Shafiqur S. Rahman v. Farida B. Rahman
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketA-0039-25
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0039-25
SHAFIQUR S. RAHMAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FARIDA B. RAHMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted October 20, 2026 – Decided November 17, 2026
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Bergman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County,
Docket No. FM-16-1153-01.
Einhorn Barbarito Frost Botwinick Nunn & Musmanno
PC, attorneys for appellant (Patricia L. Veres, on the
brief).
Heimbuch & Solimano, PC, attorneys for respondent
(William J. Heimbuch, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from the June 23, 2025 Family Part order terminating
plaintiff's permanent alimony obligation, directing continued payment of then-
existing arrears, and denying both parties' requests for counsel fees without
prejudice. After consideration of the record, applicable legal principles, and the
parties' arguments, we vacate the order terminating alimony and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
We recite the facts and procedural history relevant to our decision from
the record on appeal. The parties were married in Bangladesh in 1974 and have
one emancipated daughter. Defendant finished tenth-grade in Bangladesh, while
plaintiff had some college education there. After coming to the United States,
plaintiff began working as a chemical operator. Defendant primarily stayed
home, although from time to time she performed part-time sewing work and
worked as a cafeteria aide. The parties separated years before the divorce, and
defendant thereafter lived in Pennsylvania in a home titled in her name only.
Following a multi-day trial in 2002, the Family Part entered a dual
judgment of divorce and awarded defendant permanent alimony of $350 per
week. In the accompanying written findings, the trial judge found plaintiff was
then earning approximately $138,000 per year, including overtime and bonuses.
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The judge imputed minimum-wage income to defendant based on $5.25 per hour
for a forty-hour week. The judge further found there was "little likelihood that
the wife will ever become rehabilitated to the extent that she will be able to
support herself in a fashion commensurate with the standard of living during the
marriage," and concluded permanent alimony was warranted because "the
financial need is clearly demonstrated." The judge stated alimony would
continue until the death of either party, defendant's remarriage, or a significant
change in circumstances.
Plaintiff remained employed with the same company for approximately
twenty more years. According to his certification, he retired on December 30,
2022, at age seventy. At retirement, his annual salary was approximately
$188,505. Plaintiff certified that his employer did not provide him with a
pension, 401(k), or other retirement plan, and that he instead received a gross
severance payment of $50,000, yielding net, after tax, proceeds of $30,512. He
asserted he used a portion of those funds as a down payment on a 2023 Toyota
Corolla and another portion for legal retainers relating to the alimony issue.
After plaintiff retired, the wage garnishment funding defendant's alimony
payment ceased, and plaintiff stopped making weekly alimony payments. As of
July 5, 2024, probation records reflected arrears of $26,513.65.
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On August 20, 2024, plaintiff moved to terminate alimony, vacate arrears,
obtain reimbursement for alimony allegedly paid after retirement, and recover
counsel fees and costs. Plaintiff filed a current Case Information Statement
(CIS) reporting a gross monthly Social Security income of $4,413, net monthly
income of $3,748 after deductions, monthly expenses of approximately $3,980,
and limited assets consisting principally of the remaining severance funds and
vehicle equity. He asserted he had no retirement assets apart from the balance
of his severance and the vehicle.
On September 12, 2024, defendant filed opposition and cross-moved to
enforce alimony, for immediate payment of arrears, and counsel fees. Defendant
certified that alimony ceased in January 2023 and resumed in August 2024 only
after plaintiff's Social Security benefits were garnished. She asserted she
remained financially dependent on alimony, received approximately $1,494 per
month in net Social Security after the Medicare deduction, had to apply for food
stamps, and could not afford needed repairs to her home, which she described
as dilapidated and effectively uninhabitable. Her CIS reported limited liquid
assets and substantial debt.
Defendant further certified that she had only a tenth-grade education,
limited English proficiency, no computer skills, and only a minimal work history
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involving manual or part-time jobs. She also disclosed she suffered from
various medical conditions. Defendant contended the permanent alimony
awarded in 2002, together with her limited earning capacity, was insufficient to
permit meaningful retirement savings. She also challenged the adequacy of
plaintiff's financial disclosures, arguing a five-year review was necessary to
determine whether plaintiff had post-divorce retirement accounts or other assets.
Plaintiff filed a reply certification disputing defendant's assertions
regarding her inability to work and asserted she had many years after the divorce
to improve her language and vocational skills, engage in employment, and save
for retirement. He also attempted to compare the parties' current finances and
relied on the original trial court's determination finding defendant possessed the
requisite skills to obtain employment at the minimum-wage level.
The post-judgment proceedings then addressed the court's concerns
regarding defendant's cognitive functioning. At a February 13, 2025 hearing,
defendant's counsel presented hospital records relating to defendant's November
2024 admission. The court deferred decision on the alimony motion, stating it
wanted to ensure defendant fully understood the proceedings and to determine
whether a law guardian might be necessary. On February 24, 2025, the court
entered an order directing defendant to obtain a cognitive-function and capacity
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assessment, providing that no further support charges would accrue after August
22, 2024, and requiring plaintiff to continue $1,517 per month through a Social
Security intercept to be applied toward alimony arrears.
