M. Haverstick and Kleinbard LLC v. Pa. Ofc. of the Gov. (OOR)
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket1407 C.D. 2025
JudgeWallace
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Matthew Haverstick and :
Kleinbard LLC, :
Petitioners :
:
v. : No. 1407 C.D. 2025
: Argued: October 13, 2026
Pennsylvania Office of the Governor :
(Office of Open Records), :
Respondent :
BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: November 16, 2026
Matthew Haverstick and Kleinbard LLC (Requesters) petition for review from
the September 25, 2025 final determination of the Office of Open Records (OOR),
denying Requesters’ appeal from the Pennsylvania Office of the Governor’s (Office)
refusal to produce records they requested under the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL).1
Upon review, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
On March 14, 2025, Requesters submitted a request (March 14 Request) for
records to the Pennsylvania Office of General Counsel (OGC), seeking
1
Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104.
communications between OGC and certain private casinos and OGC and the
Pennsylvania State Police (PSP). OGC provided some redacted records, but
withheld many others based on certain exemptions and privileges. On appeal before
the OOR, OGC invoked the common-interest doctrine to shield communications
between OGC, PSP, and private entities.2 On June 20, 2025, Requesters sent a letter
to the OOR, requesting an evidentiary hearing to assess the propriety of OGC’s
exemption log. On the same date, the OOR, among other things, directed OGC to
elaborate on the common-interest doctrine. In response, OGC provided additional
factual support for invoking the doctrine.
Thereafter, on July 15, 2025, during the pendency of the appeal before the
OOR,3 Requesters submitted the underlying request for records to the Office
concerning the Office’s involvement in the March 14 Request. Specifically,
Requesters sought:
1. All documents related to the March 14 [Request] by Matthew
Haverstick (excluding documents produced to Requester), and appeal
therefrom, including but not limited to documents related to the drafting
of OGC’s [e]xemption [l]og.
2
The common-interest doctrine “function[s] as an exception to the general rule that disclosure of
information to third parties constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.” In re Fortieth
Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 191 A.3d 750, 763 (Pa. 2018) (referencing the doctrine with
approval). This Court has held a party seeking to invoke the common-interest doctrine must
demonstrate:
(1) the parties’ agreement to same; (2) a common-interest in the litigation or a
jointly shared litigation strategy; (3) the communications were made pursuant to
such agreement, and (4) the continued confidentiality of the communications, i.e.,
the communications were not disclosed to other third parties such that the privileges
were waived.
Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Sunrise Energy, LLC, 177 A.3d 438, 445 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
3
The OOR ultimately denied in part and dismissed as moot in part the Requesters’ appeal. The
Requesters’ petition for review is currently pending before this Court at Docket No. 1051 C.D.
2025.
2
2. All documents related to Requestor Matthew Haverstick’s June
20, 2025 letter to the Office of Open Records.
3. All documents related to OGC’s efforts to comply with the
[OOR] June 20, 2025 directive to OGC.
Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 7a. After receiving an extension of time to respond,
the Office denied the request, claiming the records were protected from disclosure
by the attorney-client privilege or the attorney-work-product doctrine, or otherwise
exempt as internal, predecisional deliberations. R.R. at 3a (citing 65 P.S. §§ 67.102
and 67.708(b)(10)).
On August 22, 2025, Requesters appealed to the OOR, which invited the
parties to supplement the record and file position statements, and directed the Office
to notify third parties of their ability to participate in the appeal process. The Office
filed an affirmation by Marc Eisenstein (Eisenstein), its Open Records Officer, who
stated his search of the Office records “resulted in the collection of three pages of
material, of which all were withheld as exempt under the RTKL.” Id. at 22.
Paragraph 7 of the affirmation contained a privilege log (Privilege Log) that
identified the three withheld pages and listed the reasons for their non-disclosure as
attorney-client privilege, attorney-work-product doctrine, and the predecisional
deliberation exemption. Eisenstein explained:
8) Each of the attachments detailed in paragraph 7 are documents
prepared by counsel and his subordinates and circulated to clients to
provide legal advice as requested by clients, and do convey such advice
regarding [RTKL] inquiries.
