John Omar Williams v. Douglas A. Collins

Case: 24-2592 Page: 1 of 24 Filed: 07/27/2026 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS NO. 24-2592 JOHN OMAR WILLIAMS, APPELLANT, V. DOUGLAS A. COLLINS, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE. Before ALLEN, Chief Judge, and TOTH and JAQUITH, Judges. ORDER ALLEN, Chief Judge, filed the opinion of the Court. TOTH, Judge, filed a concurring opinion. JAQUITH, Judge, filed a concurring opinion. Appellant John Omar Williams served the Nation honorably in the U.S. Army and the National Guard from June 1969 to June 1973, July 1989 to August 1995, and April 2004 to April 2005.1 In this appeal, which is timely and over which the Court has jurisdiction,2 he contests a February 5, 2024, Board of Veterans' Appeal (Board) decision.3 The issue before the Court is whether the Board erred by not addressing if the record reasonably raised appellant's entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU). While the TDIU question is the ultimate issue before the Court, to answer that question this appeal calls on us to wrestle with how the Federal Circuit's recent decisions concerning the limits on the Court's power to make factual determinations affect our authority to determine whether the record reasonably raises an issue. As we will explain, we hold that while nothing in the Federal Circuit's recent caselaw concerning factfinding undermines the Court's authority to assess whether the record reasonably raises an issue, the factfinding caselaw affects how the Court makes that determination. In this case, because we are limited in what factfinding we can do in the 1 Record (R.) at 5340, 5342, 4655. 2 See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a), 7266(a). 3 R. at 5-14. In the February 5, 2024, Board decision on appeal, the Board expressly addressed three matters, none of which are before the Court. Specifically, the Board granted appellant a 70% disability rating for adjustment disorder with depressed mood. This is a favorable determination we may not review. See Medrano v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App. 165, 170 (2007), aff'd in part, dismissed in part sub nom. Medrano v. Shinseki, 332 F. App'x 625 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The Board also dismissed an appeal of the denial of an initial disability rating greater than 10% for tinnitus. Appellant does not challenge this dismissal. Appellant also does not argue that he is entitled to a disability rating greater than 70% for an adjustment disorder with depressed mood under the terms of the relevant diagnostic code. So, he has abandoned any appeal of those matters. See Pederson v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 276, 281-86 (2015) (en banc). Finally, the Board remanded appellant's claim to a disability rating greater than 20% for prostate cancer prior to June 24, 2020. The Court lacks jurisdiction to review this remanded matter. See Breeden v. Principi, 17 Vet.App. 475, 478 (2004) (per curiam order).  Case: 24-2592 Page: 2 of 24 Filed: 07/27/2026 first instance, we will exercise our discretion to remand this matter to the Board for the limited purpose of the Board addressing if TDIU was reasonably raised by the record while retaining jurisdiction. After the Board answers the specific question we pose for remand, we will be able to address the TDIU issue before us without running afoul of the Federal Circuit's caselaw concerning our factfinding. Before proceeding, we note that we held oral argument in this matter on March 26, 2026, at Albany Law School, in Albany, New York, as part of the Court's outreach program. The Court thanks the students, staff, and faculty at Albany Law School for their hospitality. I. BACKGROUND In November 2007, appellant sought service connection for prostate cancer and PTSD.4 In October 2008, a regional office (RO) denied service connection for PTSD but granted service connection for prostate cancer.5 In February 2009, appellant filed a claim for depression secondary to his prostate cancer.6 In March 2009, the RO granted service connection for major depressive disorder, also diagnosed as adjustment disorder, and assigned a 30% rating, effective February 11, 2009.7 In January 2010, appellant sought an increased rating for his adjustment disorder.8 In March 2010, he underwent a VA psychiatric examination.9 Eventually, in May 2010, the RO increased the rating of appellant's adjustment disorder to 50%; notably, the same decision denied entitlement to TDIU.10 In April 2018, appellant's primary care physician noted that appellant "is not working currently and is still looking to move to Germany to teach."11 In August 2018, appellant filed another increased rating claim for his adjustment disorder.12 Then, in October 2018, a VA psychiatric examiner noted that appellant was currently working 3 hours per day as a lunchroom monitor.13 The examiner opined that appellant faced "[o]ccupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas, such as work, school, family relations, judgment, thinking and/or 4 R. at 9752. 5 R. at 9242. 6 R. at 9135. 7 R. at 8998. 8 R. at 8609. 9 R. at 8536-41. 10 R. at 8491-92. 11 R. at 5664. 12 R. at 5582. 13 R. at 5398. 2  Case: 24-2592 Page: 3 of 24 Filed: 07/27/2026 mood,"14 "difficulty in establishing and maintaining effective work and social relationships,"15 and "bouts of passive suicidal ideation with no history of plans or attempts,"16 among other symptoms. At a December 2018 VA psychiatric exam, the examiner noted that appellant worked as a substitute teacher for 2 years before resigning in May 2018; the reason for his resignation was unspecified.17 When asked about his occupational history, appellant stated: "You do not understand. I have a college degree[,] and I still can't get a job. Even if you do the right thing things still go bad . . . I did what I was supposed to do[,] and they didn't even hire me. I couldn't get a job with an art degree. No one will hire me as an artist! They still wouldn't let me teach, someone always bumped me out."18 Also, a December 2018 neurology exam indicated that appellant worked as a substitute teacher from 2013 to May 2017 but was not currently working at the time of the exam.19 In a June 2020 rating decision, the RO continued the 50% rating for adjustment disorder.20 In July 2020, appellant filed a Notice of Disagreement.21 In the February 2024 Board decision on appeal, the Board determined that appellant should be rated for adjustment disorder at 70%, but not 100%, categorized as "occupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas."22 In doing so, the Board analyzed the extent of appellant's depression symptoms, concluding that his adjustment disorder included "an inability to establish and maintain effective relationships and suicidal ideations."23 The Board did not explicitly address either appellant's work history or his testimony from the December 2018 exam.24 The Board also did not discuss entitlement to TDIU at all. II. ANALYSIS A. The Parties' Arguments and Course of Proceedings On appeal, appellant originally argued that the Board erred by failing to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases because it did not address whether the record reasonably raised whether he was entitled to TDIU.25 The Secretary defended the Board's omission of an 14 R. at 5396. 15 R. at 5399. 16 R. at 5398. 17 R. at 5173. 18 Id. 19 R. at 5104. 20 R. at 1684-86. 21 R. at 1667-68. 22 R. at 5-6. 23 R. at 11. 24 R. at 10-12. 25 Appellant's Brief (Br.) at 7-11. 3  Case: 24-2592 Page: 4 of 24 Filed: 07/27/2026 analysis about TDIU on the ground that the record did not raise the matter sufficiently to require the Board to address TDIU at all.26 On August 8, 2025, a single Judge issued a memorandum decision that affirmed the Board's decision, concluding that the Board did not err when it failed to discuss TDIU because the record did not reasonably raise that issue.27 Appellant then filed a motion for reconsideration and/or panel review under Rule 35 of the Court's Rules of Practice and Procedure. 28 In his Rule 35 motion, appellant argued that the Court had inappropriately weighed facts in the first instance when it determined that the record did not raise the issue of entitlement to TDIU and that remand was the appropriate outcome in this matter for the Board to make that assessment in the first instance.29 The single Judge denied reconsideration, and a panel was appointed to consider this case.30 On November 7, 2025, the panel issued a supplemental briefing order.31 In response, appellant changed his position, arguing that the Board, through its silence, had made an implicit determination that the record did not raise entitlement to TDIU.32 The Secretary's supplemental brief was less clear about how he saw what the Board did, but he continued to defend the Board's decision.33 However, at oral argument both parties agreed that they believed that the Board made an implicit factual determination that the record did not raise entitlement to TDIU. 34 Despite this agreement, the parties disagreed about the import of that supposed implicit determination. Given the parties' arguments and the course of proceedings, there are essentially two substantive questions before us: (1) Does the Board's silence implicitly mean that the Board determined that the record did not raise entitlement to TDIU? And (2) if the Board's silence was not an implicit determination on that question, can the Court in the first instance determine that TDIU was reasonably raised by the record? As we will explain below, as to the first question, and despite the parties' agreement to the contrary, we conclude that the Board did not make any determination about entitlement to TDIU through its silence. We don't say that the Board could never make such an implicit determination. Rather, it just did not do so here. With respect to the 26 Secretary's Br. at 6-12. 