M. C. v. J. E.

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ************************************************  M. C. v. J. E. M. C. v. J. E. (AC 49114) Clark, C. J., and Elgo and Moll, Js. Syllabus The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting the plain- tiff’s application for a civil protection order pursuant to statute (§ 46b-16a). He claimed that the court incorrectly granted the application because the court’s unchallenged factual finding that the plaintiff’s daughter and the defendant had married prior to the filing of the application rendered the plaintiff ineligible for relief under § 46b-16a. Held: The trial court improperly granted the plaintiff’s application for a civil protection order pursuant to § 46b-16a, as the plaintiff, a person related by marriage to the defendant, was qualified to seek relief pursuant to a different statute (§ 46b-15) and, therefore, was ineligible to obtain relief under § 46b-16a. Submitted on briefs September 22—officially released October 6, 2026 Procedural History Application for a civil protection order, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Nor- walk and tried to the court, Hon. John F. Kavanewsky, Jr., judge trial referee; judgment granting the plain- tiff’s application for a civil protection order, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; order vacated. J. E., self-represented, filed a brief as the appellant (defendant). Opinion PER CURIAM. The self-represented defendant, J. E., appeals from the judgment of the trial court, Hon. John F. Kavanewsky, Jr., judge trial referee, granting, on September 2, 2025, the August 5, 2025 application for a civil protection order filed by the plaintiff, M. C.,1 pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-16a.2 The defendant’s 1 The plaintiff did not file a brief or otherwise participate in the pres- ent appeal. 2 General Statutes § 46b-16a (a) provides in relevant part: “Any person who has been the victim of . . . stalking may make an application to the  M. C. v. J. E. dispositive claim on appeal is whether the court correctly granted the plaintiff’s application pursuant to § 46b-16a, notwithstanding the court’s factual finding, set forth in its October 6, 2025 articulation, that the plaintiff’s daughter and the defendant had married in March 2025. Because that factual finding is not challenged on appeal, we conclude that the plaintiff was not eligible for relief pursuant to § 46b-16a, which excludes from eligibility thereunder any person who qualifies to seek relief under General Statutes § 46b-15. Section 46b-15 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any family or household member, as defined in section 46b-38a, who is the victim of domestic violence, as defined in section 46b-1,3 by another fam- ily or household member may make an application to the Superior Court for relief under this section. . . .”4 (Footnote added.) General Statutes § 46b-38a (2) defines “ ‘[f]amily or household member’ ” as “any of the follow- ing persons, regardless of the age of such person: (A) Spouses or former spouses; (B) parents or their children; (C) persons related by blood or marriage; (D) persons Superior Court for relief under this section, provided such person has not obtained any other court order of protection arising out of such . . . stalking and does not qualify to seek relief under section 46b-15. As used in this section, ‘stalking’ means two or more wilful acts, performed in a threatening, predatory or disturbing manner of: Harassing, following, lying in wait for, surveilling, monitoring or sending unwanted gifts or messages to another person directly, indirectly or through a third person, by any method, device or other means, that causes such person to reasonably fear for his or her physical safety.” (Emphasis added.) 3 General Statutes § 46b-1 (b) provides in relevant part: “As used in this title, ‘domestic violence’ means: (1) A continuous threat of present physical pain or physical injury against a family or household member, as defined in section 46b-38a; (2) stalking, including, but not limited to, stalking as described in section 53a-181d, of such family or household member; (3) a pattern of threatening, including, but not limited to, a pattern of threatening as described in section 53a-62, of such family or household member or a third party that intimidates such family or household member; or (4) coercive control of such family or household member, which is a pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unrea- sonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty. . . .” 4 Section 46b-15 was amended by No. 25-78, § 14, of the 2025 Public Acts, which made changes to the statute that are not relevant to the present appeal. Accordingly, all references in this opinion to § 46b-15 are to the current revision of the statute.  M. C. v. J. E. other than those persons described in subparagraph (C) of this subdivision presently residing together or who have resided together; (E) persons who have a child in common regardless of whether they are or have been mar- ried or have lived together at any time; and (F) persons in, or who have recently been in, a dating relationship.” (Emphasis added.) On the basis of the foregoing, we con- clude that the plaintiff, as a person related by marriage to the defendant, qualified to seek relief under § 46b-15 and was, therefore, ineligible to obtain relief pursuant to § 46b-16a. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to vacate the September 2, 2025 order of civil protection.