9) Each of the attachments detailed in paragraph 7 reflect counsel’s
thoughts and mental impressions regarding strategies for responding to
inquiries from the public and prepare clients for potential litigation
regarding such matters.
10) Each of the attachments detailed in paragraph 7 provide agency
employees[’] thoughts and guidance regarding inquiries from the
3
public, and discuss how best to respond to such matters. These
discussions occurred prior to officials’ final decisions regarding such
matters.
11) The attachments detailed in paragraph 7 have not been shared
beyond the Commonwealth’s executive agencies, and the Office has
not waived any relevant privilege.
Id. at 23a.
That same day, Requesters submitted a position statement, asserting the
Office had failed to demonstrate its entitlement to withhold the three pages, and
requesting the OOR to conduct in camera review. Id. at 24a-33a.
On September 25, 2025, the OOR denied Requesters’ appeal, concluding the
attorney-client privilege and the attorney-work-product doctrine protected the three
withheld pages from disclosure.4 In so doing, the OOR principally relied upon
Eisenstein’s affirmation containing the Privilege Log. Id. at 38a-39a. Requesters
petitioned this Court for review.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Requesters raise three issues for our review.
[I.] Did the OOR err when it concluded that the attorney-client privilege
and/or work product doctrine applied?
[II.] Does the predecisional exception to the [RTKL] apply to the
records?
[III.] Did the OOR err as a matter of law in declining to conduct in
camera review of the records to assess the asserted privileges?
Requesters’ Br. at 6.
4
Having determined the records to be privileged, the OOR declined to address whether the
deliberative process exemption, as set forth in Section 708(b)(10) of the RTKL, applied.
4
We have summarized our standard and scope of review in RTKL appeals as
follows:
Pursuant to Chapter 13 of the RTKL, with respect to appeals relating to
decisions of Commonwealth agencies, this Court is the ultimate
factfinder in RTKL disputes. Section 1301 of the RTKL,
65 P.S. § 67.1301. Accordingly, we owe no deference to the OOR’s
legal analysis or factfinding, as our standard of review of a final
determination of the OOR is de novo. Bowling v. Off. of Open Recs.,
[] 75 A.3d 453, 474 ([Pa.] 2013). In addition, we are “entitled to the
broadest scope of review[,]” covering all justiciable issues raised and
preserved below. Id. at 477. See also Payne v. Pa. Dep’t of Health,
240 A.3d 221, 225 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020). Unlike in other
administrative agency contexts, “we . . . may substitute our own
findings of fact for that of the agency.” W. Chester Univ. of Pa. v.
Browne, 71 A.3d 1064, 1067 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). We have the
discretion to conduct a hearing, or to remand to the OOR, to supplement
the record. Id.
Pa. Off. of Governor v. Brelje (Off. of Open Recs.), 312 A.3d 928, 932 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2024) (footnote omitted).
For ease of disposition, we combine Requesters’ first and third issues. They
argue the OOR erred in concluding the attorney-client privilege and the work-
product doctrine applied to the three withheld pages given the Office’s “formulaic”
and “insufficient” response, and ask this Court to direct the OOR to conduct in
camera review of the pages. Requesters’ Br. at 16, 29.
When an agency asserts a privilege, “it bears the burden of proof to
demonstrate by sufficient facts that the privilege applies.” Janesch v. Pa. House of
Representatives, 299 A.3d 1030, 1036 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added); see also Section 708(a)(1) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.708(a)(1)
(providing “[t]he burden of proving that a record of a Commonwealth agency . . . is
exempt from public access shall be on the . . . agency . . . by a preponderance of the
5
evidence”); Section 903(2) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.903(2) (when denying a
request in whole or in part, an agency shall state in writing “[t]he specific reasons
for the denial, including a citation of supporting legal authority”). “To meet its
burden of proving that a record need not be disclosed under the RTKL, the agency
may establish facts with affidavits or attestations.” Couloumbis v. Senate of Pa., 300
A.3d 1093, 1104 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (en banc). This Court has explained:
Affidavits are the means through which a governmental agency . . .
justifies nondisclosure of the requested records under each exemption
upon which it relied upon. The affidavits must be detailed,
nonconclusory, and submitted in good faith . . . . Absent evidence of
bad faith, the veracity of an agency’s submissions explaining reasons
for nondisclosure should not be questioned.
