A.P. Carroll v. PPB
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledOctober 14, 2026
Docket447 C.D. 2025
JudgeCovey
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Albert Patrichiou Carroll, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Pennsylvania Parole Board, : No. 447 C.D. 2025
Respondent : Submitted: June 16, 2026
BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge
OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY FILED: October 14, 2026
Albert Patrichiou Carroll (Carroll) petitions this Court for review of the
Pennsylvania Parole Board’s (Board) March 24, 2025 decision affirming its decision
recorded November 14, 2024 (mailed November 21, 2024) that recommitted him as
a convicted parole violator (CPV) to serve a 15-month term with no credit for his
time spent at liberty on parole. Carroll presents one issue for this Court’s review:
whether the Board erred by concluding that its parole revocation hearing was timely
held. After review, this Court reverses and remands.
Carroll is currently an inmate at the State Correctional Institution (SCI)
at Laurel Highlands.1 On July 1, 2016 and January 6, 2017, the Union County
Common Pleas Court sentenced Carroll to 2 years, 2 months, and 30 days for 2
counts of retail theft (Original Sentence). On February 23, 2018, the Board rendered
a decision to parole Carroll. At that time, Carroll’s maximum sentence release date
was March 30, 2023; accordingly, he owed 1,735 days on his Original Sentence. On
January 20, 2023, the Board declared Carroll delinquent effective January 19, 2023.
1
See https://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov/#/Result (last visited Oct. 13, 2026).
On February 9, 2023, the Department of Corrections (Department) issued a Warrant
to Detain Carroll pending disposition of criminal charges in Snyder County (New
Charges) and recommitted him as a technical parole violator to a period of 2 months
and 11 days. On March 29, 2023, the Department lifted its detainer.
On May 23, 2024, Carroll entered nolo contendere pleas to corruption
of minors and other offenses. On June 3, 2024, the Department lodged a warrant to
commit and detain Carroll, noting therein that “[a]lthough [Carroll’s] maximum
sentence expired [March 30, 2023], the maximum sentence is being extended due to
a new conviction. The new maximum [sentence] will be computed upon recording
of the Board’s final action.” Certified Record (C.R.) at 25. Also on June 3, 2024,
Carroll’s parole agent took Carroll into custody and transported him to the Columbia
County Jail. On that same day, Carroll requested a panel parole revocation hearing.
On June 4, 2024, the Department transferred Carroll from the Columbia County Jail
to SCI-Smithfield; thus, on June 4, 2024, Carroll returned to the Department’s
jurisdiction. On August 22, 2024, the Snyder County Common Pleas Court
sentenced Carroll on the New Charges.2
On November 4, 2024, the Board held a parole revocation hearing
before a hearing examiner (Hearing Examiner) at which the Board offered only
Carroll’s August 22, 2024 Sentencing Order.3 See C.R. at 41. Thereafter, Carroll’s
2
The record does not state when the Department transferred Carroll back to the Columbia
County Jail for his sentencing.
3
At the close of the hearing, the Hearing Examiner took official notice of the documents
in Carroll’s hearing packet which included: June 3, 2024 Request for Panel Hearing; October 17,
2024 Notice of Charges and Hearings; Inmate Rights Form; January 27, 2023 Criminal Arrest and
Disposition report; Supervision History; June 3, 2024 Warrant; February 22, 2018 Order to Release
on Parole; June 28, 2018 Conditions Governing Parole; Sentence Order (admitted as State’s
Exhibit 1); and a secure docket print-out. See C.R. at 46-47. Notably, a Department Inmate
Moves Record was not identified as a document for which the Hearing Examiner took official
notice.
2
counsel objected that the parole revocation hearing was untimely. Parole Agent C.
Page (Agent Page)4 responded:
There’s a combination of things there that we would like
the Board to note is that [sic] [] Carroll was not returned
to [Department] custody until June 4th of 2024, which
would put the 120-day mark at about [November 26,
2024]. And his request for [a] panel on June 3rd is usually
what kind of [sic] is the marker for any change whenever
served at the time of the offense. Also making the 120-
day, [November 25, 2024]. So, I do not see a timeliness
issue in respect to his return to [the Department] and his
written request for a panel from back in June.
C.R. at 42-43.
