before the circuit court that 15 listing the wrong address on the summons was “intrinsically tied to [Anderson’s] ability to properly serve [the State].” Failure to properly raise a specific mandatory defense in the motion to dismiss renders it vulnerable to a waiver challenge. See Md. Rule 2-322(a) (“If not so made and the answer is filed, these defenses are waived.”); Maryland Rules Commentary, at 364 (explaining that the defenses under section (a) are waived if not raised in a timely motion under the Rule); see also Md. Rule 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily, an appellate court will not decide any . . . issue [other than subject matter or personal jurisdiction] unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court . . . .”). Because the State never invoked Rule 2-322(a)(3) as a basis for dismissing the complaint, we will not address that rule. However, since the State challenged the content of the summons in connection with its primary challenge under Rule 2-322(a)(4), we will consider the insufficiency of process only insofar as it relates to the challenge to the sufficiency of service of process. 1. Caption of the Complaint We first address the State’s argument that the caption of the complaint was wrong. Specifically, the State argues that although the caption named the State as a defendant, it incorrectly directed that service be made on the Attorney General, rendering the service of process insufficient. Preliminarily, we note that the State’s first challenge is to the caption of the complaint, not the service of process—that is, the State does not cite any of the requirements under Rule 2-121(a), as relevant here. An error in the caption of the complaint is not a proper basis for dismissal under Rule 2-322(a)(4) for insufficient service of process. 16 Cf. Conwell L. LLC, 221 Md. App. at 500 (holding that service of process was insufficient under Rule 2-121(a) because the papers delivered to the defendant did not include a complete version of the complaint filed with the court). In any event, the caption in this case named the correct defendant—the “State of Maryland”—as required by Rule 1-301(a)(1). Although the caption directs service to the Attorney General rather than the Treasurer (or its designee), there is no dispute that the State was properly identified as the defendant and was not misled in any way. Cf. Morrel v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 188 F.3d 218, 224 (4th Cir. 1999) (concluding that there was no possibility the defendant did not understand that the plaintiffs sought to bring them into court, specifically noting that “[t]he lack of the abbreviation ‘Inc.’ [in the caption of the complaint naming the defendant] misled no one”); Creque v. Accu-Fab, Inc., No. 5:11- CV-133-FL, 2011 WL 3664419, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 18, 2011) (“As long as the process ‘names [the defendant] in such terms that every intelligent person understands who is meant . . . it has fulfilled its purpose; and courts should not put themselves in the position of failing to recognize what is apparent to everyone else.’” (quoting Morrell, 188 F.3d at 224)).10 10 “It is the policy of this Court to allow the citation of unreported opinions from federal courts and courts of other states as long as the jurisdiction where it was issued would allow its citation for persuasive value in its courts.” Critzos v. Marquis, 256 Md. App. 684, 695 n.4 (2023). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1(a) provides that “[a] court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been: (i) designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not for publication,’ ‘non-precedential,’ ‘not precedent,’ or the like; and (ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.” Accordingly, this Court may consider unpublished federal opinions issued on or after January 1, 2007 for their persuasive value. 17  To the extent that the caption directing service on the Attorney General instead of the Treasurer (or its designee) constitutes a violation of Rule 1-301(a), the defect can be amended under Rule 2-341. Rarely, if ever, should a case be dismissed for violations involving matters of form. Maryland Rules Commentary, at 62 (citing Md. Rule 1-201, which provides that the Rules “shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay”). “Attacking a pleading or paper based on improper form or titling alone accomplishes nothing but added delay and expense . . . .” Id.; see, e.g., Cherry v. Brothers, 306 Md. 84, 91–92 (1986) (citing predecessor to Rule 2-341(c) (“Errors or defects in a pleading not corrected by an amendment shall be disregarded unless they affect the substantial rights of the parties.”)) (holding that the fact that notice of action to nullify health claims arbitration award was miscaptioned did not mandate dismissal, but, rather, trial court should have disregarded defect or allowed amendment, given that defendants were not misled). Here, the State acknowledges that it was the named defendant, and there is no indication that it was misled by the purported error in the caption of the complaint. Therefore, to the extent that the court dismissed the action for insufficient service of process because of an error in the caption in the complaint, the court erred in concluding that the purported error in the caption constituted insufficient service of process and abused its discretion in dismissing the action on that basis. Cf. Morrel, 188 F.3d at 224 (“[S]ervice of process is not legally defective simply because the complaint misnames the defendant in some insignificant way.”). 18  2. Content and Service of Process The State contends that the summons included an incorrect address for the State and thus failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 2-114(b) governing the content of process. It argues that this defect in the summons rendered service of process ineffective. In addition, the State contends that service was insufficient because counsel for the Treasurer subsequently returned the summons and related papers to Anderson’s counsel and asserted that the “drop and run” was not effective service, particularly where the summons was “not correctly addressed.” Accordingly, it maintains that the court’s dismissal of the complaint for insufficient service of process was proper. a. Clerical Error in Summons “It is generally held that where a summons substantially complies with the statute, a . . . clerical error which does not mislead the defendant to his prejudice is merely an irregularity which may be amended.” North v. Town Real Est. Corp., 191 Md. 212, 218 (1948). The Supreme Court of Maryland illustrated this principle in North v. Town Real Estate Corp., 191 Md. 212 (1948). There, the plaintiff sued the defendant in Baltimore City. Id. at 215. In renewing the issuance of writ of summons on October 14, 1947, the clerk of the court neglected to stamp on the summons that the writ was renewed to a November return date. Id. As a result, the writ indicated that it was returnable on October 14. Id. at 215–16. The writ with the October 14 return date was served on October 17, rendering it impossible for the defendant to comply. Id. at 217. The court then entered a default judgment against the defendant since no plea had been filed. Id. at 216. The 19 defendant thereafter moved to quash the writ of summons and vacate the judgment, which the court granted. Id. The plaintiff appealed. Id. The Supreme Court, recognizing that the trial