McGowan v. Pa. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 103 A.3d 374, 381 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014)
(quotation omitted). Furthermore, a privilege log listing “the date, record type,
author, recipients, and a description of the withheld record[] can serve as sufficient
evidence to establish an exemption, especially where the information in the log is
bolstered with averments in an affidavit.” Id.
Moreover, Section 305 of the RTKL provides a Commonwealth agency
record generally is presumed to be public unless “protected by a privilege” or subject
to other exemptions. 65 P.S. § 67.305(a). Section 102 of the RTKL also excludes
privileged documents from the definition of “public record.” 65 P.S. § 67.102. The
RTKL defines privilege to include “the attorney-client privilege” and the “attorney-
work product doctrine.” 65 P.S. § 67.102. In civil matters, “counsel shall not be
competent to testify to confidential communications made to him by his client, nor
shall the client be compelled to disclose the same, unless in either case this privilege
is waived upon the trial by the client.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5928.
6
Although an agency has some discretion under the RTKL to release otherwise
exempt records, it lacks discretion to release privileged records. Section 506(c)(2)
of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.506(c)(2). The RTKL permits redaction of “the
information which is not subject to access.” Section 706 of the RTKL,
65 P.S. § 67.706. Redactions may be made even if the record is protected by
privilege. Couloumbis, 300 A.3d at 1099. “Whether the attorney-client privilege
protects communications from disclosure is a question of law.” In re Thirty-Third
Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 86 A.3d 204, 215 (Pa. 2014).
In Levy v. Senate of Pennsylvania, 65 A.3d 361 (Pa. 2013), our Supreme Court
explained the application of the attorney-client privilege in the context of RTKL
cases.
This Court has repeatedly noted that the attorney-client privilege is
deeply rooted in our common law and is the most revered of our
common law privileges. The General Assembly has defined attorney-
client privilege identically for purposes of criminal and civil law . . . .
We recently observed that the purpose of the attorney-client privilege
is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of law and administration of justice. We acknowledged,
however, that the attorney-client privilege is often in tension with the
truth-determining process of the justice system, and, in this case, with
the RTKL’s goal of government transparency. In balancing these
competing purposes, we note that not all information passed between
client and attorney is privileged, but rather the privilege is limited to
communications related to the legal advice sought by the client.
Id. at 368-69 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Additionally,
the determination of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege
does not turn on the category of the information, such as a client’s
identity or address, or the category of a document, such as whether it is
an invoice or fee agreement. Instead, the relevant question is whether
the content of the writing will result in disclosure of information
otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege. For example,
7
descriptions of legal services that address the client’s motive for
seeking counsel, legal advice, strategy, or other confidential
communications are undeniably protected under the attorney client
privilege. In contrast, an entry that generically states that counsel made
a telephone call for a specific amount of time to the client is not
information protected by the attorney-client privilege but, instead, is
subject to disclosure under the specific provisions of the RTKL.
Id. at 373 (internal citations omitted). To establish the application of the attorney-
client privilege, an agency must demonstrate:
(1) The asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client;
(2) The person to whom the communication was made is a member of
the bar of a court, or his subordinate;
(3) The communication relates to a fact which the attorney was
informed by his client, without the presence of strangers, for the
purpose of securing either an opinion of law, legal services or assistance
in a legal matter, and not for the purpose of committing a crime or tort;
and
(4) The privilege has been claimed and is not waived by the client.
Couloumbis, 300 A.3d at 1102.
The work-product doctrine is closely related to the attorney-client privilege
but “provides broader protection.” Bagwell v. Dep’t of Educ., 103 A.3d 409, 415
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (citation omitted). Although the attorney-client privilege
protects confidential communications, the work-product doctrine “only applies to
records that are the work-product of an attorney and may extend to the product of an
attorney’s representative secured in anticipation of litigation.” Id. (citation omitted).
In the context of the RTKL, “the work-product doctrine protects the ‘mental
impressions, theories, notes, strategies, research and the like created by an attorney
in the course of his or her professional duties, particularly in anticipation or
prevention of litigation’ from disclosure.” Id. at 416 (quoting Levy v. Senate of Pa.,
8
94 A.3d 436, 443 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014)). The party asserting waiver of a privilege
bears the burden of proof. Bagwell, 103 A.3d at 420 (recognizing the procedural
disadvantage requesters face in RTKL appeals, this Court nevertheless placed the
burden of proving waiver on requesters).
