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The slip opinion may contain deviations from the formal authenticated opinion. 1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 2 Opinion Number: __________ 3 Filing Date: October 29, 2026 4 No. A-1-CA-43059 5 ANGELA KIM NATION, 6 Petitioner-Appellee, 7 v. 8 ISIAH DEREK ROYBAL, 9 Respondent-Appellant, 10 and 11 STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. 12 HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, 13 Intervenor-Appellee. 14 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN MIGUEL COUNTY 15 Abigail Aragon, District Court Judge 16 Angela Kim Nation 17 Las Vegas, NM 18 Pro Se Appellee 19 Isiah Derek Roybal 20 Las Vegas, NM 21 Pro Se Appellant 1 New Mexico Health Care Authority 2 Child Support Services Division 3 Kristin Sovey 4 Rio Rancho, NM 5 Larry Heyeck 6 Las Cruces, NM 7 Alicia Hohl 8 Farmington, NM 9 for Intervenor-Appellee 1 OPINION 2 HOUGHTON, Judge. 3 {1} Isiah Roybal and Angela Nation divorced in 2019. Roybal pays Nation child 4 support for their two children. In 2025, the district court adopted a child support 5 hearing officer’s recommendation to reduce Roybal’s child-support obligation 6 because the older child turned eighteen and graduated high school, and therefore was 7 emancipated. But Roybal appeals, arguing that the district court made several errors 8 by adopting the hearing officer’s recommendation. He also argues that the district 9 court erred by not ruling on an emergency motion, and that a court employee 10 prevented his motion from reaching the district court judge. 11 {2} Exercising our jurisdiction under NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-2 (1966), we 12 reverse in part. We reverse the district court’s calculation of Roybal’s child-support 13 contribution and its assignment of uninsured healthcare expenses. We decline to 14 review Roybal’s due-process argument and his argument that the district court 15 picked the wrong start date for the revised child-support plan because Roybal failed 16 to preserve those issues. Finally, we do not consider Roybal’s emergency motion 17 because the district court never ruled on it and we therefore lack jurisdiction. 18 BACKGROUND 19 {3} Appellant Isiah Roybal and Appellee Angela Nation divorced in 2019. Nation 20 has custody of their two children and Roybal pays child support. In 2025, their older 1 child turned eighteen and graduated high school, thus emancipating. As a result, the 2 Child Support Services Division (CSSD) moved to modify the child-support order. 3 {4} Because calculating child support requires considering the parents’ finances, 4 CSSD subpoenaed both Roybal and Nation seeking information about their income. 5 See NMSA 1978, § 40-4-11.1 (2023). Nation provided her two most recent paystubs, 6 each showing $2,736.83 in gross pay for different two-week periods in 2025. She 7 also provided her 2024 W-2, which showed $72,831.95 in wages. 8 {5} By consulting a New Mexico Department of Labor database, CSSD 9 independently determined that Nation’s gross income for 2025’s first quarter was 10 $16,420.98. CSSD divided that quarterly figure by three to conclude that Nation’s 11 monthly income was $5,473.66. 12 {6} After a hearing, the child support hearing officer issued a report. The hearing 13 officer relied on the $5,473.66 monthly income calculated by CSSD and income data 14 for Roybal to calculate each parent’s modified child-support obligation. Because 15 Roybal’s income accounted for 46 percent of the parents’ combined gross monthly 16 income, the hearing officer calculated that Roybal owed $555.59 in child support 17 each month. The hearing officer also recommended that Roybal should be 18 responsible for 54 percent of the child’s “reasonable medical, dental[,] and vision 19 expenses not paid by insurance.” The hearing officer noted that Nation, Roybal, and 20 CSSD each had fourteen days to object. 1 {7} Roybal objected to the hearing officer’s method for calculating Nation’s 2 income. 1 He claimed that Nation’s paystubs were for two-week periods, meaning 3 that she was paid biweekly and therefore received twenty-six paychecks per year, 4 not two per month. He argued that Nation actually made $5,929.80 per month, and 5 that, if CSSD had used that number, his child-support payments would be smaller. 