Clerk of the Circuit Court and Comptroller of Collier County v. Yoelvis Denis Hernandez, Palmetto Surety Corporation and Liberty Bail Bonds, Inc.
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledAugust 19, 2022
Docket2D21-3886
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT AND
COMPTROLLER OF COLLIER COUNTY,
Appellant,
v.
YOELVIS DENIS HERNANDEZ and
LIBERTY BAIL BONDS, INC.,
Appellees.
No. 2D21-3886
August 19, 2022
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier County; Joseph G. Foster,
Judge.
Thomas W. Franchino of Thomas W. Franchino, P.A., Naples, for
Appellant.
Philip L. Reizenstein and Bhakti Kadiwar of Reizenstein &
Associates, P.A., Miami, for Appellee Liberty Bail Bonds, Inc.
No appearance for Appellee Yoelvis Denis Hernandez.
SILBERMAN, Judge.
The Clerk of the Circuit Court and Comptroller of Collier
County (the Clerk) appeals the circuit court's order granting
remission of 95% of a $30,000 bail bond posted by Liberty Bail
Bonds, Inc. (the Surety). Because the condition of the bond was not
met, the Surety was not entitled to remission. Therefore, we reverse
the circuit court's order.
Yoelvis Denis Hernandez was arrested by the Collier County
Sheriff's Office and was charged in that county with a first-degree
felony. The Surety posted a $30,000 appearance bond on
Hernandez's behalf. When Hernandez failed to appear for a hearing
in December 2020, the judge entered a bench warrant for his
arrest. The Clerk filed a notice of bond forfeiture that same day.
About ten months later, the Surety filed a motion for remission
of the bond and submitted an affidavit in support. The motion and
affidavit reflect that on May 28, 2021, Hernandez was arrested on
federal charges by United States Marshals in Del Rio, Texas,
pursuant to an arrest warrant entered by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida. The Surety stated that it
had contacted the Collier County Sheriff's Office regarding
Hernandez's arrest and was told that Hernandez would not be
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extradited from Texas as the Collier County bench warrant provided
only for extradition within Florida. Federal authorities later
transported Hernandez to the Miami-Dade County Federal
Department of Corrections to await trial for his federal offenses. In
the affidavit, the Surety asserted that the proper prosecution of
Hernandez had not been thwarted as Hernandez remained in
federal custody.
At the hearing on the Surety's motion for bond remission, the
Clerk objected to the request for remission because Hernandez had
never been returned to the jurisdiction of Collier County pursuant
to section 903.28, Florida Statutes (2021), but rather remained in
federal custody. Focusing on the fact that Hernandez had been
arrested on the federal warrant within 180 days of his failure to
appear in Collier County, the trial court granted the Surety's motion
for remission in the amount of 95% of the bond amount.
In this appeal, the Clerk argues that granting remission was
improper because Hernandez's return to Collier County was a
precondition to remission. Further, Hernandez's return to Collier
County was thwarted by his committing new crimes, which led to
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his arrest and prosecution by federal authorities while out on bail
posted by the Surety.
"Remission of forfeiture is a wholly statutory remedy that 'may
not be ordered for any reason other than as specified' in the
statute." Hillsborough County v. Roche Sur. & Cas., Co., 805 So. 2d
937, 938-39 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (quoting ยง 903.28(7), Fla. Stat.
(1999)). We conduct a de novo review of statutory interpretation.
GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So. 2d 781, 785 (Fla. 2007). "Chapter 903,
Florida Statutes, is a compilation of enactments governing bail,
criminal surety bail bonds, and the procedures bail bond agents
should follow in order to obtain relief from the commitments and
obligations imposed on them by the surety bonds they issue once
the bonds are forfeited." Polakoff & Aabbott Bail Bonds v. State, 111
So. 3d 253, 254 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). "Parties' rights and remedies
regarding discharge of forfeited bonds and remission of part or all of
the funds forfeited are currently governed by statutes and the
courts are limited by their provisions." Bd. of Comm'rs of Brevard v.
Barber Bonding Agency, 860 So. 2d 10, 11-12 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
(citing cases).
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At issue here is section 903.28(3), Florida Statutes (2021). It
states:
If the defendant surrenders or is apprehended within 180
days after forfeiture, the court, on motion at a hearing
upon notice having been given to the clerk of the circuit
court and the state attorney as required in subsection
(8), shall direct remission of up to, but not more than, 95
percent of a forfeiture if the surety apprehended and
surrendered the defendant or if the apprehension or
surrender of the defendant was substantially procured or
caused by the surety, or the surety has substantially
attempted to procure or cause the apprehension or
surrender of the defendant, and the delay has not
thwarted the proper prosecution of the defendant. In
addition, remission shall be granted when the surety did
not substantially participate or attempt to participate in
the apprehension or surrender of the defendant when the
costs of returning the defendant to the jurisdiction of the
court have been deducted from the remission and when
the delay has not thwarted the proper prosecution of the
defendant.