Notwithstanding that 120 days from June 4, 2024 is October 2, 2024
(not November 25, 2024), the Hearing Examiner noted the objection and declared
that the Board would rule on the objection in the final Board Decision. On
November 14, 2024, the Board recommitted Carroll as a CPV to serve 15 months of
backtime and recalculated his Original Sentence maximum release date as March 2,
2029. In the Hearing Report, the Hearing Examiner overruled Carroll’s timeliness
objection, stating:
[Carroll’s counsel] objected to this matter as being
untimely. According to Board records, [Carroll] was
convicted on [May 3, 2024,] [sic] and transferred to SCI[-
]Smithfield on [June 4, 2024]. On [July 11, 2024],
[Carroll] was sent on writ to Snyder County [Jail].
[Carroll] returned to [Department] custody on
[September 17, 2024]. As this hearing was held on
[November 4, 2024], this [Hearing Examiner] finds that it
was timely and the objection is overruled.
C.R. at 118 (emphasis added).
4
Agent Page’s first name is not noted in the hearing transcript.
3
On December 11, 2024, Carroll filed an administrative remedies form
challenging the Board’s ruling on the timeliness objection. On March 24, 2025, the
Board’s panel affirmed its decision, explaining:
[Section 71.4(1) of t]he Board’s [R]egulation[s] provides
that “[i]f a parolee is confined outside the jurisdiction of
the Department . . . , such as . . . confinement in a county
correctional institution where the parolee has not waived
the right to a revocation hearing by a panel in accordance
with Commonwealth ex rel. Rambeau v. Rundle, . . . 314
A.2d 842 ([Pa.] 1973), the revocation hearing shall be held
within 120 days of the official verification of the return of
the parolee to a [s]tate correctional facility.” 37 Pa. Code
§ 71.4(1). Additionally, “there shall be excluded from that
period a delay in any stage of the proceedings which is
directly or indirectly attributable to . . . the unavailability
of parolee or counsel.” [Section 71.5(c)(l) of the Board’s
Regulations,] 37 Pa. Code[ ]§ 71.5(c)(l). [] Carroll was
convicted of the new criminal offenses on May 23, 2024.
On June 3, 2024, the Department . . . lodged a warrant
against him and he elected to have his revocation hearing
by panel. [Carroll] returned to an SCI on June 4, 2024.
After 37 days, he was transferred to Snyder County
[Jail] on writ on July 11, 2024. [Carroll] returned
again to an SCI on September 17, 2024, and the Board
conducted a revocation hearing 48 days later on November
4, 2024. Considering [] Carroll spent a total of 85 days
in an SCI prior to the November 4, 2024 hearing, that
revocation hearing is therefore deemed timely.
C.R. at 134 (emphasis added). Thus, rather than finding that Carroll was outside the
Department’s jurisdiction, the panel concluded that Carroll was unavailable under
Section 75.1(c)(1) of the Board’s Regulations for several days following his June 4,
2024 return to SCI-Smithfield (and the Department’s jurisdiction). Carroll appealed
to this Court.5
5
This Court’s “review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated,
whether the decision was in accordance with [the] law, or whether the necessary findings of fact
were supported by substantial evidence.” White v. Pa. Parole Bd., 276 A.3d 1247, 1255 n.7 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2022).
4
Carroll insists that the Board was required to hold a timely parole
revocation hearing and failed to meet its burden of demonstrating it had done so.
Carroll contends that the Board committed multiple errors when it concluded that
the November 4, 2024 hearing was timely. Carroll asserts that Agent Page
erroneously claimed that the hearing was timely because Carroll was returned to an
SCI on June 4, 2024, and that 120 days from that date would be November 26, 2024.
Carroll observes that because 120 days from June 4, 2024 is October 2, 2024, the
November 4, 2024 hearing was untimely, and the Board offered no other evidence
rebutting Carroll’s untimeliness claim. Carroll argues that rather than reserve a
decision on the objection, the Hearing Examiner should have ruled that the hearing
was untimely given Agent Page’s miscalculation and the Board’s failure to
demonstrate that the hearing was timely.
Carroll also contends that, following the hearing, the Board and the
Hearing Examiner compounded the Hearing Examiner’s mistake by attempting to
cure Agent Page’s erroneous date calculation by using the Department Moves
Report - a document not in evidence6 - to determine the days that Carroll was
unavailable to the Board following his June 4, 2024 transfer to SCI-Smithfield, and
thereby extend the hearing deadline. Finally, Carroll maintains that the Board
misapplied its Regulations when it concluded, based on the extra-record Department
Moves Report, that the hearing was timely.
This Court has explained:
“It has long been established that due process requires that
parolees receive a hearing within a reasonable time after
they are taken into custody for a parole violation.” Taylor
v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 931 A.2d 114, 117 (Pa.
6
Notwithstanding that it was not admitted into evidence at the hearing, the Department
Moves Report is contained in the Certified Record in this matter. See C.R. at 112. Carroll asserts
that the Board’s records in evidence do not reflect transfers during the period between his
conviction and his parole revocation hearing.
5
Cmwlth. 2007) (en banc) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 . . . (1972)). To satisfy due process, the Board
has issued [R]egulations concerning the timeliness of a
parole revocation hearing. See Lawson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob.
& Parole, 977 A.2d 85, 87 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009)
(“[d]etermining whether a revocation hearing was timely
is a straightforward inquiry that is governed by Board
[R]egulation”).
For example, when a parolee is convicted of a new
criminal offense, the Board must hold a revocation hearing
within 120 days from the date the Board received official
verification of that disposition.[7]
Daniels v. Pa. Parole Bd., 326 A.3d 128, 132 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024).
The Daniels Court held:
Once a parolee challenges the timeliness of a
revocation hearing, the Board bears the burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
hearing was timely. Burno v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
67 A.3d 1280, 1283 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). “If the Board
does not present substantial evidence to establish the
timeliness of a revocation hearing, the parole violation
charges are dismissed with prejudice.” Brown v. Pa.
Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 184 A.3d 1021, 1025 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2017) (citation omitted). Additionally, when the Board
fails to produce evidence that it had the burden to produce,
it “does not have the right to a second hearing to make
the case it should have made in the first instance.” Gair
v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 948 A.2d 884, 889 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2008); see also Mack v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. &
Parole, 654 A.2d 129, 131 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (reversing
the decision of the Board and dismissing the parole
violation charges with prejudice because the revocation
hearing was untimely).
Daniels, 326 A.3d at 132 (bold and underline emphasis added).
As this Court held in Daniels, once Carroll’s counsel raised the
untimeliness objection, the Board had the burden to establish by a preponderance of
7
Here, the Board’s Notice of Charges and Hearing identifies the date of verification as
May 24, 2024. See C.R. at 27.
6
the evidence that the hearing was timely. Here, in response to the objection, Agent
Page responded that the hearing occurred within the permissible time period. His
testimony, based on an erroneous calculation (120 days from June 4, 2024 is October
2, 2024, not November 4, 2024), was inadequate to meet the Board’s burden.
With respect to Carroll’s argument that the Hearing Examiner and the
Board erroneously considered extra-record evidence after the hearing to justify the
Board’s conclusion that the hearing was timely, this Court agrees. The Board
afforded itself a prohibited second bite at the apple by finding and accepting a
different justification (Carroll’s purported transfer from the SCI) for holding that the
hearing was timely. Further, the Board based that justification on the Department
Moves Report - “[e]xtra[-]record evidence [that] cannot sustain an adjudication.”
Kyu Son Yi v. State Bd. of Veterinary Med., 960 A.2d 864, 873 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Board properly considered the
Department Moves Report, such reliance does not change the outcome. This Court
has explained:
Section 71.4(1) of the Board’s [R]egulations provides that
120 days from the date the Board receives official
verification of a parolee’s conviction is a reasonable
period for conducting a revocation hearing, unless the
parolee is “confined outside the jurisdiction of the
[Department], such as . . . confinement in a county
correctional institution where the parolee has not waived
the right to a revocation hearing by a panel . . . .” 37 Pa.
Code § 71.4(1)(i) (emphasis provided).
Leonard v. Pa. Parole Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 641 C.D. 2024, filed June 18, 2025),
slip op. at 8.8 The Leonard Court expounded:
8
This Court’s unreported memorandum opinions filed after January 15, 2008, may be cited
“for [their] persuasive value, but not as binding precedent.” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth
Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). The unreported opinions
referenced herein are cited for their persuasive value.