Here, Requesters argue neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work-
product doctrine protects the three withheld pages from disclosure, because the
Office failed to identify the attorney, the client, or the relationship between them.
With respect to the attorney-client privilege, they argue the Office only “vaguely
asserted that the responsive records were ‘prepared by counsel . . . and circulated to
clients to provide legal advice’” and that the records “reflected ‘counsel’s thoughts
and mental impressions regarding strategies for responding to inquiries’ and
‘potential litigation.’” Requesters’ Br. at 19 (emphasis in original).
According to Requesters, the Office does not explain its role relative to the
creation of the three withheld pages. Requesters explain the Eisenstein affirmation’s
reference to “counsel” cannot pertain to the Office, because it “does not represent
agencies or typically function as counsel and, consequently, does not provide
confidential legal advice to ‘clients’ in the regular course.” Id. at 20. Requesters
assert the Office could not have provided legal advice regarding RTKL matters to
OGC, because providing such advice is the function of OGC. Id.
Requesters further explain the Eisenstein affirmation’s reference to “clients”
likewise cannot pertain to the Office, because they directed the March 14 Request to
OGC. Id. They described the Office as “an unrelated third party.” Id.
Finally, Requesters assail the Office’s explanations as nonsensical and as “an
attempt to render standard documents privileged merely because OGC was
9
implicated.” Id. at 21 (“Invoking ‘OGC’ is not a talisman that renders records
privileged under the RTKL.”).
As for the attorney-work-product doctrine, Requesters cast doubt on the
Office’s ability to demonstrate the three withheld pages “reflect the mental processes
of an attorney acting on behalf of a client” because the Office has not established the
identity of either the attorneys or the clients. Id. at 22. Requesters, therefore, urge
this Court to reverse the OOR’s decision and remand this matter to the OOR with
instructions to conduct in camera review of the three withheld pages to determine
whether the Office properly invoked the privileges.
The Office counters Requesters’ understanding of OGC’s role is incorrect.
Citing the Commonwealth Attorneys Act,5 the Office explains OGC acts “as the
primary ‘law firm’ for the day-to-day operations of the executive.” Office’s Br. at
6; 71 P.S. § 732-301. As a result, it asserts legal advice from OGC to the executive
should be privileged. Office’s Br. at 6. The Office notes OGC had represented
executive agencies in certain gaming matters involving private entities and that the
March 14 Request “sought information from OGC about such representation.” Id.
Thereafter, Requesters initiated the present request with the Office to obtain
communications related to the March 14 Request. Id. at 7. Although Requesters
directed their March 14 Request to OGC, the Office suggests it was implicated as a
client because OGC represents the executive. Id. Moreover, the Office asserts the
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct mandated that OGC consult with the
Office concerning the March 14 Request. Id. (citing Pa.R.P.C. 1.4). The Office
maintains Requesters are not entitled to communications it had with OGC
5
Act of October 15, 1980, P.L. 950, as amended, 71 P.S. §§ 732-101-732-506.
10
concerning the March 14 Request, and should not be permitted to define “the scope
of OGC lawyers’ legal representation.” Id. at 8.
With respect to the work-product doctrine, the Office suggests Requesters’
“inquiry expressly sought records relating to OGC’s work product.” Id. at 10
(emphasis in original). But even if that were not the case, the Office argues, the
Eisenstein affirmation satisfies every element of the work-product doctrine, because
the three withheld pages “were created by counsel to prepare clients (here, [the
Office]) for potential litigation (which did, as this matter demonstrates, actually
ensue).” Id.
In response, Requesters continue to argue that, contrary to the Office’s
statement, which they characterize as “untrue,” the March 14 Request submitted to
OGC had “nothing to do” with the Office. Requesters’ Reply Br. at 3, 8. They
neither sought “communications between OGC and [the Office], nor did the March
14 Request facially concern OGC’s legal representation” of the Office under the
Commonwealth Attorneys Act. Id. at 3. Separately, the current request only seeks
documents in the Office’s possession bearing any relation to the March 14 Request.
Id. at 3-4.
Requesters contend the Office’s position that the March 14 Request was about
OGC’s representation of the Office is an alternative explanation, raised for the first
time on appeal. Id. at 7. They argue the Office “is attempting to supplement its
evidentiary showing to the OOR and cure its prior evidentiary failures.” Id.
Upon review of the entire record, as detailed above, we agree with Requesters
that the OOR erred in concluding the attorney-client privilege and the work-product
doctrine applied to the three withheld pages. Critically, the Eisenstein affirmation
is facially inadequate, conclusory, and otherwise generic. C.f. Janesch, 299 A.3d at
11
1042-43 (finding the affidavits sufficiently detailed); Bonner v. Dep’t of Cmty. and
Econ. Dev. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 292 C.D. 2025, filed July 16, 2026), slip op. at 11
(noting the “attestations sufficiently state why the privilege was invoked and provide
adequate detail as to why the privilege extends to the record at issue”).6
The Eisenstein affirmation does not provide any information about the nature
of the pages, whether they are e-mails, memoranda, or the like, or to what they
specifically relate. Rather, Eisenstein summarily states the three withheld pages
were “prepared by counsel and his subordinates and circulated to clients to provide
legal advice as requested by clients, and do convey such advice regarding [RTKL]
inquiries.” R.R. at 23a. Similarly, with respect to the application of the work-
product doctrine, the Eisenstein affirmation states the pages “reflect counsel’s
thoughts and mental impressions regarding strategies for responding to inquiries
from the public and prepare clients for potential litigation regarding such matters.”
Id. The Privilege Log, likewise, did not provide sufficient information to support
the invocation of the privileges. It only identified the records at issue as “Adobe
Acrobat (PDF),” the date and time they were last modified, and the applicable
Sections of the RTKL and the Judicial Code.7 Thus, because the Office did not
sufficiently explain the basis for nondisclosure through the Eisenstein affirmation
and the Privilege Log, in camera review is necessary. See UnitedHealthcare of Pa.,
Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 187 A.3d 1046, 1060 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (noting
“where an agency sufficiently explains the basis for nondisclosure through an
affidavit, a log or in camera review may not be necessary”). Without a detailed
6
An unreported panel decision of this Court, “issued after January 15, 2008,” may be cited “for
its persuasive value[.]” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating
Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
7
Tellingly, the Privilege Log under the column “record type” simply noted “attachment.” R.R. at
22a.
12
affirmation, a privilege log, or in camera review, the Office may shield from
disclosure every document by globally invoking the attorney-client privilege or
work-product doctrine if the document in any way references or involves OGC.8 See
Twp. of Neshannock v. Kirila Contractors, Inc., 181 A.3d 467, 474 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2018) (noting “the attorney[-]client privilege must be asserted with respect to each
. . . document sought to be withheld, rather than a single, blanket assertion”)
(quotation omitted). This would contravene the RTKL’s goal of government
transparency. Accordingly, given the record before it, the OOR erred in concluding
the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine applied.9 We, therefore,
remand this case to the OOR with instruction to conduct in camera review of the
three withheld pages to determine if the privileges apply.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, we vacate the OOR’s final determination, and
remand the matter to the OOR for in camera review of the three withheld pages.
The OOR is instructed to issue a final determination within 60 days of the date of
this Court’s Order.
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge
8
We agree with the Office’s contention that OGC’s core function is to provide legal advice to the
executive. See 71 P.S. § 732-301.
9
Given the outcome of this case, we need not address Requesters’ second issue, but we do instruct
the OOR to address the deliberative process exemption on remand, should it determine the asserted
privileges do not apply.
13
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Matthew Haverstick and :
Kleinbard LLC, :
Petitioners :
:
v. : No. 1407 C.D. 2025
:
Pennsylvania Office of the Governor :
(Office of Open Records), :
Respondent :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 16th day of November 2026, the September 25, 2025 final
determination of the Pennsylvania Office of Open Records (OOR) is hereby
VACATED and this matter is REMANDED to the OOR for further proceedings
consistent with the accompanying memorandum opinion.
Jurisdiction RELINQUISHED.
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge