In re: Tameka Fitzpatrick v. Personnel Board of Jefferson County and City of Birmingham
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Alabama
Date FiledMay 29, 2026
DocketCL-2025-1001
JudgeEdwards, J.
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Rel: May 29, 2026
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ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
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Ex parte Tameka Fitzpatrick
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(In re: Tameka Fitzpatrick
v.
Personnel Board of Jefferson County
and City of Birmingham)
(Jefferson Circuit Court: CV-23-904554)
EDWARDS, Judge.
Tameka Fitzpatrick seeks review of a judgment of a three-judge
panel of the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the circuit court"), which dismissed
her appeal from a decision of the Jefferson County Personnel Board ("the
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JCPB") terminating her employment as an administrative analyst with
the City of Birmingham ("the city").
In May 2021, Fitzpatrick was hired as an administrative analyst in
the city's planning, engineering, and permits department. On November
29, 2022, the city notified Fitzpatrick that her employment was being
terminated. 1 Fitzpatrick appealed the termination of her employment to
1The city leveled six charges against Fitzpatrick, which resulted in
the termination of her employment. Those charges included:
"Charge One, [Fitzpatrick] did not dispute sending disrespectful,
rude, and aggressive emails to [her] supervisor and [d]irector.
"Charge Two, [Fitzpatrick] did not provide documentation proving
that [she] completed ... assignments, and that [she] responded to
directives from [her] [d]irector.
"Charge Three, [Fitzpatrick] did not dispute that [she] [was]
untruthful on [her] submitted telework report. Additionally,
during [her] hearing [she] continued to state that [she] personally
communicat[ed] with Mayor Woodfin on [her] personal devices and
on [her] personal time.
"Charge Four, [Fitzpatrick] failed to demonstrate that [she]
provided adequate notice to [her] supervisor according to the [c]ity
and [planning, engineering, and permits] department policy.
[Fitzpatrick] did not provide any evidence to contradict the 4
[absent without leaves].
"Charge Five, [Fitzpatrick's] written and verbal response to the
charges stated that [she] [was] neither sleep[ing] nor snoring.
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the JCPB, which assigned a hearing officer to preside over the appeal.
Following a three-day evidentiary hearing, on November 13, 2023, the
hearing officer entered a decision, which included findings of fact and
conclusions of law, recommending that the JCPB affirm the termination
of Fitzpatrick's employment. On December 5, 2023, the JCPB adopted
the hearing officer's recommendation and affirmed the termination of
Fitzpatrick's employment.
On December 15, 2023, Fitzpatrick filed in the circuit court a notice
of appeal and an affidavit of substantial hardship. In her form affidavit,
Fitzpatrick checked the box indicating that she was unable to pay the
fees and costs of the appeal to the circuit court, and she requested that
payment of those fees and costs be initially waived and taxed as costs at
the conclusion of the appeal. On March 11, 2024, Judge Carole C.
Smitherman, the circuit-court judge initially assigned to the appeal,
entered an order that, in pertinent part, "granted" Fitzpatrick's hardship
request and ordered that "[t]he prepayment of docket fees is waived."
"Charge Six, [Fitzpatrick] did not dispute that [she] violated the
[c]ity's telework policy and failed to demonstrate that [she] [was]
assigned World Games duties by [human resources] or [The World
Games] staff."
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On May 29, 2024, the city filed a motion in the circuit court seeking
to intervene in Fitzpatrick's appeal. The following day, the circuit court
granted the city's motion to intervene. Also on May 30, 2024, Judge
Smitherman recused herself from Fitzpatrick's appeal. On June 6, 2024,
Judge Elisabeth A. French, the Presiding Judge of the Jefferson Circuit
Court, entered an order appointing a three-judge panel to hear the
appeal.
On March 26, 2025, the city filed a motion seeking to dismiss
Fitzpatrick's appeal because, it said, Fitzpatrick had failed to comply
with certain provisions of the local act that created the JCPB ("the
Enabling Act"). See Act No. 248, Ala. Acts 1945, which, as amended, is
codified at Ala. Code 1975, § 45-37-121 et seq. (Local Laws, Jefferson
County). Specifically, the city alleged that the circuit court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the appeal because, it contended, Fitzpatrick
had failed to file security for costs within 10 days of the announcement of
the decision of the JCPB and had failed to perfect service on the JCPB's
director of personnel.
On April 30, 2025, Fitzpatrick filed a response to the city's motion
to dismiss, refuting both of the city's stated grounds for dismissal.
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Fitzpatrick argued that the circuit court had granted her hardship
request asserted in her affidavit on March 11, 2024, which, she implied,
had negated the requirement that she file security for costs. Fitzpatrick
also contended that she had perfected service of the notice of appeal to
the JCPB's director of personnel by hand delivery and by service of the
summons. The city filed a renewed motion to dismiss on May 5, 2025, to
which Fitzpatrick responded on August 7, 2025. On August 18, 2025, the
JCPB filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. In
its motion, the JCPB argued that Fitzpatrick had failed to perfect her
appeal because she had failed to comply with § 22 of the Enabling Act, as
amended, codified at Ala. Code 1975, § 45-37-121.19 (Local Laws,
Jefferson County), which requires a party appealing a decision of the
JCPB to, among other things,
"fil[e] with the [JCPB's] director of personnel a statement in
writing signed by the party appealing to the effect that the
party appeals from the decision or order of the panel to the
circuit court, which statement shall be filed within 10 days
from the announcement of the decision or order of the panel."
§ 45-37-121.19(a).
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On September 10, 2025, the circuit court entered an order disposing
of the motions to dismiss that had been filed by the city and by the JCPB.
That order provided:
"1. Our appellate courts have stated the following
regarding appeals from agency decisions:
" ' " '[A]ppeals from agency decisions are purely
statutory, and the time constrictions must be
satisfied.' " ' Ex parte Alabama State Pers. Bd., 86
So. 3d 993, 995 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)(quoting Davis
v. Alabama Medicaid Agency, 519 So. 2d 538, 539
(Ala. Civ. App. 1987)). Our supreme court further
noted in MPQ, Inc. v Birmingham Realty Co., 78
So. 3d 391, 394 (Ala. 2011), regarding a purported
appeal from district court to circuit court, that
" ' "[t]he failure to file a timely
notice of appeal is a jurisdictional
defect that prevented the circuit
court from acquiring jurisdiction
over the appeal. See Kennedy v.
Merriman, 963 So. 2d 86, 88 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2007). 'A court must dismiss an
appeal for lack of jurisdiction if a party
does not appeal within the time
prescribed by statute.' Flannigan v.
Jordan, 871 So. 2d 767, 770 (Ala.
2003)." '
"Smith v. City of Mobile, 203 So. 3d 885, 886 (Ala. Civ. App.
2016).
"2. The Enabling Act for appeals from decisions of the
[JCPB] states the following requirements to perfect an appeal
from an [o]rder of the [JCPB]:
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" 'The appeal shall be perfected by filing with the
[JCPB's] director of personnel a statement in
writing signed by the party appealing to the effect
that the party appeals from the decision or order
of the panel to the circuit court, which statement
shall be filed within 10 days from the
announcement of the decision or order of the panel;
provided further, that the party taking an
appeal shall file with the clerk of the circuit
court security for costs in an amount
approved by any judge of the circuit court,
which security for costs may consist of a cash
deposit or a bond executed by such party
appellant and a surety or sureties approved
by the circuit clerk. Such security for costs
shall be filed by the party taking the appeal
within 10 days from the announcement of the
decision or order of the panel. Within 10 days
from the filing of such statement of appeal the
[JCPB's] director of personnel shall forward to the
circuit clerk the original or copies of charges
preferred and the answer filed to such charges and
a complete transcript of all the proceedings before
the panel at such hearing. In the event the director
is unable to complete such transcript of all
proceedings within 10 days, the presiding judge of
the circuit court shall allow the director such
additional time as may be necessary to do so. In
the event copies of the charges and answer are
forwarded to the circuit clerk instead of the
originals, the director of personnel shall certify
that the copies are true and correct copies of the
originals. The personnel board shall make no
charge for furnishing the copy of the record
required by the circuit court.'
"Ala. Code § 45-37-121.19 (1975) ....
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"3. Much of the focus of the [p]arties' briefing on these
motions to dismiss has been on whether [Fitzpatrick] timely
delivered to the [d]irector of the [JCPB] a written statement
of her intent to appeal. And affidavits were submitted by the
[p]arties that create a question of fact on that issue.
"4. However, [the city] also pointed out that
[Fitzpatrick] has not filed with the Circuit Court Clerk
security for costs. There is no dispute that this was not done
within the 10-day [period] stated by Ala. Code § 45-37-121.19
(1975) and, to date, still has not been done.
"5. We FIND that, since the requirement for filing
security for costs is contained within the same sentence in
Ala. Code § 45-37-121.19 (1975) and is stated with the same
imperative 'shall' as the requirement for delivery of a written
statement of intent to appeal, the same jurisdictional defect
ensues from a failure to timely file acceptable security for
costs with the Clerk of Court.
"6. Accordingly, we conclude that this [c]ourt lacks the
jurisdiction to hear this appeal, Kennedy v. Merriman, 963 So.