7
In such circumstances, the revocation hearing must be
conducted within 120 days of the date of the official
verification of the parolee’s return to [Department]
custody at an SCI. [37 Pa. Code § 71.4(1).]
This exception is based on the principle that the 120-day
period does not begin to run until the Board acquires
jurisdiction over the parolee, which it does not have during
the periods where the parolee is “confined” in a county
prison. Koehler v. P[a.] Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 935 A.2d
44, 50 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); Hartage v. P[a.] B[d.] of
Prob[. &] Parole, 662 A.2d 1157, 1160 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1995); Williams v. P[a.] B[d.] of Prob[. &] Parole, . . . 579
A.2d 1369, 1371 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1990). The exception
applies notwithstanding the fact that, pursuant to [Section
6136(1)-(3) of the Prisons and Parole Code (Parole
Code),] 61 Pa.C.S. § 6136(1)-(3), the Board now has
remote communication and observation access to county-
confined state parolees.
Leonard, slip op. at 8-9 (footnote omitted).
Importantly, the Leonard Court added:
However, the exception does not apply where a state
parolee is housed in a county prison solely to attend his
or her criminal proceedings. Foley v. P[a.] B[d.] of
Prob[. &] Parole, 195 A.3d 630, 632-34 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2018) (citing Morgan v. P[a.] B[d.] of Prob[. &] Parole,
814 A.2d 300 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), and Montgomery v.
P[a.] B[d.] of Prob[. &] Parole, 808 A.2d 999 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2002)). Where a parolee is transferred for this
reason and not to serve a county-imposed sentence, the
parolee does not leave the jurisdiction of the Board
even where physically housed in a county prison.
Foley, 195 A.3d at 633-34. In such circumstances, the
120-day period for conducting a revocation hearing begins
to run the day the Board receives the official verification
of the parolee’s conviction. Id.; 37 Pa. Code § 71.4(1).
Leonard, slip op. at 9 (bold emphasis added).
Following his conviction, on June 4, 2024, Carroll was returned to the
Department’s jurisdiction when he was transferred to SCI-Smithfield. Carroll’s
8
subsequent transfer to Snyder County Jail on writ for sentencing did not remove him
from the Department’s jurisdiction. Specifically, as here: “When a parolee is
transferred on new charges to another jurisdiction by judicial writ, he remains
‘in the primary custody of the first jurisdiction unless and until the first sovereign
relinquishes jurisdiction over the person.’” Burrell v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa.
Cmwlth. No. 308 C.D. 2019, filed Nov. 13, 2019), slip op. at 12 (emphasis added)
(quoting Foley, 195 A.3d at 632 (citation omitted)).
Here, Carroll did not leave the Department’s jurisdiction9 when he was
transferred to Snyder County Jail on writ between July 11, 2024 and September 17,
2024, because Snyder County was “considered simply to be ‘borrowing’ [Carroll]
from the [Board] for the purposes of . . . sentencing him.” Foley, 195 A.3d at 632
(quoting Morgan, 814 A.2d at 303); see also Leonard. Nor was Carroll unavailable
under Section 71.5(c)(1) of the Board’s Regulations during such time, because even
while on writ to Snyder County, he was available to the Board pursuant to Section
6136 of the Parole Code which provides that “[a]ll prison officials shall” grant the
Board access to any offender at all reasonable times. 61 Pa.C.S. § 6136.
In accordance with Daniels, Leonard, and Foley, this Court is
constrained to conclude that the Hearing Examiner should have ruled that the Board
did not meet its burden of proving that Carroll’s parole revocation hearing was
timely and dismissed the parole violation charges with prejudice.
For all of the above reasons, the Board’s decision is reversed.
_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
9
See Section 71.4(1)(i) of the Board’s Regulations
9
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Albert Patrichiou Carroll, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Pennsylvania Parole Board, : No. 447 C.D. 2025
Respondent :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of October, 2026, the Pennsylvania Parole
Board’s (Board) March 24, 2025 order is REVERSED. Albert Patrichiou Carroll’s
(Carroll) parole violation charges are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This
matter is REMANDED to the Board with instructions to dismiss the parole
revocation charges against Carroll based on the May 23, 2024 conviction, and to
recalculate his backtime accordingly.
Jurisdiction is relinquished.
_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge