Dey v. Univ. of Cincinnati College of Medicine

[Cite as Dey v. Univ. of Cincinnati College of Medicine, 2026-Ohio-4100.] IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO SWATI DEY Case No. 2024-00612JD Plaintiff Judge Lisa L. Sadler Magistrate Robert Van Schoyck v. DECISION UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI COLLEGE OF MEDICINE Defendant {¶1} On March 27, 2026, defendant, University of Cincinnati College of Medicine (UC), filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(B). Plaintiff, Swati Dey (Dr. Dey), filed a response on April 24, 2026, and UC filed a reply on April 30, 2026. UC’s motion is now before the court for a non-oral hearing pursuant to L.C.C.R. 4(D). For the reasons set forth below, the motion shall be granted. Standard of Review {¶2} Motions for summary judgment are reviewed under the standard set forth in Civ.R. 56(C): Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is Case No. 2024-00612JD -2- DECISION made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor. “[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying these portions of the record before the trial court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on a material element of the nonmoving party’s claim.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St. 3d 280, 292 (1996). To meet this initial burden, the moving party must be able to point to evidentiary materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Id. at 292-293. {¶3} If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party bears a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E): When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party. Background {¶4} As set forth in the complaint, at all times relevant Dr. Dey was an Assistant Professor of Medicine in the Division of Clinical Pharmacology of the Department of Internal Medicine at Vanderbilt University Medical Center. (Complaint, ¶ 5.) The complaint provides that Dr. Dey, whose work was funded by the Department of Defense, obtained funds on or about May 1, 2019, to conduct research on implantable medical devices that could monitor and regulate cardiac activity. (Id. at ¶ 7, 10.) Vanderbilt University subsequently entered into a contract with UC to conduct research on such devices in live animals, and to create a database for storing research data collected by Dr. Dey, according to the complaint. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Dr. Dey alleges that by 2022, UC “was not meeting its requirements pursuant to their contract”, and she consequently “indicated to UC that she would be terminating the contract . . . .” (Id. at ¶ 13-14.) {¶5} According to the complaint, Dr. John C. Byrd, Department Chair of Internal Medicine at UC, subsequently contacted Dr. Dey’s supervisor and falsely accused her of Case No. 2024-00612JD -3- DECISION trespassing on UC property, engaging in illegal activity, having inappropriate relationships in her personal life, and having improprieties related to her grant funding through the Department of Defense. (Id. at ¶ 15-18.) The complaint further states that Dr. Byrd and Dr. Sakthivel Sadayappan, Associate Chair of Internal Medicine at UC, “reiterated the false accusations against Dr. Dey to multiple individuals including, but not limited to, students, trainees, colleagues, partners, publishers, funding agencies, journal editors, grant reviewers, and prospective employers.” (Id. at ¶ 22.) Dr. Dey relates that on or about September 28, 2022, “Dr. Byrd’s and Dr. Sadayappan’s false accusations were memorialized in a formal complaint, which Defendants caused to be filed with Vanderbilt [University]”, and “Dr. Byrd and Dr. Sadayappan caused the false accusations to be reiterated to external funding agencies including, but not limited to, the Department of Defense . . . .” (Id. at ¶ 28, 31.) {¶6} It is alleged that “[a]s a result of Dr. Byrd’s and Dr. Sadayappan’s false accusations, Vanderbilt University shut down Dr. Dey’s research” and “informed Dr. Dey that she must find a new position with another university” and “that she will not be granted tenure.” (Id. at ¶ 30, 33-34.) It is further alleged that “UC locked up Dr. Dey’s data in direct violation of UC’s contractual obligations”, and that “Dr. Byrd and/or Dr. Sadayappan have interfered with Dr. Dey’s research such that the animal test subjects participating in her research have been slaughtered; her trainees and collaborators abandoned her research project; new hardware and software comprising intellectual property were locked up at UC; equipment purchased with her grant funds were locked up at UC; her lab has been un-staffed and shut down; and ten years of Dr. Dey’s research results have been destroyed or withheld from Dr. Dey’s possession.” (Id. at ¶ 35, 37.) According to the complaint, “[b]ecause Dr. Byrd and Dr. Sadayappan have interfered with Dr. Dey’s research she has been unable to use her intellectual property to create business and to progress her patent applications.” (Id. at ¶ 38.) {¶7} In her complaint, Dr. Dey asserts claims for defamation (Counts I & II), tortious interference with a contract (Count III), tortious interference with a business relationship (Count IV), conversion (Count V), false light invasion of privacy (Count VI), injunctive relief (Count VII), and a request for a determination as to whether Drs. Byrd and Sadayappan Case No. 2024-00612JD -4- DECISION are entitled to personal immunity as state employees under R.C. 2743.02(F) and 9.86. 