Seneca Leandro View, LLC v. Greene County Board of Assessment Appeals & Central Greene S.D.
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledJuly 27, 2026
Docket276 C.D. 2025
JudgeMcCullough
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Seneca Leandro View, LLC, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 276 C.D. 2025
:
Greene County Board of Assessment : Submitted: June 16, 2026
Appeals and Central Greene School :
District :
BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge
OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: July 27, 2026
Seneca Leandro View, LLC (Taxpayer) appeals from the February 4, 2025
order of the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County (trial court), which granted the
Petition to Strike Consent Order filed by Central Greene School District (School
District) in Taxpayer’s statutory assessment appeal. The trial court concluded that,
because the School District and Waynesburg Borough (Borough) did not receive notice
of the filing of Taxpayer’s appeal, it was without jurisdiction to approve and enter a
final consent order agreed upon by Taxpayer and the Greene County Board of
Assessment Appeals (Board).
Upon review, we quash this appeal as premature.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The material facts underlying this dispute are undisputed and may be
summarized as follows. Taxpayer owns the subject property (Property), which is
located within both the Borough and the School District. Taxpayer purchased the
Property at an upset tax sale in 2020. For tax year 2023, the Property’s assessed value
was $38,040.00, which assessment Taxpayer appealed to the Board. In support of its
appeal, Taxpayer submitted an appraisal report that detailed the Property’s state of
disrepair and assigned it a significantly reduced fair market value. The Board
nevertheless denied Taxpayer’s appeal and affirmed the prior assessment.
Taxpayer filed a timely appeal in the trial court on September 22, 2022
(Trial Court Action). Taxpayer named only the Board as a Respondent. For
approximately eight months, the parties engaged in pretrial proceedings and settlement
negotiations, during which period neither the School District nor the Borough sought
to intervene or otherwise participate in the proceedings. On May 23, 2023, Taxpayer
and the Board filed a consent order to conclude the litigation (Consent Order). The
Consent Order was signed by counsel for Taxpayer and the Board and provided that,
beginning with tax year 2022, the Property’s fair market value would be set at
$13,250.00. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 069a.) The trial court entered the Consent
Order the same day, and the case was closed.
Approximately 15 months later on August 27, 2024, the Greene County
Assessment Office issued a memorandum noting the change of assessment for the
Property, which it served on the School District and Borough, among other entities.
(R.R. at 154a.) The change of assessment was not appealed. On December 9, 2024,
the School District filed in the trial court a Petition to Strike Consent Order (Petition to
Strike), in which it argued that both the School District and Borough were
indispensable parties to the Trial Court Action and were neither joined as respondents
nor notified of its filing. The School District accordingly contended that the trial court
was without jurisdiction and that the Consent Order must be vacated as void. (R.R. at
77a-81a.)1
1
A petition to strike a judgment operates as a demurrer directed to defects in the record. Such
a petition will be granted only if the defects are fatal and appear on the face of the record. Chartiers
(Footnote continued on next page…)
2
Taxpayer filed an Answer and a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
the Petition to Strike, in which it argued, among other things, that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to strike the Consent Order more than 30 days after it was entered pursuant
to Section 5505 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505, and that neither the School
District nor the Borough were indispensable parties to the Trial Court Action. (R.R. at
116a, 157a.)
The trial court granted the Petition to Strike on February 4, 2025. The
trial court concluded that the Board’s failure to provide adequate notice to the School
Board and Borough pursuant to Section 8844(e)(2.1)(ii) of the Consolidated County
Assessment Law, 53 Pa.C.S. § 8844(e)(2.1)(ii), deprived it of jurisdiction and rendered
the Consent Order “ineffective.” (Trial Ct. Order, 2/5/2025, at 4 (unpaginated); R.R.
at 170a.)2
This appeal followed, and both the trial court and Taxpayer have complied
with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Pa.R.A.P.) 1925. (R.R. at 187a-96a.)
II. Issues
In this Court, Taxpayer argues that (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to strike the Consent Order pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505; (2) the School District lacked
standing to file the Petition to Strike; (3) neither the School District nor the Borough
were indispensable parties to the Trial Court Action; (4) the School District waived any
objections to the Consent Order because it failed to intervene or otherwise participate
Industrial and Commercial Development Authority v. Allegheny County Board of Property
Assessment, Appeals, and Review, 645 A.2d 944, 946 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).
