Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals Hulsey Law Group, LLC, Respondent, v. Robin M. Schoepfel, Jessica Lynn Schoepfel, and Nicolas Mark Schoepfel, Appellants. Appellate Case No. 2025-000355 Appeal From Charleston County Jessica Ann Salvini, Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-467 Submitted September 1, 2026 – Filed November 4, 2026 REVERSED AND REMANDED Jonathan M. Robinson, Shanon N. Peake, and G. Murrell Smith, Jr., all of Smith Robinson Holler DuBose Morgan, LLC, of Columbia, for Appellants. Cherie K. Durand, of Hulsey Law Group, LLC, of Mount Pleasant, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: This is an appeal of three orders. One denied a temporary injunction, which Appellants sought to stop their former attorney from disclosing confidential and privileged information. The others denied motions to dismiss and to stay. We reverse the order denying a temporary injunction and remand for additional consideration. We find the other orders are not immediately appealable. We begin with the temporary injunction. The circuit court carefully considered this situation, but the order does not apply the correct standard. See Rawlinson Rd. Homeowners Ass'n v. Jackson, 395 S.C. 25, 36, 716 S.E.2d 337, 343 (Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam) (holding the failure to consider the elements required for an injunction was error). The order does not evaluate whether Appellants demonstrated irreparable harm or a likelihood of success on the merits. See Compton v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 392 S.C. 361, 366, 709 S.E.2d 639, 642 (2011) (holding an injunction requires (1) threat of irreparable harm; (2) likelihood of success on the merits; and (3) no adequate remedy at law). The order holds Appellants' remedy would be a report to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel but does not analyze the adequacy of that remedy. See Cartee v. Lesley, 286 S.C. 249, 256, 333 S.E.2d 341, 345 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding the adequacy of a remedy is "not decided by narrow and artificial rules"). Disciplinary decisions are inadequate to remedy Appellants' alleged harm, and we believe this injunction is like others upheld on appeal which preserved the status quo during litigation. See Jennings-Dill, Inc. v. Israel, 442 S.C. 98, 104, 897 S.E.2d 201, 204 (Ct. App. 2024); see also Peek v. Spartanburg Reg'l Healthcare Sys., 367 S.C. 450, 457, 626 S.E.2d 34, 37–38 (Ct. App. 2005). We leave it to the circuit court's discretion to review the existing record and determine whether additional submissions or a second hearing is necessary to evaluate Appellants' temporary injunction motion. The other orders are not immediately appealable. See Huntley v. Young, 319 S.C. 559, 506, 462 S.E.2d 860, 861(1995) (per curiam); cf. Edwards v. SunCom, 369 S.C. 91, 95, 631 S.E.2d 529, 531 (2006) (holding an order granting a stay is not immediately appealable). Though this court can consider such orders when paired with an appealable issue, judicial economy does not warrant review here. See Edge v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 366 S.C. 511, 517, 623 S.E.2d 387, 390 (2005). REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1 GEATHERS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur. 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.