6 {8} Roybal also objected to the hearing officer’s recommended split of uninsured 7 healthcare expenses. According to Roybal, he should be responsible for 46 percent 8 of the child’s uninsured healthcare expenses—equivalent to his share of the 9 income—rather than the 54 percent that the hearing officer recommended. 10 {9} Nation responded to Roybal’s objections, and claimed that she makes 11 $5,473.66 monthly but gets paid $2,736.83 biweekly. She also admitted that she 12 made $71,832.00 in 2024, and was paid in twenty-six biweekly payments. The 13 district court overruled Roybal’s objections. Roybal timely appealed. 14 DISCUSSION 15 {10} Roybal raises five issues on appeal. We resolve only the first two. As for the 16 other three, we either lack jurisdiction to consider them or decline to do so because 17 Roybal did not preserve them below. 1 Roybal objected again fifteen days later. But he filed his second set of objections outside the fourteen-day deadline to object and, in any event, the second set is not materially different than the first. 1 I. Standard of Review 2 {11} We review child-support determinations for abuse of discretion. Diamond v. 3 Diamond, 2012-NMSC-022, ¶ 24, 283 P.3d 260; Styka v. Styka, 1999-NMCA-002, 4 ¶ 8, 126 N.M. 515, 972 P.2d 16. “We also review the trial court’s findings of fact to 5 determine if there is substantial evidence to support the determinations.” Styka, 6 1999-NMCA-002, ¶ 8. But a trial court must exercise its discretion “in accordance 7 with the child support guidelines.” Id. “A district court abuses its discretion if it 8 applies an incorrect standard, incorrect substantive law, or its discretionary decision 9 is premised on a misapprehension of the law.” Jury v. Jury, 2017-NMCA-036, ¶ 26, 10 392 P.3d 242 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining 11 whether the district court’s child-support calculation resulted from a 12 misapprehension of law, we apply de novo review. See id. 13 II. Calculating Nation’s Income 14 {12} Roybal argues on appeal that the district court erred by miscalculating 15 Nation’s income. He says that Nation’s paystubs reflect biweekly pay, not twice- 16 monthly pay, so she actually received twenty-six paychecks in 2024. That means her 17 monthly income was $5,929.80, not $5,473.66. On appeal, Nation admits that she is 18 paid biweekly, and that she received a third paycheck in May 2024 and in October 19 2024. Nevertheless, she argues that the district court correctly calculated her 20 monthly income. CSSD, as an intervenor, argues that the district court used an 1 appropriate method to calculate Nation’s income, and that using Roybal’s method 2 would reduce his child-support contribution by just $5.08 per month. We agree with 3 Roybal. 4 {13} The question here is how the district court should calculate gross monthly 5 income when paychecks arrive every two weeks. By its terms, the statute answers 6 the question. When interpreting a statute, “our task is to identify the intent of our 7 Legislature.” State v. Billey, 2026-NMCA-027, ¶ 11, 585 P.3d 547. “If those words 8 are clear and unambiguous, we honor their plain meaning.” Id. (internal quotation 9 marks and citation omitted). In this case, we begin and end with the statute’s plain 10 meaning. 11 {14} Section 40-4-11.1(G) states that the parents’ child-support “obligation[s] shall 12 be calculated based on the combined income of both parents and shall be paid by 13 them proportionately.” The statute defines “income” as “actual gross income,” 14 which includes “income from any source,” like a salary from an employer. 15 Section 40-4-11.1(C)(1), (2). For situations involving a custodial parent and 16 noncustodial parent, “the basic child support obligation shall be calculated using the 17 basic child support schedule promulgated by the department, Worksheet A and 18 instructions contained in Subsection M of this section.” Section 40-4-11.1(H)(1). 19 Worksheet A requires a calculation of each parent’s “Gross Monthly Income.” 