27 Williams v. Collins, No. 24-2592, 2025 WL 2267935 (Vet. App. Aug. 8, 2025) (mem. dec.) (withdrawn Nov. 6, 2025) (per curiam order). 28 Appellant’s Aug. 28, 2025, Motion for reconsideration or in the alternative, for a panel decision. 29 Id. at 5-6. 30 November 6, 2025, Order denying single-judge reconsideration, granting panel review (per curiam order). 31 November 7, 2025, Order for supplemental briefing (per curiam order). 32 Appellant's Supplemental Br. at 3-5. 33 Secretary's Supplemental Br. at 5-6. 34 Oral Argument (OA) at 5:09-5:41; 32:33-32:49, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fU-a4qxRxk8. We note that appellant overreads the Federal Circuit's decision in Bean v. McDonough, 66 F.4th 979 (Fed. Cir. 2023), as part of his argument. Appellant seems to read Bean as providing some sort of rule about Board silence equating to the denial of a claim. Appellant's Supplemental Br. at 2-3. Bean does not go that far. Instead, Bean merely supports the notion that the Court has jurisdiction to consider whether the Board erred in connection with an issue that was before it (including by being raised by the record). But that point is not in dispute here. Both parties agree we have jurisdiction, and we have independently assured ourselves that we have jurisdiction under Bean and similar authority. 4  Case: 24-2592 Page: 5 of 24 Filed: 07/27/2026 second question, we hold that the Court is empowered to determine whether the record reasonably raised entitlement to TDIU in the first instance, but that it is constrained in doing so by the Federal Circuit's recent caselaw concerning limitations on the Court's factfinding authority. In the case before us, we conclude the record does not allow us to make the determination about TDIU without running afoul of the limitations on our factfinding ability. To address that issue, we will exercise our discretion to issue a limited remand, while retaining jurisdiction, for the Board to address, in the first instance, whether the record reasonably raised the issue of entitlement to TDIU. B. The Legal Landscape "VA compensates veterans for their service-connected disabilities through its rating schedule, which is designed to reflect the average impairment in earning capacity that a veteran with a certain type of disability would experience."35 But VA also recognizes that there are situations in which a veteran is not 100% disabled as a result of service-connected disabilities but, nonetheless, is unemployable.36 This individualized employability assessment for TDIU is set forth in 38 C.F.R. § 4.16.37 A claimant is "generally . . . presumed to be seeking the maximum benefit allowed by law and regulation."38 Thus, "the Secretary is required to maximize benefits" and "'render a decision [that] grants every benefit that can be supported in law.'"39 The Board is required to consider all theories of entitlement to VA benefits that are either raised by the claimant or reasonably raised by the record.40 The Court has jurisdiction to review whether the Board erred in failing to consider such theories.41 We have held that the Board should address TDIU where there is evidence of unemployability and the veteran is not receiving the maximum rating.42 As we have explained, TDIU is not a separate claim "but rather involves an attempt to obtain an appropriate rating for a disability or disabilities."43 While entitlement to TDIU can be part of an initial claim or a claim seeking an increased rating,44 the Board is only required to address entitlement to TDIU if the record "presents cogent evidence of unemployability."45 35 Ray v. Wilkie, 31 Vet.App. 58, 63 (2019) (citing 38 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2018)). 36 Id. 37 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (2026). 38 AB v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 35, 38 (1993); see also Tatum v. Shinseki, 23 Vet.App. 152, 157 (2009). 39 Bradley v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 280, 294 (2008) (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (2008)); see also Morgan v. Wilkie, 31 Vet.App. 162, 164 (2019). 