2d at 88, and this appeal must be dismissed, Flannigan v.
Jordan, 871 So. 2d at 770.
"7. Therefore, the ... motions to dismiss are due to be
and are hereby GRANTED: This case is hereby DISMISSED
with prejudice, costs taxed as paid."
(Bold typeface and capitalization in original.)
On September 10, 2025, Fitzpatrick filed a postjudgment motion
seeking to set aside the circuit court's dismissal order and to reinstate
the appeal. That motion was denied on September 30, 2025. On October
22, 2025, Fitzpatrick filed a notice of appeal to our supreme court, which
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transferred the appeal to this court as being within this court's original
appellate jurisdiction. See Ala. Code 1975, § 12-3-10.
Section 22 of the Enabling Act, as amended, provides that "there
shall be no appeal to any appellate court of Alabama" from a decision of
the three-judge panel. § 45-37-121.19(b).
"Nevertheless, as we noted in Ex parte Dixon, 841 So. 2d 1273
(Ala. Civ. App. 2002), a party aggrieved by a circuit-court
decision in such a matter is not without a remedy in the
appellate courts; he or she may file a petition for a writ of
certiorari in this court, as to which the appropriate standard
of review limits this court to ' " a review of whether the circuit
court properly applied the law," ' ' " whether the decision is
supported by any legal evidence," ' and '[whether] there ha[s]
been [a] violation of a party's fundamental rights.' "
Ex parte Chambers, 137 So. 3d 912, 915-16 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013)
(citations omitted). Thus, we treat Fitzpatrick's appeal from the circuit
court's order dismissing her appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari.
Turning to Fitzpatrick's substantive argument, her sole contention
before this court is that the circuit court erred in ruling that it lacked
jurisdiction over her appeal due to her failure to file security for costs.
Fitzpatrick specifically contends that, because she filed her appeal to the
circuit court, along with her affidavit of substantial hardship, within 10
days of the JCPB's announcement of its decision, Rule 24, Ala. R. App.
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P., operated to negate her obligation to post security to perfect her
appeal. 2 We disagree.
In State of Alabama Department of Revenue v. Welding
Engineering & Supply Co., 452 So. 2d 1340 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984), this
court examined the applicability of the rules of appellate procedure to an
appeal from a decision of an administrative agency. In Welding, a
taxpayer appealed from a final lease-tax assessment entered by the
Alabama Department of Revenue ("the Department"). 452 So. 2d at 1341.
The Department moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the
taxpayer had failed to file a timely notice of appeal, and the Mobile
2Rule 24(a) provides:
"A party to an action in a court who desires to proceed on appeal in
forma pauperis shall file in the trial court a motion for leave so to
proceed, together with an affidavit showing, in the detail
prescribed by Form 15 of the Appendix of Forms, the party's
inability to pay fees and costs or to give security therefor, the
party's belief that he or she is entitled to redress, and a statement
of the issues which the party intends to present on appeal. If the
motion is granted, the party may proceed without further
application to the appellate court and without prepayment of fees
or costs in either court or the giving of security therefor. If the
motion is denied, the trial court shall state in writing the reasons
for the denial."
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Circuit Court denied that motion and, ultimately, ruled in favor of the
taxpayer. The Department then appealed.
On appeal to this court, the taxpayer argued that Rule 25(a), Ala.
R. App. P., should govern the matter because that rule provided that the
filing of appellate papers required or permitted to be filed with the
appellate clerk are deemed to be filed on the day of mailing if certified or
registered mail is utilized in transmitting the papers to the clerk of the
appellate court. 452 So. 2d at 1342. This court stated:
"We disagree with that contention for the reasons which
follow.
" 'Contrary to the defendants' argument, Rule 25(a),
[Ala. R. App. P.,] does not apply to all filings, but only to filings
in an appellate court. That rule does not allow a certified
mailing date as this was to be deemed the filing date in
a trial court.' Holmes v. Powell, 363 So. 2d 760, 762 (Ala.
1978). That rationale is equally applicable to the required
filing of the notice of appeal with the secretary of the
department.
"Since compliance with the provisions of [Ala. Code
1975,] § 40-2-22, ... is jurisdictional, that code section applies
and Rule 25(a) does not provide the mechanism by which a
party may invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court over such
a tax appeal. To apply the Alabama Rules of Appellate
Procedure so as to find an external exception to the
jurisdictional time requirements of § 40-2-22 would constitute
an unauthorized extension of jurisdiction. Holmes v. Powell,
supra; Mitchell v. State, [351 So. 2d 599, 601 (Ala. Civ. App.
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1977)]; State v. Empire Building Company, Inc., [46 Ala. App.
