Biddle v. Biddle

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA No. COA25-581 Filed 1 July 2026 Caldwell County, No. 19CVD001553-130 GARY BIDDLE, Plaintiff, v. SUVI HANNELE BIDDLE, Defendant. Appeal by defendant from order entered 6 December 2024 by Judge Sherri W. Elliott in District Court, Caldwell County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 November 2025. LeCroy Law Firm, PLLC, by M. Alan LeCroy, for plaintiff-appellee. Poyner Spruill LLP, by Steven B. Epstein, for defendant-appellant. STROUD, Judge. Suvi Hannele Biddle, Defendant, appeals from the trial court’s equitable distribution order. She contends the trial court erred in the classification and valuation of certain marital assets. She also argues that the trial court did not comply with the parties’ binding stipulations and that it erred by placing the burden of proof on her to show that gains in Plaintiff Gary Biddle’s separate assets during the marriage should be classified as marital property. For the reasons below, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for entry of a new order. I. Background  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court Gary Biddle (Husband) and Suvi Biddle (Wife) married 23 March 2011 and separated 16 November 2019. In his complaint, Husband sought an equitable distribution of the marital estate and a divorce from bed and board. On 12 September 2023, the parties entered into a Pretrial Order. A series of schedules containing extensive stipulations were attached to the Pretrial Order. These stipulations: (1) stated how the parties’ property would be classified, valued, and distributed; and (2) set out the precise issues the court would decide with each respective schedule. Schedule C of the Pretrial Order contained “a list of marital property upon which there [wa]s [a]greement as to [v]alue and [d]isagreement as to [d]istribution.” Included in this schedule was item A-1, the former marital home, with an agreed- upon value of $1,100,000. Schedule C also included item L-1, the Monroe Medical stock, with an agreed-upon value of approximately $877,000. Schedule D contained a “list of marital property upon which there is [d]isagreement as to [d]istribution and [d]isagreement as to [v]alue.” Schedule D included a townhome that the parties owned in South Carolina. Schedule E listed numerous accounts with which there was “[d]isagreement as to [w]hether the item is [m]arital [p]roperty.” Included in this schedule were three Charles Schwab investment accounts—Schwab #8193, Schwab #8773, and Schwab #0407 (investment accounts)—which Husband owned prior to the marriage. Schedule G contained “a list of items with [m]ixed, [m]arital and [s]eparate [c]haracteristics.” Such item was a Wells Fargo Biddle’s Custom Homes Checking 2  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court Account (Wells Fargo Checking Account), which Husband had opened before the marriage. The parties agreed that the Wells Fargo Checking Account’s value was $12,465, and Husband contended $5,447 of this amount was marital. Additionally, Schedule G included the Charles Schwab #4691 IRA Rollover Account (Rollover Account). Both parties agreed the Rollover Account’s value was approximately $676,562, and Husband contended $255,495.29 of this amount was marital. In summary, the parties made the following stipulations in the Pretrial Order: • The parties agreed on the marital home and Monroe Medical stock’s classification as marital property and their respective date-of-separation values. They disagreed as to the distribution of both. • The parties agreed the townhome was marital property but disagreed as to its distribution and value. • The parties agreed on the date-of-separation values of each of the investment accounts but disagreed as to whether any portion of each account was marital property. • The parties agreed that some portion of both the Wells Fargo Checking Account and the Rollover Account was marital but disagreed about how much. The Pretrial Order also included, in Schedule H, Husband’s contentions for an unequal distribution. Husband stated that he had purchased the townhome, listed in Schedule D, with his own pre-marital funds for his daughter and grandsons when they “became homeless.” Although the townhome was originally titled just to him, Husband asserted “to maintain marital peace,” he had added Wife to the deed. 3  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court Husband also claimed he had made three loans totaling $105,000 to Wife’s daughter and did not use any marital money. On 5 January 2024, Husband filed a document entitled “Plaintiff’s Notice of Amendment of his Equitable Distribution Affidavit and The Pretrial Order” (Notice). In the Notice, Husband stated he had obtained a “new current appraisal” of $1,175,000 for the former marital home and a separate “new current appraisal” of $150,000 for the vacant lot across the street from the marital home, which the parties also owned. Husband moved to amend “item A-1 of the Pretrial Order” with the marital home and lot’s new total value (collectively, $1,325,000). He also stated he was amending “item L-1 of the Pretrial Order” with a new value for the Monroe Medical Stock ($1,003,663.89). Wife filed “Defendant-Wife’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff-Husband’s ‘Notice’ of Amendments and Motion in Limine,” (motion in limine) in which she opposed the “amendments” to the Pretrial Order. Wife alleged that the Pretrial Order could not be unilaterally “amended” by Husband but, instead, could be amended only upon a proper motion and order under Rule 59 or Rule 60 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 59 (2025) (“New trials; amendment of judgments); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 60 (2025) (“Relief from judgment or order”). Wife claimed Husband could not add the vacant lot with a separate value from the marital home’s value. She moved in limine for the court “to conduct a pre-trial hearing” and, pursuant to Rule 46 of the North Carolina Rules of 4  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court Civil Procedure, that the trial court rule “as inadmissible any evidence regarding the divisible v[ersus] marital nature of” the marital home or the vacant lot. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 46 (2025) (“Objections”). The equitable distribution hearing was held on three dates, beginning on 26 January 2024 and concluding on 2 July 2024. On the first day of the hearing, the trial court addressed Husband’s Notice and Wife’s motion in limine. The court ruled on Wife’s motion in limine and denied Husband’s request to value the marital home and the lot as two separate parcels because the “parties combined that lot with the house” in 2019. It determined the marital home’s value would include all the real property at that location, including the lot. However, the trial court also ruled that it would consider the marital home’s date-of-distribution value and would address any divisible property based upon the evidence. The court also declared that Husband would be allowed to present evidence of the Monroe Medical stock’s value. Based on the trial court’s ruling, the parties stipulated to the Monroe Medical stock’s date-of-trial value. The court denied Husband’s request to present evidence on an outstanding loan and “a 2019 tax refund” because these items were not previously listed. During the hearing, the parties made certain oral stipulations: Husband and Wife orally stipulated to the townhome’s $290,000 value and to the Wells Fargo Checking Account’s $5,447 marital portion. Consistent with the court’s ruling at the start of the trial, Husband presented evidence from an appraiser, who testified that 5  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court the marital home’s fair market value was $1,275,000. The parties also put on evidence regarding gains and losses in the investment accounts and the Rollover Account. Husband testified about the frequency with which he traded investments in each investment account. Husband also submitted Exhibit 15, wherein he tried to trace out his separate assets in the Rollover Account. On 13 December 2024, the trial court entered an equitable distribution order (Order), concluding that an equal distribution was equitable and distributed the parties’ property according to its findings. As to the items in Schedule C, the court found that the marital home’s value had increased since 2019. “[B]ased on the appraisal report presented,” the marital home’s date-of-distribution value was $1,275,000. The court also found that the townhouse, listed in Schedule D, was a mixed asset. Of the townhome’s $290,000 value, the marital and/or divisible portion was $126,693 and Husband’s separate portion was $163,307. As for the investment accounts listed in Schedule E, the court found: Schwab #8193’s date-of-separation value was $24,011 and there had been a $17,409 passive gain during the marriage; Schwab #8773’s date-of-separation value was $121,966 and there had been a $13,230.42 passive gain during the marriage; and Schwab #0407’s date-of-separation value was $223,353,00 and there had been a $66,206.00 passive gain during the marriage. The court made identical findings as to each investment account: “The [c]ourt fails to find that the simple few trades made on this account by [Husband] during the marriage amounts to ‘substantial activity’. These gains 6  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court represent passive appreciation and must be declared separate in this order.” As to the items in Schedule G, the court found that Wells Fargo Checking Account’s $12,465.00 date-of-separation value was Husband’s separate property. Finally, the court found that the Rollover Account “contained both separate and marital funds” and that Husband had “produced sufficient evidence requiring th[e c]ourt to trace out and classify” the separate contributions. Wife appeals. II. Analysis We begin with some general equitable distribution principles. When a party applies for an equitable distribution, the North Carolina Equitable Distribution Act requires the trial court to determine whether the property