Ellis v. Hill
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
Date FiledOctober 21, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2026-1738
JudgeJudge Trevor N. McFadden
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MICHAEL B. ELLIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No. 1:26-cv-01738 (TNM)
HEATHER HILL, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Michael B. Ellis, Robert A. McNeil, Mark Crumpacker, and Melba Ford sue eleven
employees of the U.S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (“TIGTA”) in their
individual capacities for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. Plaintiffs proceed pro se. At bottom, they allege that
Defendants have obstructed justice by helping to conceal a wide-ranging scheme by the Internal
Revenue Service to seize individuals’ property on the false pretense that they failed to pay
income tax. The Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims sua sponte under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1).
I.
The background to Plaintiffs’ claims is a purported scheme by the Internal Revenue
Service of astounding complexity. They explain this scheme in a document styled as a “White
Paper” and attach as an exhibit to their original Complaint. See Compl. Ex. A (“White Paper”),
ECF No. 1-1; see also Second Am. Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 13 (“adopt[ing]” the White Paper
“wholly by reference”). The contours of this scheme can be difficult to follow. In Plaintiffs’
words, the “IRS uses sophisticated, layered computer fraud concealed by falsified, sanitized
paper records to circumvent the Service’s statements that IRS lacks authority to compel filing
income tax returns and payment of income tax.” Id. at 2 (cleaned up). Put otherwise, Plaintiffs
claim that the IRS purportedly uses fake records to illegally compel individuals to pay taxes or
forfeit their property.
More technically, by falsifying a “Form 1040A,” the IRS apparently bypasses safeguards
in its internal software. See id. at 3–4 (cleaned up); id. at 4 (“The [software] platform, of course,
does not KNOW that targeted victims never filed 1040A returns.”). From here, the IRS creates
other false documents and “[a]s icing” it “creates for entry by the [Department of Justice] in
court cases” falsified account transcripts and “robo-signed paper Form 4340 Certificates of
Assessment.” Id. at 8. DOJ can then use these false documents to obtain forfeitures in court.
See id. The conspiracy need not end there. Plaintiffs highlight a forfeiture action in the District
of Idaho to illustrate the IRS fraud. See id. Plaintiffs claim that in this case the judge “literally
suspended the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to give himself and his Magistrate more time to
work out a plausible defense for the IRS/DoJ scheme.” Id.
Finally, underlying Plaintiffs’ theory seems to be the belief “that the income tax is
voluntary.” Id. at 3. They provide six decades-old statements by IRS officials, stripped of
context, to substantiate this premise. See id. at 3 n.6 (quoting, for one, IRS Commissioner
Mortimer Caplin as stating that “[o]ur tax system is based on . . . voluntary compliance”).
Now turn to this case. Plaintiffs allege that TIGTA has undertaken four investigations
into this purported IRS scheme. See id. at 4–5; Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 19–27. As a result, the
Defendants “are aware the IRS program is both unlawful, yet ‘institutionalized.’” Second Am.
Compl. ¶ 12. Yet Defendants have allegedly joined forces with the IRS. They “are operating an
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‘enterprise’ within TIGTA to conceal and prolong the underlying IRS racket to falsify federal
records, thus enabling the ongoing theft of their fellow-Americans’ property in a nationwide
disruption of commerce.” Id. ¶ 13; accord id. ¶ 20. More specifically, Defendants “have
falsified TIGTA internal records concerning the FOUR complaints, improperly destroyed
TIGTA records related to the complaints, failed to provide accurate reports of their investigations
to Congress and to the Secretary of the Treasury, failed to refer any report to IRS leaders, and
issued multiple falsified FOIA responses.” Id. ¶ 15; see also id. ¶ 17 n.2 (collecting statutes
Defendants have purportedly violated).
Plaintiffs recently filed the operative Second Amended Complaint. See Second Am.
Compl. Defendants have yet to file an answer or other response.
II.
Plaintiffs proceed pro se. This pro se status entitles them to special solicitude. See
Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The Court thus “construe[s]
the allegations of [their] complaint liberally.” Redmond v. Fulwood, 859 F.3d 11, 13 (D.C. Cir.
2017).
But pro se status is not a golden ticket. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) permits
dismissal of a claim for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” And a court may dismiss sua
sponte a claim under Rule 12(b)(1) that is so “patently insubstantial” that it “present[s] no federal
question suitable for decision.” Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (cleaned up);
see Lewis v. Bayh, 577 F. Supp. 2d 47, 54 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting a district court’s ability to
dismiss sua sponte frivolous claims). That is because “federal courts are without power to
entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as
to be absolutely devoid of merit” or “obviously frivolous.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,
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536–37 (1974) (cleaned up). More than “doubtful or questionable,” such a claim must be
“essentially fictitious.” Best, 39 F.3d at 330. To warrant dismissal on these grounds, plaintiffs
must allege, for example, “bizarre conspiracy theories,” “fantastic government manipulations of
their will or mind,” or “supernatural intervention.” Id. (cleaned up).
Courts have thus dismissed allegations of fanciful government conspiracies for failure to
present a suitable federal question. For instance, claims that a U.S. senator conspired to hack
into a plaintiff’s personal computer and monitor the plaintiff’s telephone calls warranted sua
sponte dismissal. See Lewis, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 54–55. Similarly, a court sua sponte dismissed a
pro se complaint that “allege[d] a broad conspiracy” by the Administration for Children’s
Services in New York City, various state and local officials, and plaintiffs’ own counsel to
“facilitate the kidnapping of [plaintiffs’] child.” Zhang v. Hotel Fortune, 2025 WL 2840263, at
*1 (D.D.C. Oct. 7 2025).
III.
Plaintiffs’ allegations are similarly incredible. Plaintiffs claim to have discovered
“systematic[]” computer fraud deeply entrenched in the IRS without providing a concrete basis
for their belief. White Paper at 2; see id. at 12–48 (attaching several documents of doubtful
relevance largely taken from the District of Idaho forfeiture case). Exposing this fraud, they
claim, will “render[] void” “thousands of previous judgments” against “victims of the IRS
racket.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 14. In on this cabal is supposedly most of the IRS, see White
Paper at 2; the DOJ, see id. at 8; Defendants, who are supposed to police the IRS as employees
of TIGTA, see Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10–11, 13; the district judge who presided over the
District of Idaho case, see White Paper at 10; and perhaps now this Court because of its
enforcement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)(3), see Mot. to Retract/Amend Unnumbered
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“Minute Orders” at 3, ECF No. 29 (claiming that the Court “has impermissibly manipulated this
case, both to ‘buy time’ for the Defendants and to precipitate entry of the United States into the
case to defend the [Defendants]”). Finally, the IRS’s “scheme” rests on the flatly incorrect
premise that the income tax is voluntary. Contrast White Paper at 3 & n.6 (collecting evidence
that “the income tax is voluntary”), with 26 U.S.C. § 6012(a) (mandating that individuals with
“gross income which equals or exceeds the exemption amount” file income-tax returns, with
enumerated exceptions).
In short, Plaintiffs’ “bizarre conspiracy theor[y]” fails to raise a “federal question suitable
for decision.” Best, 39 F.3d at 330. The Court thus lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ case. See Hagans, 415 U.S. at 536–37.
IV.
For all these reasons, the Court will dismiss sua sponte Plaintiffs’ case. Plaintiffs’
outstanding motions, ECF No. 29, 30, & 31, will be denied as moot. A separate Order will issue.
2026.10.21
10:45:36 -04'00'
Dated: October 21, 2026 TREVOR N. McFADDEN
United States District Judge
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