Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2960-24 CATHLEEN STORMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EDWARD STORMS, Defendant-Respondent. _________________________ Submitted October 8, 2026 – Decided October 20, 2026 Before Judges Mawla and DeAlmeida. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County, Docket No. FM-03-1179-22. Hark & Hark, attorneys for appellant (Michael J. Collis, on the brief). Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM In this one-sided appeal, plaintiff Cathleen Storms appeals from an April 25, 2025 order denying her request to amend a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On February 27, 2023, the parties were divorced following a long-term marriage, which produced one child who is emancipated. The judgment of divorce incorporated a property settlement agreement (PSA) the parties entered a month prior. The PSA contained a mutual waiver of alimony, required each party to bear their own medical insurance and related expenses, retain the vehicles titled in their respective names, and recited the fact they neither owned a home nor had joint bank accounts. The prime assets were defendant's IRA and his pension. Plaintiff owned no retirement assets. The parties agreed to divide defendant's IRA equally. They also agreed to equally divide the marital coverture portion of defendant's pension and retain an accounting firm to prepare the QDRO. The PSA noted "[a]fter the account has been segregated and the QDRO has been effectuated, [defendant] shall be authorized to remove [plaintiff's] name from such account, or as beneficiary or survivor, on the account." Approximately one month after the parties' divorce, plaintiff's counsel 1 contacted the accountant regarding the QDRO preparation. Counsel completed 1 Plaintiff has new counsel on appeal. A-2960-24 2 a QDRO instruction form on behalf of plaintiff and submitted it to the accountant. The form asked several questions to enable the accountants to understand the type of QDRO to prepare. Notably, it asked: "Should the order be a separate interest order or a shared interest order (check one)?" This section of the form defined the interests as follows: Under a shared interest the alternate payee begins collecting when participant does and receives a benefit until either party dies. Under a separate interest the alternate payee may enter pay status any time after the participant reaches earliest retirement age under the plan and will continue collecting after the participant's death as long as [they] commenced benefits before the participant's death. If participant has already commenced benefits, shared must be selected. Counsel selected the "shared" box. Further on, the form asked: "Should the alternate payee receive survivor benefits upon the participant's death pre-retirement (check one and if yes, specify percentage or to extent of assigned interest)?" The definitional section of this part of the form explained "[a]nswering yes means . . . alternate payee's benefit is not forfeited if the participant dies before the alternate payee commences benefits." Counsel selected "no." A-2960-24 3 The next box asked the same question regarding whether the alternate payee should receive survivor benefits on the participant's death post-retirement. The definitional section of the box read as follows: Under a separate interest order, post-retirement survivorship is not necessary because the alternate payee will collect until [their] own death if the participant dies after the alternate payee's commencement. Under a shared interest order, answering yes will allow the alternate payee to collect until [their] own death, but the benefit amount for both parties will be reduced by the cost of the benefit. Counsel selected "no." On July 18, 2023, the accountant emailed the parties and counsel to advise the QDRO form as completed meant that upon defendant's death, "whether before or after his commencement of benefits," plaintiff would not collect anything further from the pension. The accountant asked plaintiff's counsel to advise if her "intent [was] something other than a shared interest order for the pension with no survivor benefits." Plaintiff's counsel replied the following day, advising plaintiff "should still be entitled to her share of the benefit[s] even in the event of [defendant]'s death." Counsel contended the PSA language, which allowed defendant to remove plaintiff as his beneficiary "only meant to refer to [defendant's] portion A-2960-24 4 of the benefit - after the account had been divided." Defendant responded as follows: I'm confused on what is needed. 1. Am [I] to find out if there is an annuity? 