Dolan v. Federal Emergency Management Agency
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket25-2102
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS November 17, 2026
Christopher M. Wolpert
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
_________________________________
TOBIN DOLAN; LYDIA DOLAN;
TANGEE DOLAN; DOROTHY JONES;
BRIAN RODGERS; BARBARA
RODGERS; MICHAEL SALAZAR;
REYNALDO HERRERA; LINDA
SALAZAR; KATHY VARELA,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v. No. 25-2102
FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY; DAVID
RICHARDSON, as Administrator of
FEMA,
Defendants - Appellants,
------------------------------
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Amicus Curiae.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
MARIANNA LANDS; CHARLES
WILLIAM PAYNTER,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v. No. 25-2103
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FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY; DAVID
RICHARDSON, as Administrator of
FEMA; JOSE BAQUERO,
Defendants - Appellants.
------------------------------
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Amicus Curiae.
_________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. Nos. 1:23-CV-00908-JB-JFR and 1:23-CV-00869-JB-JFR)
_________________________________
Caroline W. Tan, Attorney, Appellate Staff (Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney
General, August Flentje and Amanda L. Mundell, Attorneys, Appellate Staff, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. and James Evans, Chief Counsel, Jordan Fried,
Senior Counsel and Lindsay Rausch, Trial Attorney, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, with her on the briefs), for Defendants – Appellants.
Benjamin I. Siminou, Singleton Schreiber, LLP, San Diego, California (Jonna D.
Lothyan, Singleton Schreiber LLC, San Diego, California, and Antonia Roybal-Mack and
Sean P. McAfee, Roybal-Mack & Cordova, PC, Albuquerque, New Mexico, with him on
the brief), for Dolan Plaintiffs – Appellees.
Mark C. Dow, Bauman & Dow, Albuquerque, New Mexico (Maureen S. Moore, B&D
Law Offices, Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Thomas Tosdal, Tosdal Law Firm,
Ovando, Montana, with him on the brief), for Lands Plaintiffs – Appellees.
Raúl Torrez, Attorney General, Aletheia V.P. Allen, Solicitor General, Albuquerque,
New Mexico, and Ellen Venegas, Senior Solicitor General, and Daniel Ahrens, Assistant
Solicitor General, Santa Fe, New Mexico, filed an Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of
Plaintiffs – Appellees.
_________________________________
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Before McHUGH, VRATIL, * and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________
Plaintiffs seek compensation for injuries, including noneconomic injuries,
resulting from a 2022 wildfire that grew from two controlled burns set in
New Mexico by the United States Forest Service (“USFS”). Congress enacted the
Hermit’s Peak/Calf Canyon Fire Assistance Act (“Act”), Pub. Law No. 117-180,
136 Stat. 2114, 2168 (2022), as one way to compensate those injured by the fire, and
it tasked the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) with implementing
the Act. This appeal is from an action Plaintiffs initiated under the Administrative
Procedures Act (“APA”) challenging FEMA’s rules interpreting the Act not to allow
those injured by the fire to recover noneconomic damages under the Act. The
District Court ruled that Plaintiffs could recover noneconomic damages under the
Act.
The specific question presented in these appeals by FEMA is whether the Act
clearly and unequivocally waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for claims
made under the Act seeking noneconomic damages resulting from the fire. We do
not find any such clear and unequivocal waiver. Therefore, having jurisdiction under
*
The Honorable Kathryn H. Vratil, U.S. District Judge, U.S. District Court for
the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
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28 U.S.C. § 1291, we REVERSE the district court’s contrary decision and REMAND
these cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1
I. BACKGROUND
Congress, in passing the Act, found the following: On April 6, 2022, the USFS
“initiated . . . [a] prescribed burn on Federal land in the Sante Fe National Forest in
San Miguel County, New Mexico, when erratic winds were prevalent in the area that
was also suffering from severe drought after many years of insufficient
precipitation.” Act, § 102(a)(1). That same day, the prescribed burn “exceeded the
[USFS’s] containment capabilities . . . , was declared a wildfire, and spread to other
Federal and non-Federal land.” § 102(a)(2). That fire was known as the Hermit’s
Peak Fire. Id.
On April 19, 2022, another fire, “the Calf Canyon Fire, also in San Miguel
County, New Mexico, began burning on Federal land . . . as the result of a [USFS]
pile burn in January 2022 that remained dormant under the surface before
reemerging.” § 102(a)(3). A week later, the two fires merged, grew in size, and
were eventually declared a “major disaster.” § 102(a)(4)‒(6). The USFS “has
assumed responsibility for the . . . Fire.” § 102(a)(8).
1
We previously granted FEMA’s motion to consolidate these appeals. We
also previously granted in part FEMA’s unopposed motion to expedite briefing and
oral argument, in light of the many claims before the agency seeking recovery under
the finite amount of funding Congress has made available. In light of that fact, as
well as FEMA’s later assertion that binding arbitration on Plaintiff Lands’ claim
seeking economic and noneconomic damages is tentatively set for November 2026,
we now GRANT FEMA’s motion to the extent it seeks expedited resolution of these
appeals.
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Congress, on September 30, 2022, enacted the Hermit’s Peak/Calf Canyon Fire
Assistance Act and provided a discrete but limited fund as a quick way to compensate
victims of the Fire if a claimant was willing to accept that expedited but limited
payment rather than resorting to the more laborious approach of pursuing a claim
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), which offered the possibility of a
higher recovery but which would significantly delay the time of recovery. Congress
tasked FEMA with implementing the Act, e.g., § 104(a)(2)‒(4), (b)‒(d), (f), and
directed FEMA to promulgate regulations to facilitate the agency’s processing and
paying claims made under the Act, § 104(f)(1). FEMA first issued interim rules for
public comment and then responded to the comments before finalizing the
regulations, see 44 C.F.R. Pt. 296. Although neither the Act nor the regulations
specifically address the availability or unavailability of noneconomic damages,
FEMA, in responding to public comments about the agency’s regulations, indicated
that the Act did not authorize recovery of noneconomic damages. See Hermit’s
Peak/Calf Canyon Fire Assistance, 88 Fed. Reg. 59730, 59743‒45, 59749 (Aug. 29,
2023) (stating “[t]he Act does not provide non-economic damages for nuisance and
trespass,” “emotional distress, disturbance, and annoyance,” “loss of enjoyment, loss
of lifestyle, mental and emotional distress, sentimental losses, or disturbance and
enjoyment,” or “negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress”).
Plaintiffs filed claims under the Act with FEMA seeking compensation for
both economic and noneconomic injuries. The first group of ten Plaintiffs lost their
homes and all of their personal possessions in the fire (the “Dolan Plaintiffs”). In
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addition to seeking compensation for their destroyed property, the Dolan Plaintiffs
also seek to recover damages for noneconomic injuries, including “significant
interference with personal comfort, annoyance, and inconvenience beyond the
economic cost of their lost property.” (E.g., Aplt. App. v. 1, p. 35 ¶ 9.)
The second group of Plaintiffs (the “Lands Plaintiffs”) included two
individuals who had to leave their property and relocate because of the fire and the
flooding that occurred in the fire’s burn scar. Plaintiff Lands also suffered a stroke
which she attributes to the fire. The Lands Plaintiffs seek to recover, among other
damages, compensation for “noneconomic damages such as pain and suffering,” and
“for annoyance, inconvenience, and discomfort.” (E.g., id. 64 ¶ 2.)
Each of these two groups of Plaintiffs sued FEMA under the APA, see
5 U.S.C. § 706(2), challenging FEMA’s interpretation of the Act as not providing for
the recovery of noneconomic damages. In a single order entered in both cases, the
district court agreed with Plaintiffs, ruling that FEMA’s interpretation of the Act as
not allowing recovery of noneconomic damages under the Act was arbitrary and
capricious and contrary to law. Dolan v. FEMA, 760 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1208, 1265‒
66 (D. N.M. 2024). The district court, therefore, set aside FEMA’s Final Rule and
ordered FEMA to consider claims for noneconomic damages and to pay those claims
when warranted. Id. Subsequently, the district court denied FEMA’s Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(e) motions to alter the court’s judgments. Dolan v. FEMA, 794 F. Supp. 3d
951, 969‒70 (D. N.M. 2025). FEMA appeals.
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II. DISCUSSION
“Under the APA,” this court “generally review[s] agency action to assess
whether it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law[.]’” Adams v. F.A.A., 168 F.4th 1271, 1277 (10th Cir. 2026)
(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). We review an agency’s interpretation of a statute
de novo and do not defer to the agency’s interpretation. See id. at 1277‒78 (citing
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024)). 2
The specific question presented here is whether the United States, through the
Act, waived its sovereign immunity for claims made under the Act seeking
noneconomic damages from the United States for injuries caused by the Fire. See
Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (“To sustain a claim that the Government is
liable for awards of monetary damages, the waiver of sovereign immunity must
extend unambiguously to such monetary claims.”). “[B]ecause . . . [it] is Congress’s
prerogative” to waive sovereign immunity, such a waiver must be clear and
unmistakable from the statute’s text. Dep’t of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Housing Serv.
v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 48‒49 (2024). It must be unequivocal. See F.A.A. v. Cooper,
566 U.S. 284, 290 (2012). Nevertheless, “‘Congress need not state its intent in any
2
To the extent FEMA is also challenging the district court’s decision to deny
FEMA’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motions to alter or amend the court’s judgments, we
review that decision for an abuse of discretion. See Hafen v. Howell, 121 F.4th
1191, 1207 (10th Cir. 2024). Relevant here, “[a] district court abuses its discretion
when the court relies on an erroneous conclusion of law.” Id. FEMA does not assert
any separate arguments challenging the district court’s Rule 59(e) decision, so our
ruling and reasoning here is the same for all matters before us.
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particular way’”; “[i]t need not ‘use magic words.’” Kirtz, 601 U.S. at 48 (quoting
Cooper, 566 U.S. at 291). Nor must Congress “make its clear statement” waiving
sovereign immunity “in a single section” of the relevant statute. Id. at 48‒49
(quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 76 (2000)). Instead, it is
sufficient if Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity “is ‘clearly discernible’ from
the sum total of its work.” Id. at 54‒55 (quoting Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin, 599 U.S. 382, 388 (2023)). Waiver of
sovereign immunity for liability for damages beyond the basic compensatory
damages (that is, liability for additional compensatory damages, for example, for pain
and suffering, or other noneconomic damages) also requires a clear and unequivocal
waiver by Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity. See Cooper, 566 U.S. at 290‒
91.
Any “waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed, in terms of its
scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Ohlsen v. United States, 998 F.3d 1143, 1154
(10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 292 (2011)). In
addition,
[a]ny ambiguities in the statutory language are to be construed in favor
of immunity, . . . so that the Government’s consent to be sued is never
enlarged beyond what a fair reading of the text requires . . . . Ambiguity
exists if there is a plausible interpretation of the statute that would not
authorize money damages against the Government. . . .
Cooper, 566 U.S. at 290‒91 (omitting citations to Supreme Court case law).
In this case, there is no question that Congress, through the Act, clearly
provides that the United States will compensate to some degree those injured by the
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Fire who make claims under the Act. Said another way, there is no doubt that those
injured by the Fire can obtain some compensation under the Act from the United
States. The relevant question here is the scope of the United States’ sovereign
immunity waiver—that is, whether Congress clearly and unequivocally waived the
United States’ sovereign immunity as to claims made under the Act for noneconomic
damages. Id. at 291.
The Supreme Court addressed a similar situation in Cooper, 566 U.S 284
(2012). Cooper considered the Privacy Act, which sets forth requirements with
which federal executive agencies must comply when managing confidential records.
Id. at 287. The Privacy Act provides that the United States will be liable for “actual
damages” to an individual adversely affected by an agency’s intentional and willful
violation of that Act. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A)). Cooper sought to
recover damages from the United States for his mental and emotional harm resulting
from violations of the Privacy Act. Id. at 289. The question the Supreme Court had
to decide there was whether Congress, through the Privacy Act, waived the United
States’ sovereign immunity for claims specifically seeking damages for mental and
emotional harm. Id. at 290‒91. The Court explained that “[t]he question that
confronts us here is not whether Congress has consented to be sued for damages
under the Privacy Act. That much is clear from the statute, which expressly
authorizes recovery from the Government for ‘actual damages.’ Rather, the question
at issue concerns the scope of that waiver.” Id. at 291.
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Similarly, in this case, it is clear that Congress waived sovereign immunity
under the Act to compensate individuals injured by the Fire. The question we must
decide is the scope of that waiver; that is, whether the Act waived sovereign
immunity for claims made under the Act for noneconomic damages.
Our task here, then, is to interpret the Act de novo, using traditional
interpretive tools, to determine whether the Act provides that the United States will
pay claims made under the Act for noneconomic damages. See id. at 290‒91; see
also Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1157 (10th Cir. 2025), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. July 31, 2026) (No. 26-146). If we conclude the Act is ambiguous as to that
question, then we must “take the interpretation most favorable to the Government”
and uphold sovereign immunity. Cooper, 566 U.S. at 291; see also Daley, 158 F.4th
at 1156‒57.
A. Summary of the Act
In passing the Act, Congress found that the Fire resulted from the USFS’s
actions, the USFS had “assumed responsibility for the . . . Fire,” and “the United
States should compensate the victims of the . . . Fire.” § 102(a)(8), (10).
Importantly, Congress structured the Act to recognize three different ways that
persons can “seek compensation from the United States” for their injuries resulting
from the Fire: 1) by “submitting a claim under this Act,” 2) by “filing a claim or
bringing a civil action under” the FTCA, or 3) by “bringing an authorized civil action
under any other provision of law.” § 104(h)(1)(A)‒(C). “[A]n election by an injured
person to seek compensation in any manner described in paragraph (1) shall be final
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and conclusive on the claimant with respect to all injuries resulting from the . . . Fire
that are suffered by the claimant upon acceptance of an award.” § 104(h)(2); see also
§ 104(e). Plaintiffs in this case chose the first option and filed claims under the Act
with FEMA. Our focus here, then, is whether those filing claims under the Act can
recover noneconomic damages.
We pause here to note that, although the FTCA is relevant to several
provisions in the Act, we disagree with Plaintiffs’ suggestion that recovery under the
Act is based on a “wholesale adoption” of the FTCA. (Dolan Aple. Br. 15.) The Act
represents a separate way, apart from the FTCA, by which those injured by the Fire
can seek quick compensation from the United States for injuries caused by the Fire.
If the Act, instead, just adopted the FTCA “wholesale,” there would have been no
need to pass the Act in the first place because the FTCA was already available.
Congress appears to have enacted the Act as a separate means for recovery, providing
a more expeditious remedy from limited funds Congress appropriated to be made
available under the Act.
The Act’s purposes are expressly twofold: 1) “to compensate victims of the . . .
Fire, for injuries resulting from the fire,” and 2) “to provide for the expeditious
consideration and settlement of claims for those injuries.” § 102(b)(1), (2).
Addressing the first purpose—“to compensate victims of the . . . Fire, for
injuries resulting from the fire,” § 102(b)(1)—the Act provides that “[t]he term
‘injury’” under the Act “has the same meaning as the term ‘injury or loss of property,
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or personal injury or death’ as used in” the FTCA. § 103(5) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b)(1)).
However, “injury” is different from “compensation.” Regarding the
“compensation” available under the Act, the Act does not expressly address
noneconomic damages. Section 104(c)(3), addressing the “EXTENT OF
DAMAGES,” provides that “[a]ny payment under this Act—(A) shall be limited to
actual compensatory damages measured by injuries suffered; and (B) shall not
include—(i) interest before settlement or payment of a claim; or (ii) punitive
damages.”
Section 104(d)(4) provides three categories of “ALLOWABLE DAMAGES”:
(A) “LOSS OF PROPERTY,” (B) “BUSINESS LOSS,” and (C) “FINANCIAL
LOSS.” Each of these categories lists specific types of losses that “[a] claim” for that
category of loss “may include,” and concludes each list with the catch-all proviso:
and “any other loss that” FEMA “determines to be appropriate for inclusion as” loss
under that category. In a related provision, § 104(c)(2), addressing
“APPLICABILITY OF STATE LAW,” indicates that, “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this Act, the laws of the State of New Mexico shall apply to the
calculation of damages under subsection (d)(4).”
Serving the Act’s second purpose—“to provide for the expeditious
consideration and settlement of claims for those injuries” resulting from the Fire,
§ 102(b)(2)—the Act provides a streamlined procedure for filing and processing
those claims. FEMA had forty-five days from the date Congress passed the Act
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(September 30, 2022) to promulgate and publish regulations to process and pay
claims under the Act. § 104(f)(1). Claimants then initially had two years from the
date on which FEMA first promulgated its regulations to file claims under the Act,
§ 104(b), a deadline that Congress later extended to March 14, 2025 (Aplt. Br. 7
(citing Continuing Appropriations Act 2025, Pub. L. No. 118-158, div. A, § 101(1),
138 Stat. 1722, 1723 (2024)). FEMA has 180 days from submission of a claim to
“determine and fix the amount, if any, to be paid for the claim.” § 104(d)(1)(A)(i).
Recovery under the Act is dependent on there being available funds provided
by Congress. See § 104(a)(1) (“Each injured person shall be eligible to receive
compensation for injury suffered by the injured person as a result of the . . . Fire,
subject to the availability of appropriations . . . .”); § 104(d)(1)(B)(iv) (stating that,
“[i]n determining and settling a claim under this Act,” one of several things FEMA
“shall determine” is “whether sufficient funds are available for payment”).
A claimant can dispute the amount FEMA determines to pay on a claim either
through binding arbitration or judicial review. § 104(h)(3)(C) and (i). If, instead, a
claimant accepts payment under the Act, that “acceptance . . . shall . . . (1) be final
and conclusive on the claimant, with respect to all claims arising out of or relating to
the same subject matter; and (2) constitute a complete release of all claims against
the United States” under the FTCA “or any other Federal or State law, arising out of
or relating to the same subject matter.” § 104(e); see also § 104(h)(2).
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B. The district court failed to apply the presumption against waiver of sovereign
immunity
As our discussion of sovereign immunity principles illustrates, a “[s]overeign
immunity analysis . . . begins with a presumption of government immunity.” United
Aeronautical Corp. v. United States Air Force, 80 F.4th 1017, 1029 (9th Cir. 2023);
see also, e.g., Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639, 653 (8th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family, 879 F.2d 20, 27 (2d Cir. 1989). Such a
presumption can only be defeated by clear, unmistakable, unequivocal statutory
language waiving sovereign immunity, and only to the limited extent of that clear
waiver. See Kirtz, 601 U.S. at 48‒49; Cooper, 566 U.S. at 290; Lane, 518 U.S.
at 192. Here, the district court erred in failing to recognize and to start its analysis
with this presumption. See Dolan, 760 F. Supp. 3d at 1225‒28 (discussing sovereign
immunity generally). In our de novo review, we begin with that critical presumption.
C. The Act does not clearly and unequivocally provide for recovery of
noneconomic damages
Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that the United States clearly and
unequivocally waived sovereign immunity for claims made under the Act seeking
noneconomic damages. See Ohlsen, 998 F.3d at 1154. Waiver has to be specific
both as to liability and the scope of recoverable damages, including pain and
suffering and punitive damages.
As previously mentioned, the Act does not expressly address such
noneconomic damages. Plaintiffs, nevertheless, point to several provisions in the Act
that they contend can be read to waive sovereign immunity for noneconomic
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damages. We are not persuaded that any of the Act’s provisions that Plaintiffs point
to are a clear and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity for recovering
noneconomic damages under the Act.
1. Section 104(c)(3), “Extent of Damages” Provision
Plaintiffs point to § 104(c)(3), which is titled “EXTENT OF DAMAGES.”
That section provides that “Any payment under this Act . . . shall be limited to actual
compensatory damages measured by injuries suffered.” § 104(c)(3)(A) (emphasis
added). Plaintiffs assert that the phrase “actual compensatory damages” encompasses
noneconomic damages. As further support for their contention, Plaintiffs point to the
next section, § 104(c)(3)(B), which excludes from “actual compensatory damages”
“interest before settlement or payment of a claim” and “punitive damages,” but does
not expressly mention noneconomic damages as being excluded.
The Supreme Court, in Cooper, considered whether the similar phrase “actual
damages” used in the Privacy Act waived the United States’ sovereign immunity for
claims seeking noneconomic damages for mental and emotional distress resulting
from the violation of that statute. 566 U.S. at 287, 291. Cooper noted both that the
Privacy Act did not define “actual damages” and that the phrase generally did not
have one single meaning. Id. at 291‒94. Instead, the phrase “actual damages” has a
“chameleon-like quality,” permitting recovery of noneconomic damages under some
statutes, but not under other statutes. Id. at 294; see also id. at 292‒93 (citing
specific examples among federal statutes). Therefore, in order to determine whether
that phrase, used in a particular statute, encompassed mental and emotional damages,
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Cooper directed that a court “consider the specific context in which the term
appears.” Id. at 294. Doing so in Cooper, the Supreme Court held that the Privacy
Act’s use of the phrase “actual damages” there did not waive sovereign immunity for
claims seeking such noneconomic damages. Id. at 294‒99, 304.
We employ Cooper’s reasoning here to consider whether, in light of the
“specific context” in which the Act uses the language “actual compensatory
damages,” the Act clearly, unmistakably, and unambiguously waives sovereign
immunity for claims seeking noneconomic damages under the Act. We conclude it
does not.
Here, one purpose of the Act undoubtedly is “to compensate victims of the . . .
Fire, for injuries resulting from the fire.” § 102(b)(1). But, importantly this phrase
does not say to compensate “for all damages” or otherwise define the extent of
compensation contemplated. Importantly, the Act’s second purpose is “to provide for
the expeditious consideration and settlement of claims for those injuries.”
§ 102(b)(2) (emphasis added). In support of those purposes, the Act provides for
expedited claims processing, giving FEMA only 180 days to determine an amount to
be paid on a claim. Such a short time frame lends itself to valuing concrete harms,
such as destroyed property and necessary repairs. It does not lend itself to
calculating more amorphous noneconomic harms such as pain and suffering, or
emotional distress, or loss of enjoyment, which would make the recovery much more
difficult to calculate and more difficult to resolve expeditiously.
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Another consideration that counsels against reading the phrase “actual
compensatory damages” in this context as including noneconomic damages is that the
funds Congress allotted for paying out claims made under the Act were limited and
recovery for all claimants depended on the continued availability of those limited
funds. Claims for any one or early claimants’ noneconomic damages could balloon
to large amounts, well beyond the amounts set aside to compensate for lost and
damaged property for all claimants.
Also of importance, the Act recognizes that there are other avenues through
which an injured claimant could alternatively seek noneconomic damages, including
an action under the FTCA. Generally speaking, the FTCA permits compensation of
noneconomic damages as well as economic damages against the United States
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred,
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Here, such alternative claims under the FTCA might rely on
New Mexico law, which would support recovering noneconomic damages.
After considering the context in which the Act uses the phrase “actual
compensatory damages”—including the Act’s purposes of compensating fire victims,
but doing so in an expeditious manner from finite funding—we conclude that the Act,
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by using the phrase “actual compensatory damages,” did not clearly and
unequivocally waive sovereign immunity for claims seeking noneconomic damages. 3
2. The Act’s incorporation of New Mexico law
Seeking to recover under the Act for noneconomic damages that the district
court held were available under New Mexico law, Plaintiffs point to § 104(c)(2),
which is titled “APPLICABILITY OF STATE LAW.” That section provides:
“Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the laws of the State of New Mexico shall
apply to the calculation of damages under subsection (d)(4).” Subsection (d)(4), in
turn, sets forth three categories of “ALLOWABLE DAMAGES”: loss of property,
business loss, and financial loss. Notably this section seeks to carve out a more
limited set of “allowable” damages from the more broadly defined general
“damages.” For each of those categories, subsection (d)(4) lists specific measures of
allowable damages, plus a catch-all provision for “any other loss that” FEMA
“determines to be appropriate for inclusion” under that category. 4
Plaintiffs contend that § 104(c)(2)’s language, “Except as otherwise provided
in this Act, the laws of the State of New Mexico shall apply to the calculation of
3
Alternatively, we conclude that the Act’s use of the phrase “actual
compensatory damages” is ambiguous as to whether it includes noneconomic
damages, in light of the “chameleon-like quality” of that phrase. Cooper, 566 U.S.
at 294. That leads us to the same conclusion, that there was no clear and
unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity for noneconomic damages in this Act.
4
There is nothing in the record before us that suggests FEMA has specifically
done anything to enlarge the category of “allowable damages” beyond the three kinds
of damages specifically listed in subsection 104(d)(4).
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damages under subsection (d)(4)” (emphasis added), employs the specifically
enumerated categories of allowable damages to incorporate all damages available
under New Mexico law and that New Mexico law would permit recovery for
noneconomic damages for property, business, and financial losses. FEMA counters
that § 104(c)(2)’s phrase “the calculation of damages” refers only to a mathematical
calculation; that is, New Mexico law “merely clarifies how the [specific] categor[ies]
of damages deemed ‘[a]llowable’ under § 104(d)(4) are to be tallied up.” (Aplt.
Br. 20.) In support of this assertion, FEMA points to New Mexico rules setting forth
pattern civil jury instructions directing several formulae that jurors can use to
determine the amount of damage resulting to personal property: by, for instance,
paying the property’s fair market value immediately before the occurrence; awarding
the difference in the property’s fair market value before and after the occurrence; or
by awarding the reasonable cost of repairs necessary to repair the property, along
with the decrease in the property’s fair market value before and after the occurrence
(Id. at 28‒29 (citing New Mexico Rules 13-1812, 13-1814, 13-1815, 13-1817).)
The district court rejected FEMA’s interpretation of “the calculation of
damages” as “overly narrow” and overlooking “other legitimate yet broader
definitions of ‘calculation,’” such as “determination.” 760 F. Supp. 3d at 1239.
We disagree with the district court’s conclusion in this regard. Again, we return to
our core interpretative principle in this case that any “waiver of sovereign immunity
must be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Ohlsen,
998 F.3d at 1154 (quoting Sossamon, 563 U.S. at 292). As the district court noted,
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the parties’ differing interpretations of the word “calculation” are legitimate. Thus,
the meaning of § 104(c)(2) is ambiguous. Therefore, we must construe that term in
favor of no waiver of sovereign immunity consistent with the narrower interpretation
because waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unambiguous. See Cooper,
566 U.S. at 290‒91; see also Daley, 158 F.4th at 1156‒57.
Plaintiffs next contend that the Act incorporates New Mexico tort law by
adopting the FTCA’s definition of injury. Plaintiffs reason that, because the FTCA
incorporates state tort law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), and because the Act’s
§ 103(5) adopts the FTCA’s meaning for “injury”—“injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death”—the Act works “a wholesale adoption of the FTCA’s core
liability framework.” (Dolan Aple. Br. 15.) The Dissent agrees. But that is not what
the Act says, or at least that is not what the Act clearly and unambiguously states.
Section 103(5) only adopts the FTCA’s definition of “injury” and not the definition
or meaning of “damages” or “allowable damages.” Reasonable “damages” can be a
subset of the baseline term of “injury,” but undeniably, “damages” and “injury” are
not interchangeable That provision says nothing about further adopting the FTCA’s
liability framework or the measure of damages available against the United States
under the FTCA. The bottom line is that the Dissent cannot point to any language in
the Act that clearly and unambiguously waives sovereign immunity for noneconomic
damages. 5
5
The Dissent points out that FEMA (a non-judicial forum) interpreted another
statute, the Cerro Grande Fire Assistance Act, to adopt the FTCA’s liability
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Nor does it make sense that the Act would simply adopt the FTCA liability
framework, which would make recovery under the Act redundant of noneconomic
recovery under the FTCA, which the Act expressly provides as an alternate means to
recover compensation for injuries resulting from the Fire. As Congress structured the
Act, if an injured party wishes to recover for noneconomic damages such as nuisance,
trespass, or emotional damages, there are alternative methods of recovery for such
claimants who do not need or desire the alternative expedited and limited recovery
against the limited emergency funding made available under the Act.
III. CONCLUSION
We do not speculate how we might interpret the language of the Act if the
question did not come to us in the restrictive context of whether Congress made a
“clear and unequivocal waiver” of the United States’ sovereign immunity for claims
made under the Act seeking noneconomic damages. Here, we simply find no clear
and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity. The district court erred in reaching
the contrary conclusion. We, therefore, REVERSE and REMAND these cases for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.
framework. But we may not defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute, see
Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 413, let alone the agency’s interpretation of a different
statute addressing a different fire.
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Nos. 25-2102, 25-2103, Dolan v. Federal Emergency Management Agency
MCHUGH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I agree with the district court that the Hermit’s Peak Act unambiguously requires
FEMA to compensate claimants for their “injuries” as that term is used in the FTCA.
I also agree with the district court that this definition requires compensation for the types
of noneconomic harms that Plaintiffs allege here. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Sovereign Immunity Canon
Because of its importance to the majority’s decision, I begin my analysis with a
discussion of the sovereign immunity canon.
As the Supreme Court recently explained, “the United States, as sovereign, is
generally immune from suits seeking money damages,” but Congress may waive this
immunity by making a “clear statement” to that effect. Dep’t of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural
Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 48 (2024). Under the terms of the “clear statement”
rule, courts “will permit a suit against the government only when a statute ‘unmistakably’
allows it.” Id. (quoting FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 291 (2012)). However, “Congress
need not state its intent in any particular way.” Id. (quoting Cooper, 566 U.S. at 291). It
need neither “use magic words” nor “make its clear statement in a single section or in
statutory provisions enacted at the same time,” although “a waiver of sovereign immunity
must be ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” Id. at 48–49 (first quoting
Cooper, 566 U.S. at 291; then quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 76
(2000); and then quoting id. at 73). And when a statute clearly authorizes a claim against