2743.02(F) (Count VIII). Analysis {¶8} In support of its motion, UC submitted the deposition transcripts of Dr. Dey and Dr. Sadayappan, together with corresponding exhibits. In opposition, Dr. Dey submitted an affidavit of her counsel, together with several attached exhibits. {¶9} In its motion for summary judgment, UC first argues that Dr. Dey’s claims are time-barred. Dr. Dey argues that she timely filed her claims, with some being timely filed within the original statutes of limitation and others being rendered timely by operation of the saving statute, R.C. 2305.19. {¶10} R.C. 2305.19(A) states as follows: In any action that is commenced or attempted to be commenced, if in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff . . . may commence a new action within one year after the date of the reversal of the judgment or the plaintiff’s failure otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later. {¶11} “In general, the savings statute ‘operates in favor of a plaintiff who commenced an action within the proper time limits; who failed other than upon the merits; and who refiles within one year.’” Cook v. ProBuild Holdings, Inc., 2014-Ohio-3518, ¶ 36 (10th Dist.), quoting Wasserman, Wasserman, Bryan & Landry v. Midwestern Indemn. Ins. Co., 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 364 (6th Dist. Feb. 5, 1988). “R.C. 2305.19 will ‘save’ a re-filed action that would otherwise be barred by a statute of limitations when the requirements of the rule have been satisfied, and ‘when the original suit and the new action are substantially the same.’” Carl L. Brown, Inc. v. Lincoln Natl. Life Ins., 2003- Ohio-2577, ¶ 41 (10th Dist.), quoting Children’s Hosp. v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 69 Ohio St.2d 523, 525 (1982). “Proceedings in the Court of Claims are subject to the savings provisions of R.C. 2305.19, provided the original suit and the action in the Court of Claims are substantially the same.” State ex rel. Hensel v. Court of Claims, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 69, *5 (10th Dist. Jan. 11, 1990). Case No. 2024-00612JD -5- DECISION {¶12} “Actions are not ‘substantially the same’ when the claims or parties in the original action are different than the claims or parties in the subsequent actions.” Khatri v. Ohio State Univ., 2024-Ohio-4700, ¶ 41 (10th Dist.); see also McGraw v. Jarvis, 2021- Ohio-522, ¶ 28 (10th Dist.), quoting Children’s Hosp. at 525 (“‘The actions are not substantially the same, however, when the parties in the original action and those in the new action are different.’”). {¶13} There is no dispute that on September 16, 2023, Dr. Dey filed an action in federal court against Drs. Byrd and Sadayappan, which she voluntarily dismissed on December 8, 2023. On August 5, 2024, Dr. Dey commenced the present action before this court against UC. As UC was not a party in the original action, the saving statute cannot operate to extend the time for filing any claims in the action now before this court. See Heilprin v. Ohio State Univ. Hosps., 31 Ohio App.3d 35 (10th Dist.1986) (where the plaintiff’s original action in common pleas court was against an alleged employee or agent of a state university, but not the university itself, the saving statute did not preserve claims against the university in the plaintiff’s subsequent action in the Court of Claims); see also Jones v. Chillicothe Corr. Inst., 2012-Ohio-1762, ¶ 8, fn. 2 (10th Dist.). {¶14} Since the saving statute has no application in the present action against UC, Dr. Dey’s claims, to be timely-filed, must have been commenced within the applicable limitation on actions provided for in R.C. 2743.16(A), which states that “civil actions against the state . . . shall be commenced no later than two years after the date of accrual of the cause of action or within any shorter period that is applicable to similar suits between private parties.” Counts I & II: Defamation {¶15} Counts I and II of the complaint are for defamation. “R.C. 2305.11(A) requires an action for defamation to be commenced within one year of the time the cause of action accrued.” Rhoads v. Olde Worthington Business Assn., 2024-Ohio-2178, ¶ 55 (10th Dist.). “A cause of action for defamation accrues on the date of publication of the alleged defamatory matter.” Pankey v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 2011-Ohio-4209, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). Case No. 2024-00612JD -6- DECISION {¶16} UC argues that, according to Dr. Dey’s deposition testimony, the alleged defamatory remarks were made no later than April 2022, more than one year before this action was commenced on August 5, 2024. (Dey Depo., pp. 74-76, 86-92.) {¶17} In her response, Dr. Dey does not dispute that the alleged defamatory remarks were made no later than April 2022, but she argues that the remarks occurred in such a manner that