Full Opinion

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ Case No. 5D2025-1127 LT Case No. 2024-CA-054543 _____________________________ JOSEPH TRASKA, Appellant, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BREVARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, and JAMES STOKES, Appellees. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County. George T. Paulk, Judge. Christopher J. Bonti and Mark S. Bentley, of Johnson Pope Bokor Ruppel & Burns, LLP, Tampa, for Appellant. Morris Richardson and Sarah H. Beazley, of the Office of the County Attorney, Viera, for Appellee, Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County, Florida. No Appearance for Appellee, James Stokes. September 10, 2026 MACIVER, J. Joseph Traska invoked the Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act (“FLUEDRA”), section 70.51, Florida Statutes, to resolve a code-enforcement dispute with Brevard County. After a mediation hearing and a contingent settlement that the Board of County Commissioners rejected, the County took the position that the 165-day statutory period had expired and refused to proceed further. Traska filed for mandamus to compel the special magistrate to file the written recommendation required by section 70.51(19) and the Board to act on it under section 70.51(21). The trial court issued an alternative writ but, after a non-evidentiary hearing, quashed the writ and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The controlling question is whether FLUEDRA’s 165-day limitation bars the complaint, notwithstanding the statute’s mandatory “shall prepare and file” language and the parties’ extensive conduct after day 165. Because the complaint stated a plausible claim to compel a narrow ministerial act, and because the trial court resolved disputed factual predicates without evidence, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. I. This Court has jurisdiction and reviews de novo an order dismissing a mandamus complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Chandler v. City of Sanford, 121 So. 3d 657, 658 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013); Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). Mandamus lies to compel a respondent to perform a ministerial duty imposed by law, not to direct how discretion is exercised. City of Miami Beach v. Atheneum, Inc., 254 So. 2d 41, 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); Town of Manalapan v. Rechler, 674 So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also Fla. Dep’t of Corr. v. Gould, 344 So. 3d 496, 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (en banc) (explaining that mandamus “has remained consistently available in Florida over the years to order an officer to exercise his discretion where it is his duty to do so”); Miami-Dade Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. An Accountable Miami-Dade, 208 So. 3d 724, 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (noting that “[a] duty or act is defined as ministerial when there is no room for the exercise of discretion, and the performance being required is directed by law” (quoting Shea v. Cochran, 680 So. 2d 628, 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996))). Traska’s mandamus complaint was not limited to forcing the County to “agree” to a new extension or to negotiate anew; it sought completion of a statutory step phrased in mandatory terms—the special magistrate’s duty to “prepare and file with all 2 parties a written recommendation.” § 70.51(19), Fla. Stat. (2024). See Maloy v. Seminole County, 264 So. 3d 370, 374 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (noting that “[u]nlike the word ‘may,’ which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’ usually connotes a requirement” (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 300 (2018))). On its face, that duty “is directed by law” and leaves no room to dither over whether to act at all. See, e.g., Exec. Off. of the Gov. v. Fla. Ctr. for Gov’t Accountability, Inc., 408 So. 3d 839, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025) (noting that “[t]he duty must be ministerial and not discretionary for mandamus to lie”); Hillsborough County v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., 395 So. 3d 1116, 1120 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024) (affirming a writ compelling county commissioners to place a school board referendum on the ballot where the statutory duty was ministerial); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Broward Cnty. v. Parrish, 154 So. 3d 412, 417 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (affirming mandamus compelling county commissioners to fund property appraiser’s statutorily approved budget, notwithstanding pendency of discretionary appeal to the Administration Commission). True, the contents of a no-agreement recommendation could involve discretion, but the obligation to file one does not. Section 70.51(19) does not vest discretion in whether to act; it mandates the act and vests discretion only in the act’s substance. Courts routinely compel officials to issue decisions that involve judgment, without dictating the outcome. Gould, 344 So. 3d at 502. Put simply, mandamus can require magistrates to write a recommendation; it cannot tell them what to recommend. Town of Manalapan, 674 So. 2d at 790; see also Polley v. Gardner, 98 So. 3d 648, 649 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (holding that mandamus may issue “to require a timely ruling on a matter pending before a lower tribunal” (quoting Moody v. Moody, 705 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998))). The County’s theory under section 70.51(23) is that the statutory process can be unilaterally terminated on day 165 without issuing a recommendation. Accepting that theory at the pleading stage would risk nullifying subsection (19)(c)—and the filing requirement in subsection (19)—whenever the process reaches the Board on a proposed agreement. At a minimum, the complaint stated a plausible claim to compel the narrow ministerial act of issuing and filing the recommendation. See Poole v. City of Port Orange, 33 So. 3d 739, 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) 3 (reversing the with-prejudice dismissal of a mandamus count where the complaint “adequately alleged the elements of a mandamus claim”); Coldiron v. Seminole Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 936 So. 2d 42, 43 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (requiring petitioner to “establish a clear legal right to the requested relief, an indisputable legal duty, and have no adequate remedy at law”). A with-prejudice dismissal foreclosed the ministerial relief Traska sought. Nor does Traska’s separate appeal of the code-enforcement order provide an adequate alternative remedy. That appeal addresses the validity of the underlying enforcement action—not FLUEDRA’s distinct statutory obligations. It cannot compel a FLUEDRA recommendation, terminate FLUEDRA tolling under section 70.51(10)(a), or generate the statutory record that subsections (25) and (26) contemplate; a remedy that addresses a different grievance through a different mechanism is not an adequate substitute. See Coldiron, 936 So. 2d at 43 (requiring “no adequate remedy at law”). The County relies on section 70.51(17)(a)–(b)’s two-phase structure to argue that, because the parties reached a contingent settlement during mediation, no hearing “concluded” and section 70.51(19)’s recommendation duty never attached. But section 70.51(19)(c) expressly contemplates agreements reached “prior to the special magistrate entering a recommendation” and provides that such an “agreement for a permissible use must be incorporated in the special magistrate’s recommendation.” The word “must” is mandatory, and the provision does not condition this incorporation duty on whether the agreement arose during or after a concluded hearing. Further, even if the rejected contingent settlement does not qualify as an “agreement for a permissible use” under subsection (19)(c)—because the Board’s rejection arguably prevented the agreement from becoming final—the base duty under section 70.51(19) exists independently. The statute requires the special magistrate to “prepare and file with all parties a written recommendation” regardless of whether the parties reach an agreement. Subsection (19)(c) is an additional directive for cases in which an agreement exists; it does not limit the core obligation to file. The County’s emphasis on the contingent nature of the 4 settlement misses the mark: a recommendation was owed either way. As for futility, the County argues that any recommendation under section 70.51(19)(c) would merely parrot the rejected agreement and produce no benefit. But the recommendation serves concrete statutory purposes that do not depend on Board adoption. Most critically, it is the predicate for ending the statutory tolling of judicial-review deadlines, which runs under section 70.51(10)(a) until the recommendation “is acted upon by the local government”; without it, Traska remains in indefinite procedural limbo, unable to seek judicial review of the underlying code-enforcement order through the channels FLUEDRA contemplates. Once the recommendation issues, section 70.51(21) gives the Board 45 days to accept, modify, or reject it—and, absent an agreed extension, inaction is itself a rejection. A recommendation that the enforcement action is unreasonable or unfairly burdens the property’s use may also serve as an indication of hardship supporting later modifications, variances, or special exceptions under section 70.51(25); and any recommendation supplies data for comprehensive plan amendments under section 70.51(26). These are not speculative downstream benefits; they are statutory consequences the Legislature built into the FLUEDRA framework. See Campbell v. State ex rel. Garrett, 183 So. 340, 342 (Fla. 1938) (holding that mandamus unavailing when relief “would be without beneficial results and fruitless to the relator”). On this record, the futility doctrine does not bar relief. The County’s position contains its own refutation: it insists the recommendation is too meaningless to compel yet treats FLUEDRA’s mandatory language as too consequential to honor— it cannot have it both ways. These questions—whether the proceeding constituted a concluded hearing, whether section 70.51(19)(c) applies to mediation-phase agreements, and whether the recommendation would produce meaningful benefit—demand factual development on remand, not foreclosure at the pleading stage. II. Section 70.51(23) provides that the FLUEDRA procedure “may not continue longer than 165 days, unless the period is 5 extended by agreement of the parties.” The dispositive premise in the County’s motion to quash was that the County never agreed— expressly or implicitly—to extend beyond day 165 and could therefore stop participating, regardless of what occurred afterward. But the pleadings and exhibits attached to the mandamus complaint reflect substantial post–165-day activity: the parties executed a tentative settlement agreement on October 14, 2024; the Board considered that agreement at its October 22, 2024 meeting; and the Board rejected it. County counsel’s subsequent email characterizing the question as “any further extension” can be read as acknowledging that the parties had already proceeded beyond the initial 165-day cap, at least by conduct. The County did not merely tolerate Traska’s continued participation—it actively shaped the post–165-day proceedings by negotiating the terms of the contingent settlement, executing a written agreement memorializing them, and carrying that agreement to the Board for action. That course of conduct is inconsistent with a party that considers the statutory process concluded. If the County could participate for months past the statutory cap—negotiating terms, executing a settlement, presenting it to the Board—and then disclaim any “agreement” to extend, the 165-day limitation would become a one-way ratchet: binding on the property owner, optional for the government. Notably, section 70.51(23) does not prescribe the form the “agreement” must take—it requires no writing, no resolution, no recital. The Legislature knew how to demand a writing when it wanted one. Subsection (19) requires a “written recommendation,” and subsection (22) requires a “written decision.” Subsection (21)(c) names whose agreement extends a deadline. Subsection (23) does none of that, and its silence is significant. Whether the parties’ post–165-day conduct amounts to an implied agreement to extend is, at a minimum, a factual question that cannot be resolved on the pleadings alone. In addition, whether that conduct satisfies section 70.51(23)’s “agreement of the parties” requirement is not purely a question of law; it turns on what the parties did and how the process unfolded. Where the petition and the response to the alternative writ raise disputed factual predicates, the trial court must resolve them on 6 evidence rather than on argument. Villa Bellini Ristorante & Lounge, Inc. v. Mancini, 283 So. 3d 972, 977 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019); Moeller v. Se. Fla. Behav. Health Network, Inc., 392 So. 3d 579, 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). Competing characterizations at a motion hearing are not evidence. III. Even apart from the substantive questions addressed above, the procedure below independently requires reversal. Florida mandamus procedure distinguishes between facial legal insufficiency, which can be addressed on a motion to dismiss, and factual disputes raised by the petition and the respondent’s return, which require evidence. In Radford v. Brock, the Second District explained that if a petition is facially sufficient, the court must issue an alternative writ, and if the petition and the answer to that writ raise disputed factual issues, the trial court must resolve them “upon evidence submitted by the parties.” 914 So. 2d 1066, 1067–68 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(d)(2), (e); Moeller, 392 So. 3d at 587; Smith v. State, 335 So. 3d 795, 798 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (holding that “[i]f the petition and response to the alternative writ raise disputed factual issues, the trial court must resolve these issues upon evidence submitted by the parties”); Floyd v. Laramore, 329 So. 3d 802, 803 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (reversing denial of mandamus petition where trial court failed to issue alternative writ in response to facially sufficient petition); Soto v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Hernando Cnty., 716 So. 2d 863, 864–65 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (reversing dismissal of mandamus complaint against board of county commissioners and remanding for issuance of alternative writ where complaint stated prima facie claim). Here, an alternative writ was issued. The March 7, 2025 hearing reflects live disputes over whether the process had been extended “by agreement,” whether the special magistrate still owed a recommendation incorporating the tentative settlement, and whether the County could declare tolling over without completion of the statutory sequence. On this posture, quashing the alternative writ and dismissing with prejudice—without evidentiary development—risked resolving disputed facts on unsworn representations alone. Cf. Moeller, 392 So. 3d at 587; Stern v. City of Miami Beach, 359 So. 3d 1209, 1212 (Fla. 3d DCA 7 2023) (affirming dismissal without an alternative writ where “no party was deprived the opportunity to present its position fully to the court” after years of litigation and multiple hearing opportunities (quoting 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 427 (2023))). Reversal and remand will allow the trial court to hear evidence and confine any writ to ministerial duties; contested facts should not be resolved on argument alone. On remand, the trial court may permit Traska to pursue a narrowed writ compelling the special magistrate’s ministerial obligation to file a written recommendation under section 70.51(19) and to incorporate any agreement under section 70.51(19)(c). If necessary, the trial court should take evidence and make findings on whether the parties agreed—expressly or by conduct—to extend the FLUEDRA process beyond 165 days under section 70.51(23). This approach follows the established mandamus procedure. See Soto, 716 So. 2d at 864–65; Radford, 914 So. 2d at 1067–68. The narrowed scope—confining relief to the ministerial filing obligation rather than the recommendation’s substance—ensures the remand does not cross the discretionary boundary mandamus cannot reach. REVERSED and REMANDED. SOUD, J., concurs. KILBANE, J., dissents with opinion. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ 8 Case No. 5D2025-1127 LT Case No. 2024-CA-054543 KILBANE, J., dissenting with opinion. This is an appeal of an order dismissing a complaint for writ of mandamus with prejudice and quashing the alternative writ of mandamus. Because the four corners of the complaint did not demonstrate that Brevard County and Special Magistrate James Stokes had indisputable ministerial duties to continue the procedure under Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act (“FLUEDRA”), section 70.51, Florida Statutes, the complaint failed to set forth a prima facie case for mandamus relief and the trial court did not err in dismissing it. Thus, I respectfully dissent. I. Facts A. Background Joseph Traska (“Traska”) is the owner of real property in Brevard County, Florida. In March 2023, Brevard County (“County”) issued a building permit to Traska to construct an accessory building on his property: a “man cave” built out of a shipping container. In October 2023, the County issued a “stop work” order followed by a notice of violation. The County asserted that Traska had deviated from the approved building plans by, among other things, stacking shipping containers. In November 2023, the County initiated a code enforcement proceeding against Traska. In December 2023, a hearing was held before a code enforcement special magistrate. On February 16, 2024, the magistrate issued an order finding that Traska had violated county code provisions, directing Traska to bring the property into compliance, and imposing fines for any noncompliance and $550 in enforcement costs. B. FLUEDRA Proceeding Thereafter, on February 26, 2024, Traska submitted a request for relief under section 70.51(4), Florida Statutes. The County responded to the request in accordance with section 70.51(16)(a). On August 7, 2024, 163 days after Traska submitted his request 9 for relief, the parties convened for a “mediation and hearing session”1 before Special Magistrate James Stokes (“Magistrate Stokes”). At some point during that session, the parties preliminarily reached a tentative settlement agreement (“TSA”), which explicitly stated it was “subject to the approval of the Board of County Commissioners [(“Board”)], which shall be in its sole discretion and at a publicly advertised meeting.” The complaint and its attachments are unclear as to whether the session continued further. The TSA did not indicate how the parties should proceed if the Board failed to approve it. According to emails attached to the complaint, the County did not receive the executed TSA from Traska until October 14, 2024. The County executed the TSA on the same date. On October 22, 2024, at a publicly advertised meeting, the Board rejected the executed TSA. In a letter to the County Attorney, dated October 23, 2024, and attached to the complaint, the Board explained: [T]he Code Enforcement proceedings will no longer be abated; and Mr. Traska will continue to accrue fines until he either unstacks the shipping containers and obtains an approved revision to his building permit in full compliance with the Code, or returns the property to its original configuration prior to construction (i.e., removes the containers); and because of FLUEDRA’s tolling provision, Mr. Traska has time remaining to file an appeal of the Code Enforcement Magistrate’s order should he choose to do so. After the TSA was rejected, Traska’s attorney updated Magistrate Stokes and requested that he issue a written 1. The parties inconsistently describe this proceeding as either a hearing, a mediation, or a combined hearing and mediation. The statute primarily refers to the proceeding before the magistrate as a “hearing” but also describes it as a “mediation.” Compare § 70.51(17), (17)(a), (17)(c), (19), Fla. Stat. (referring to the proceeding as a hearing), with id. § 70.51(10)(b), (17)(a)–(b) (referring to the proceeding as a mediation). 10 recommendation under section 70.51. Traska’s counsel asserted that the section 70.51 procedure was “ongoing,” but the County disagreed, arguing that the procedure could no longer continue based on the 165-day time limitation set forth in section 70.51(23). On October 25, 2024, counsel for the County emailed Magistrate Stokes and Traska’s attorney stating that “Brevard County does not agree to any further extension of the 165-day time limitation for FLUEDRA proceedings set forth in Fla. Stat. § 70.51(23), and does not consent to any additional FLUEDRA proceedings.” Each of these communications were attached to Traska’s complaint. Magistrate Stokes never issued a written recommendation. C. Mandamus Action On November 13, 2024, Traska filed a complaint for writ of mandamus against the County and Magistrate Stokes. The complaint requested: (1) an alternative writ of mandamus requiring the County and Magistrate Stokes to show cause why the alternative writ should not be issued; (2) a writ of mandamus “requiring the County to complete the [alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”)] process statutorily mandated by FLUEDRA”; (3) and a writ of mandamus requiring Magistrate Stokes “to neutrally and impartially fulfill his duties as the special magistrate presiding over the ADR pursuant to § 70.51 Fla. Stat., or in the alternative, removing Mr. Stokes as special magistrate.” The complaint alleged that Magistrate Stokes had a ministerial duty to issue the written recommendation and that the County had an “indisputable legal duty to comply with [FLUEDRA]’s requirements and participate in the [ADR] process” and an “obligation to abide by FLUEDRA leav[ing] no room for discretion.” The complaint further alleged that Traska had a “legal right to the ADR process contemplated by FLUEDRA,” and that mandamus was his only adequate remedy. The court issued an alternative writ in mandamus, directing the County to serve written defenses to the complaint. The County filed a motion to quash the alternative writ and to dismiss the complaint (“motion to dismiss”). Traska did not file a written response to the motion to dismiss. A hearing on the motion to dismiss was held on March 7, 2025. Following the hearing, the court entered an order dismissing the complaint with 11 prejudice and quashing the alternative writ.2 Traska filed a motion for rehearing, which was denied. This timely appeal followed. II. Standard of Review “The de novo standard of review applies when appellate courts consider an order granting a motion to dismiss a petition for writ of mandamus.” Waters v. Dep’t of Corr., 306 So. 3d 1264, 1266 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020); see Barnett v. Antonacci, 122 So. 3d 400, 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (“The de novo standard of review is applied when considering an order granting a motion to dismiss, including the review of an order dismissing a petition for writ of mandamus.” (citation modified)). “Likewise, the appellate standard of review on issues involving the interpretation of a statute is de novo.” Richeson v. S.’s Custom Constr., Inc., 317 So. 3d 1241, 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021). III. Analysis Traska’s complaint failed to state a prima facie case for mandamus relief because it did not establish that the County and Magistrate Stokes (collectively, “Appellees”) had an indisputable ministerial duty to act under FLUEDRA. In support of this conclusion, I first address the fact that the trial court must, like this Court, consider the attachments to the complaint when evaluating its facial sufficiency. Next, I briefly note the difference between a complaint alleging the entitlement to a clear legal right where that entitlement depends on controverted facts—precluding mandamus relief—and factual disputes that may be resolved once the complaint is deemed facially sufficient. After addressing these preliminary matters, I illustrate why Appellees had no 2. In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the court was presented with the same question it first considered when deciding whether to issue the alternative writ: whether the complaint established a prima facie case for relief. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.630(d)(2) (providing that, “[i]f the complaint shows a prima facie case for relief,” an alternative writ in mandamus must issue). The court answered that question in the negative and quashed the alternative writ. 12 indisputable ministerial duty to continue with the FLUEDRA process. Lastly, I discuss why the relief Traska seeks is neither narrow nor appropriate. A. The Attachments to the Complaint Must Be Considered in Evaluating Facial Sufficiency Stating a claim for mandamus relief required Traska to allege that: (1) he had “a clear legal right to the requested relief”; (2) Appellees had “an indisputable legal duty to perform the requested action”; and (3) he had “no other adequate remedy available.” Pleus v. Crist, 14 So. 3d 941, 945 (Fla. 2009) (citation omitted). To determine whether Traska’s complaint stated a prima facie case for mandamus relief, the trial court had to “confine its review to the four corners of the complaint, draw all inferences in favor of the pleader, and accept as true all well-pled allegations.” Poole v. City of Port Orange, 33 So. 3d 739, 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). The exhibits that Traska attached to his complaint were “encompassed within the four corners of the complaint and [had to] be considered therewith on a motion to dismiss.” Chandler v. City of Greenacres, 140 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (citation modified); see Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.130(b) (“Any exhibit attached to a pleading must be considered a part thereof for all purposes.”). To the extent any allegations in the complaint were inconsistent with the attached exhibits, “the plain meaning of the exhibits control[led].” Age of Empire, Inc. v. Ocean Two Condo. Ass’n, 367 So. 3d 1278, 1280 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023); see Viverette v. Dep’t of Transp., 227 So. 3d 1274, 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (“Any inconsistency between the pleading and the attached exhibit has the effect of neutralizing the allegations of the petition, rendering the pleading deficient.” (citation modified)). The same principles govern our review of an order granting a motion to dismiss. See City of Gainesville v. Dep’t of Transp., 778 So. 2d 519, 522 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (explaining that, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a trial court applies the four corners rule and “a reviewing court operates under the same constraints” (citation modified)); Chandler, 140 So. 3d at 1083 (applying the four corners rule to the appellate court’s review of an order dismissing a mandamus complaint). Accordingly, the exhibits that Traska attached to the mandamus complaint were reviewable by the trial court in ruling 13 on the motion to dismiss and are reviewable by this Court in determining whether that ruling was correct. B. When the Clear Legal Right Depends on the Determination of Controverted Questions of Fact, Mandamus Cannot Lie A mandamus complaint that alleges entitlement to a clear legal right dependent upon the determination of controverted facts is distinct from one that states a claim for relief but subsequently requires the fact finder to resolve questions of fact to determine the complainant’s ultimate entitlement to the relief requested. Compare Immer v. City of Miami, 898 So. 2d 258, 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (finding mandamus was not an available remedy where complaint, which sought to cancel a building permit issued to the property owners association, and its attachments revealed a factual dispute over whether association or complainant owned property on which a building was to be constructed), with Floyd v. Laramore, 329 So. 3d 802, 803 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (finding that a mandamus complaint asking the public defender’s office to provide a deposition transcript was facially sufficient, warranting a response to the complaint, and that “[i]f there is a dispute over whether the [office] possesses the requested records, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue”). “Relief cannot be afforded by mandamus where the right to which relator claims he clearly is entitled depends on the determination of controverted questions of fact.” Immer, 898 So. 2d at 259 (citation modified). Here, the determination of whether the parties agreed to extend the FLUEDRA process beyond 165 days is a question of fact that, if resolved, would establish whether Traska has a clear legal right at all to compel Appellees to act under FLUEDRA. See id. (emphasizing mandamus relief is unavailable where the clear legal right alleged depends on the determination of controverted questions of fact); see also Coldiron v. Seminole Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 936 So. 2d 42, 43 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“Mandamus may not be used to establish rights.”). Thus, mandamus is not appropriate. C. The Complaint and Its Attachments Failed to Demonstrate Appellees Had an Indisputable Ministerial Duty to Continue with the FLUEDRA Process 14 Under these facts, the court did not err in dismissing the case because the complaint and its attachments did not demonstrate Appellees had an indisputable ministerial duty to continue with the FLUEDRA process.3 “The duty of the respondent in a mandamus action must be ministerial in nature, and not discretionary.” Ag. for Health Care Admin. v. Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP, 221 So. 3d 1260, 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). “A duty or act is ministerial when there is no room for the exercise of discretion, and the performance being required is directed by law.” Maloy v. Seminole County, 264 So. 3d 370, 372 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (citation omitted). Here, it is unclear whether the parties ever transitioned to the hearing phase because they reached the TSA during mediation. The hearing is triggered “[i]f an acceptable solution is not reached.” § 70.51(17)(b), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Because a solution was preliminarily reached between Traska and the County, the record is unclear whether that hearing occurred. If an acceptable solution is not reached and the hearing phase occurs,4 the magistrate “shall 3. Whether the County had an indisputable ministerial duty to initially participate in the FLUEDRA process is not at issue in this case and thus is not addressed here. See City of Tarpon Springs v. Planes, 30 So. 3d 693, 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“The City did not have a ministerial duty to submit to the dispute resolution procedures of the Act unless the dispute qualified for such informal resolution, which here it did not.”). 4. The majority’s analysis only addresses whether the TSA was an “agreement for a permissible use”: “This subsection does not prohibit the owner and governmental entity from entering into an agreement as to the permissible use of the property prior to the special magistrate entering a recommendation. An agreement for a permissible use must be incorporated in the special magistrate’s recommendation.” § 70.51(19)(c), Fla. Stat. This analysis fails to consider that the TSA was a “solution” under section 70.51(17). Compare § 70.51(17)(a)–(b), Fla. Stat. (discussing “solution[s]” during the mediation phase, which are never described by subsection (17)(a) to (b) as “agreement[s] for permissible use”), with id. § 70.51(19)(c) (referring to “agreement[s] for a permissible use” in the context of the magistrate’s recommendation, which 15 weigh all information offered at the hearing” and “may hear from all parties and witnesses that are necessary to an understanding of the matter.” Id. § 70.51(17)(c). It is this hearing which requires the magistrate to, “[w]ithin 14 days after the conclusion of the hearing, . . . prepare and file with all parties a written recommendation.” Id. § 70.51(19). In other words, FLUEDRA conditions the magistrate’s issuance of the recommendation on the conclusion of the hearing. See id. Traska’s complaint and attachments do not establish that the hearing occurred and therefore Traska cannot demonstrate that Magistrate Stokes had an indisputable legal duty to issue the recommendation. See Pleus, 14 So. 3d at 945. i. Because Issuance of the Recommendation Was Not Statutorily Triggered, the County Also Had No Indisputable Ministerial Duty to Act After the 165-Day Deadline Passed Because issuance of the recommendation was not triggered, the County had no indisputable ministerial duty to continue with the FLUEDRA process after 165 days. FLUEDRA imposes a 165- day deadline on its ADR process: “The procedure established by this section may not continue longer than 165 days, unless the period is extended by agreement of the parties.”5 § 70.51(23), Fla. Stat. This 165-day deadline is an absolute outer limit on the issues fourteen days after the hearing under section 70.51(19)). The distinction between an acceptable solution and an agreement for permissible use matters because the shift to the hearing phase is triggered where an acceptable solution is not reached, see id. § 70.51(17)(b), and it is the conclusion of the hearing that triggers the magistrate’s recommendation, see id. § 70.51(19). 5. The 165-day limitation is in furtherance of the expedited procedure contemplated by FLUEDRA. See § 70.51(29), Fla. Stat. (“Governmental entities are encouraged to expedite notice and time-related provisions to implement resolution of disputes under this section.”); Mark S. Bentley, Understanding the Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act, 37 Stetson L. Rev. 381, 383 (2008) (noting FLUEDRA is “intended to provide an informal, expedited procedure”). 16 “procedure established by this section.” Id. (emphasis added). Put differently, the FLUEDRA procedure as a whole cannot continue for more than 165 days absent an “agreement of the parties.” Id. Also important here is section 70.51(21). Forty-five days after receiving the recommendation, “the governmental entity responsible for the development order or enforcement action” and other participating governmental entities “must consult among themselves” and accept, modify, or reject the recommendation in accordance with subsection (21). Id. § 70.51(21). Without receiving the recommendation, the County had no indisputable ministerial duty to “consult” on the recommendation and accept, modify, or reject it after the parties surpassed the 165-day period. See id. That the County may have initially agreed by its conduct to extend the 165-day deadline, see id. § 70.51(23), did not impose an indisputable ministerial duty on the County to continue with the FLUEDRA process indefinitely. The County clearly stated that it did “not agree to any further extension of the 165-day time limitation” and did “not consent to any additional FLUEDRA proceedings” immediately after learning the TSA was rejected by the Board. On these facts, in the absence of an “agreement of the parties” to continuing extending the 165-day deadline and a recommendation from Magistrate Stokes, Traska was not entitled to further action by the County.6 See id. D. The Relief Sought in the Complaint Is Unwarranted in the Context of the Narrow, Extraordinary Writ of Mandamus 6. The majority refers to the County’s interpretation of the 165-day requirement as a “one-way ratchet: binding on the property owner, optional for the government,” but under the majority’s analysis, the 165-day requirement would be binding on the government, but not the owner. Such an interpretation misses the mark. If one party no longer agrees to continue past the 165- day requirement—whether that party is the owner or the government—then an “agreement of the parties” no longer exists. See § 70.51(23), Fla. Stat. 17 The majority asserts that the complaint stated a plausible claim to compel “the narrow ministerial act of issuing and filing the recommendation” and permits Traska to pursue a “narrowed writ compelling the special magistrate’s ministerial obligation to file a written recommendation.” But this relief is unavailable on our review of an action seeking the “narrow, extraordinary writ” of mandamus. Mathews v. Crews, 132 So. 3d 776, 779 (Fla. 2014); see Mayfield v. Sec’y, Dep’t of State, 402 So. 3d 1002, 1005 (Fla. 2025) (“Mandamus is a discretionary writ that offers relief only in narrow circumstances.”); State ex rel. Perkins v. Lee, 194 So. 315, 317 (Fla. 1940) (“While mandamus is classed as a legal remedy, it is a remedial process, which is awarded, not as a matter of right, but in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion and upon equitable principles. It is an extraordinary remedy[.]”). Compelling Magistrate Stokes to issue the recommendation would necessarily activate additional steps under FLUEDRA, such as requiring the County to consult on the recommendation and accept, modify, or reject it. See § 70.51(21), Fla. Stat. What the majority describes as a “narrow” act is not only unwarranted, but in fact not narrow at all. See Mayfield, 402 So. 3d at 1005; Mathews, 132 So. 3d at 779. IV. Conclusion Because Traska failed to allege an indisputable legal duty on the part of Appellees, the remaining elements for a mandamus claim need not be addressed. See Est. of White v. Med. Exam’rs Comm’n, 416 So. 3d 400, 404 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025) (“All three elements are necessary to establish a mandamus claim. If any element is not proven, mandamus will not lie.” (citations omitted)); Wuesthoff Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Fla. Elec. Comm’n, 795 So. 2d 179, 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (finding “it unnecessary to determine whether [the petitioner] has satisfied the first two elements” for mandamus relief because it failed to establish the third). The complaint and its attachments did not set forth a prima facie case for mandamus, and the trial court properly dismissed the complaint. I would affirm. 18