is marital or divisible and provide for an equitable distribution of the marital property and divisible property between the parties. In accordance with the Act, the trial court is required to follow a three-step analysis: (1) identify the property as either marital, divisible, or separate property after conducting appropriate findings of fact; (2) determine the net value of the marital property as of the date of the separation; and (3) equitably distribute the marital and divisible property. With regard to the distribution phase, there is generally a presumption in favor of equal distribution. However, the trial court may conclude, within its discretion, that unequal distribution is equitable after considering the factors listed in [North Carolina General Statute Section] 50-20(c) and making sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion. Mugno v. Mugno, 205 N.C. App. 273, 276-77, 695 S.E.2d 495, 498 (2010). Marital 7  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court property is defined, in part, as “[a]ll real and personal property acquired by either spouse or both spouses during the course of the marriage and before the date of the separation of the parties, and presently owned, except property determined to be separate property or divisible property.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(b)(1b) (2025). Marital property is valued on the parties’ date of separation. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50- 21(b) (2025). Separate property is defined as “[a]ll real and personal property acquired by a spouse before marriage or acquired by a spouse by devise, descent, or gift during the course of the marriage.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(b)(2) (2025). Separate property includes “[t]he increase in value of separate property and the income derived from separate property.” Id. In this case, Wife argues that the trial court erred in not accepting the parties’ binding stipulations as to the townhouse, Wells Fargo Checking Account, and marital home. She also contends the court erred in finding and concluding that Husband successfully traced out his separate contributions to his Rollover Account. Finally, Wife claims the court erred in finding and concluding that the post-marital investment gains in Husband’s investment accounts were his separate property. We address each argument below. A. Townhome’s Classification Wife argues that the trial court erred in finding and concluding that the parties’ townhome was a mixed asset—with a separate component of $163,307.00 awarded to Husband and a $126,693 marital value—because the parties stipulated 8  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court to the townhome’s classification and value. She asserts that the stipulations in the Pretrial Order were binding upon the parties and the trial court, so the court erred by considering classifying the townhome as a mixed asset. Husband counters that the “pre-trial stipulations . . . regarding their townhome were not definite and certain enough to prohibit the trial court’s ability to trace out” Husband’s “separate contributions and award those to him.” We start with our standard of review. Wife acknowledges that “[i]t is not clear from this Court’s jurisprudence what standard of review applies to the trial court’s failure to adhere to the binding stipulations of the parties in an equitable distribution . . . pretrial order.” As noted above, the court considered some amendments to stipulations in the Pretrial Order at the beginning of the hearing, but the stipulations about the townhouse were not amended. Wife is correct that no case has explicitly stated the standard of review for a trial court’s failure to follow “binding stipulations of the parties.” But as a practical matter, prior cases have applied de novo review, as explained below. We thus review this issue de novo. “As a general rule, this Court has noted that any material fact that has been in controversy between the parties may be established by stipulation.” Plomaritis v. Plomaritis, 222 N.C. App. 94, 101, 730 S.E.2d 784, 789 (2012) (citations and ellipses omitted). Where a stipulation is “definite and certain,” and no party has requested that it be set aside or for permission to present additional evidence contrary to the stipulated fact, the parties and the trial court are bound by the stipulation. Id. at 9  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court 105-06, 730 S.E.2d at 791. But stipulations may be set aside in certain circumstances. Our Supreme Court recently addressed our case law on setting aside stipulations in Smith v. Smith: The Court of Appeals has aptly summarized the procedural and substantive principles that govern the setting aside of stipulations: A party to a stipulation who desires to have it set aside should seek to do so by some direct proceeding, and, ordinarily, such relief may or should be sought by a motion to set aside the stipulation in the court in which the action is pending, on notice to the opposite party. Application to set aside a stipulation must be seasonably made; delay in asking for relief may defeat the right thereto. Whether a motion is seasonably made cannot be determined with mathematical precision. It is generally recognized that it is within the discretion of the court to set aside a stipulation of the parties relating to the conduct of a pending cause, where enforcement would result in injury to one of the parties and the other party would not be materially prejudiced by its being set aside. A stipulation entered into under a mistake as to a material fact concerning the ascertainment of which there has been reasonable diligence exercised is the proper subject for relief. Other proper justifications for setting aside a stipulation include: misrepresentations as to material facts, undue influence, collusion, duress, fraud, and inadvertence. 387 N.C. 255, 259-60, 912 S.E.2d 762, 765-66 (2025) (citations and brackets omitted). Here, there was no request to set aside or modify the Pretrial Order’s 10  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court stipulations regarding the townhouse (unlike the marital home, which we address below). Accordingly, the stipulation remained binding on the parties and the trial court. See Plomaritis, 222 N.C. App. at 105, 730 S.E.2d at 791. Because the stipulation’s existence and terms are undisputed, the issue on appeal is not one of fact-finding or discretionary decision-making, but whether the trial court correctly applied the law governing the effect of binding stipulations. That determination involves the legal effect of undisputed facts, which is a question of law and consequently reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Malinak v. Malinak, 242 N.C. App. 609, 612, 775 S.E.2d 915, 916 (2015). “Under a de novo standard of review, this Court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the trial court.” Reese v. Mecklenburg Cnty., 200 N.C. App. 491, 497, 685 S.E.2d 34, 38 (2009) (citation omitted). In the Pretrial Order, the townhome was included on Schedule D, which contained “a list of marital property upon which there [wa]s [d]isagreement as to the [d]istribution and [d]isagreement as to value.” (Emphasis added.) The townhome did not appear on Schedule G, which listed assets with “[m]ixed, [m]arital and [s]eparate characteristics.” In other words, the parties’ stipulation to the townhome’s classification as marital property was clear. The only issues the trial court had to resolve with respect to items listed on Schedule D were (1) the property’s value and (2) which party would become the owner. During the equitable distribution hearing, the parties stipulated to the 11  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court townhome’s value, as the trial court confirmed by stating: “So we’ve got a stipulation that the value is 290.” Counsel for both parties confirmed that this was correct. Husband also offered evidence consistent with the Pretrial Order in support of his contention that an unequal distribution would be equitable because of his separate contribution to the townhome. In response to his counsel’s question, Husband testified that he would like the court to consider “giving [him] back [his] initial investment of $108,000,” noting that he “understand[s] that it’s a marital asset, but the initial part of it was from a separate account of $108,000.” (Emphasis added.) In the Order, the trial court found that the townhome’s value was $290,000.00—per the parties’ stipulation—but also “traced out” Husband’s contributions by crediting Husband with his initial purchase price ($108,000) and $55,307 in expenses as his separate property. The court also found that this left a “marital and/or divisible value of $126,693.00.” Thus, the trial court assigned the townhome a marital value of $126,693, rather than the stipulated $290,000, and treated the remainder as Husband’s separate property. This issue is controlled by our decision in Clemons v. Clemons, 265 N.C. App. 113, 828 S.E.2d 501 (2019). There, the parties stipulated that a townhome was the wife’s separate property and had a net value of $186,000.00. Id. at 114, 828 S.E.2d at 503. In the equitable distribution order, however, the trial court found that the townhome contained a “marital component” and distributed that amount to the wife. Id. On appeal, we held that “[b]ecause the parties had stipulated that the townhome 12  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court was [the w]ife’s separate property and that its value was $186,000.00, the trial court erred by classifying a portion of it as marital and attempting to value it.” Id. at 121, 828 S.E.2d at 507. Here, the trial court erred in classifying the townhome as a mixed marital and separate asset contrary to the parties’ stipulation. As in Clemons, Husband and Wife stipulated to their townhome’s value and its classification as marital property. See id. at 114, 828 S.E.2d at 503. In doing so, the parties “eliminate[d] the necessity of submitting that issue of fact” to the trial court and were precluded from taking an “inconsistent position,” such as contending there was a separate component in the townhome’s classification or value. Smith, 387 N.C. at 259, 912 S.E.2d at 765. The parties did not, however, stipulate to the townhome’s distribution, and both parties requested an unequal distribution of the marital estate. The Pretrial Order’s terms further buttress the conclusion that the existence of a separate component was a factual issue removed from dispute. Because it was listed in Schedule D, the trial court had to determine only the item’s value and to whom it would be distributed. Then, by reaching a stipulation on the townhome’s value at the hearing, the parties further limited the issues before the trial court. And because neither party moved to set aside these stipulations, they were binding upon the parties. See Smith, 387 N.C. at 259-60, 912 S.E.2d at 765-66. And together, these stipulations supplied the trial court with the facts necessary to support a proper finding and reach the appropriate conclusion. See Clemons, 265 N.C. App. at 117, 13  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court 828 S.E.2d at 505 (“In equitable distribution cases, stipulations in the pretrial order are intended to limit the evidence needed and to define the issues the trial court must decide.”). They also narrowed the precise issue the trial court had to rule on: the townhome’s distribution. Id. Thus, the court erred in finding and concluding that the townhome had a $163,307 separate component. See id. at 114, 828 S.E.2d at 503. The trial court tried to reach an equitable result at the wrong stage of the process. As discussed above, when a party requests an equitable distribution, the trial court must conduct a three-step analysis. See id. at 115, 828 S.E.2d at 504 (noting that first, “the court must identify and classify all property as marital or separate”; “[s]econd, the court must determine the net value of the marital property as of the date of the parties’ separation”; and “[t]hird, the court must distribute the marital property in an equitable manner”). During the third step—distribution— “the trial court may conclude, within its discretion, that an unequal distribution is equitable after considering the factors listed in [North Carolina General Statute Section] 50-20(c) and making sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion.” Mugno, 205 N.C. App. at 277, 695 S.E.2d at 498; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c) (2025) (listing the distributional factors a trial court must consider upon determining “that an equal division is not equitable”). But here, instead of classifying the townhome as marital property (step one)— valued at $290,000 (step two)—and then considering Husband’s separate contribution as a distributional factor supporting an unequal distribution (step 14  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court three), the trial court wrongly attempted to do equity in step two. In the Order, the court specifically rejected Husband’s contention that he should receive an unequal distribution in his favor based upon the factor that the townhouse “was purchased entirely with his separate funds and was originally titled only in his name.” The court found that Husband’s separate contribution to the townhome’s purchase did “not justify an unequal distribution in his favor” because the court “followed the source of funds rule,” determining that Husband’s “separate contributions to th[e] asset” should “be retained by him.” As support for that finding, the court cited McLean v McLean, 88 N.C. App. 285, 363 S.E.2d 95 (1987). The trial court erred in relying on McLean, but that case explains why the court rejected Husband’s contention for unequal distribution. McLean dealt with the classification of property as marital or separate, not an unequal distribution: It is true that there may be both marital and separate ownership interests in the same property. Our courts have adopted a source of funds approach to distinguish marital and separate contributions to a single asset. Under the source of funds approach, each party retains as separate property the amount he contributed to purchase the property plus passive appreciation in value. 88 N.C. App. at 288-89, 363 S.E.2d at 98 (citations omitted). The parties had stipulated to the townhome’s classification as marital property, so the trial court could not classify any portion of the townhome as separate property or assign any portion as having a separate value. See Clemons, 265 N.C. App. at 114, 828 S.E.2d at 503. Husband properly requested that the trial court 15  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court consider his separate contribution to the townhome’s purchase as a distributional factor under North Carolina General Statute Section 50-20(c)—but the trial court rejected Husband’s request based on its erroneous reclassification and valuation of the townhome. See N.C. Gen. Stat. 50-20(c). Instead, the court should have considered Husband’s “contribution of his separate property to the marital estate [as] a distributional factor” under North Carolina General Statute Section 50-20(c). Collins v. Collins, 125 