Kenneth R. Covey v. Columbia County, Georgia
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
Date FiledOctober 29, 2026
DocketA27D0247
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Court of Appeals
of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA,____________________
October 29, 2026
The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:
A27D0247. KENNETH R. COVEY v. COLUMBIA COUNTY, GEORGIA.
Following a trial in magistrate court, Kenneth Covey was convicted of violating
a Columbia County local ordinance. Covey filed a petition for review to the superior
court, asserting that the ordinance, as applied, violated the Georgia Constitution
because it was a local law that conflicted with and was thus preempted by state law.
The superior court denied the petition for review, and Covey filed this timely
application seeking discretionary review. We lack jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court of Georgia “has exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
involving construction of the Constitution of the State of Georgia and of the United
States and all cases in which the constitutionality of a law, ordinance, or constitutional
provision has been called into question.” Atlanta Independent School System v. Lane,
266 Ga. 657, 657(1) (469 SE2d 22) (1996) (citing Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI,
Par. II (1)). This exclusive jurisdiction extends “only to constitutional issues that were
distinctly ruled on by the trial court and that do not involve the application of
unquestioned and unambiguous constitutional provisions or challenges to laws
previously held to be constitutional against the same attack.” State v. Davis, 303 Ga.
684, 687(1) (814 SE2d 701) (2018) (quotation marks omitted).
Covey argued before the superior court that if the language of the local
ordinance was construed to impose strict liability, it violated the Georgia Constitution
because it was a local law that conflicted with and was thus preempted by state law.
The superior court ruled that the ordinance imposed strict liability and authorized
Covey’s conviction. Thus, it is possible that the superior court’s order was
“effectively a distinct ruling on the constitutional issues.” Rouse v. Dept. of Natural
Resources, 271 Ga. 726, 728(1) (524 SE2d 455) (1999). See also Willis v. City of Atlanta,
285 Ga. 775, 775–76(1) & (2) (684 SE2d 271) (2009) (the Supreme Court’s exclusive
jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to ordinances was implicated by the
appellants’ argument that a local ordinance violated the Georgia Constitution because
it was a local law that conflicted with and was thus preempted by state law); Hancock
County v. Williams, 230 Ga. 723, 724(1) (198 SE2d 659) (1973) (explaining that trial
court’s ruling sufficiently passed upon the constitutionality of a statute to invoke the
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction). Covey reiterated this constitutional argument in his
application brief. Thus, it is possible that this case implicates the Supreme Court’s
exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional questions. As that Court has the ultimate
responsibility for determining appellate jurisdiction, see Saxton v. Coastal Dialysis &
Med. Clinic, 267 Ga. 177, 178 (476 SE2d 587) (1996), this case is hereby
TRANSFERRED to the Supreme Court of Georgia for disposition.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________
10/29/2026
I certify that the above is a true extract from
the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Witness my signature an d t he seal of said court
hereto affixed the day and year last above written.
, Clerk.