2. If [I] die why should [plaintiff] get any payments since that is being done now? So even if we are divorced and [I] die [five] years from now; she still gets a payout? This is very concerning. Plaintiff's counsel replied the accountant had been seeking clarification "for months" about whether his pension was comprised of "a pension and an annuity or just a pension." Regardless, counsel explained "in the event of your death, [plaintiff] would receive the payments she is entitled to per the QDRO. Nothing more." At this point, the QDRO-related correspondence ceased. Then on February 16, 2024, a Family Part judge entered a QDRO, whose caption showed it was prepared by plaintiff's counsel. Paragraph four of the QDRO noted it applied to defendant's union pension fund, which it called the "Pension Plan" as well as his union's "Annuity Fund." The annuity fund was comprised of a money purchase sub-account and a profit- sharing sub-account, which it collectively referred to as the "Sub-Accounts." Paragraphs seven and eight of the QDRO defined the marital coverture portion A-2960-24 5 as approximately twenty-two years, and noted plaintiff was assigned fifty percent of plaintiff's accrued benefits in the pension plan during the marital coverture period. Paragraph ten, entitled "Death Procedures," noted plaintiff would receive benefits until the earlier of defendant's death or her own. "Should [defendant] predecease [plaintiff] either before or after they have commenced benefits, [plaintiff] shall not be treated as [defendant]'s surviving spouse. If [plaintiff] predeceases [defendant], her assigned share of his benefit[s] under the [p]ension [p]lan shall revert to defendant." Paragraph twelve read as follows: The death of [plaintiff] shall have no effect on the payment of the benefit assigned to her from the Annuity Fund by this Order. In the event of the death of [plaintiff], payment from the Annuity Fund shall be made to her designated beneficiary or, if no beneficiary has been designated, her estate in the amount determined in . . . this Order. The death of [defendant] shall have no effect on the payment of benefits to [plaintiff] from the Annuity Fund. On January 13, 2025, plaintiff filed a post-judgment motion to amend the QDRO to reflect she was entitled to survivor benefits. Her motion sought relief under Rule 4:50-1(a) and (f). Plaintiff's certification pointed out the parties' long-term marriage and the lack of other assets subject to equitable distribution. She understood the QDRO A-2960-24 6 would provide her with a survivor benefit to enable her to receive her share of the equitable distribution because she would otherwise be exiting the marriage "with absolutely nothing and no means to support [herself] in retirement." The post-judgment email correspondence about the QDRO preparation showed everyone understood she would receive a survivor benefit. She noted defendant was involved in the correspondence, and "[a]lthough he initially raised an objection, his concerns seemed to be pacified by [her] lawyer's response to him." Plaintiff's counsel also filed a certification. She claimed the error in the QDRO came to her attention after the QDRO was entered. Counsel "assumed . . . the QDRO would . . . reflect a survivor benefit for [plaintiff] per [her] emails." When counsel contacted the accountant, they indicated the QDRO was not prepared based on the email correspondence but instead based on the instruction form. Counsel certified "[a] paralegal completed the administrative task of filing out the instruction form and inadvertently stated . . . plaintiff would not be entitled to a survivor benefit." Plaintiff paid the accountant an additional sum to amend the QDRO, however, by then defendant retained counsel who objected to entry of an amended order. Plaintiff's counsel argued the court should grant relief under Rule 4:50- 1(a) because the QDRO was inaccurate due to "several mistakes." She noted A-2960-24 7 the original instruction form sent to the accountant "inadvertently indicated . . . plaintiff should not receive a survivor benefit." Notwithstanding this error, plaintiff noted her attorney's follow up email made clear she should receive a survivor benefit. Counsel asserted the email correspondence showed even though defendant initially objected, it later appeared he did not. Yet despite this, the survivor benefit was omitted from the QDRO. Plaintiff's counsel also argued relief was warranted under Rule 4:50-1(f) because there had been no delay in her making the post-judgment motion as "[t]he mistake was recently discovered." Plaintiff only wanted her agreed upon equitable distribution in the event defendant predeceased her. Neither party would be prejudiced if the court granted the motion, whereas plaintiff would be "greatly prejudiced" if the QDRO was not amended. Defendant retained counsel, who filed a cross-motion in opposition to plaintiff's motion. Defendant's certification claimed the parties "agreed . . . [p]laintiff would not be a survivor or beneficiary on the pension[,]" that defendant was free to designate a beneficiary or survivor, and had already done so. His certification emphasized plaintiff's "portion is [fifty percent] of the marital coverture share and that is it." Plaintiff's benefit ended when either she A-2960-24 8 or defendant died. He argued the court should not consider the parties' post- judgment email correspondence about the QDRO because the PSA controlled. Plaintiff's reply certification pointed out the QDRO language