U. S. Bank National Association, as Trustee v. Jose L. Martinez
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJune 3, 2022
Docket2D21-1351
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE ON BEHALF
OF THE TERWIN MORTGAGE TRUST 2006-5 ASSET-BACKED
SECURITIES, SERIES 2006-5,
Appellant,
v.
JOSE L. MARTINEZ; GRACE E. MARTINEZ; CIT LOAN
CORPORATION F/K/A/THE CIT GROUP/CONSUMER FINANCE;
INC.; SUMMERFIELD/RIVERWALK VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.;
AND UNKNOWN PERSON(S) IN POSSESSION OF THIS SUBJECT
PROPERTY,
Appellees.
No. 2D21-1351
June 3, 2022
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Manatee County; Charles Sniffen,
Judge.
Allison Morat of Bitman, O'Brien & Morat, PLLC, Lake Mary, for
Appellant.
Michael Alex Wasylik of Ricardo & Wasylik, PL, Dade City, for
Appellee, Jose Martinez.
No appearance for remaining Appellees.
LUCAS, Judge.
U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee, on behalf of the
Holders of the Terwin Mortgage Trust 2006-5 Asset-Backed
Securities, Series 2006-5 (U.S. Bank), appeals from an order of
involuntary dismissal entered at the conclusion of a nonjury
mortgage foreclosure trial. The defendant below, Jose Martinez,
challenged the sufficiency (and, in several instances, the
admissibility) of the record evidence that U.S. Bank's servicer,
Select Portfolio Servicing (SPS), presented through its one witness.
Although the court found SPS's witness "to be straightforward,
genuine and credible," it deemed her testimony insufficient to
establish U.S. Bank's right to foreclose on a note that had been lost
before SPS began servicing it. The court was troubled by the
contradictory business records that were presented, as well as
whether SPS's witness could competently testify about a prior
servicer's record-keeping and the general practices and regulatory
oversight of mortgage loan servicers. At the conclusion of the trial,
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the court entered the order of involuntary dismissal that is now
before us.1
Like the circuit court, we are not particularly impressed with
the evidence U.S. Bank presented to establish its purported right to
enforce a lost note. Nevertheless, from our de novo review, Allard v.
Al-Nayem Int'l, Inc., 59 So. 3d 198, 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), there
was enough evidence to require the court's rendering of a judgment
on the merits. As we summarized in Deutsche Bank National Trust
Co. v. Kummer, 195 So. 3d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016),
When a party raises a motion for involuntary dismissal in
a nonjury trial
the movant admits the truth of all facts in
evidence and every reasonable conclusion or
inference based thereon favorable to the non-
moving party. Where the plaintiff has
presented a prima facie case and different
conclusions or inferences can be drawn from
the evidence, the trial judge should not grant a
motion for involuntary dismissal.
1 In its order, the court attempted to fashion an alternative
basis of finding "that Plaintiff should not prevail." It has been
suggested, for the sake of expediency, that we should simply
construe this alternative holding as if it were a final judgment and
review it accordingly. We decline to do so. Instead, we must
construe the circuit court's ruling as being what the court issued—
an involuntary dismissal—and review it as such.
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Day v. Amini, 550 So. 2d 169, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). A
trial court can neither weigh the evidence nor consider
the credibility of witnesses when deciding a motion for
involuntary dismissal. Capital Media, Inc. v. Haase, 639
So. 2d 632, 633 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
We have also remarked (albeit in footnotes) that when a trial
court has heard all the evidence in a nonjury trial, and all sides
have rested their cases, it is a far better practice for the court to
simply enter a judgment, rather than an involuntary dismissal
under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(b), if the court is
inclined to rule in favor of a defendant. See Morroni v. Wilmington
Sav. Fund Soc'y FSB, 292 So. 3d 514, 519 n.4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)
("We have explained that a defense motion for involuntary dismissal
at the close of all the evidence in a nonjury trial—as distinguished
from at the close of the plaintiff's case—is not best practice because
the trial court can just as easily at that point render a judgment."
(citing Kummer, 195 So. 3d at 1175 n.2)); Ventures Tr. 2013-I-H-R v.
Asset Acquisitions & Holdings Tr., 202 So. 3d 939, 940 n.1 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2016) ("[W]e reiterate that it would have been preferable for the
circuit court to have rendered a final judgment at the conclusion of
this nonjury trial, rather than an order of involuntary dismissal.").
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We reiterate that point again2 because under the heightened
standard of involuntary dismissal, the circuit court's involuntary
dismissal must be reversed. However, we decline U.S. Bank's
invitation to order a new trial. U.S. Bank has had its opportunity to
put on its case. We see no reason to replicate the judicial labor of
another trial. Cf. Mace v. M&T Bank, 292 So. 3d 1215, 1224 (Fla.
2d DCA 2020) (declining to remand for a new trial, noting, "our
record reflects no exceptional circumstances that would warrant a
do-over"); Tracey v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 264 So. 3d 1152, 1168
(Fla. 2d DCA 2019) ("The prohibition against proverbial multiple
'bites at the apple' for trials remains firmly rooted as the leading,
guiding principle to govern the scope of remand and should serve as
the default direction when these kinds of decisions are being
made."). Therefore, on remand, the circuit court shall enter a
2 And note, we are now "elevating" a previously footnoted point
into the lofty heights of an opinion's main text—to the extent that
matters to the reader—if only in the hope that this observation may
gain a little wider recognition. See generally Edward R. Becker, In
Praise of Footnotes, 167 F.R.D. 283, 293 (1996) ("Many readers will
not need any footnotes; most will need some footnotes, but not all
the footnotes. Others will want to read all the footnotes.").
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judgment based upon the evidence U.S. Bank chose to present and
the court's consideration of the weight of that evidence.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
KELLY and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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