Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT 949 CLEVELAND STREET, LLC, Appellant, v. BAKER BARRIOS ARCHITECTS, INC.; B&W STRUCTURAL DESIGNS, LLC; ZMG CONSTRUCTION, INC.; and PROSPECT CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, Appellees. No. 2D2025-3319 November 20, 2026 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Patricia A. Muscarella, Judge. Howard W. Poznanski, Coconut Creek, for Appellant. Amy L. Koltnow of Kelley Kronenberg, Tampa, for Appellee Baker Barrios Architects, Inc. No appearance for remaining Appellees. SMITH, Judge 949 Cleveland Street, LLC, appeals the trial court's final judgment awarding attorneys' fees and costs to Baker Barrios Architects, Inc. (BBA), based upon a proposal for settlement under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2021), arguing, among other things, that the final judgment was premature where no judgment was obtained on the jury's verdict of no liability. Because this issue has merit and is dispositive, we need not address the remaining arguments. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. I 949 Cleveland sued BBA alleging construction defects, negligence, and violations of the Florida Building Code. Shortly after suit was filed, BBA served 949 Cleveland with a proposal for settlement, which went unaccepted. The parties attempted to resolve the case at nonbinding arbitration, ordered by the trial court, but 949 Cleveland opted to go forward with a jury trial under section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2024), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820. The details of the trial are not pertinent to this appeal with the exception of the jury's verdict. The jury returned a verdict of no liability in favor of BBA, which in turn filed its Motion for Final Judgment Taxing Attorneys' Fees and Costs.1 The motion sought a final judgment taxing attorneys' fees and costs "by virtue of the jury's verdict." The motion did not request that the trial court confirm or enter judgment on the jury's verdict but instead argued that the jury's verdict "serves as an adjudication on the merits." Relevant here, all parties agreed on the record that no judgment had been entered on the jury's verdict and that 1 We note that nothing in section 768.79 precludes a prevailing offeror from filing a motion for attorneys' fees and costs under section 768.79 following a jury's verdict but prior to a "judgment obtained"; however, the statute requires an "outside deadline of thirty days after the filing of the judgment." See Frosti v. Creel, 979 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 2008) (holding that a party's motion for attorneys' fees and costs filed after a jury's verdict but prior to judgment was timely filed under section 768.79). 2 a hearing on the motion would decide entitlement and the amount of fees. In its order on the motion, the trial court determined that BBA was entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79 and found some, but not all, of its requested attorneys' fees reasonable. The order contemplated that a final judgment in the case would follow: "[BBA] is awarded $598,866.44 which amount shall be included in a Final Judgment when such is entered in this case." A Final Judgment was later entered which provided in toto: Pursuant to the jury verdict rendered in this action and this Court's Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Baker Barrios Architects, Inc.'s April 21, 2025, Motion for Final Judgment Taxing Attorneys' Fees and Costs it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that BAKER BARRIOS ARCHITECTS, INC. shall recover from 949 CLEVELAND STREET, LLC attorneys' fees in the amount of $533,378.44 and taxable costs in the amount of $109,268.50, for a total Final Judgment in the amount of $642,646.94 which sum shall bear interest at the rate prescribed by law of 8.65% per annum from the date of this final judgment, for which let execution issue. II 949 Cleveland argues that the Final Judgment strictly relates to the attorneys' fees and costs as opposed to being the final judgment in the case, while BBA contends that the Final Judgment is the final judgment because it "terminates [the] litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but [t]o enforce by execution what has been determined." Hillsboro Plantation v. Plunkett, 55 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla. 1951) (citing State Rd. Dep't v. Crill, 128 So. 412, 414 (Fla. 1930)). In either scenario, we have jurisdiction. See Hastings v. Osius, 104 So. 2d 21, 22 (Fla. 1958) (holding that an order awarding attorneys' fees containing the language "for which let execution issue" was an 3 independent appealable final judgment); Scott ex rel. Scott v. Women's Med. Grp., P.A., 837 So. 2d 577, 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) ("Final attorney's fees orders are appealable as separate final judgments."). "Oddly, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure contain many references to a final judgment, but they do not appear to contain a rule explaining the procedure for entry of judgment on a jury's verdict." Carlson v. Jeflis Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 904 So. 2d 642, 645 (Fla. DCA 2d 2005). Nor does chapter 55, Florida Statutes, on "Judgments," state that a trial judge must enter a judgment on a verdict. Id. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure Form 1.991 does provide an example of a defense verdict final judgment, which we find instructive: "Pursuant to the verdict rendered in this action IT IS ADJUDGED that plaintiff . . . take nothing by this action and that defendant . . . shall go hence without day and recover costs from plaintiff . . . for which let execution issue." See, e.g., Saye v. Pieschacon, 750 So. 2d 759, 761-62 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (holding that an "award [under 768.79] requires the entry of a final judgment on the issue of liability, or its equivalent, in order to trigger entitlement under the statute"). While this act is typically ministerial, it still remains the trial court's responsibility to enter a judgment on the jury's verdict. Id.; see also Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.215(g)(1) ("Judge's Duty. Every judge has a duty to enter within a reasonable time an order or judgment on every matter submitted to that judge."). The issue of entitlement and the award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to BBA's proposal for settlement are governed by section 768.79, the offer of judgment statute. The plain and clear language of section 768.79 requires a judgment, not a verdict, and provides in pertinent part: 4 (1) In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this state, if a defendant files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by the plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred by her or him . . . if the judgment is one of no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than such offer, and the court shall set off such costs and attorney's fees against the award. .... (7) Upon motion made by the offeror within 30 days after the entry of judgment or after voluntary or involuntary dismissal, the court shall determine the following: (a) If a defendant serves an offer which is not accepted by the plaintiff, and if the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than the amount of the offer, the defendant shall be awarded reasonable costs, including investigative expenses, and attorney's fees, calculated in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Supreme Court, incurred from the date the offer was served, and the court shall set off such costs in attorney's fees against the award. When such costs and attorney's fees total more than the amount of the judgment, the court shall enter judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff for the amount of the costs and fees, less the amount of the award to the plaintiff. .... For purposes of the determination required by paragraph (a), the term "judgment obtained" means the amount of the net judgment entered, plus any postoffer collateral source payments received or due as of the date of the judgment, plus any postoffer settlement amounts by which the verdict was reduced. For purposes of the determination required by paragraph (b), the term "judgment obtained" means the amount of the net judgment entered, plus any postoffer settlement amounts by which the verdict was reduced. (Emphasis added.) The Florida Supreme Court has, time after time, expressed that "it is clear that . . . entitlement to attorneys' fees hinges on the 'judgment obtained,' as opposed to a verdict form returned by the jury." Anderson 5 v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 202 So. 3d 846, 856 (Fla. 2016); see also Frosti v. Creel, 979 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 2008) (holding that a "judgment obtained" should not be equated with a jury's verdict); CCM Condo. Ass'n, v. Petri Positive Pest Control, Inc., 330 So. 3d 1, 3-4 (Fla. 2021) (explaining that in considering whether to accept an offer for section 768.79 purposes, a party must evaluate the amount of a potential jury verdict along with the amount of potential fees, costs, and interest, an amount "to which the offer must be compared in determining whether to award fees and costs"). Accordingly, an award of attorneys' fees and costs, prior to the entry of a final judgment on the issue of liability, is premature and will be reversed. Saye, 750 So. 2d at 761-62. III BBA contends that the Final Judgment entered in this case is the final judgment, arguing that it confirms the verdict of the jury. BBA's position rests on those first five words in the Final Judgment: "Pursuant to the jury verdict." However, these five words are legally insufficient to carry the day. Foremost, BBA did not seek a judgment on the verdict in its motion and, in fact, declined to heed the suggestion from 949 Cleveland to first obtain such a judgment. BBA chose to go forward only on its motion for attorneys' fees and costsโ€”instead arguing that the "no liability" jury verdict satisfied the requisite "adjudication on the merits." Indeed, a trial court cannot be said to have entered certain relief where none was requested. See, e.g., Amerace Corp. v. Stallings, 823 So. 2d 110, 114 (Fla. 2002) (approving the proper procedure for obtaining a judgment after verdict where the trial court denied a request for postjudgment interest on the verdict under section 55.03, Florida Statutes (1998), and quoting the trial court: "If I would have had a request to enter judgment, I would have entered it."). Notably the 6 "adjudication on the merits" argument has been abandoned in this appeal. Second, the first five words of the Final Judgment fail to give any hint of what the jury's verdict was, leaving open the question of liability or what, if anything, the jury found and for whom. See Saye, 750 So. 2d at 761-62 (holding that an "award [under section 768.79] requires the entry of a final judgment on the issue of liability, or its equivalent, in order to trigger entitlement under the statute"). Therefore, there is clearly more work to be done by the trial court in this case. IV Because no judgment was obtained on the jury's verdict, the final judgment of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79 was prematurely entered. Reversed and remanded. SILBERMAN and KELLY, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication. 7