N.C. App. 113, 116, 479 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1997). As we explained in Clemons: [B]y attempting to classify and value a “marital component” of the townhome contrary to the stipulations and evidence and then attempting an equitable result by dividing the net estate equally, the court put the cart before the horse. The trial court may in its discretion do equity in the distribution, including an unequal distribution if supported by the factors under [North Carolina General Statute Section] 50-20(c), but it may not use equity to classify or value marital property or debt. Where the trial court decides that an unequal distribution is equitable, the court must exercise its discretion to decide how much weight to give each factor supporting an unequal distribution. A single distributional factor may support an unequal division. 265 N.C. App. at 125, 828 S.E.2d at 509 (citations and quotation marks omitted). We therefore reverse and remand for the trial court to properly classify and value the townhome in accordance with the parties’ stipulations and to distribute it as well. See id. On remand, the trial court shall also make new findings as appropriate regarding the townhome’s distribution, including reconsideration of 16  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court Husband’s contentions related to the townhome as listed on Schedule H of the Pretrial Order. See id. B. Checking Account’s Classification Wife contends the trial court erred in “finding and concluding that Husband’s [Wells Fargo] [C]hecking [A]ccount contained no marital funds because the parties stipulated, during trial, that it contained $5,477.001 in marital funds.” As noted above, we review the trial court’s failure to comply with a fact’s clear and definite stipulation de novo. In the Pretrial Order, the Wells Fargo Checking Account was listed on Schedule G, “items with [m]ixed, [m]arital and [s]eparate [c]haracteristics.” Both parties agreed the Wells Fargo Checking Account’s date-of-separation value was $12,465; Husband contended $5,447 was marital and the remainder was separate. The parties did not agree on the Wells Fargo Checking Account’s value or classification. During the trial, Husband presented some evidence on the Wells Fargo Checking Account and during Husband’s testimony, Wife’s counsel agreed that the account’s marital value was $5,447.00: [HUSBAND’S COUNSEL]: He’s saying that $5,477 – [WIFE’S COUNSEL]: 447? [HUSBAND’S COUNSEL]: Correct, is marital. 1 It appears this number is a typographical error. The number listed in Schedule G and stipulated to at trial was $5,447. 17  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court [WIFE’S COUNSEL]: Okay. We stipulate that that’s the marital component and the rest of it is separate. ... [WIFE’S COUNSEL]: Thank you. THE COURT: So what’s my stipulated amount on this one again, please, [Wife’s counsel]? [WIFE’S COUNSEL]: $5,447 is the number that’s in the middle of the page. THE COURT: I see that. Do you accept that stipulation – [HUSBAND’S COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. However, in the Order, the court found and concluded that the Wells Fargo Checking Account’s date-of-separation value—$12,465—was Husband’s separate property. Wife is correct that the trial court overlooked the stipulation the parties reached during the equitable distribution hearing. Husband argues only that he “introduced an exhibit, without objection, that during the marriage [he had] used that money and some of his separate funds to pay for marital expenses.” In Husband’s view, that exhibit supported the court’s finding that the entire account was his separate property. Husband is correct that he testified about the exhibit, but the exhibit he references also show he had deposited $5,447 into the Wells Fargo Checking Account during the marriage. He testified about this exhibit just before the parties stipulated to the account’s marital value. Husband’s attorney stipulated that 18  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court the marital value was $5,447—the same number he had alleged as the marital value on Schedule G of the Pretrial Order—and during the trial, Wife’s counsel also stipulated to the amount. Therefore, with respect to the Wells Fargo Checking Account, the trial court erred by finding that the account’s entire value was Husband’s separate property. Based on the stipulation at trial, the account’s marital value was $5,447 and the remainder of the account balance should have been classified as Husband’s separate property. C. Marital Residence’s Valuation Next, Wife contends that the trial court “erred in finding and concluding that the distributable value of the former marital residence was $1,275,000 when the parties stipulated that its distributable value was $1,100,000.” Wife acknowledges that Husband filed the Notice and she filed a response and motion in limine before the trial. She also acknowledges that the trial court considered the arguments from both her and Husband before beginning to receive evidence. Yet she claims that the trial court