565, 246 So. 2d 454 (1971)].
"When the legislature has prescribed the means and
method of perfecting an appeal from a tax assessment to the
circuit court, that procedure must be followed. The legislature
requires the filing of a notice of appeal with the secretary of
the department within the specified thirty-day period. That
means that mailing was not enough but that the notice had to
be actually received by the secretary of the department before
it was filed. Holmes v. Powell, supra. In that case, it was
stated, '[I]t is obvious from a comparison of the Rules and the
authorities that, in connection with filing a notice of appeal,
the hazards of mail traffic have been studiously avoided.' 363
So. 2d at 762."
452 So. 2d at 1342-43.
In Ex parte Alabama Department of Labor, 214 So. 3d 356 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2015), the Alabama Department of Labor ("the ADOL")
petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus directing the Tallapoosa
Circuit Court to grant its motion to dismiss an appeal filed in the
Tallapoosa Circuit Court by Charter HR, Inc. ("Charter"), which appeal
sought the review of an administrative determination and final
assessment by the ADOL that imposed unemployment-compensation
taxes against Charter. Charter generally argued that the procedural
aspects of its appeal from the administrative proceedings to the
Tallapoosa Circuit Court were governed by the Alabama Rules of
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Appellate Procedure. 214 So. 3d at 361. Charter specifically argued that,
pursuant to Rule 4, Ala. R. App. P., it had had 42 days to appeal the
decision of the ADOL, instead of the 30 days provided in Ala. Code 1975,
§ 25-4-134(c)(3)b. Id. Relying on our analysis from Welding, supra, this
court concluded:
"[T]he legislature has prescribed the means and method for
perfecting an appeal to a circuit court from an administrative
determination and final assessment by ADOL for
unemployment-compensation taxes in [Ala. Code 1975,] § 25-
4-134(c)(3)b. Rule 4, Ala. R. App. P., on the other hand,
applies to appeals made to an appellate court. Therefore, the
42-day period prescribed in that rule is inapplicable to
appeals taken pursuant to § 24-4-134(c)(3)b."
214 So. 3d at 362.
In the current case, § 22 of the Enabling Act, as amended, provides:
"The appeal shall be perfected by filing with the director of
personnel a statement in writing signed by the party
appealing to the effect that said party appeals from the
decision or order of the [JCPB] to the circuit court, which
statement shall be filed within 10 days from the
announcement of the decision or order of the [JCPB]; provided
further, that the party taking an appeal shall file with the
clerk of the circuit court security for costs in an amount
approved by any judge of said circuit court, which security for
costs may consist of a cash deposit or a bond executed by such
party appellant and a surety or sureties approved by the said
circuit clerk. Such security for costs shall be filed by the party
taking the appeal within 10 days from the announcement of
the decision or order of the [JCPB]."
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§ 45-37-121.19(a). Because the legislature has prescribed the means and
procedure to appeal decisions of the JCPB to the circuit court, and
because the prescribed procedure to perfect such an appeal requires an
appellant to "file with the clerk of the circuit court security for costs in an
amount approved by any judge of said circuit court" which "shall be filed
by the party taking the appeal within 10 days from the announcement of
the decision or order of the [JCPB]," § 45-37-121.19(a), we reject
Fitzpatrick's contention that the provisions of Rule 24 governing in forma
pauperis status in the appellate courts apply to appeals from decisions of
the JCPB to the circuit court. Welding, supra; Ex parte Alabama Dep't
of Labor, supra; see also Rule 1, Ala. R. App. P. (providing that the rules
of appellate procedure "govern appeals to the Supreme Court, the Court
of Civil Appeals, and the Court of Criminal Appeals, and proceedings on
petitions for writs or other relief which th[ose] courts or judges thereof
are empowered to grant").
Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., requires an appellant arguing that
a trial court has committed a reversible legal error to present this court
with relevant legal authority showing that error; if the appellant fails to
do so, the appellant waives the argument. See Moore v. Prudential
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Residential Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 849 So. 2d 914, 923 (Ala. 2002). This court
has no duty to "address legal arguments for a party based on
undelineated general propositions not supported by sufficient authority
or argument." Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251 (Ala.
1994) (declining to consider argument that employment-at-will doctrine
violated Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution when argument was unsupported by any
relevant legal authority). Because Fitzpatrick relies exclusively on Rule
24(a) to support her sole contention on appeal, and because that rule had
no application to the appeal to the circuit court from the JCPB's decision,
we do not fur ther consider Fitzpatrick's jurisdictional argument.
Welding, supra; Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Labor, supra. Accordingly,
we deny the petition for a writ of certiorari.
PETITION DENIED.
Moore, P.J., and Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.
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