Jeffrey Hineman v. Daisy Chase

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-2000 JEFFREY HINEMAN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. DAISY CHASE, Respondent-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 2:24-cv-00415 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge. ____________________ ARGUED APRIL 10, 2026 — DECIDED JULY 20, 2026 ____________________ Before ROVNER, ST. EVE, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. A jury found Jeffrey Hineman guilty of first-degree child sexual assault after a two-day trial in a Wisconsin county court. Hineman sought postconviction re- lief in state court, which the Wisconsin Supreme Court ulti- mately denied. Hineman then petitioned for federal habeas relief, arguing that the prosecution suppressed material evi- dence and that his defense attorney’s performance at trial was prejudicially defective. The district court granted Hineman’s 2 No. 25-2000 petition, but we reverse that decision and deny habeas relief because the Wisconsin Supreme Court reasonably applied federal law in concluding that neither the suppressed evi- dence nor counsel’s performance impacted the outcome of Hineman’s trial. I. Background A. Factual Background Hineman had a romantic relationship with SJS’s mother when SJS 1 was born in April 2008. Though Hineman was not SJS’s biological father, he stayed involved in SJS’s life for a lit- tle over a year until SJS and his mother moved away in Sep- tember 2009. SJS’s mother eventually lost custody and SJS moved in with his biological father. In 2013, Hineman contacted SJS’s grandmother asking to reestablish a relationship with SJS. SJS’s father and grand- mother agreed and allowed Hineman to have regular contact with SJS. Hineman spent time with SJS in SJS’s home, bought him gifts, took him shopping, and played with him in the park. In October 2014, when SJS’s father was hospitalized with a severe illness, Hineman stayed in SJS’s home for about a week to watch and care for the child. Often, Hineman was alone with SJS. Hineman stayed in the house with SJS the week of Halloween. Around Christmastime of that year, SJS’s father and grandmother started noticing changes in SJS’s relationship with Hineman. Though SJS previously had a positive relation- 1 SJS is the minor victim in the underlying child sexual assault case. No. 25-2000 3 ship with Hineman, he stopped wanting to be around Hineman, though he did not explain why. In January 2015, SJS also began showing behavioral and anger issues both at home and at school. His behavioral problems culminated in a March 12, 2015, report to Child Protective Services (“CPS”) from SJS’s therapist. The CPS report indicated SJS had dis- played troubling behavior, including pulling his pants down in class and at home and acting as if he was going to defecate on the floor. SJS’s therapist also reported that SJS was ob- served at school sucking on his pen cap, moving his head up and down while slurping, and telling a classmate that it “feels good when someone sucks on your privates.” Though ini- tially SJS said he learned about this from a Garfield movie, he later told his father that Hineman told him. The CPS report stated, “Reporter indicates that no information was given by [SJS] that Hineman had touched him or forced [SJS] to touch Hineman.” The therapist reported that she told SJS’s father and grandmother about her concerns and they no longer per- mitted Hineman to have contact with SJS. On June 5, 2015, the Racine County Sheriff’s Office re- ceived a copy of the March CPS report. The sheriff’s office as- signed the case to Investigator Tracy Hintz, who began her investigation by reviewing the CPS report and summarizing its contents in a police report. Hintz’s report described SJS’s concerning behavior and stated that SJS had been sucking on a pen at school, told a classmate it “feels good to have your privates sucked on,” and indicated that Hineman had told him this. Hintz also wrote in her report that “[n]o specific in- formation was given on if [Hineman] touched [SJS] or forced [SJS] to touch [Hineman].” 4 No. 25-2000 Hintz interviewed SJS’s father and grandmother and coor- dinated a forensic interview of SJS, which took place on Au- gust 4, 2015. During the forensic interview, SJS disclosed to the interviewer, Heather Jensen, that Hineman had touched him inappropriately. Hintz visited Hineman’s residence the following day to interview him. Hineman was not home when Hintz arrived, but he soon drove by in his truck and then, seeing Hintz’s police car, drove off. Immediately after, he told Hintz on the phone that he was an hour away. He re- turned within minutes of the call and Hintz interviewed him. The following day, the State filed a criminal complaint charging Hineman with first-degree child sexual assault for sexual contact with a person under the age of thirteen, in vio- lation of Wisconsin Statute § 948.02(1)(e). B. Procedural Background The case against Hineman proceeded to trial. The State made various pre-trial disclosures to Hineman, including Hintz’s report detailing the March CPS report, but did not dis- close the CPS report itself. At trial, the State called four wit- nesses: Jensen (the forensic interviewer), SJS, SJS’s grand- mother, and Hintz. Jensen testified to her interview process and provided ex- pert testimony on common patterns in children’s disclosures of sexual assault. She explained child sexual assault victims often delay disclosing what happened out of fear, shame, or ignorance that what happened to them was wrong. Hensen estimated around fifty percent of the children she interviews delay their disclosure. She also testified that children often disclose in a piecemeal fashion, sharing small parts of the story with different individuals over time. No. 25-2000 5 Jensen next authenticated the video of SJS’s forensic inter- view, which the State played for the jury. The video contained the following exchanges: [Jensen]: Did [Hineman] ever do anything else that you didn’t like? Tell me about that. [SJS]: He touched my private parts. Q: Okay. Tell me all about [Hineman] touching your private parts. A: Ugh, my mom and dad were sleeping, and me and him were on the couch and he just touched my private parts. Q: Uh-hmm. And then what happened? A: He laughed at me. Q: He laughed at you? Okay. Then what happened? A: I woke my mom and dad up and I told them. Q: Okay. And then what happened? A: Um, he kicked [Hineman] out again, and he told him that—to never come back. … Q: Okay. And did [Hineman] touch on your clothes or your skin? A: My clothes. … Q: … Did [Hineman] ever want you to do something to his privates? A: Yeah, but I didn’t do it. 6 No. 25-2000 Q: What did [Hineman] want you to do? A: Touch his privates, but I didn’t do it. SJS stated during the interview that Hineman had touched him during the “wintertime” when he was six and that it hap- pened four times, then later said Hineman touched him six times. SJS testified following the forensic interview video. Ini- tially he answered, “I don’t remember,” or “No” when the prosecutor asked whether Hineman had touched him. But SJS, who was nine years old at the time of the trial, relaxed and grew more responsive after admitting that he was nerv- ous testifying, stating, “I think [Hineman] touched me on my private part.” SJS said the sexual contact occurred the day af- ter Halloween while he and Hineman were alone in the house and sitting on the couch together watching cartoons. He first said he told his grandmother and father what Hineman had done the day it happened, but later on cross-examination tes- tified that he told them a few weeks after it happened and at different times. SJS’s grandmother testified that SJS had never told her or his father about the assault in any specific terms, explaining that while SJS “claims that he told his daddy … he didn’t come right out and say what anything was.” Instead, SJS told his father he did not want to be around Hineman anymore. The grandmother testified that she could tell something was bothering SJS and kept asking him what was wrong, but that he always said “nothing.” Hintz testified for the State regarding her involvement with the case. She recounted how Hineman attempted to evade her and lied about his whereabouts when she tried to No. 25-2000 7 contact him at his home. Hintz also shared several of the ex- planations Hineman gave during the interview as to why SJS might falsely accuse him of sexual assault and supplied her reasons for disbelieving his explanations. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Hintz whether the August 2015 forensic interview was the first time SJS disclosed that Hineman had sexually assaulted him: [Counsel:] And is that the first time that [SJS] says that [Hineman] touched his privates? [Hintz:] I don’t know if that’s the first time [SJS] had said that. I know that was the first time that I had seen that. But I believe in the CPS report, that there was a statement in there that he said [Hineman] had done that. But I would have to look at the original report that came from CPS. Q: Would that have been anywhere in your report if … there was a mention that [Hineman] had inappropri- ately touched [SJS]? A: I don’t know if I documented that. Whether or not I would have to look at my report again, in my original narrative to see if I did indeed write that in there. Q: But if you were told that [there was inappropriate touching], you would have then put it in your report? A: I would think I would have but it’s not—I might have not put it in there but that’s why I would have to look at the report and look at the original CPS. I believe it does state that he later says that. Though defense counsel had access to Hintz’s police report summarizing the CPS report and stating it contained no dis- 8 No. 25-2000 closure of sexual touching, counsel did not use Hintz’s report to impeach her testimony. Hintz testified that neither SJS’s grandmother nor father mentioned any disclosure of sexual touching when Hintz spoke to them in July 2015, and that there was nothing about a disclosure in the police report she wrote after talking to them. Defense counsel also elicited that Hintz had been a po- lice investigator for a long time, that it was important to doc- ument relevant facts in an investigation, and that if anyone had told her SJS had disclosed sexual touching, she should have included that information in her report. Hineman, the sole defense witness, testified about his re- lationship with SJS and denied assaulting him. He also denied ever calling SJS his son, though the State played a snippet of an interview with Hineman where he said the opposite. The jury found Hineman guilty, and the court sentenced him to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. Hineman filed a postconviction motion asserting that the State suppressed favorable material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland because it failed to disclose the March CPS report, and that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to obtain that report. The postconviction court denied Hineman’s motion, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals re- versed. The Wisconsin Supreme Court unanimously reversed the court of appeals, reinstating Hineman’s conviction. Hav- ing reached the end of the line in state court, Hineman turned to federal court, filing the habeas petition at issue here. The district court granted Hineman’s petition, and the State ap- pealed. No. 25-2000 9 II. Discussion “We review the district court’s decision de novo, but our inquiry is an otherwise narrow one.” Schmidt v. Foster, 911 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2018) (en banc). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a federal court may not grant habeas relief after a state-court adjudica- tion on the merits unless that decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2) “was based on an unreasonable deter- mination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2). We focus our inquiry on the Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion “as the last reasoned state-court decision on the merits.” Schmidt, 911 F.3d at 477. Hineman’s challenge implicates the first of the two ave- nues for relief under § 2254(d), arguing the Wisconsin Su- preme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. Again, our inquiry is narrow: Only the Supreme Court’s holdings may constitute “clearly established federal law” un- der AEDPA, and the Court has “cautioned against stretching its precedent to declare state-court decisions unreasonable.” Id.; see also, e.g., White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 426 (2014). “These standards require federal courts to give the ‘benefit of the doubt’ to merits decisions issued by the courts of the sov- ereign States.” Klein v. Martin, 607 U.S. 213, 220 (2026) (quot- ing Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)). “The term ‘unreasonable’ refers not to ‘ordinary error’ or even to circumstances where the petitioner offers ‘a strong case for relief,’ but rather to ‘extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice syste[m].’” Mays v. Hines, 592 U.S. 385, 391 10 No. 25-2000 (2021) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)). A state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent may be incorrect or even clearly erroneous yet still fall short of un- reasonableness. See McDaniel v. Polley, 847 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2017); Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 118 (2020). We may in- trude on a State’s “sovereign power to punish offenders,” only when the state court’s decision “was so lacking in justifi- cation that there was an error … beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. “[A] state prisoner must ‘show far more’ than ‘clear error.’” Klein, 607 U.S. at 220 (quoting Shinn, 592 U.S. at 118). This is, by Con- gress’s design, a difficult standard to meet. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102; see also Klein, 607 U.S. at 220 (“AEDPA sharply lim- its federal review of habeas claims raised by state prisoners.”). Only in “those relatively uncommon cases in which state courts veer well outside the channels of reasonable decision- making about federal constitutional claims” is habeas relief appropriate. Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 302 (7th Cir. 2017). This is not one of those uncommon cases. The state court did not “blunder so badly” that every fairminded jurist would agree its decision unreasonably applied Supreme Court prec- edent governing suppression of evidence and ineffective as- sistance of counsel claims. Mays, 592 U.S. at 392. We address each claim as follows. A. Brady Claim On appeal, Hineman maintains that the State withheld fa- vorable evidence from him at trial in violation of his due pro- cess rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He argues the State should have disclosed the March CPS report, which could have changed his odds at trial. No. 25-2000 11 The prosecution’s “failure to disclose favorable evidence upon a defendant’s request ‘violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.’” United States v. Walker, 746 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). The Brady rule applies not only to exculpatory evidence but also to impeachment evi- dence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)). To succeed on his Brady claim in the state postconviction proceedings, Hineman needed to prove the evidence at issue was (1) favor- able, (2) suppressed, and (3) material to his defense. Socha v. Richardson, 874 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 2017). The Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly articulated this Brady standard and concluded Hineman failed to satisfy it because the CPS report, while favorable and suppressed, was not material. Now, to merit federal habeas relief, Hineman must show that the state- court decision “involves an unreasonable application of Brady and its progeny.” Snow v. Pfister, 880 F.3d 857, 867 (7th Cir. 2018). On appeal, as below, the parties’ arguments hinge on Brady’s materiality element. Evidence is “material” for Brady purposes “only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. “A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the out- come.” Id. In other words, the suppression of evidence must have “deprive[d] the defendant of a fair trial.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). We assess the likelihood of a different outcome “in light of the totality of the circumstances.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683. As with the general Brady rule, the Wisconsin Supreme 12 No. 25-2000 Court accurately identified these precedents governing mate- riality under Brady. Often, cumulative impeachment evidence is not material. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 582 U.S. 313, 327–28 (2017); see also Socha, 874 F.3d at 989 (“Impeachment evidence is not ma- terial if it is ‘merely cumulative.’” (quoting United States v. Dweck, 913 F.2d 365, 371 (7th Cir. 1990))). This is a logical ap- plication of the Brady standard: cumulative impeachment ev- idence typically adds little to the picture before the jury. If the jury has already heard that a witness was using mind-altering drugs during the events he is testifying about, for example, additional evidence of drug use to impeach that witness would have no substantial likelihood of changing the trial’s outcome because it is cumulative. Turner, 582 U.S. at 327–28. The materiality inquiry regarding cumulative evidence still turns on the standard set forth in Bagley—whether there is a reasonable probability of a different result had the evidence been disclosed. But in general, impeachment evidence that is “merely cumulative” “has no reasonable probability of affect- ing the result of trial.” Dweck, 913 F.2d at 371. The Wisconsin Supreme Court evaluated the CPS report alongside Hintz’s police report containing nearly identical language and reasonably concluded that the CPS report was cumulative impeachment evidence with no substantial likeli- hood of changing the outcome of Hineman’s trial. Hineman contends that he could have used the withheld CPS report to impeach Hintz’s testimony suggesting the CPS report de- tailed a disclosure of sexual contact in March. Doing so would have weakened Hintz’s reliability and clarified that SJS de- layed his disclosure even longer, until August, perhaps cast- ing doubt on the veracity of his claims. The CPS report, which No. 25-2000 13 stated unequivocally that “no information was given by [SJS] that [Hineman] had touched him or forced [SJS] to touch [Hineman],” certainly could have impeached Hintz’s testi- mony. But it was cumulative of the police report in Hineman’s possession at trial, which stated, “[n]o specific information was given on if [Hineman] touched [SJS] or forced [SJS] to touch [Hineman].” Hineman continuously stresses the im- portance of impeaching Hintz’s testimony and clarifying the disclosure timeline with the CPS report, but the police report containing a nearly identical statement would have achieved the same result. A fairminded jurist could agree this is the kind of case where the suppressed evidence is “merely cumu- lative and thereby has no reasonable probability of affecting the result of trial.” Id. This case differs slightly from other cases denying Brady claims based on cumulative impeachment evidence because here, Hineman never used the police report at trial to impeach Hintz’s statement about the timing of SJS’s initial disclosure. But Brady only requires the prosecution to disclose the rele- vant exculpatory evidence to the defendant, Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; it does not require the prosecution to ensure the defense uses all disclosed evidence advantageously. If Hineman’s in- ability to impeach Hintz’s testimony dating SJS’s initial dis- closure to March deprived him of a fair trial, it was because his counsel failed to use the police report to that end, not be- cause the State suppressed the CPS report. And Hineman does not claim ineffective assistance of counsel on those grounds. Perhaps not every court would agree with the state court’s disposition given the CPS report was not cumulative to any evidence actually presented at trial. But “‘if we can posit ar- 14 No. 25-2000 guments or theories that could have supported the state court’s decision, and if fairminded jurists could disagree about whether those arguments or theories are inconsistent with Supreme Court holdings,’ we must deny the petition.” Socha, 874 F.3d at 987 (quoting Kidd v. Lemke, 734 F.3d 696, 703 (7th Cir. 2013)). We have no trouble identifying arguments to support the state court’s decision here. At the very least, Hineman has not cited any Supreme Court precedent saying it is unreasonable to find cumulative evidence would not affect the trial outcome merely because the defendant chose not to use the evidence in his possession at trial. Accordingly, Hineman has not shown the state court’s decision to the contrary was an unreasonable application of federal law under AEDPA’s demanding standard. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (“Given the lack of holdings from this Court regarding” the circumstances of the state- court trial, “it cannot be said that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.” (citation modified)). Following the district court’s lead, Hineman insists the state court erred beyond reasonable disagreement by divorc- ing the two nearly identical statements in the police and CPS reports from the totality of the circumstances at trial. But a side-by-side comparison of the two statements reveals how little would have changed had the State disclosed the CPS re- port, regardless of the other evidence presented. A fair- minded jurist could find that the two reports communicate exactly the same thing for purposes of impeaching Hintz’s tes- timony on disclosure. Applying the deference due under AEDPA, the state court’s statement-to-statement analysis was reasonable. No. 25-2000 15 Moreover, Hineman incorrectly suggests that clearly es- tablished federal law required the state court to expressly walk through the totality of the evidence presented at trial in order to conclude the CPS report was immaterial. “Federal courts have no authority to impose” these kinds of “manda- tory opinion-writing standards on state courts.” Klein, 607 U.S. at 221 (citation modified) (quoting Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 300 (2013)). A state court “need not make detailed findings addressing all the evidence before it” to withstand federal habeas review. Id. at 221–22 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 347 (2003)) (reversing lower court’s de- cision granting habeas petition because the state court had “failed to discuss certain evidence that tended to undermine the State’s case”). Indeed, the Court has upheld state-court Brady decisions even when they did not discuss the evidence at all. See, e.g., Harrington, 562 U.S. at 99. Though the totality of the trial evidence must factor into the state court’s ruling on materiality, Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683, no clearly established federal law requires state courts to expressly articulate this analysis in their opinions. Bagley certainly does not say so, id., nor may we stretch Bagley’s holding to declare the state-court decision unreasonable, Schmidt, 911 F.3d at 477. The district court arrived at the opposite conclusion rely- ing on Sims v. Hyatte, where we articulated some of the factors courts should consider when evaluating the Brady materiality element. 914 F.3d 1078, 1089 (7th Cir. 2019). But Sims does not impose a requirement that state courts expressly walk through each factor or explicate every piece of evidence from trial. And as a non–Supreme Court opinion, Sims does not es- tablish a basis for finding an unreasonable application of fed- eral law under AEDPA. In demanding the Wisconsin Su- preme Court recount all the evidence and weigh it in a specific 16 No. 25-2000 way, the district court failed to afford the deference AEDPA requires. See Klein, 607 U.S. at 222–23 (“AEDPA … bars federal courts from imposing opinion-writing standards on state courts and demands that the relevant state-court decision be given the ‘benefit of the doubt.’” (quoting Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24)). In any event, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s ruling on materiality was reasonable under the totality of the circum- stances. This case turned on the credibility of a nine-year-old boy testifying about traumatizing events that happened when he was six, versus the credibility of an adult man. Though contradictions and inconsistencies appeared in both parties’ testimony, the State presented ample evidence explaining SJS’s inconsistent disclosures. SJS also admitted he was nerv- ous testifying on the witness stand—understandably so given his age and situation. In contrast, defense counsel presented no evidence to rehabilitate or explain the weaknesses in Hineman’s testimony. Hintz’s testimony about her initial in- teraction with Hineman, where he evaded her and lied about his whereabouts, further degraded his credibility. Further, Hintz’s testimony regarding the date of SJS’s ini- tial disclosure was confused and uncertain, and Hineman suc- cessfully impeached her memory and the quality of her inves- tigation on cross-examination. There was little to gain from further impeaching Hintz’s statement that she “thought” the CPS report mentioned SJS’s disclosure. Altogether, we cannot say all fairminded jurists would agree that a different out- come was substantially likely had the State disclosed the CPS report. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112 (“The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.”). No. 25-2000 17 The district court gave short shrift to the strength of SJS’s testimony while neglecting to acknowledge the factors com- promising Hineman’s testimony or the expert testimony ex- plaining SJS’s inconsistent disclosure. But our role under AEDPA is not to look for the strongest arguments against the state court’s decision. Rather, a federal court considering a state prisoner’s habeas petition “must carefully consider all the reasons and evidence supporting the state court’s deci- sion,” Mays, 592 U.S. at 391, and give the state court the “ben- efit of the doubt,” Klein, 607 U.S. at 220; see also Mays, 592 U.S. at 392 (explaining the question under AEDPA is not whether the district court “itself could see a substantial likelihood of a different result” but whether the state court “managed to blunder so badly that every fairminded jurist would disa- gree” with its decision (citation modified) (first quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) and then quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009))). A fairminded jurist could see the State’s case against Hineman more favorably and determine that the CPS report would not have changed the outcome of the trial. B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel On appeal, Hineman maintains he received ineffective as- sistance of counsel because his lawyer failed to obtain the CPS report. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. To succeed under a Strick- land claim, a petitioner must demonstrate first “that counsel provided constitutionally deficient performance” and second “that this deficient performance prejudiced his defense.” Pierce v. Vanihel, 93 F.4th 1036, 1047 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Dunn v. Jess, 981 F.3d 582, 591 (7th Cir. 2020)). “Failing to prove either element defeats a petitioner’s claim.” Dunn, 981 F.3d at 591. 18 No. 25-2000 As to counsel’s failure to obtain the March CPS report for impeachment purposes, the Wisconsin Supreme Court cor- rectly held that Hineman’s Brady and Strickland claims rise and fall together because they use the same standard for “ma- teriality” and “prejudice.” Suppressed evidence is material and a counsel’s deficient performance is prejudicial if there is a “reasonable probability” that “the result of the proceeding would have been different” absent the error. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (extending the prejudice test from Strickland to materi- ality under Brady claims); accord Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 646 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The Strickland prejudice and Brady materiality standards are identical.”) As with the Brady materiality analysis, it is reasonable to conclude the result would not have changed had Hineman’s attorney obtained the CPS report, since even when she had the police report containing identical information at her dis- posal, she did not use it to impeach Hintz’s testimony regard- ing SJS’s disclosure. Hineman could have brought an ineffective assistance of counsel claim about his counsel’s failure to use Hintz’s police report to impeach her testimony regarding the disclosure timeline. But Hineman did not make that claim (and it would likely fail on the deficiency prong given the obvious strategic soundness of his lawyer’s decision not to introduce evidence that revealed Hineman had talked to six-year-old SJS about oral sex). Hineman also argues he received ineffective assistance be- cause, had his counsel filed motions to obtain the March CPS report, she also would have obtained other CPS reports from April and May. But the Wisconsin court thoroughly reviewed the additional CPS reports and found them of no consequence No. 25-2000 19 for Hineman’s postconviction arguments. This factual finding was not clearly erroneous because the reports, which detailed SJS’s worsening behaviors and his father and grandmother’s suspicions about Hineman, added nothing new to the picture. Hineman nevertheless argues that the April and May CPS reports could have changed the outcome of his trial by iden- tifying alternative causes for SJS’s behavior problems, expos- ing “investigative tunnel vision,” and showing that the adults in SJS’s life jumped to conclusions about sexual assault in- volving Hineman before SJS ever disclosed anything. But other evidence adduced at trial showed that the adults in SJS’s life repeatedly asked him what was wrong, assumed some- thing bad had happened, and assumed Hineman had harmed SJS months before SJS ever disclosed the assault. Trial evi- dence also showed Hintz’s investigation was fixated on Hineman without looking into any alternative causes. Under these circumstances, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply federal law in concluding Hineman failed to show his trial would have come out differently had counsel performed differently. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 200–02 (2011). * * * The judgment of the district court is REVERSED.