40 Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 553 (2008), aff'd sub nom. Robinson v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 41 Barringer v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 242, 244 (2008); see Bean, 66 F.4th at 989. 42 See Harper v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 356, 361 (2018). 43 Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Vet.App. 447, 454 (2009); see also Harper, 30 Vet.App. at 361. 44 See Rice, 22 Vet.App. at 453-54. 45 Comer v. Peake, 553 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("Once a veteran submits evidence of a medical disability and makes a claim for the highest rating possible, and additionally submits evidence of unemployability, the 'identify the benefit sought' requirement of 38 C.F.R. § 5  Case: 24-2592 Page: 6 of 24 Filed: 07/27/2026 Whether an issue is reasonably raised by the record is essentially a question of fact, which the Court reviews for clear error.46 The Court will reverse a factual finding of the Board only when, after reviewing the evidence of record, we are "'left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'"47 In addition, it is well-established that for all its findings on material issues of fact and law, the Board must support its decision with an adequate statement of reasons or bases that enables "a claimant to understand the precise basis for the Board's decision" and "facilitate[s] review in this Court."48 If the Board failed to do so, remand is appropriate.49 C. The Board's silence about TDIU was not an implicit determination about anything. We first must address whether the parties are correct that the Board's silence amounts to an implicit determination that the record did not reasonably raise entitlement to TDIU. This is an important question. If the Board implicitly ruled that the record did not raise the issue of entitlement to TDIU, it would have made a factual finding. And in that case, two points follow. First, we would review that determination for clear error.50And second, the Board would have to support its implicit determination with an adequate statement of reasons or bases.51 We are not writing on a blank slate in terms of implicit factual determinations. So, we start off with a general principle. The Court has recognized that the Board can make implicit factual determinations in certain circumstances. We see no principled reason why the Board could not implicitly determine that the record did not reasonably raise entitlement to TDIU. So, we conclude that the Court's caselaw concerning implicit determinations informs the question before us. At the same time, however, we think there is no basis to conclude that the Board's silence about whether the record reasonably raised the issue of entitlement to TDIU always means that it implicitly ruled on that issue. Instead, there must be something in the decision that indicates that the Board intended its silence to reflect a considered assessment about whether the record reasonably raised entitlement to TDIU. Two illustrations from the Court's caselaw are helpful in terms of assessing what the Board's silence means. One situation in which the Court has recognized implicit factfinding is Miller v. Wilkie.52 There the Court held that "[w]hen the Board has made its decision without finding that the veteran is not competent to report symptoms and nothing suggests that the Board 3.155(a) is met[,] and [] VA must consider TDIU."). 46 See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4); Robinson, 21 Vet.App. at 553. 47 Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 52 (1990) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). 48 Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 517, 527 (1995); see 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1); Medlin v. Collins, 39 Vet.App. 159, 169 (2026), appeal docketed, No. 26-1885 (Fed. Cir. May 29, 2026); Gilbert, 1 Vet.App. at 57. 49 See Tucker v. West, 11 Vet.App. 369, 374 (1998). 50 See Lynch v. Wilkie, 30 Vet.App. 296, 304 (2018) ("Whether an issue is reasonably raised by the record is essentially a question of fact, subject to the 'clearly erroneous' standard of review.") (internal citations omitted). 51 See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1). 52 32 Vet.App. 249, 260-61 (2020). 6  Case: 24-2592 Page: 7 of 24 Filed: 07/27/2026 failed to review the evidence at issue, we may reasonably conclude that it implicitly found the veteran credible."53 Miller represents a situation in which the nature of the decision itself points towards an implicit factual finding. In other words, in Miller it would have made no sense for the Board to do what it did if it had not found the veteran credible. If we were writing on a blank slate, we might conclude that entitlement to TDIU would qualify under a Miller-like analysis when the Board was also rating a mental disorder as it did here. After all, a large part of the criteria for evaluating a mental disorder deals with occupational impairment.54 But we aren't writing on a clean slate. The Board does not have to address TDIU in every case, even those connected to evaluating a mental disorder. Rather, as we noted above, the Board is only required to consider entitlement to TDIU when the record "presents cogent evidence of unemployability."55 The Court has also held that in certain circumstances we can assume the Board made an implicit finding because of the specific context provided in a Board decision. A prime example concerns an implicit finding that a medical opinion was adequate even when the Board did not explicitly provide that determination.56 In those cases, there were textual cues pointing to both the fact that the Board had made the determination, as well as the grounds for the determination.57 In cases such as Walleman v. McDonough and Mitchell v. Shinseki, the Board discussed the opinion at issue and its discussion allowed the Court to understand why the Board considered the opinion appropriate for adjudication purposes. There is nothing in the Board's decision on appeal that is akin to the situations in which the Court has determined that the Board implicitly determined that a medical opinion was adequate.58 In other words, there is no indication that the Board thought about TDIU at all. And this brings us to a practical problem if we were to accept the parties' positions that silence about TDIU equates to an implicit factual determination that the record did not raise the entitlement to that benefit. If we assume that silence in this context means that the Board considered whether the record raised TDIU and determined that it did not, the Court's clear error review would be difficult (if not impossible) to perform because there would be only silence to review. It might also lead to the conclusion that in all (or at least most) situations in which we consider whether the record reasonably raised entitlement to TDIU there would be a reasons-or- bases problem. As the Court recently stated, the reasons-or-bases requirement naturally focuses on whether the Board has rendered all the necessary findings on material issues of fact and law and whether its analysis of such findings is intelligible to the claimant and the Court alike. If the Court needs to guess what the Board's reasoning might 53 Id. at 261. 54 See 38 C.F.R. § 4.130 (2026). 55 Comer, 553 F.3d at 1367. 56 See, e.g., Walleman v. McDonough, 35 Vet.App. 294, 307 (2022); Mitchell v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 32, 43 (2011). 57 Id. 58 Id. 7  Case: 24-2592 Page: 8 of 24 Filed: 07/27/2026 be as to a material issue of fact or law, the Board has violated its duty to provide adequate reasons [or] bases. [59] If the parties were correct about the meaning of the Board's silence, there would be nothing for the Court to do but guess about the Board's reasoning. That can't be right. To be clear, a Board decision could include an implicit finding about whether the record reasonably raised entitlement to TDIU. But the Board decision would need the textual to exist when the Board makes an implicit adequacy determination concerning a medical opinion. As we've said, there are no such cues in the decision before us. In sum, we conclude that the Board's silence here means what silence usually does: nothing. So, we are unable to engage in clear error review because the Board made no finding for us to review. We must transition to a different path to resolve the appeal. D. The Court's Ability to Determine, in the First Instance, if the Record Reasonably Raised Entitlement to TDIU This leads us to the second issue—the one we thought was originally presented. Specifically, we consider the scope of the Court's authority to review the record to determine whether TDIU was reasonably raised such that the Board was required to discuss that issue. And more to the point, we do so in light of recent Federal Circuit precedent concerning the prohibition on factfinding in the first instance at the Court.60 We begin with an important recognition. There is no question that the Court has the authority to review the record to determine whether there is an issue the Board was required to address.61 This is a well-established legal principle. There is no indication that anything in recent Federal Circuit caselaw concerning factfinding undermines that well-established precedent. The question we address here is how the Court can balance our authority to review the record while remaining faithful to the limits on our ability to weigh evidence in the first instance. 1. Recent Federal Circuit Decisions We begin our exploration of this question by considering the Federal Circuit's recent decisions in Tadlock and Stinson and, in particular, how the principle those decisions recognized applies when the Court considers whether the record reasonably raised an issue. We note that in both cases, the Federal Circuit addressed the Court's obligation to "take due account of the rule of prejudicial error."62 So, our task is to discern how a rule articulated in the prejudicial error context applies more generally. 59 Medlin, 39 Vet.App. at 169. 60 See Stinson v. McDonough, 92 F.4th 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2024); Tadlock v. McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2021). 61 See Bean, 66 F.4th at 988; Lynch, 30 Vet. App. at 304–06; Garner v. Tran, 33 Vet.App. 241, 247 (2021); Robinson, 21 Vet.App. at 555. 62 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2). 8  Case: 24-2592 Page: 9 of 24 Filed: 07/27/2026 To frame the issue, we highlight that the Federal Circuit stated directly that the Court "exceed[s] its statutory authority when it improperly weigh[s] evidence in the first instance."63 The problem (or at least potential problem) is that if the Court cannot weigh evidence in the context before us, it is difficult to see how we can do much more as a practical matter than categorically remand cases when the claimed error is a failure of the Board to address if an issue was reasonably raised by the record. Stated differently, the danger here is endless automatic remands leading to future appeals with potentially little practical benefit to veterans.64 While the issue before the Federal Circuit in Tadlock and Stinson was this Court's assessment of prejudice, each decision used broad language concerning the limits on this Court's authority related to factfinding. In Stinson, the Federal Circuit provided a categorical prohibition: "The Veterans Court has no statutory authority to make factual findings in the first instance. The Veterans Court also has no statutory authority to weigh evidence in the first instance."65 Meanwhile in Tadlock, the Federal Circuit provided a more focused limitation: When questions of fact are open to debate, veterans are entitled to present whatever evidence and arguments they have to the agency charged with administering veterans' benefits and possessed with the expertise to render informed judgments and to have that evidence and those arguments considered by that agency in the first instance.[66] So, it is our job to balance the holdings in both these cases to appropriately exercise our authority here. Stinson acknowledged that this Court "may appropriately assess whether the record contains sufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support a particular argument."67 As far as it goes, this acknowledgement is important with respect to the issue we address today—whether the record required the Board to address entitlement to TDIU. However, the Federal Circuit also instructed that: "What the Veterans Court cannot do, however, is find facts or weigh evidence in the first instance when entertaining a newly raised issue, as it did in this case."68 So, we are back to the question at hand because we are left with broad rules without consideration of how those rules apply beyond assessing prejudicial error. An additional point concerns the rationale Stinson provides for its rule, one that goes beyond harmless error analysis. Specifically, the Federal Circuit highlights that inappropriate factfinding or weighing of evidence deprives veterans of their rights to present issues to the agency 63 Stinson, 92 F.4th at 1362. 64 See Coburn v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 427, 434 (2006) (Lance, J., dissenting) (discussing the "hamster-wheel reputation of veterans law"). 65 Stinson, 92 F.4th at 1360-61 (citations omitted). 66 Tadlock, 5 F.4th at 1337. 67 Stinson, 92 F.4th at 1363. 68 Id. at 1363. 9  Case: 24-2592 Page: 10 of 24 Filed: 07/27/2026 and then receive meaningful appellate review in this Court.69 This rationale certainly extends to matters such as one before us today, even if the Federal Circuit has yet to explore the specific question we face. To recap, it is not clear how far the "open to debate" language from Tadlock extends beyond the prejudicial error analysis. Does it apply in the same way to the situation we face now when assessing whether the record raises an issue? Does it apply in the same way to our assessment about reversal of a finding is appropriate? We just don't know for sure. Nor is it clear the degree of evidence that is necessary for an issue to be considered "open to debate." So that leaves us without a clear sense of what we are allowed to do, if anything, to clarify this issue. This brings us to another Federal Circuit decision: Golden v. Collins, a case in which the Federal Circuit rejected an appellant's argument that this Court made inappropriate factual findings under Tadlock and Stinson.70 Golden is potentially significant for two reasons. First, it did not concern harmless error analysis.71 That is at least some indication that the Tadlock/Stinson analysis is not confined to the prejudicial error analysis. After all, if the Tadlock/Stinson analysis was limited to prejudicial error, that would have been a straightforward way to address the issue in Golden. Second, the Federal Circuit appeared to recognize that this Court's review of the existing record to make some sort of assessment was within our authority. The Federal Circuit stated: "The Veterans Court is not precluded from 'synthesizing,' 'analyzing,' and 'paraphrasing' the Board's decision, as these actions do not constitute independent fact[]finding."72 In rejecting appellant's assertion that the Court had transgressed the prohibition on factfinding, the Court said: "Here, the Veterans Court simply acknowledged that the record reflected the 2011 examiner was the only examiner who linked Mr. Golden's hearing loss and tinnitus."73 This sentence at least suggests that reviewing the record may pose different questions than engaging in prejudicial error analysis. Of course, the Federal Circuit followed up that sentence by noting that appellant "does not dispute this fact," perhaps suggesting that the court was applying the beyond debate notion from Tadlock and Stinson.74 The bottom line is that Golden is helpful but does not resolve the issue we face in this appeal. We pause to highlight an additional case at the Federal Circuit: Yurk v. Collins. During the oral argument in Yurk, the Federal Circuit panel hearing the case appeared to recognize the difficulty of reflexively adopting a broad interpretation of "open to debate" when assessing whether the record reasonably raised an issue.75 We had hoped that the argument would lead to a 69 Id. 70 161 F.4th 1346, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2025). 71 Id. 72 Id. at 1352. 73 Id. 74 Id. 75 OA at 10:40-15:21, Yurk v. Collins, 2026 WL 632438 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 6, 2026) (per curiam judgment) (No. 2024- 2023), https://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/03-05-2026-2024-2023-yurk-v-collins-audio-uploaded/. 10  Case: 24-2592 Page: 11 of 24 Filed: 07/27/2026 decision that provided guidance about the question before us today. Unfortunately for our purposes today, the Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the decision in Yurk without an opinion.76 The reality is that we are in a position in which the law is evolving and uncertain. The downside of that reality is that we are largely incapable of resolving the present uncertainty because we are dealing with decisions of the Federal Circuit that we are bound to do our best to carry out and can't change. The upside is that we trust the Federal Circuit will resolve the uncertainty as it continues to develop the doctrine in this area. But for today, we take the law as it is, or at least as how we best interpret it. 2. An Attempted Synthesis So, what are we to do with the specific question before us? Merely for purposes of articulating an approach to the question about how the Court should address whether an issue was reasonably raised by the record in the first instance given the limitations on factfinding, we will use the metaphor of a spectrum. On one end, there are situations in which the Court can definitively say that the Board did not err in failing to address an issue without any risk of inappropriately weighing evidence. In that regard, even appellant agrees that "[w]here a fully developed record is presented to the Board with no evidentiary support for a particular theory of recovery, there is no reason for the Board to address or consider such a theory."77 How far this end of the spectrum goes without running into evidence weighing issues is uncertain. At the other end of the spectrum are cases in which the evidence is so overwhelming that the Board should have discussed the issue that there can be no debate that the Board erred. Again, we can't say for sure how broad this part of the spectrum is, but we are confident that it exists. By definition, the spectrum analogy precludes a binary approach in which the two ends of the spectrum represent the full scope of the Court's choices—the record reasonably raised the issue or it did not.78 That binary approach seems to track how the Court approached the issue historically; but if the Federal Circuit's factfinding decisions have done anything, they have converted the binary into a spectrum.79 And that recognition brings us to the real challenge: what to do when a matter exists in the middle of our metaphorical spectrum. We recognize that individual judges will view the issue we are addressing through different eyes. Some judges will have more expansive views of one end of the spectrum or the other. But there will always be cases in the middle. At that point, a judge will 76 Yurk, 2026 WL 632438. To be sure, judges' questions at oral argument are not binding authority and don't even necessarily suggest a case's outcome. But they highlight the difficulty we face in addressing the issues in this appeal. 77 Robinson, 557 F.3d at 1361 (emphasis added). 78 See Yurk OA at 10:40-15:21. 79 We note that some of the caselaw addressing the reasonably raised issue seems to go beyond what the Court could appropriately do if Tadlock and Stinson apply in any meaningful way to this situation. A prime example is Lynch, in which the Court goes into great detail about why it determined the record did not raise the matter at issue. See Lynch, 30 Vet.App. at 304-06; see also id. at 306-09 (Allen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Another example is Garner, in which the Court considered whether the record reasonably raised the possibility of obesity being an intermediate step in the context of a service connection claim. See 33 Vet.App. at 246-49. 11  Case: 24-2592 Page: 12 of 24 Filed: 07/27/2026 use his or her best efforts to resolve the "reasonably raised" issue consistent with the limits on factfinding. What we offer here is a tool that may be employed in a judge's discretion to address a difficult case in the middle of the spectrum: a limited remand while the Court retains jurisdiction. We turn to that tool next. 3. Limited Remand In Skaar v. Wilkie, the Court ordered a limited remand so the Board could address an argument appellant had expressly raised below but that the Board had ignored.80 While not laying out an exhaustive test for determining when to use a limited remand, the Court stressed that the issue at the heart of the remand did not require vacating the Board decision.81 The same is true here, although for a different reason. As we will explain in the next section, we can't tell if there is an error in the Board's failure to address entitlement to TDIU without potentially committing an error ourselves by overstepping our factfinding limitations. In addition, the Skaar Court stressed that it was dealing with a unique circumstance because the Court was faced with a class action motion that potentially required action from the Board on the neglected issue.82 We face a similar situation, at least conceptually. How the Court's role in reviewing whether an issue is reasonably raised by the record interacts with the Federal Circuit's recent decisions concerning the limitation on the Court's factfinding authority is also a unique and developing area of the law. When confronted with the question of whether the Board erred by failing to discuss whether the record reasonably raised an issue, we are faced with the danger of overstepping our limitations on factfinding. We, therefore, conclude that retaining jurisdiction and issuing a limited remand for the Board to address whether the record was sufficient to require a discussion is the appropriate option for the Court in this case. And we may, in our discretion, use this tool instead of reflexively issuing a reasons-or-bases remand. We stress again that the Court is operating in a period in which we are uncertain about the contours of the doctrine the Federal Circuit has discussed in Tadlock, Stinson, and Golden. We make this point again not to be critical but rather to highlight that a limited remand to address cases like the one before us may be a tool that will not be needed often in the future. But the mere fact that a tool in a toolbox will not be needed tomorrow doesn't mean it isn't important today. 4. Application Here, appellant points to several examples of evidence that he was unemployable due to his service-connected adjustment disorder, evidence he maintains required the Board to discuss entitlement to TDIU. Appellant cites the April and December 2018 VA medical exams, both of which indicated that he was not currently working.83 He further emphasizes his 2018 testimony: 80 31 Vet.App. 16, 17-18 (2019) (en banc order) (per curiam). 81 Id. at 19. 82 Id. 83 Appellant's Br. at 9-10 (citing R. at 5104, 5664). 12  Case: 24-2592 Page: 13 of 24 Filed: 07/27/2026 "I have a college degree[,] and I still can't get a job. Even if you do the right thing[,]