20 Section 40-4-11.1(M). To calculate “[g]ross monthly income,” the instructions for 1 Worksheet A state to use “current income if steady.” Id. But if “income varies a lot 2 from month to month,” the instructions direct using “an average of the last twelve 3 months, if available, or last year’s income tax return.” Id. 4 {15} A parent paid biweekly will get twenty-six or twenty-seven paychecks each 5 year. Most months, a biweekly employee will receive only two paychecks. But some 6 months they will receive a third, which would boost their monthly income by 50 7 percent—what we would call “a lot.” See § 40-4-11.1(M). After all, “a lot” means 8 “to a considerable degree or extent.” See a lot, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 9 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/a%20lot (last visited October 19, 10 2026). For parents whose monthly income varies by 50 percent, as Nation’s does, 11 the statute directs that gross monthly income should be calculated by using “an 12 average of the last twelve months, if available, or last year’s income tax return.” 13 Section 40-4-11.1(M). 14 {16} We acknowledge that an employee paid biweekly has income that is “steady,” 15 which suggests using “current income.” Id. But Worksheet A’s instructions are about 16 how to calculate “monthly” income. Id. And the monthly income of an employee 17 paid biweekly is not steady. It varies depending upon how many pay periods end 18 that month. Some months, an employee will receive two checks. Other months, the 19 employee will receive three. 1 {17} Thus, we hold that calculating gross monthly income under Section 2 40-4-11.1(H)(1) for a parent who is paid biweekly requires using “an average of the 3 last twelve months, if available, or last year’s income tax return.” Section 4 40-4-11.1(M). Doubling biweekly income or dividing a biweekly employee’s 5 quarterly income by three is contrary to Section 40-4-11.1(M) and results in an 6 under- or over-calculation of gross monthly income, as it did in this case. 7 {18} Because the district court adopted the hearing officer’s calculation of Nation’s 8 monthly income, which divided Nation’s last reported quarterly income by three 9 rather than using “an average of the last twelve months” or “last year’s tax return,” 10 the court misapplied Section 40-4-11.1(H)(1). “A discretionary decision premised 11 on a misapprehension of the law is an abuse of discretion.” Oakey v. Tyson, 2017- 12 NMCA-078, ¶ 19, 404 P.3d 810. We therefore reverse the district court’s calculation 13 of Roybal’s monthly child-support obligation and remand for the district court to 14 correct its calculation. 15 III. Uninsured Healthcare Expenses 16 {19} Roybal argues that the district court erred by assigning him 54 percent of the 17 child’s healthcare expenses that insurance does not cover. Instead, he claims that he 18 should be responsible for 46 percent, in accordance with his share of the combined 19 income. Nation does not respond to this argument, but CSSD agrees with Roybal. 1 We agree as well. In assigning him 54 percent of the child’s healthcare expenses that 2 insurance does not cover, the district court abused its discretion. 3 {20} Section 40-4-11.1 does not specify how to assign portions of healthcare 4 expenses that insurance does not cover. It does, however, specify that the “cost of 5 providing medical and dental insurance for the children” should be assigned “in 6 proportion to that parent’s income.” Section 40-4-11.1(J). 7 {21} We need not decide whether Section 40-4-11.1(K)(1) mirrors Section 8 40-4-11.1(J) and requires “uninsured expenses” to be assigned in the exact 9 proportions as income. That’s because there is no doubt that assigning Roybal 10 54 percent of the uninsured expenses was a typographical error. At the hearing, 11 CSSD recommended that Roybal cover 46 percent of these uninsured expenses. On 12 appeal, CSSD calls assigning Roybal 54 percent of uninsured healthcare expenses a 13 “scrivener’s error.” Along these same lines, no evidence supports the district court’s 14 decision to assign 54 percent of uninsured expenses to Roybal. Thus, because 15 assigning Roybal 54 percent of uninsured expenses was a “manifest error” and 16 “contrary to all reason,” we hold that the district court abused its discretion. See 17 Spingola v. Spingola, 1978-NMSC-045, ¶ 19, 91 N.M. 737, 580 P.2d 958. 18 {22} But because we hold that the district court miscalculated Nation’s income 19 under Section 40-4-11.1(H)(1), Roybal’s share of uninsured healthcare expenses 1 will change. On remand, the district court should account for this change when 2 reassessing the proportions of uninsured healthcare expenses owed by each parent. 3 IV. Start Date for Revised Child-Support Scheme 4 {23} Roybal argues that the district court erred by ordering the revised 5 child-support plan to begin July 1, 2025. Roybal contends that the plan should have 6 started on June 1, 2025, instead, because the oldest child emancipated no later than 7 May 31, 2025. We will not address this issue because Roybal did not preserve it. 8 {24} “To preserve an issue for review, it must appear that a ruling or decision by 9 the trial court was fairly invoked.” Rule 12-321(A) NMRA. That means to preserve 10 an issue for appeal, “a party must clearly raise the issue in the lower court by 11 invoking a ruling from the court on the question.” Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006- 12 NMSC-002, ¶ 12, 139 N.M. 12, 127 P.3d 548 (internal quotation marks and citation 13 omitted). 14 {25} Roybal did not raise this issue in either his first or his second (untimely) set 15 of objections to the hearing officer’s recommendation. Roybal claims that he 16 preserved it by including it in his docketing statement. It is well established that a 17 party cannot preserve an issue with a docketing statement. See State v. Barrera, 18 2001-NMSC-014, ¶ 20, 130 N.M. 227, 22 P.3d 1177. A party must still raise the 19 issue below. See State v. Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, ¶ 45, 345 P.3d 1056. And 20 Roybal does not point us to where he did so. Unlike a roadrunner that searches the 1 brush for lizards, this Court will not scour the record for evidence of preservation. 2 See Muse v. Muse, 2009-NMCA-003, ¶ 42, 145 N.M. 451, 200 P.3d 104. 3 {26} Because Roybal did not preserve the issue, we review only for fundamental 4 error. See Rule 12-321(B)(2)(c); Est. of Gutierrez ex rel. Jaramillo v. Meteor 5 Monument, LLC, 2012-NMSC-004, ¶ 32, 274 P.3d 97. The fundamental-error 6 doctrine provides relief in civil cases only “under the most extraordinary and limited 7 circumstances.” Meteor Monument, LLC, 2012-NMSC-004, ¶ 33. Roybal does not 8 argue that the timing of the revised child-support order’s start is such a 9 circumstance. 2 Accordingly, Roybal has not demonstrated there was fundamental 10 error in the assignment of the revised child-support order’s start date as July 1, 2025, 11 and not June 1, 2025. See State v. Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 21, 128 N.M. 12 711, 998 P.2d 176 (“Parties alleging fundamental error must demonstrate the 13 existence of circumstances that shock the conscience or implicate a fundamental 14 unfairness within the system that would undermine judicial integrity if left 15 unchecked.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Even so, CSSD points out that modifying the child-support start date to June 2 1, 2025, would increase the amount that Roybal owes by $383.59. Roybal does not address this point in his reply brief, so, even if Roybal had preserved this issue, he waived it. See Delta Automatic Sys., Inc. v. Bingham, 1999-NMCA-029, ¶ 31, 126 N.M. 717, 974 P.2d 1174. 1 V. Roybal’s Emergency Motion 2 {27} Roybal argues that the district court abused its discretion by not ruling on his 3 emergency cease-and-desist motion. On May 20, 2025, he filed a motion asking the 4 district court to issue an emergency cease-and-desist order. The motion appears to 5 request some form of injunction related to his allegation that Nation improperly 6 accessed his financial records. But the district court never issued an order resolving 7 the motion. Roybal asks us on appeal to order the district court to hold a hearing on 8 the motion. 9 {28} We lack jurisdiction to review Roybal’s request because the district court did 10 not resolve it. In other words, there’s a finality problem. “The general rule . . . for 11 determining the finality of a judgment is that an order or judgment is not considered 12 final unless all issues of law and fact have been determined and the case disposed of 13 by the district court to the fullest extent possible.” State ex rel. Child., Youth & Fams. 14 Dep’t v. Brian F., 2023-NMCA-087, ¶ 13, 538 P.3d 478 (alteration, internal 15 quotation marks, and citation omitted); see § 39-3-2. And though we give the term 16 “finality” a practical rather than technical legal construction, there is no final order 17 or judgment here because the district court never ruled on the motion. See Brian F., 18 2023-NMCA-087, ¶ 13. See generally Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 1992- 19 NMSC-005, ¶ 39, 113 N.M. 231, 824 P.2d 1033 (“[I]n collateral matters not 20 involved in the appeal, . . . the trial court retains jurisdiction.”). 