Defendant later submitted self-represented certifications asserting she did
not require a guardian, objecting to any cognitive evaluation, and expressing
dissatisfaction with her counsel. At an April 17, 2025, status conference, the
court addressed defendant's desire to discharge counsel and directed a
substitution of attorney to be filed within seven days, which was never filed.
The matter returned on May 1, 2025. Defendant did not appear. Because
no substitution had been filed, the court directed existing counsel to remain and
argue on defendant's behalf. The court noted it had reviewed defendant's recent
self-represented filings and reiterated it had seen no conduct by counsel
suggesting dishonesty or lack of diligence. The court also recognized the
medical materials mentioned neurological issues but did not indicate defendant
was incompetent or unable to understand the proceedings. Based on these
determinations, the court heard the parties' motions on their merits.
During oral argument, defendant's counsel asserted plaintiff's disclosures
were insufficient, and a five-year lookback was needed to determine whether
plaintiff had retirement contributions or other assets accumulated post -divorce.
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Counsel also contended defendant could not realistically have saved for
retirement given her imputed minimum-wage earning capacity, modest alimony,
age, education, and health. Plaintiff's counsel argued defendant had not
submitted a complete CIS, and had not adequately established the value of, or
equity in, her home.
On June 23, 2025, the court entered an order finding plaintiff had
demonstrated a good-faith retirement under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3), had "met
his burden to establish [d]efendant's ability to adequately save for retirement,"
and had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that modification of alimony
was warranted. The order terminated alimony effective September 12, 2024,
required plaintiff to continue paying arrears at $1,517 per month until satisfied,
denied both parties' fee applications without prejudice, and stated it was a final
order addressing all issues.
On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions: (1) the order
terminating alimony was error and defendant was entitled to discovery and a
plenary hearing on the disputed issue of defendant's ability to save for
retirement, her need for alimony, and plaintiff's income and ability to pay
alimony; and (2) the trial court erred in denying defendant's request for counsel
fees.
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II.
We begin by setting forth the principles that guide our analysis. Our
review of a Family Part decision modifying or terminating alimony is limited.
A Family Part judge's decision regarding a support obligation should not be
disturbed unless the court made findings inconsistent with the evidence,
unsupported by the record, or erred as a matter of law. Voynick v. Voynick, 481
N.J. Super. 207, 221 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super.
552, 572 (App. Div. 2013)). Although we accord deference to factual findings
supported by substantial credible evidence, legal conclusions are reviewed de
novo. Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J. Super. 190, 194 (2007) (citing Manalapan
Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
Because the original alimony award predated the 2014 amendments to the
alimony statute, plaintiff's application is governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3).
Under that provision, when there is an existing final alimony order established
before the effective date of the amendments, the obligor's reaching full
retirement age is automatically deemed a good-faith retirement age. N.J.S.A.
2A:34-23(j)(3). The statute further requires both parties to submit a current CIS,
together with prior CISs or equivalent documents from the time the original
alimony award was entered and any subsequent modification. Ibid.
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Most significantly, in making its determination the court "shall consider
the ability of the obligee to have saved adequately for retirement" as well as the
enumerated statutory factors, including: the age and health of the parties; the
obligor's field of employment and typical retirement age; the obligor's motives
in retiring; the reasonable expectations of the parties regarding retirement; the
obligor's ability to maintain support after retirement; the obligee's level of
financial independence and the financial impact of retirement; and any other
relevant factors affecting the parties' financial positions. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-
23(j)(3)(a) to (h). (Emphasis added).
In Voynick, we explained that after an obligor has shown a good-faith
retirement, the next step is for the court to determine whether a prima facie
"change in circumstances has been shown based on [the] obligor's overall
financial status" and continuing ability to pay alimony, including non-immune
assets, income, and any reasonable income stream from non-exempt assets. 481
N.J. Super. at 229-30. We further explained that subsection (j)(3) separately
requires a reviewing court to specifically consider the obligee's ability to have
saved adequately for retirement. Id. at 232. Where the motion record
demonstrates prima facie evidence concerning the obligee's ability to have saved
adequately for retirement or reveals material factual disputes bearing on the
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statutory factors set forth in subsection (j)(3), discovery and a plenary hearing
are necessary before determining whether alimony should be terminated or
reduced. Id. at 233; see also Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 159 (1980); Murphy
v. Murphy, 313 N.J. Super. 575, 580 (App. Div. 1998).
Applying these principles, we conclude the trial court misapplied its
discretion by terminating plaintiff's alimony obligation based solely on the
written submissions and oral argument, because material issues existed
requiring discovery and a plenary hearing bearing directly on the analysis
required under the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3).
The record exhibits there was no dispute plaintiff had reached full
retirement age and thus established a good-faith retirement age within the
meaning of the statute. Plaintiff retired at age seventy in December 2022.