defendant relied upon to claim she waived pension payments after his death dealt with the survivor benefit after the account having been segregated. In other words, defendant could designate a beneficiary and survivor on his portion of the retirement assets. On the other hand, allowing plaintiff to receive her portion of the retirement benefits in the event of defendant's death would not affect defendant's share and would assure she received her equitable distribution. The record reflects the motion judge issued a tentative decision prior to oral argument. Afterwards, the judge conducted oral argument during which each attorney reiterated their client's view of the dispute. The judge then directed plaintiff to return to the accountant "to see if the interpretation of survivor benefits of the marital coverture is a reasonable interpretation in consideration of the" PSA. In other words, was it possible to name plaintiff the beneficiary or survivor of her half of the marital coverture portion of the pension and enable defendant to name the beneficiary or survivor on the remainder. The judge concluded her ability to grant plaintiff's motion would be predicated on the accountant's response. A-2960-24 9 Although the Appellate Clerk's office requested it, we do not have plaintiff's response to the judge's directive. However, the April 25, 2025 order reflects plaintiff filed a supplemental certification containing the accountant's response to the judge's directive on March 7, 2025. According to the order, the accountant stated "if a participant is already collecting under the [p]ension fund, an order can only be a shared interest order." The motion judge denied plaintiff's motion without prejudice. She found as follows: Upon review of the submissions, the [c]ourt agrees with [d]efendant's counsel that the parties did not bargain for a Qualified Preretirement Survivor Annuity (QPSA) or Qualified Joint and Survivor annuity (QJSA). Correspondence from [the accountant] indicates . . . the QDRO prepared was a shared interest order.[] [The accountant]'s correspondence indicates that for a shared interest for a participant who has not begun to collect, the order can or cannot include a QPSA and/or a QJSA. Without a QPSA, if the participant dies before starting to collect, the alternate payee will not collect. Defendant states that the parties did not bargain for a QPSA or QJSA, with neither being referenced in the [PSA]. Defendant asserts that as he is not collecting, the alternate payee would not collect. The [c]ourt agrees. I. Plaintiff argues the record shows her survivorship benefits were inadvertently left off the QDRO form by her previous attorney contrary to the A-2960-24 10 parties' intent. She points to the July 2023 email exchange between her attorney and the accountant where the latter advised the QDRO as provided would not give plaintiff any survivorship benefits from defendant's pension and plaintiff's attorney asserted this was incorrect and plaintiff should be entitled to survivorship benefits as the parties intended. Plaintiff contends "[t]hese undisputed communications" demonstrate the QDRO's exclusion of survivorship benefits was simply a clerical mistake. Plaintiff asserts the judge erred in denying her motion by finding the parties did not bargain for a QPSA and a QJSA because this was not the issue before the court. Rather, the issue was whether the QDRO was incorrect and mistakenly omitted survivorship benefits for plaintiff. The PSA provision allowing defendant to remove plaintiff as the beneficiary of the pension did not eliminate the availability of survivorship protection to secure her share of the pension and instead intended to apply after the pension was QDROed. Plaintiff argues the record evidence of the mistakes associated with the entry of the QDRO warranted relief under Rule 4:50-1(a). The circumstances were also exceptional and warranted relief pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(f). II. A-2960-24 11 Relief from a final order under Rule 4:50-1 is to be "granted sparingly." F.B. v. A.L.G., 176 N.J. 201, 207 (2003). Therefore, a trial court's decision under a Rule 4:50-1 motion "will be left undisturbed [by us] unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion." Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994). Beyond Rule 4:50-1, we generally defer to factual findings made by Family Part judges when they are supported by "'adequate, substantial, credible evidence.'" Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). "Minimally adequate fact finding requires a discussion that demonstrates that the court has heard and addressed the relevant facts and claims under the controlling legal standards." Gordon v. Rozenwald, 380 N.J. Super. 55, 76-77 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Bailey v. Bd. of Rev., 339 N.J. Super. 