1 {29} Nor did the district court implicitly deny Roybal’s motion. A district court can 2 implicitly deny a motion when it enters final judgment or enters “an order 3 inconsistent with the granting of the relief sought.” Stinson v. Berry, 1997-NMCA- 4 076, ¶ 8, 123 N.M. 482, 943 P.2d 129. The district court did neither here. In fact, 5 after the district court entered its child-support order, Roybal acknowledged that his 6 motion was unrelated by stating that the “motion was not a family court matter.” So 7 there was no implicit denial. 8 {30} Additionally, “this [C]ourt does not have the authority to issue a writ of 9 mandamus to district courts.” Lepiscopo v. Hopwood, 1990-NMCA-044, ¶ 9, 110 10 N.M. 30, 791 P.2d 481; see N.M. Const. art. VI, § 29; NMSA 1978, § 34-5-8 (1983). 11 The authority to issue writs of mandamus to the district court is given only to the 12 New Mexico Supreme Court. See N.M. Const. art. VI, § 3; State ex rel. Townsend v. 13 Ct. of Appeals, 1967-NMSC-128, ¶¶ 5-7, 78 N.M. 71, 428 P.2d 473. 14 {31} Thus, because there is no final order resolving Roybal’s motion and we cannot 15 consider this as a writ of mandamus, we lack jurisdiction to consider the issue. See 16 Khalsa v. Levinson, 1998-NMCA-110, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 680, 964 P.2d 844. 17 VI. Due-Process Issue 18 {32} Finally, Roybal argues that the district court violated his due-process rights 19 by permitting a court employee to deny Roybal a hearing on his emergency motion. 20 Roybal claims that he learned from one court employee that another employee—not 1 a judge—had “made a unilateral decision not to schedule hearings” on his 2 emergency motion because the employee “believed CSSD should handle those 3 issues.” 4 {33} We decline to address Roybal’s argument for two reasons. First, Roybal 5 references facts not in the record. Contrary to Roybal’s invitation, we do not consider 6 new facts on appeal because we are “not a fact-finding court.” See State v. Knight, 7 2019-NMCA-060, ¶ 22, 450 P.3d 462. It is well established that “reference to facts 8 not before the district court and not in the record is inappropriate and a violation of 9 our Rules of Appellate Procedure.” See Durham v. Guest, 2009-NMSC-007, ¶ 10, 10 145 N.M. 694, 204 P.3d 19. 11 {34} Second, Roybal did not preserve this issue. He argues that he preserved it by 12 filing the motion and raising it on appeal. But Roybal neither “requested [n]or 13 received a ruling” from the district court on the due-process issue. See Juneau, 2006- 14 NMSC-002, ¶ 12. We will not abandon our rules of preservation, which serve 15 important purposes, including giving the district court an opportunity to correct its 16 own error, and offering the opposing party an opportunity to respond. See Sandoval 17 v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 2009-NMCA-095, ¶ 56, 146 N.M. 853, 18 215 P.3d 791. 19 {35} We decline to exercise our discretion under Rule 12-321(B) to review this 20 issue despite Roybal’s lack of preservation. Roybal did not argue that any of Rule 1 12-321(B)’s exceptions to our preservation requirement applies. And we may 2 “decline[] to apply the preservation exceptions” when an appellant does not argue 3 them on appeal. State v. Joanna V., 2003-NMCA-100, ¶ 10, 134 N.M. 232, 75 P.3d 4 832, aff’d, 2004-NMSC-024, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 40, 94 P.3d 783. Even so, Roybal has 5 not identified any authority requiring the district court to hold a hearing on his 6 motion. And when a party does not cite authority to support an argument, “we may 7 assume no such authority exists.” Curry v. Great Nw. Ins. Co., 2014-NMCA-031, 8 ¶ 28, 320 P.3d 482. 9 CONCLUSION 10 {36} For the reasons stated above, we reverse the district court’s calculation of 11 Roybal’s child-support contribution, reverse the district court’s assignment of 12 uninsured healthcare expenses, and remand to the district court to recalculate 13 Roybal’s child-support contribution and reapportion each parent’s uninsured 14 healthcare expenses obligation. 15 {37} IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 ___________________________________ 17 KRISTOPHER N. HOUGHTON, Judge 1 WE CONCUR: 2 _________________________________ 3 JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge 4 _________________________________ 5 GERALD E. BACA, Judge