2
Although the School District alleged defective notice in the Petition to Strike, Taxpayer
asserted in its answer that adequate notice was provided. (Petition to Strike, ¶¶ 13, 14, 29; R.R. at
075a, 077a; Answer, ¶¶ 13, 14, 29; R.R. at 118a-21a, 136a.) Thus, the precise nature of the required
notice and the notice actually provided appears to have been in dispute below. The trial court did not,
however, conduct a hearing on the Petition to Strike or make any associated findings of fact.
3
in the Trial Court Action; and (5) the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the Consent
Order.
The School District argues in response that, as a preliminary matter,
Taxpayer’s appeal of the trial court’s February 4, 2025 order is premature because it is
not a final order disposing of all claims against all parties. The School District points
out that the trial court’s order merely strikes the Consent Order and reopens the
litigation, which must be finally decided before an appeal to this Court will lie. (School
District Br. at 15-17.) Alternatively, the School District contends that the trial court
properly struck the Consent Order as void ab initio. Id. at 17-31.3
III. Discussion
We begin with the School District’s argument that this appeal is premature
because it implicates our subject matter jurisdiction and, in this instance, is dispositive.4
The School District argues that the trial court’s February 2, 2025 order is neither a final
order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341 nor an appealable, non-final order pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 311, 312, or 313. (School District Br. at 15-17.) Taxpayer rejoins that the
trial court’s order is a final, appealable order because it struck the Consent Order, which
itself was a final and appealable order disposing of the Trial Court Action. (Taxpayer
3
The Board joins in the School District’s appellate brief. See Joinder, 3/12/2026. The Board
appears to agree both that this appeal is premature and, alternatively, that the trial court did not err in
granting the Petition to Strike.
4
The appealability of trial court orders implicates our jurisdiction, is an unwaivable issue, and
may be raised by this Court sua sponte. Smith v. Ivy Lee Real Estate LLC, 326 A.3d 1064, 1069 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2024); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. James, 90 A.3d 813, 815 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
Questions of appealability and subject matter jurisdiction are questions of law, over which we exercise
de novo, plenary review. Com. Ex rel. Kane v. Philip Morris, Inc., 128 A.3d 334, 340 n.5 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2015).
4
Reply Br. at 1.) We are constrained to agree with the School District that the trial
court’s order is not appealable and, consequently, that this appeal must be quashed.
This Court’s jurisdiction over appeals from orders of the courts of
common pleas generally is limited to final orders. See Section 762(a) of the Judicial
Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 762(a); Mahoning Township v. Zoning Hearing Board of Mahoning
Township, 320 A.3d 861, 867 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024). Relatedly, Pa.R.A.P. 341(a)5
provides that, with exceptions not applicable here, “an appeal may be taken as of right
from any final order of an administrative agency or lower court.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(a).
Rule 341(b) defines a “final order” as one that (1) disposes of all claims and all parties;
(2) is entered as a final order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c);6 or (3) is a qualifying Post
Conviction Relief Act7 order under Pa.R.A.P. 341(f). Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). See also
Pa.R.A.P. 311 (allowing certain interlocutory appeals as of right), 312 and 1311
(allowing certain interlocutory appeals by permission), and 313 (allowing appeals from
qualifying “collateral orders”). “The purpose of limiting appellate review to a final
order is to prevent piecemeal determinations and the consequent protraction of
litigation.” In re First Baptist Church of Spring Mill, 22 A.3d 1091, 1095 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2011) (citations and quotations omitted).
Here, Taxpayer has not sought permission to appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
312 and 1311, and Taxpayer does not contend that the trial court’s order is an
5
Rule 341 was amended on December 11, 2025, effective July 1, 2026, with changes that do
not impact the issues involved here. Nevertheless, because the trial court’s order and Taxpayer’s
notice of appeal pre-date the effective date of the amendments, we apply the former Rule 341.
6
Rule 341(c) provides a mechanism by which a trial court may enter a final order as to fewer
than all claims against all parties upon the court’s determination that “an immediate appeal would
facilitate resolution of the entire case.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(c).
7
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
5
appealable collateral order.8 We therefore must determine whether the order qualifies
as a “final order” under Pa.R.A.P. 341, or, alternatively, whether it is an interlocutory
order that may be appealed by right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311.
First, the trial court’s order, on its face, is not a final order under Pa.R.A.P.
341, as it does not dispose of all claims and all parties. The trial court concluded that
it did not have jurisdiction to enter the Consent Order because notice under 53 Pa.C.S.