did not set aside the Pretrial Order’s stipulation, but ruled Husband could “introduce a newer appraisal at a higher value.” The marital home was listed on Schedule C, meaning the parties agreed that it (1) was marital property and (2) had a $1,100,000 date-of-separation value. Before the hearing, Husband filed the Notice, contending the marital residence had a “current market value” of $1,375,000. Although the trial court denied Husband’s 19  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court request to value the marital home and the lot as two separate parcels, it ruled that Husband could offer evidence of the marital home’s value at the time of the hearing. Then, at the hearing, an appraiser testified that the marital home’s fair market value was $1,275,00. In the Order, the court found that the marital home’s date-of- distribution value was $1,275,000 and that the “$175,000.00 increase in value from the date of separation [was] due to passive market factors and that increase represents, therefore, divisible property.” Wife argues that this issue is subject to the same standard of review as the first two issues because the trial court’s findings of fact were “contrary to stipulations contained in an ED pretrial order” and so they are “reversible error.” However, the trial court did rule on Husband’s Notice and Wife’s motion in limine regarding Husband’s request to “amend” his contentions. It allowed Husband’s request as to the marital home, at least in part. So we review the trial court’s findings on the marital home’s valuation only to determine if they are supported by the evidence. Shear v. Stevens Bldg. Co., 107 N.C. App. 154, 160, 418 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1992) (“[T]he standard of review on appeal is whether there was competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact and whether its conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts.” (citation omitted)). Wife relies on Smith v. Smith to argue that because the trial court did not “set aside” the Pretrial Order’s stipulation as to the marital home’s date-of-separation value, it erred by considering Husband’s new-appraisal evidence of the home’s value 20  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court at the date of distribution. In Smith, although the wife had “moved to set aside the 14 January 2019 stipulations, the record nowhere indicate[d] that the trial court ruled on the motion in any direct proceeding. Nor did the court dispose of the motion either during or after the equitable distribution hearing.” 387 N.C. at 260, 912 S.E.2d at 766 (emphasis added). But this case is different—for here, unlike in Smith, the trial court did “rule[ ] on the motion” of both Husband and Wife in a “direct proceeding.” Id. And this Court has previously held that no particular form is required for a parties’ request to present evidence different from a stipulation; the important inquiry is whether the party made the request and the trial court addressed the request at the hearing. See, e.g., Lowery v. Locklear Const., 132 N.C. App. 510, 514, 512 S.E.2d 477, 479 (1999) (“[The d]efendants moved to submit additional evidence which sought to relieve them from a previously made stipulation. This motion was tantamount to a motion to set aside a stipulation and should have been treated as such by the Commission. The fact that the motion was not delineated as one to ‘set aside a stipulation’ is not material.” (emphasis added)). And unlike Smith, the hearing on Husband’s Notice and Wife’s motion in limine fills the first twenty-six pages of the trial transcript. Husband’s Notice was “tantamount to a motion to set aside a stipulation,” id., and the trial court correctly considered it as such. The court considered and ruled on both parties’ requests, allowing some modifications to the Pretrial Order and denying others. Although Wife claimed that Husband should have instead filed a motion under Rules 59 or 60 of the 21  BIDDLE V. BIDDLE Opinion of the Court North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure instead of the Notice, the court considered the substance of both parties’ contentions and requests and ruled that the Pretrial Order would be amended. See id. Wife has neither challenged this ruling on appeal nor asserted that the trial court made any legal error or abused its discretion by amending the Pretrial Order. As a result, the facts and ruling in this case are not controlled by Smith as to the Pretrial Order’s original stipulation on the marital home’s value. The evidence Husband presented regarding the marital home’s value at the date of distribution was within the scope of the trial court’s ruling, which modified the Pretrial Order’s stipulations on the marital home’s value at both the date of separation and the date of distribution. The evidence supports the trial court’s findings as to the value of the marital home. Shear, 107 N.C. App. at 160, 418 S.E.2d at 845. Therefore, the trial court did not err in the marital home’s classification or valuation. D. Rollover Account’s Classification Wife argues t