Full Opinion

25CA1706 Hancock v Colorado Dept of Human Services 10-29-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA1706 City and County of Denver District Court No. 24CV547 Honorable Jon J. Olafson, Judge Brenda Hancock, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of Colorado Department of Human Services, Defendant-Appellee. JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS Division IV Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Harris and Lipinsky, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 29, 2026 Brenda Hancock, Pro Se Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Rachel E. Ollis, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 Plaintiff, Brenda Hancock, appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing her amended complaint against defendant, the State of Colorado Department of Human Services (the Department). We reverse and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. I. Background ¶2 Hancock, representing herself, filed a complaint and then an amended complaint in the district court using JDF 610, which is a judicial department form complaint for seeking judicial review of final agency action under section 24-4-106, C.R.S. 2026. She stated in both her initial and amended complaints that she sought review of a decision issued by the Department. ¶3 Hancock attached to her initial complaint a final decision issued by the Department, through its Office of Appeals, rejecting her administrative appeal of an order by an administrative law judge (ALJ) granting summary judgment to the Department. The Department’s decision indicated that Hancock had brought the underlying administrative proceeding to challenge a county department of human services’ finding of moderate intrafamilial physical abuse of a child. According to the Department’s decision, 1 the ALJ entered an order granting a motion to deem admitted various requests for admissions to which Hancock hadn’t responded. Then, in the summary judgment order, the ALJ concluded that Hancock’s admitted actions constituted child abuse. The Department rejected Hancock’s arguments challenging the summary judgment order and, accordingly, affirmed that order. ¶4 In her amended complaint, Hancock answered the three preprinted questions on the form complaint as follows: The following facts show how I have been adversely affected or aggrieved: It affects my background by seeking employment working with children as youth leader at my church, going to the detention center holding a weekly service, a relation with my grandchildren because it affects the relationship to see them. The reasons entitling me to relief are as follows: I still want to be able to attend the [ministerial] roles I hold at the juvenile detention center, nursing homes and potential future I have with the youth and school activities volunteering with my grandchildren. The relief that I request is as follows: The relief is the reversal of the decision of the remand or modification of the initial decision of the summary judgment, and final agency decision, from the Office of Appeals. 2 ¶5 Hancock also included an additional page in her amended complaint further outlining the prejudice she claimed to have suffered as a result of the Department’s decision. She further added, “From the beginning to the end this process has been false and inaccurate[.] That’s why I’m seeking to appeal the final decision from the Office of Appeals.” ¶6 After Hancock filed her amended complaint, an attorney entered an appearance on her behalf in the district court. Before the Department responded to the amended complaint, and without filing the administrative record, the attorney filed a brief in support of Hancock’s petition for review. The Department filed a motion to strike the brief as premature, which the district court granted. ¶7 The Department also filed a motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), arguing that Hancock hadn’t stated any factual or legal basis entitling her to relief. The district court agreed and granted the motion. This appeal followed. II. Discussion ¶8 Hancock challenges the Department’s final decision approving the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Department and asks us to reverse that decision and either vacate the ALJ’s child 3 abuse finding or remand the matter for a hearing before an ALJ. We can’t provide such relief in this appeal, which is limited to reviewing the district court’s order dismissing the complaint for judicial review. Nor could the district court have provided such relief at this stage of the proceedings, before the administrative record was lodged with the court. ¶9 Nonetheless, while we can’t address the more specific challenge and request for relief Hancock raises in her appeal, we can address the more general relief she seeks, which is relief from the district court’s dismissal order. Thus, although she doesn’t expressly address how her amended complaint satisfies the applicable pleading standards, we broadly interpret her pro se opening brief to argue that the district court erred by dismissing her complaint for judicial review. See Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 262 P.3d 970, 973 (Colo. App. 2011). ¶ 10 And, on review of the district court’s dismissal order, we conclude that the amended complaint sufficiently states a claim for relief and should proceed under section 24-4-106 to a review on the merits of the Department’s final decision. We therefore reverse and remand the case for further proceedings. 4 A. Legal Standards ¶ 11 We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5). Miller v. Crested Butte, LLC, 2024 CO 30, ¶ 21. In doing so, “we apply the same standards as the district court, and we accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. And, like the district court, we consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to or referenced in the complaint, and any matters of which we may take judicial notice. 802 E. Cooper, LLC v. Z-GKids, LLC, 2023 COA 48, ¶ 12. ¶ 12 The principal purpose of a complaint is to provide notice of the plaintiff’s claims. CenturyLink, Inc. v. Houser, 2026 CO 20, ¶ 28. To that end, section 24-4-106(4) requires a complaint seeking judicial review of final agency action to “state the facts upon which the plaintiff bases the claim that [they] ha[ve] been adversely affected or aggrieved, the reasons entitling [them] to relief, and the relief which [they] seek[].” See Arapahoe Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Velarde, 2022 CO 18, ¶ 19. ¶ 13 To survive a Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege a plausible claim for relief. Miller, ¶ 22. This means that 5 “‘the factual allegations of the complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief “above the speculative level”’ and ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” 802 E. Cooper, ¶ 11 (quoting Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50, ¶¶ 1, 9). That includes, under section 24-4-106(4), alleging facts indicating that the plaintiff has been adversely affected or aggrieved by an agency action, is entitled to relief, and specifically seeks that relief. ¶ 14 Because Hancock represented herself when she filed her initial and amended complaints, we liberally interpret those pleadings. See Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone, LLC, 2024 COA 128, ¶ 11. However, even when she was self-represented, she was still required to comply with the same procedural rules that apply to parties represented by counsel. See Adams v. Sagee, 2017 COA 133, ¶ 10. B. Analysis ¶ 15 Construing Hancock’s amended complaint liberally, as we must, we conclude that she sufficiently stated a claim for relief. ¶ 16 Although we agree with the district court that most of the amended complaint is dedicated to describing the “perceived harm that resulted from [the Department’s] actions,” we disagree with the district court’s conclusion that the amended complaint fails to 6 allege sufficient facts to allow us to “draw a reasonable inference” that the Department “acted in a wrongful manner causing the alleged harm.” ¶ 17 We can ascertain from the amended complaint — particularly when construed along with the Department’s final decision attached to the initial complaint, see 802 E. Cooper, ¶ 12 — that Hancock is seeking judicial review of the Department’s final decision affirming the ALJ’s grant of summary judgment on her challenge to the child abuse finding. Hancock states in the amended complaint that she seeks “reversal” or “modification” of the “final agency decision” on summary judgment. And she alleges that the proceedings before the Department were “false and inaccurate.” Although she doesn’t flesh out the legal bases supporting her challenge to the Department’s final decision, we conclude that she has alleged enough to state a claim at this stage in the proceedings. See id. at ¶ 11; § 24-4-106(4).1 1 Although we don’t consider Hancock’s stricken, prematurely filed district court opening brief in determining whether she sufficiently stated a claim in her amended complaint, we note that she attempted to flesh out her legal theories in that filing before the Department moved to dismiss her amended complaint. 7 ¶ 18 Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of Hancock’s amended complaint and remand the case for further proceedings. In doing so, we express no opinion on the merits of Hancock’s claim. III. Disposition ¶ 19 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court to reinstate the amended complaint and conduct further proceedings in this case. JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur. 8