Notwithstanding this stipulation, we conclude the motion record contained
genuine disputes regarding plaintiff's post-retirement financial circumstances
and his ability to continue providing spousal support. Although plaintiff
certified his employment ended, he had no pension or employer-sponsored
retirement plan, his sole income was Social Security, and his monthly expenses
exceeded his monthly income, defendant squarely challenged the adequacy and
completeness of those assertions. She asserted plaintiff had earned between
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approximately $138,000 and $188,000 for more than two decades after the
divorce, received a severance payment on retirement, and had not provided a
sufficient historical record to establish the absence of retirement contributions,
retirement-related accounts, or other post-divorce non-immune assets. We
agree.
The record also presented a central dispute over defendant's ability, or
inability, to have saved adequately for retirement, which the statute expressly
requires the court to consider and Voynick identified as a distinct and necessary
inquiry. 481 N.J. Super. at 233. Defendant relied on the original trial findings
establishing that she had only a tenth-grade education, limited vocational
background, and little likelihood of becoming rehabilitated to the point of self -
support commensurate with the marital standard of living. The 2002 court
imputed only minimum-wage income to her and awarded permanent alimony
because her financial need had been demonstrated. Defendant certified she
remained in substantially the same position: elderly, minimally educated,
limited in English proficiency, lacking computer skills, possessing only a history
of menial or sporadic work, and dependent on modest Social Security and
alimony. She specifically asserted the alimony amount, even when paid, was
insufficient to allow meaningful retirement savings.
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Plaintiff, by contrast, contended defendant had over twenty years to
improve her circumstances, work, and save for retirement, and that her present
condition reflected her failure to advance herself rather than incapacity. Those
positions were plainly in conflict. Despite these genuinely disputed facts, the
court summarily resolved that conflict, finding plaintiff had "met his burden to
establish [d]efendant's ability to adequately save for retirement." We conclude
the court's decision did not provide an adequate explanation reconciling its
conclusion with the original trial court findings, defendant's current financial
circumstances as reflected in her CIS, or the specific arguments advanced by
both parties.
Furthermore, the record revealed genuine factual disputes regarding
defendant's present need for support, her level of financial independence and, as
previously set forth, plaintiff's income, ability to pay support and questions
concerning any post judgement acquired non-immune assets. Defendant's CIS
and certification asserted she received only modest Social Security income, had
minimal liquid assets, substantial debt, and was living in a deteriorating or
effectively uninhabitable home. She also described multiple physical ailments
affecting her functioning. Plaintiff disputed the sufficiency of those claims,
argued defendant had not adequately documented her medical conditions, and
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emphasized that she owned her home free and clear while plaintiff never owned
a home himself. The parties also disputed the value of defendant's home.
Defendant described it as moldy, dilapidated, and unlivable, while plaintiff
emphasized ownership and the absence of a current valuation.
The above disputes bore directly on the factors set forth in N.J.S.A.
2A:34-23(j)(3), including but not limited to subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h),
which require the court to consider, respectively: the reasonable expectations
of the parties regarding retirement during the marriage or civil union and at the
time of the divorce or dissolution; the ability of the obligor to maintain support
payments following retirement, including whether the obligor will continue to
be employed part-time or work reduced hours; the obligee's level of financial
independence and the financial impact of the obligor's retirement upon the
obligee; and any other relevant factors affecting the parties' respective financial
positions. On this record, we conclude these issues could not properly be
resolved on certifications alone.
In addition, during oral argument, defendant's counsel specifically argued
a five-year lookback was necessary to determine where plaintiff's substantial
earnings had gone and whether retirement-related assets existed, noting plaintiff
was claiming he had "nothing, zero, to show for it." The court stated counsel's
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point was "a good point." That exchange strongly suggests the existence of
material factual disputes bearing on plaintiff's continuing ability to pay under
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3)(f).
Moreover, at the February 13, 2025 proceeding, the court expressly stated
these matters are ordinarily handled at oral argument, "no real testimony" is
typically taken, and declined to decide the motion because of concerns about
defendant's cognitive status. At the later proceedings, the court heard attorney
argument only. Defendant did not appear on May 1, 2025, no witness testimony
was taken, no cross-examination occurred, and no evidentiary hearing was
conducted. The court's order nonetheless terminated a long-standing permanent
alimony obligation on the merits without discovery and a hearing.
Here, the motion record revealed prima facie evidence and genuine
disputes concerning the obligee's ability to have saved adequately for retirement
as well as disputes concerning the other statutory factors set forth in N.J.S.A.
2A:34-23(j)(3). As such, as we held in Voynick, discovery and a plenary
hearing are necessary. 481 N.J. Super. at 233.
We do not decide on this record whether alimony must continue, should
be modified, or should ultimately be terminated. Those determinations require
factual development and findings by the Family Part in the first instance. Nor
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do we suggest the ultimate outcome on remand. We determine only that the
existing motion record was insufficient to support outright termination without
discovery and potentially, a plenary hearing on the disputed issues material to
the statutory analysis.
On remand, the court shall permit the parties to engage in discovery and
a plenary hearing, if discovery discloses genuine disputed factual issues
concerning the factors set forth at N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j)(3). Further, we vacate
the trial court's counsel fee order and direct the court to reconsider this issue as
part of the remand proceedings. We leave to the court's discretion as to whether
to hold a case management conference to enter a discovery case management
order setting forth the scope of discovery and exchange dates.
Vacated and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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