ยง 903.28(3).
This court has addressed the doctrine of impossibility of
performance as it relates to section 903.28. In State v. Sunshine
State Bail Bonds, Inc., 967 So. 2d 1084, 1084 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), a
defendant who was out on bond failed to appear in court in Collier
County, an arrest warrant was issued, and a notice of forfeiture was
filed. Id. The defendant remained at large until he was shot and
killed by law enforcement in Georgia. Id. The surety that posted
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the bond moved for remission, and the trial court granted remission
of 80% of the bond. Id.
On appeal, this court reversed the order granting remission
because it was not authorized by section 903.28. Id. at 1085-86.
We concluded that the doctrine of impossibility of performance did
not excuse the surety from "its obligation to take precautionary
action to prevent [the defendant] from leaving the jurisdiction, even
though the actions of a third party prevented it from bringing [the
defendant] back to the jurisdiction." Id. at 1085 (citing Allegheny
Cas. Co. v. State, 850 So. 2d 669, 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) ("The
risk of a defendant not appearing is borne by the surety and the
surety, in order to protect its interest, must take precautionary
actions to prevent this type of situation. . . . [The] [s]urety's
inability to perform its obligation is due to its own fault in
permitting the defendant to leave the State of Florida.")).
The Third District, also addressing impossibility of
performance, upheld the denial of a motion for remission when a
surety was unable to produce the defendant for prosecution. See
Curlycan Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 933 So. 2d 122, 123 (Fla. 3d DCA
2006). There, a defendant who failed to appear in court absconded
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to Venezuela after his bond was estreated. Id. Venezuela refused to
extradite the defendant to the United States, and the surety was
unable to present him for prosecution. Id. The trial court refused
to grant remission, and the Third District affirmed, noting that "a
combination of [the defendant's] voluntary action in fleeing to
Venezuela and [the surety's] failure to take precautionary action to
prevent his leaving the jurisdiction . . . led to the surety's inability
to perform its obligation under the bond." Id. As a result, the court
concluded that the surety was "not entitled to be relieved of the
monetary obligation it contractually assumed." Id.
The Surety asks this court to follow the reasoning set forth in
Surety Continental Heritage Insurance v. Orange County, 798 So. 2d
837 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); however, that case is distinguishable from
the facts of this case. There, defendants who were out on bail failed
to appear at trial and absconded to Jamaica. Id. at 838. The
surety filed for remission of the bond after locating the defendants
in Jamaica. Id. The surety submitted that the Jamaican
authorities were willing to extradite the defendants if an arrest
warrant was issued by the United States and the county would pay
the extradition expenses. Id. However, the State Attorney's Office
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refused to initiate extradition proceedings. Id. Although the trial
court refused to grant remission, the Fifth District reversed. Id.
The Fifth District noted that the surety "was willing to travel to
Jamaica, apprehend [the defendants], and pay the entire expense of
their extradition." Id. at 839. The court concluded that remission
was warranted because the failure in apprehending the defendants
was "due in large part to the State's unwillingness to extradite
them." Id.
Here, unlike the circumstances in Orange County, Hernandez
is alleged to have committed new crimes while out on bond and he
was arrested because a federal warrant was issued against him, not
because of any effort by the Surety. And unlike the surety in
Orange County, the Surety here has not established that it was
ready, willing, and able to present Hernandez to be prosecuted in
Collier County but for the State's refusal to extradite. The record
reflects that the Surety contacted law enforcement while Hernandez
was in federal custody in Texas and was told that the State would
not extradite Hernandez as his warrant was only for extradition
within Florida. However, the record also reflects that Hernandez
was subsequently transferred from Texas to a federal facility in
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Miami. Nothing in the record indicates that the Surety sought to
procure Hernandez's return to Collier County from federal custody
in Miami or that the State refused to seek his return to Collier
County from Miami. Further, the Surety failed to establish whether
the federal authorities would have allowed Hernandez to be
returned to Collier County for prosecution had extradition been
pursued.
Based on these circumstances, Hernandez's prosecution in
Collier County has been thwarted and the granting of remission was
error under section 903.28(3). Accordingly, we reverse the trial
court's order granting remission.
Reversed.
CASANUEVA and SMITH, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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