29, 33 (App. Div. 2001)). "A trial court's rulings in such matters are discretionary and not overturned unless the court abused its discretion, failed to consider controlling legal principles or made findings inconsistent with or unsupported by competent evidence." Id. at 76 (citations omitted). Where, as here, the motion judge's findings were based solely on those written submissions and oral argument, we do not owe the same degree of A-2960-24 12 deference to the judge's fact findings as we would if they had made credibility findings after a plenary hearing. P.B. v. T.H., 370 N.J. Super. 586, 601 (App. Div. 2004). And where the issue is a misapplication of law, our review is de novo. S.D. v. M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super. 417, 430 (App. Div. 2010). The contractual nature of matrimonial agreements has long been recognized in New Jersey. Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 265 (2007) (citing Harrington v. Harrington, 281 N.J. Super. 39, 46 (App. Div. 1995)). A contract's terms should be enforced as the parties intended. Id. at 266. However, "Family Part judges possess a broad supervisory role in determining the fairness of agreements between spouses." Fattore v. Fattore, 458 N.J. Super. 75, 87 (App. Div. 2019). In other words, a marital settlement agreement is a contract that is enforceable to the extent it is fair and equitable. Petersen v. Petersen, 85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981) (citations omitted). Here, the disputed facts were secondary to the more fundamental question of law the judge did not fully consider, namely, whether plaintiff should receive her bargained-for equitable distribution. Equitable distribution is "designed to advance the policy of promoting equity and fair dealing between divorcing spouses." Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 45 (App. Div. 2011). "[T]he goal of equitable distribution . . . is to effect a fair and just division of marital A-2960-24 13 [property]." Steneken v. Steneken, 183 N.J. 290, 299 (2005) (alterations in original). "[E]quitable distribution 'reflects a public policy that is 'at least in part an acknowledgment that marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking, that in many ways [ ] is akin to a partnership.'" M.G. v. S.M., 457 N.J. Super. 286 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 284 (2016)). "By the plain terms of the statute, [N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1], a spouse's right to share in marital property by virtue of equitable distribution arises when" the parties are divorced. Carr v. Carr, 120 N.J. 336, 342 (1990). We do not believe the judge would have reached the same result if she had looked beyond the contract issues and considered whether the result was fair to both parties as required by law. The evidence in the record readily shows there was substantial prejudice to plaintiff and none to defendant. Indeed, as things stand with the present QDRO, if defendant predeceases plaintiff, then plaintiff forfeits her equitable distribution. Whereas if the judge had granted plaintiff's motion, the "prejudice" to defendant was to deprive him of the ability to name a beneficiary or survivor other than plaintiff on plaintiff's equitable distribution. The judge's finding the parties did not negotiate for a QPSA or a QJSA ignored language already in the PSA, limiting defendant's ability to designate a beneficiary on the pension. As we noted, the PSA permitted defendant to A-2960-24 14 designate a beneficiary "[a]fter the account has been segregated and the QDRO has been effectuated . . . ." (Emphasis added). This sort of language is normal in matrimonial cases; it envisions the working spouse who earned the pension can designate someone other than their ex-spouse on not only the working spouse's marital coverture share but also on the pre- and post-marriage portion of the pension, if any. Therefore, the PSA's omission of a QPSA or QJSA was not dispositive. For these reasons as well, we are unconvinced the PSA granted defendant the ability to name a survivor or beneficiary on the entire pension, such that if he predeceased plaintiff the survivor or beneficiary would receive plaintiff's portion of what was acquired during the marriage, in contravention of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1. In closing, without reaching the arguments related to Rule 4:50-1(a), we conclude exceptional circumstances existed warranting granting plaintiff's motion pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(f). "No categorization can be made of the situations which would warrant redress under [Rule 4:50-1](f). . . . [T]he very essence of (f) is its capacity for relief in exceptional situations. And in such exceptional cases its boundaries are as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice." DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242, 269-70 (2009) A-2960-24 15 (omission and second alteration in original) (quoting Ct. Inv. Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334, 341 (1966)). A reversal is necessary here to achieve equity and justice. The April 25, 2025 order is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the judge shall supervise the entry of a revised QDRO consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-2960-24 16