she was prevented “from knowing the true caliber of the defamation” until later, and as a result she only “discovered the defamation in February of 2023.” (Response, p. 6.) According to Dr. Dey, the one-year statute of limitations applicable to her defamation claims should have been tolled until she made this discovery, pursuant to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in Weidman v. Hildebrant, 2024-Ohio-2931, ¶ 17 (“Today, we conclude that the discovery rule applies to claims of libel based on reputational injuries when the publication of the libelous statements was secretive, concealed, or otherwise inherently unknowable to the plaintiff due to the nature of the publication.”). {¶18} As evidence of her purportedly discovering the alleged defamation in February 2023, Dr. Dey cites only to what appears to be a February 23, 2023 letter to her from Vanderbilt University which does not mention Drs. Byrd or Sadayappan nor directly refer to any statements by them. The letter is attached to an affidavit from Dr. Dey’s counsel, which does not appear to authenticate the letter based on personal knowledge, and the letter thus does not qualify as evidence that the court may consider under Civ.R. 56(C). See Boyd v. Elsamaloty, 2015-Ohio-5578, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.) (“Although the attorney may have personal knowledge that the documents have been photocopied, an attorney has no personal knowledge of whether the documents are truthful and genuine.”); Thompson v. Hayes, 2006-Ohio-6000, ¶ 105 (10th Dist.) (“If the affiants lacks personal knowledge of the records attached to his or her affidavit, the affiant has not properly authenticated the records.”). Accordingly, the letter is not appropriate evidence for the court to consider under Civ.R. 56(C). Regardless, even if Dr. Dey claims to have not discovered some of the allegedly defamatory remarks on which her claims are based until receiving a letter on or about February 23, 2023, it was still more than one year later that Dr. Dey commenced this action, on August 5, 2024. Case No. 2024-00612JD -7- DECISION {¶19} In sum, UC met its burden of coming forward with evidence establishing that Dr. Dey did not file her defamation claims within the one-year statute of limitations. In turn, Dr. Dey did not meet her reciprocal burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of fact on this question. Reasonable minds can only conclude that the defamation claims were filed outside the one-year statute of limitations and are thus untimely. UC is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Counts I and II of the complaint. Counts III & IV: Tortious Interference with a Contract & Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship {¶20} Counts III and IV of the complaint, respectively, are for tortious interference with a contract and tortious interference with a business relationship. {¶21} UC argues that the tortious interference claims are based at least in part on the alleged publication of defamatory statements and are therefore subject to the same one-year statute of limitations, but that, like the defamation claims, they were not timely filed within one year from the time when they accrued. {¶22} “[I]n considering whether a cause of action is time-barred, [the court] must ‘determine the true nature or subject matter of the acts giving rise to the complaint.’” Ibanez v. Hutchins, 2012-Ohio-5040, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.), quoting Doe v. First United Methodist Church, 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 536 (1994). “A court may characterize a claim as one for defamation where ‘the “predominant subject matter” of [the] plaintiff’s action is “the alleged damage to the [plaintiff’s] reputation caused by the circulation of allegedly false information.”’” Akarah v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2024-Ohio-4499, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.), quoting Ra v. Ohio Atty. Gen.’s Office, 2020-Ohio-1346, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.), quoting Singh v. ABA Publishing, 2003-Ohio-2314, ¶ 25-27. In Akarah, the appeals court stated that, because the predominant subject matter of the plaintiff’s tortious interference claim was damage resulting from the alleged publication of false and defamatory information, the trial court did not err by characterizing the tortious interference claim as a claim for defamation. Akarah at ¶ 20. {¶23} According to Dr. Dey’s complaint, the claim of tortious interference with a contract is based on UC allegedly “impugning Dr. Dey and her professional and personal reputation. The conduct harmed Dr. Dey’s relationships with current and future Case No. 2024-00612JD -8- DECISION employers, students, trainees, partners, colleagues, publishers, funding agencies, grant reviewers and regulatory bodies.” (Complaint, ¶ 60.) Similarly, the claim of tortious interference with a business relationship is based on UC allegedly “impugning Dr. Dey and her professional and personal reputation. The conduct harmed Dr. Dey’s relationships with current and prospective employers, partners, colleagues, publishers, and funding sources.” (Id. at ¶ 65.) {¶24} UC argues that “the predominant subject matter of [Dr. Dey’s] claims regards damage to her reputation, and the alleged adverse effects of Dr. Byrd’s and Dr. Sadayappan’s alleged defamatory statements upon her business, scholarly submissions, and career prospects. Those harms sound in defamation.” (Motion, p. 9.) For example, according to the complaint and Dr. Dey’s deposition, Dr. Dey claims that Dr. Sadayappan interfered with her opportunity to publish an article in an academic journal when he allegedly made false statements about her to the editor of that journal at a professional conference held in April 2022, and the journal decided “right after” the conference to reject a proposed article that Dr. Dey had submitted in January 2022. (Complaint, ¶ 25-26; Dey Depo., pp. 72-76, 92.) {¶25} In response, Dr. Dey acknowledges that the “defamation-based claims” of her complaint include “tortious interference to the extent it is based on defamatory statements . . . .” (Response, p. 6.) Dr. Dey does not dispute that the tortious interference claims, at least in part, sound in defamation, and are subject to the same one-year statute of limitations as the defamation claims. (Id.) And as explained earlier, Dr. Dey’s defamation claims are time-barred. Thus, to the extent that Dr. Dey’s tortious interference claims involve the same predominant subject matter as the defamation claims, the tortious interference claims are time-barred for the same reasons. See Ra, 2020-Ohio- 1346, at ¶ 26 (10th Dist.). {¶26} Even if the tortious interference claims, insofar as they are based upon the allegedly defamatory remarks by UC employees, were subject to a two-year statute of limitations, as previously established in the analysis of the defamation claims it is undisputed that those remarks were made no later than April 2022, so the claims would still be untimely since they were filed more than two years later, on August 5, 2024. Case No. 2024-00612JD -9- DECISION {¶27} Finally, Dr. Dey argues—without further explanation—that her “tortious interference claims are partially premised on the same conduct” as her claim for conversion. (Response, p. 5.) As explained next, however, Dr. Dey’s conversion claim is also time-barred. Therefore, even if it is assumed that the nature of Dr. Dey’s tortious interference claims sounds partially in conversion, they are subject to the same limitations period as the conversion claim and are likewise time-barred. {¶28} UC thus met its burden of coming forward with evidence establishing that Dr. Dey did not file her tortious interference claims within the applicable statute of limitations, and Dr. Dey did not meet her reciprocal burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of fact on this question. Reasonable minds can only conclude that the tortious interference claims are time-barred. UC is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Counts III and IV of the complaint. Count V: Conversion {¶29} Count V of the complaint is for conversion, for which there is no dispute that the two-year limitation on actions in R.C. 2743.16(A) applies. {¶30} “Under Ohio law, ‘[a] cause of action for fraud or conversion accrues either when the fraud is discovered, or [when] in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the fraud should have been discovered.’” Cain v. Panitch, 2018-Ohio-1595, ¶ 44 (10th Dist.), quoting Cundall v. U.S. Bank, 2009-Ohio-2523, ¶ 29. {¶31} For her claim of conversion, Dr. Dey alleges that she “has ownership over her research data and materials that UC was contracted to provide and those she had provided to UC to create the centralized perpetual repository”, and that UC “wrongfully converted this property and/or wrongfully destroyed this property.” (Complaint, ¶ 69-70.) {¶32} In support of its argument that the conversion claim is time-barred, UC points to Dr. Dey’s deposition testimony in which she stated that she discovered in March 2022 that she had been “locked out” from accessing the data that was kept at UC. (Dey Depo., p. 65.) UC argues that any claim for conversion accrued at that time, when Dr. Dey discovered that that data was no longer accessible to her, or at the latest in July 2022, when Vanderbilt University terminated its contract with UC. Case No. 2024-00612JD -10- DECISION {¶33} Dr. Dey, on the other hand, argues that the “[l]ab equipment that included Dr. Dey’s data was reported missing on August 18, 2022”, and that this was “the first time [she] could have known that information”, such that she had two years from that date to bring an action for conversion. (Response, p. 5.) In support, Dr. Dey again points to the affidavit of her attorney, purporting to authenticate a document attached as Exhibit C to the affidavit. But as before, the affidavit does not appear to authenticate the document based on personal knowledge and thus does not qualify as evidence that the court may consider under Civ.R. 56(C). See Boyd, 2015-Ohio-5578, at ¶ 22 (10th Dist.); Thompson, 2006-Ohio-6000, at ¶ 105 (10th Dist.). Accordingly, the document is not appropriate evidence for the court to consider under Civ.R. 56(C). Regardless, even if the court were able to consider the document, it does not support Dr. Dey’s position. The document appears to be a chain of email messages between individuals at UC and Vanderbilt University from October 2022 which make no mention of missing data or Dr. Dey, and in no way demonstrate that her data was reported missing on August 18, 2022. Dr. Dey also cites her deposition testimony at pages 156-157 as evidence that she discovered the alleged conversion of her data in August 2022, but while she stated in this testimony that she was unable at that time to access her data, she does not indicate that she discovered her inability to access the data in August 2022. (Dey Depo., pp. 156-157.) Rather, Dr. Dey stated that she knew by March 2022 that she could no longer access the data because, according to her, she was “locked out” by UC. (Id. at p. 65.) {¶34} In sum, UC met its burden of coming forward with evidence establishing that Dr. Dey did not file her conversion claim within the two-year statute of limitations. In turn, Dr. Dey did not meet her reciprocal burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of fact on this question. Reasonable minds can only conclude that the conversion claim was filed outside the two-year statute of limitations and is thus untimely. UC is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Count V of the complaint. Count VI: False Light Invasion of Privacy {¶35} Count VI of the complaint is for false light invasion of privacy. UC argues that this claim involves the same allegations on which Dr. Dey’s defamation claims are Case No. 2024-00612JD -11- DECISION based, and that this makes it subject to the same one-year statute of limitations applicable to defamation claims. Dr. Dey’s response does not address or even mention the false light invasion of privacy claim. As UC notes in its reply, courts have stated that “‘a plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a plaintiff fails to address it in response to a motion for summary judgment.’” Hope Academy, Broadway Campus v. White Hat Mgt., LLC, 2022-Ohio-178, ¶ 36 (10th Dist.), quoting Brown v. VHS of Michigan, Inc., 545 Fed.Appx. 368 (6th Cir. 2013). {¶36} In any event, similar to the claims of defamation where Dr. Dey claims that UC published false statements about her, for her false light invasion of privacy claim she alleges that UC “gave publicity to a matter concerning Dr. Dey that placed Dr. Dey before the public in a false light”, and that this resulted in harm to her reputation. (Complaint, ¶ 73-76.) UC also argues that Dr. Dey’s deposition testimony demonstrates that the claims involve similar allegations. (Dey Depo., p. 100.) Upon review, the uncontroverted evidence shows that the false light invasion of privacy claim substantially involves the same allegations upon which the defamation claims are based. {¶37} “[A] false light invasion of privacy claim[] involving allegations that would also support a defamation claim has the same statute of limitations applied to it as the defamation claim.” Stainbrook v. Ohio Secy. of State, 2017-Ohio-1526, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.); see also Weidman, 2024-Ohio-2931 at ¶ 26. As the court previously explained, Dr. Dey’s defamation claims were not timely filed within the applicable one-year statute of limitations. The false light invasion of privacy claim, being based on the same underlying allegations and having accrued at the same time, was likewise untimely. {¶38} In sum, UC met its burden of pointing to evidence demonstrating that Dr. Dey did not file her false light invasion of privacy claim within the applicable one-year statute of limitations. In turn, Dr. Dey did not meet her reciprocal burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of fact on this question. Reasonable minds can only conclude that the false light invasion of privacy claim was not timely filed. UC is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Count VI of the complaint. Count VII: Injunctive Relief Case No. 2024-00612JD -12- DECISION {¶39} Count VII of the complaint requests injunctive relief. “The Court of Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction, and has exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions against the state for money damages that sound in law.” Wood v. Div. of Oil & Gas Resources Mgmt., 2018-Ohio-4968, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.). It is well-settled that in the absence of a claim for money damages over which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction, the court has no jurisdiction over ancillary claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. See Id. at ¶ 16-17; Cristino v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 2014-Ohio-1383, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.); Cardi v. State, 2012-Ohio-6157, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.). Because Dr. Dey’s claims for defamation, tortious interference, conversion, and false light invasion of privacy are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation, Dr. Dey has not stated a valid claim for money damages and the Court of Claims therefore has no jurisdiction over an ancillary claim for injunctive relief. See Duff v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 2017-Ohio-8895, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.) (“Given appellant has no viable legal claim for monetary damages, the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction over his equitable claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.”). Therefore, the claim for injunctive relief shall be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Count VIII: Request for Immunity Determinations under R.C. 2743.02(F) & 9.86 {¶40} Finally, Count VIII requests a determination as to whether Drs. Byrd and Sadayappan are entitled to personal immunity as state employees under R.C. 2743.02(F) and 9.86. R.C. 2743.02(F) provides, in relevant part: A civil action against an officer or employee, as defined in section 109.36 of the Revised Code, that alleges that the officer’s or employee’s conduct was manifestly outside the scope of the officer’s or employee’s employment or official responsibilities, or that the officer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner shall first be filed against the state in the court of claims that has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine, initially, whether the officer or employee is entitled to personal immunity under section 9.86 of the Revised Code and whether the courts of common pleas have jurisdiction over the civil action. {¶41} UC argues in its motion that Dr. Dey cannot show that Drs. Byrd and Sadayappan acted manifestly outside the scope of their employment or official Case No. 2024-00612JD -13- DECISION responsibilities, or that they acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. Dr. Dey’s response does not address the request for immunity determinations, much less respond to UC’s arguments. {¶42} Regardless, “[u]nder the plain language of R.C. 9.86, the Court of Claims has authority to decide immunity questions only in ‘any civil action that arises under the law of this state.’” Miracle v. Ohio Dept. of Veterans Servs., 2019-Ohio-3308, ¶ 30. Because there are no genuine issues of material facts and reasonable minds can only conclude that Dr. Dey failed to state any timely claim for relief arising under state law, the Court of Claims has no basis on which to conduct an immunity determination. See Miracle (“Given our conclusion that Miracle failed to state any wrongful-discharge claim arising under state law, the Court of Claims has no basis upon which to conduct an immunity determination.”); Cotten v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2018-Ohio-3392, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.) (“Having concluded that Cotton’s complaint failed to state any claims arising under state law, the trial court no longer had basis upon which to conduct an immunity determination.”); La Riccia v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 2025-Ohio-754, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.) (“Because the court determined it must dismiss appellants’ complaint, the question of whether individual members of the commission were entitled to immunity became moot.”). Accordingly, the request for immunity determinations shall be denied as moot. Conclusion {¶43} Based on the foregoing, even when construing the evidence most strongly in her favor, Dr. Dey fails to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether Counts I to VI of the complaint are time-barred. As a result, the court need not address UC’s alternative argument that it would be entitled to summary judgment even if those claims had been timely filed. The court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that UC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, UC’s motion for summary judgment shall be granted, with judgment being rendered in favor of UC as to Counts I to VI of the complaint, Count VII of the complaint being dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, and the request for immunity determinations in Count VIII of the complaint being denied as moot. Case No. 2024-00612JD -14- DECISION LISA L. SADLER Judge [Cite as Dey v. Univ. of Cincinnati College of Medicine, 2026-Ohio-4100.] IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO SWATI DEY Case No. 2024-00612JD Plaintiff Judge Lisa L. Sadler Magistrate Robert Van Schoyck v. JUDGMENT ENTRY UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI COLLEGE OF MEDICINE Defendant {¶44} A non-oral hearing was conducted in this case upon defendant’s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth in the decision filed concurrently herewith, the court concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As a result, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED such that judgment is rendered in favor of defendant as to Counts I to VI of the complaint, Count VII of the complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, and the request for immunity determinations in Count VIII of the complaint is DENIED as moot. All previously scheduled events are VACATED. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. LISA L. SADLER Judge Case No. 2024-00612JD -2- JUDGMENT ENTRY Filed September 3, 2026 Sent to S.C. Reporter 10/19/26