§ 8844(e)(2.1)(ii) was defective. (R.R. at 169a-70a.) It accordingly vacated the
Consent Order, but did not dismiss the action.9 Thus, because the trial court’s order
does not dispose of all claims and all parties and neither resolves nor dismisses the
Trial Court Action with prejudice, it is not a final order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341.
Second, the order also is not an interlocutory order appealable as of right
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311. Rule 311(a)(1) provides that an appeal may be taken as of
8
In any event, the collateral order doctrine is not satisfied here. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313(b),
an otherwise interlocutory order may be appealable if: (1) it is “separable from and collateral to the
main cause of action”; (2) “the right involved is too important to be denied review;” and (3) “the
question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will
be irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b); see also Brooks v. Ewing Cole, Inc., 259 A.3d 359, 364 (Pa.
2021). The trial court’s order satisfies none of these prongs. The order is directly related to the merits
of Taxpayer’s assessment appeal, as it struck the Consent Order that resolved the merits of the dispute
and established the fair market value of the Property. The order also did not resolve any of Taxpayer’s
claims; it merely reopened the litigation, which could be resolved either by settlement or by final
adjudication of the trial court.
9
Although the trial court did not expressly conclude that the Borough and School District
were indispensable parties, it did conclude that notice to those parties of the filing of Taxpayer’s
appeal was indispensable. R.R. at 169a. See also Chartiers Industrial and Commercial Development
Authority, 645 A.2d at 946 (although taxing authorities are interested parties in statutory assessment
appeals and have the right to participate in all phases of litigation, such right may be waived by failure
to appear after being properly served with notice). The trial court therefore did not dismiss the action
but instead vacated the Consent Order, presumably to give the taxing authorities an opportunity to
seek intervention. Even had the trial court concluded that the taxing authorities were indispensable,
the proper course would have been for that court to join those parties, if possible. See Pa.R.Civ.P.
1032(b). Only if such joinder is impossible must a court dismiss the action. Id.
6
right, without any need to seek permission, from an order “refusing to open, vacate, or
strike off a judgment.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1) (emphasis added). The rule conspicuously
omits from its application an order striking or opening a judgment. We have explained
the logic behind that omission as follows:
[A] an order striking a judgment is generally not appealable.
Unlike an order which refuses to strike a judgment, an order
which strikes a judgment is not an interlocutory order from
which an appeal as of right may lie under Pa.R.A.P.
311(a)(1). This is because an order which strikes a judgment
(entered, for example, for non-pros, default, or by
confession) does not end the litigation. Rather, it anticipates
further litigation because it places the parties back in the
position they were prior to the entry of judgment.
Wilson v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, 88 A.3d 237, 245 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2013).10 Our sister intermediate appellate court has stated similarly that an “order
opening [a confessed] judgment . . . does not end the litigation, nor preclude
participation by certain parties in the litigation, nor result in the irreparable loss of the
claim. On the contrary, this order opens up the possibility of further litigation between
the parties, while causing neither irreparable loss nor prejudice to” the appellant. Joseph
Palermo Development Corp. v. Bower, 564 A.2d 996, 998 (Pa. Super. 1989); see also
id. at 997 (“Review of the correctness of the trial court’s action in opening the judgment
is merely postponed to a later date.”).11
10
See also 20 West’s Pa. Prac., Appellate Practice § 311:10 (2025-26 ed.) (order vacating or
striking off a judgment is not appealable as of right; the body of caselaw interpreting the former
Pa.R.A.P. 311(a) to permit such appeals has been superseded by rule amendments).
11
Although Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, they are valuable as
persuasive precedent where they address analogous issues. Lerch v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
7
Pennsylvania appellate courts thus have generally declined to exercise
jurisdiction over appeals from orders opening or striking judgments, particularly where
those orders do not dispose of all claims against all parties and anticipate further
litigation. See, e.g., Carter v. Cornerstone Construction Services (Pa. Cmwlth., No.
1174 C.D. 2016, filed June 6, 2017) (quashing appeal from an order striking a default
judgment as interlocutory; Rule 311(a)(1) not applicable to orders granting motions to
strike judgments);12 Digital Communications Warehouse, Inc. v. Allen Investments,
LLC, 223 A.3d 278, 283, 284 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2019) (order granting a motion to open
judgment not appealable; such an order returns parties to their pre-judgment positions
and anticipates future litigation). Cf. Chartiers Industrial and Commercial Development
Authority, 645 A.2d at 946 (considering and deciding appeal from an order refusing to
strike a final consent judgment entered in tax assessment appeal); Cargitlada v. Binks
Manufacturing Co., 837 A.2d 547, 549 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2003) (appellate court
considered appeal from trial court order granting a motion to strike judgment entered
after jury trial where order removed a party from the case’s caption and otherwise
resolved all claims against all parties); Duquesne Light Co. v. Rudolph N. Rohn Co.,
Inc., 753 A.2d 286, 287 (Pa. Super. 2000) (court exercising discretionary review of the
propriety of a trial court’s order opening a consent judgment after granting the
appellant’s petition for review). Further, although Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1) typically
applies to judgments entered by default or confession, it also applies to other types of
judgments. See 20 West’s Pa. Prac., Appellate Practice §§ 311:10, 311:19 (2025-26
ed.) (order granting a petition to vacate summary judgment or judgment on the
pleadings generally not appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)).
12
We cite this unreported Commonwealth Court decision for its persuasive value. See Section
414(a) of the Internal Operating Procedures of the Commonwealth Court, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
8
Here, the trial court’s order is not appealable under the express language
of Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1), as it did not refuse to strike the Consent Order. There further
are no circumstances in this case that militate in favor of finding the order to be
appealable. The order did not dismiss the Trial Court Action or resolve all (or any)
claims and all (or any) parties. The order also clearly anticipated further litigation. The
trial court concluded that notice to the taxing authorities was defective and struck the
Consent Order presumably to afford those entities an opportunity to intervene or
otherwise participate in the proceedings. Had Taxpayer not appealed, the litigation
likely would have proceeded to its conclusion either by another settlement or by
adjudication, and any appeal from a final order disposing of the action could include
the issue of whether the trial court erred in striking the Consent Order. For all of these
reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s order is not immediately appealable as of
right under Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1).
Taxpayer argues, in part, that “an order vacating a consent judgment is
final and appealable because it disposes of the settlement that resolved all claims
between the parties.” (Taxpayer Br. at 1) (citing Penn National Mutual Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Phillips, 276 A.3d 268, 273 (Pa. Super. 2022), and Digital
Communications Warehouse, Inc., 223 A.3d at 283). Taxpayer’s argument is both
misguided and unsupported by the cases it cites. First, there is no dispute that the
Consent Order was a final order disposing of all claims against all parties. All
judgments, including those entered by default, confession, consent, or adjudication,
accomplish finality. But orders striking or opening those judgments, including the one
entered here by consent, do not; they re-open the litigation and, by their very nature,
are not final.
9
Second, Penn National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. and Digital
Communications Warehouse, Inc. both undermine Taxpayer’s position and support our
disposition. Considering the cases in reverse order, Digital Communications
Warehouse, Inc. involved two appeals: one from an order opening a default judgment
and one from an order denying a petition to strike and/or open a default judgment. 223
A.3d at 281. The Superior Court quashed the appeal from the order opening a default
judgment, therein concluding that the order was not final, was not an appealable
collateral order, and was not immediately appealable by right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
311(a). Id. at 284. The Court permitted and considered the appeal from the order
refusing to strike or open a default judgment, concluding that the order was
immediately appealable as of right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1). Id. Thus, the
Superior Court in Digital Communications Warehouse, Inc. made the exact distinction
that we have made herein between orders that open or strike judgments (which
generally are not appealable) and those that refuse to open or strike judgments (which
generally are appealable).
Penn National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. is similar. There, the
Superior Court permitted and considered an appeal from a trial court order denying a
petition to strike or open a default judgment. 276 A.3d at 270. The Superior Court
nowhere addresses orders granting petitions to strike, and the decision therefore lends
no support to Taxpayer’s position.
IV. Conclusion
In sum, because the trial court’s February 4, 2025 order is neither final nor
otherwise appealable, Taxpayer’s appeal is premature, and we lack jurisdiction to
consider it. We accordingly quash.
________________________________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
10
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Seneca Leandro View, LLC, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 276 C.D. 2025
:
Greene County Board of Assessment :
Appeals and Central Greene School :
District :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 27th day of July, 2026, for the reasons set forth in the
foregoing Opinion, the instant appeal from the February 4, 2025 order of the Court
of Common Pleas of Greene County is hereby QUASHED.
________________________________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge