Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00093-CR ___________________________ Ex parte Salim P. Charania On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 4 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. C0012895 Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker MEMORANDUM OPINION I. INTRODUCTION This appeal arises from another habeas-corpus proceeding connected to a broader series of cases involving numerous defendants alleged to have participated in a scheme targeting elderly individuals.1 Appellant Salim P. Charania is among those defendants. After his arrest for two first-degree felony offenses, Charania sought habeas relief requesting that the trial court set reasonable bonds. Following a hearing, the trial court set his bond at $7.5 million for each charge, resulting in an aggregate bond of $15 million. In his sole issue, Charania contends that the “trial court abused its discretion and violated the Eight[h] Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution[,] and Article 17.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure by refusing to set a reasonable [bond] amount.” The State concedes that the “record does not countenance such an exorbitantly high bond.” 1 See Ex parte Nair, No. 02-26-00218-CR, 2026 WL 2275302, at *1 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth Aug. 6, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (reversing habeas order denying relief concerning a $15 million bond set on Count Two after the $15 million bond on Count One was reduced to $75,000); Ex parte Sajwani, No. 02-26-00216-CR, 2026 WL 2275297, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 6, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (reversing habeas order denying relief concerning a $7.5 million bond set on Count Two after the $7.5 million bond on Count One was reduced to $75,000); Ex parte Malani, Nos. 02- 26-00153-CR, 02-26-00154-CR, 2026 WL 2206735, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 30, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (reversing habeas order denying relief on offenses involving aggregate bonds of $25 million and $30 million after defendants were indicted as part of a gold-bar scam). 2 Because the relevant factors do not support a bond amount of this magnitude, we will reverse and remand. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.15 (establishing the rules and factors for setting bond); Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849–50 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981) (setting out other factors—commonly referred to as the Rubac factors—which include the defendant’s work record, his family and community ties, and his length of residency). II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Law enforcement’s investigation into a multi-state, multi-victim scheme— through which elderly individuals were allegedly defrauded of gold bars and hundreds of thousands of dollars—led to Charania’s arrest on two charges: engaging in organized criminal activity (Count One) and financial abuse of an elderly individual of $150,000 or more (Count Two). Following his arrest, Charania filed a “Defense Writ to Set Reasonable Bond.” The trial court conducted a hearing on Charania’s request for a reasonable bond. Charania presented one witness: his daughter-in-law, Jenna Hassam. The State introduced Charania’s wife’s arrest warrant and supporting affidavit.2 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court imposed several bond conditions on 2 Charania’s wife was also arrested and charged with the same offenses. There is no material difference between his wife’s arrest warrant and Charania’s arrest warrant and accompanying affidavit. 3 Charania and set his bonds at $7.5 million on Count One and $7.5 million on Count Two, resulting an aggregate bond of $15 million. Charania now challenges his aggregate bond as “punitive, oppressive, and higher than an amount necessary to ensure [his] appearance and [the] community[’s] safety.” In its brief, the State “agrees with Charania” and acknowledges that “the trial court abused it discretion in setting Charania’s bond at $7,500,000 for each offense he has been charged with.” III. DISCUSSION3 A. NATURE OF THE OFFENSE AND POTENTIAL SENTENCE The nature of a defendant’s alleged offense and the length of his potential sentence are primary factors we consider in evaluating a bail decision.4 See id; Ex parte Hanson, No. 02-22-00045-CR, 2022 WL 1496533, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 12, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). As noted, Charania’s $15 million bond stems from his arrest for two first- degree felony charges: engaging in organized criminal activity and financial abuse of 3 We have twice set out the relevant factual background, standard of review, and applicable law in prior related opinions, so we need not repeat that discussion here. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. Instead, we evaluate the evidence presented at Charania’s writ hearing against Article 17.15 and the Rubac factors. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.15(a); Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849–50; Chavez v. State, 671 S.W.3d 775, 785 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023, no pet.). 4 In the context of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 17, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “bail” and “bond” are interchangeable terms. Ex parte Gomez, 624 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). 4 an elderly individual of $150,000 or more. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 32.55(c), (d)(6), 71.02(a)(8), (b)(3). Engaging in organized criminal activity carries a punishment range of fifteen to ninety-nine years or life in prison. Id. § 71.02(a)(8), (b)(2). Financial abuse of an elderly individual involving $150,000 or more carries a punishment range of five to ninety-nine years or life in prison. Id. §§ 32.55(c), (d)(6). The nature of these alleged offenses and the length of the potential sentences generally support imposing a reasonably high bond. See Chavez, 671 S.W.3d at 786; Hanson, 2022 WL 1496533, at *4. But just as was the case in Sajwani, 2026 WL 2275297, at *4, and Malani, 2026 WL 2206735, at *4, the State presented scant evidence at the hearing connecting Charania to the alleged charges. The State called no witnesses and offered only the arrest warrant and its supporting affidavit. Although the affidavit spans ninety-eight pages, it mentions Charania for the first time on page eighty-four and provides facts specific to him only on page eighty-five—alleging that he owned and operated a jewelry store that handled the “illegal gold.” Accordingly, in light of this sparse evidentiary showing, we conclude that the nature-of-the-offense factor does not support a bond of this magnitude. B. CRIMINAL HISTORY The State presented no evidence that Charania has any prior criminal history. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.15(a)(6). Nor did the State offer any evidence that Charania has previously been on bond, has any outstanding bonds, or has ever failed 5 to appear for a court proceeding. Hassam testified that Charania has never been arrested and has never been in trouble for any violent offenses. See id. Accordingly, we conclude that Charania’s criminal history—or lack thereof—does not support a bond of this magnitude. See Sajwani, 2026 WL 2275297, at *6; Malani, 2026 WL 2206735, at *5; see also Ex parte Ramirez-Hernandez, 642 S.W.3d 907, 918 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2022, no pet.) (“The State presented no evidence showing [appellant] had any previous or outstanding bonds, or that he [has] ever failed to appear for a court appearance. Additionally, there was testimony that he has never been charged with a previous crime. We conclude these factors weigh against a high bond amount.”); Hanson, 2022 WL 1496533, *4 (holding that this factor weighed in favor of a lower bail amount when evidence of appellant’s prior criminal history did not indicate that he would be a danger to the public). C. CITIZENSHIP STATUS, FAMILY AND COMMUNITY TIES, AND MEDICAL ISSUES We next consider Charania’s citizenship status, family and community ties, and medical issues. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.15(a)(7); Rubac, 611 S.W.3d at 849– 50. Hassam testified that Charania was born outside the United States—either in India or Pakistan—and that she does not know when he last visited his country of birth. She explained that Charania’s most recent travel outside the United States occurred in 2024, when he went to Cabo for his son’s engagement. She further 6 testified that Charania surrendered his passport to defense counsel following his arrest.5 The evidence also showed that Charania resides in Carrollton, Texas, with his wife, son,6 daughter-in-law, and father-in-law. He has lived at his residence for twenty years and has resided in Carrollton for more than thirty years. Charania provides daily care for his eighty-five-year-old father-in-law, who is in poor health and requires constant assistance. Charania regularly attends a local mosque, maintains friendships in Carrollton—including hosting weekly Thursday gatherings—and shares weekly family dinners on Mondays or Tuesdays. Hassam testified that Charania is not a flight risk because his entire immediate family lives locally, he assists with his father-in-law’s care, and he has no immediate family outside the United States. The record also contains a letter from Charania’s medical provider describing his deteriorating health since being confined. The provider noted Charania’s complex medical history, explained the need for consistent medical management, and opined that continued incarceration places Charania’s life in jeopardy. Accordingly, we conclude that Charania’s citizenship status, family and community ties, and medical issues do not support a bond of this magnitude. See Ex parte McKinney, No. 02-24-00223-CR, 2024 WL 4562503, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Fort Although the record does not expressly state his current citizenship or 5 residency status, we note that Charania’s passport was issued by the United States. 6 His son was born in Dallas, Texas. 7 Worth Oct. 24, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating that appellant’s family ties to the Wichita Falls area and the fact that he was from Wichita Falls “indicate[d] that he is likely to stay in Wichita County” and weighed in favor of a lower bail amount); Chavez, 671 S.W.3d at 789 (holding that evidence of appellant’s family ties to community and employment history weighed in favor of a reduced bail amount); Ex parte Cook, No. 02-18-00537-CR, 2019 WL 2323643, at *4 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth May 31, 2019, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (similar). D. GOVERNMENT’S INTERESTS The State presented no evidence that any victims—or any other persons— would fear for their safety if Charania were released. The absence of evidence concerning the victims’ or the community’s future safety weighs in favor of a lower bond amount. See Chavez, 671 S.W.3d at 786–87 (holding that this factor weighed against trial court’s bail determination when “the State offered very little evidence that [the appellant] present[ed] an identifiable threat to specific Wichita County residents or that the threat is ongoing” and that “[t]here was no testimony offered on this subject at the habeas hearing”); Ex parte Mazuera, No. 01-21-00612-CR, 2022 WL 1110989, at *8–9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 14, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that lack of evidence regarding future safety of any victim weighed in favor of lower bail amount). 8 Moreover, the trial court imposed several bond conditions that would apply upon Charania’s release, including surrender of his passport, GPS monitoring, and restrictions limiting him to Tarrant, Dallas, and Collin Counties. These conditions are adequate to prevent Charania from participating in the alleged nationwide fraud scheme while on bond and to ensure his appearance at trial. See Sajwani, 2026 WL 2275297, at *5–6; Malani, 2026 WL 2206735, at *6. Accordingly, we conclude that the government’s interests do not support a bond of this magnitude. E. ABILITY TO MAKE BAIL A defendant’s inability to meet the bail set by the trial court does not automatically make the bail amount excessive. Hanson, 2022 WL 1496533, at *7; Ex parte Hunt, 138 S.W.3d 503, 506 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d). “If the ability to make bond in a specified amount controlled, then the role of the trial court in setting bond would be completely eliminated, and the accused would be in the position to determine what his bond should be.” Hunt, 138 S.W.3d at 506. “But it is nonetheless a consideration, and a weighty one at that.” Hanson, 2022 WL 1496533, at *7. Whether bail is oppressive or not depends on the defendant’s financial circumstances; bail is oppressive if it is set at an amount higher than the defendant can afford for the express purpose of forcing him to remain incarcerated pretrial. Id. at *6; Ex parte Johnson, No. 05-21-00049-CR, 2021 WL 5822838, at *7 (Tex. App.— Dallas Dec. 8, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 9 Hassan testified that Charania’s bank accounts were frozen and that she was unaware of any other funds available to him. She stated that his only assets of value include his home and his vehicle. She estimated the home’s value at approximately $700,000 but did not know the value of the vehicle. Hassan also testified that she had spoken with bondsmen in the area, and they informed her that no bondsman would take on a $2 million bond. Although the trial court was free to disbelieve Hassan’s testimony regarding Charania’s resources, it may not speculate without evidentiary support. See Chavez, 671 S.W.3d at 789 (reversing $1 million murder bond as excessive and noting in analysis that “[w]hile the trial court was not required to believe [the defendant’s mother’s] testimony, there was no evidence to contradict her either” (internal citations omitted)). Apart from the fraud network described in the arrest-warrant affidavit, the State presented no evidence that Charania has access to sufficient funds to satisfy a $15 million bond. Accordingly, we conclude that Charania’s financial circumstances do not support a bond of this magnitude.7 7 Even if Charania possessed additional undisclosed wealth, that fact alone would not justify the $15 million bond. “Just as a defendant’s inability to afford b[ond] does not, in itself, demonstrate that b[ond] is excessive, a defendant’s ability to afford [a high bond] in the amount set does not in itself justify b[ond] in that amount.” Malani, 2026 WL 2206735, at *7 (quoting Ex parte Beard, 92 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d)). 10 F. SUMMARY The only factors that even marginally support imposing a reasonably high bond are the general nature of the charges and the length of the potential sentences. All other factors—Charania’s inability to make bail, the absence of evidence that he poses a future safety risk, his lack of criminal history, his substantial and longstanding community ties, and the bond conditions already imposed to protect the community—do not support a $15 million bond. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, see Gomez, 624 S.W.3d at 576, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by setting an aggregate $15 million bond because that decision—as compared against the relevant factors—is not within the zone of reasonable disagreement, see Ex parte Estrada, 640 S.W.3d 246, 250, 256 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d). We sustain Charania’s sole issue. V. CONCLUSION Having sustained Charania’s sole issue, we reverse the trial court’s order on his writ to set a reasonable bond and remand the case to the trial court to set a reasonable, non-excessive bond.8 See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(d); see also Malani, 2026 WL 8 Charania asks this court to set a reasonable bond in the amount of $25,000. The State likewise requests that we “reduce the bond to a reasonable amount such as that proposed by defense counsel at the hearing––$150,000 for both counts . . . or the one proposed in his brief––$25,000 for both counts.” We decline to do so. Instead, “[w]e give the trial court the first opportunity to set [a] reasonable b[ond].” Ex parte McIntyre, 558 S.W.3d 295, 303 n.8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d). 11 2206735, at *8 (reversing trial court’s habeas order denying relief and remanding the cause to that court to set a reasonable bond). /s/ Brian Walker Brian Walker Justice Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) Delivered: August 27, 2026 12