Full Opinion

J-S31001-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 CHRISTOPHER PLATANOS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : JESSICA AYRES : No. 240 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Order Entered February 2, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Civil Division at No(s): 24 18145 BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: OCTOBER 20, 2026 Christopher Platanos (“Husband”) appeals from the order entered in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas on February 2, 2026, sustaining the preliminary objections filed by Jessica Ayres (“Wife”) and dismissing the divorce complaint filed by Husband for lack of jurisdiction. After careful review, we affirm, albeit on different grounds. The parties were married on April 28, 2018. On December 16, 2024, Husband filed a complaint in divorce in Berks County, Pennsylvania. On January 17, 2025, Husband reinstated the complaint. Wife was personally served with the reinstated complaint by the Allegany County, New York Sheriff’s Office on January 27, 2025. On March 11, 2025, Wife filed a petition to dismiss the divorce complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically, Wife argued the Pennsylvania divorce J-S31001-26 complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the parties had resided together in New York at the martial residence until August 8, 2024, the date of the party’s separation, and therefore Husband had not been a bona fide resident of Pennsylvania for at least 6 months prior to filing the divorce complaint pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 3104(b). See Petition to Dismiss Complaint in Divorce for Lack of Jurisdiction, 3/20/25, at ¶ 5. Wife specifically averred that prior to the date of separation, Husband had been traveling back and forth between his parents’ house in Berks County, Pennsylvania and the parties’ marital home in Allegany County, New York, and he would routinely sleep over for occasional nights until August 1-3, 2024. See id. Wife further provided that there was a separate, but related, proceeding currently pending in the Allegany County Family Court between the parties. See id. at ¶ 8. On April 4, 2025, Husband filed an answer to the motion to dismiss, along with new matter, in which he denied that the parties were residing together in New York. See Answer to Petition to Dismiss Complaint in Divorce for Lack of Jurisdiction, 4/4/25, at ¶ 5(a). Specifically, Husband asserted his driver’s license was issued in Pennsylvania in 2022 and has remained in Pennsylvania. See id. Further, Husband argued that at the time of filing a protection from abuse (“PFA”) petition on August 8, 2024, Wife stated in her petition that Husband “was living 5 hours away.” Id. Husband contended that the parties had lived in separate states for “quite some time” and that the August 8, 2024, date of separation was merely the date that Wife filed for a -2- J-S31001-26 PFA, “marking the official date that the parties were no longer going to attempt to stay married.” Id. at 5(d). Wife subsequently filed a supplemental petition to dismiss, only to add that while the previously mentioned New York family court proceeding had concluded, there was “yet another matter pending between the same parties in New York State” related to the PFA. Supplemental Petition to Dismiss, 9/5/25, at ¶ 4. Accordingly, Wife argued “it would only make sense” to have the divorce matter heard in New York. Id. at ¶ 5. On January 7, 2026, the parties appeared for a hearing on the motion to dismiss. Husband stated that he and Wife stopped living together prior to Thanksgiving 2023. See N.T., Motion to Dismiss Hearing, 1/7/26, at 4. Husband’s counsel clarified that while Husband lived in Pennsylvania, he was going to New York some weekends while the parties were trying to work on their marriage. See id. Husband reaffirmed that his domicile was Pennsylvania “[a]rguably before but at least since Thanksgiving ‘23.” Id. at 5. The court then indicated that there was a question of filing, leading to the following pertinent exchange: THE COURT: All right, so now we have a question of filing. According to the documents that I saw, [H]usband filed initially in December but then that complaint became stale and had to be reinstated and -- [HUSBAND’S COUNSEL]: It did. THE COURT: And it was reinstated but in the meantime [W]ife filed in New York; is that accurate? -3- J-S31001-26 … [HUSBAND’S COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. [WIFE’S COUNSEL]: Yes. Id. at 5-6. The court averred that “technically wife’s action is the earliest one.” Id. at 6. Husband’s counsel disagreed, noting Husband’s action in divorce had been filed first, but they couldn’t get it served. See id. at 6. The court asserted that once a complaint is filed, “the 30 days pass and becomes stale it’s null and void.” Id. Husband’s counsel emphasized the complaint had been reinstated. See id. Husband’s counsel further noted he sent Wife certified and regular mail of the original complaint; that the regular mail was not returned; and that they believe Wife intentionally avoided service of the certified mail. See id. at 6-7. Husband’s counsel then questioned Wife. Wife disputed receiving a divorce complaint in December 2024, indicating she reached out to her friend that is the postmaster in her small town and “there was no mail.” Id. at 7. Wife clarified for the court that she “was blindsided by a sheriff serving me divorce papers” on January 24, 2025. Id. at 8. Wife affirmed she had no knowledge of any documents prior to January. See id. Wife denied getting notice of certified mail on December 17, 2024, and denied getting any first- class mail on December 17th or after. See id. at 8-9. Husband’s counsel provided the court with a copy of his letter and the divorce complaint that he sent to Wife in December, indicating “[w]e -4- J-S31001-26 understand she was well aware that we had filed this in December and was avoiding service.” Id. at 9. The court noted that Wife was testifying under oath to the contrary. See id. Counsel emphasized that he never got the letter back, and that “the rules say that if you mail something and it’s to the correct address it’s assumed the party on the other side received it.” Id. The court responded that is a rule of procedure, “but rule of procedure is superseded by evidence in court. So the question comes down to the credibility of this witness.” Id. Counsel again insisted that Husband filed in Pennsylvania first, and expressed his confusion over why jurisdiction would switch to New York just because Wife filed a complaint in New York a few days before Husband reinstated and served the Pennsylvania complaint. See id. at 11. The court then requested briefs on the validity of Husband’s original complaint. See id. The court allowed Wife’s counsel to ask Wife a few questions before ending the hearing. Wife affirmed the marital residence is in New York. See id. at 12. Wife asserted the last time Husband spent the night at the marital home in New York was the week of August 1, 2024. See id. at 12-13. Wife affirmed that Husband had been going back and forth between New York and Pennsylvania prior to August 2024. See id. at 14. Wife asserted that she still had a majority of Husband’s personal effects at the marital home, and denied there being any martial assets in Pennsylvania. See id. -5- J-S31001-26 The court asked Wife if she disputed that Husband had resided in Pennsylvania for “the last six months.” Id.at 16. Wife stated that she disputed that fact, and that Husband did not meet the jurisdiction requirements. See id. Wife’s counsel clarified that was not the court’s question. See id. The court again asked where Husband had been living “for the last six months.” Id. Wife stated Husband had been living in Pennsylvania for the last six months because she was protected under a PFA, and he is not allowed at the martial residence. See id. at 17. The court then stated: “Well, this is not really a question of me not having jurisdiction, it appears that either New York or Pennsylvania could proceed with the divorce because wife has lived in New York and husband has lived in Pennsylvania for the requisite amount of time ….” Id. Husband’s counsel asked Wife why she stated in her PFA application that Husband lived 5 hours away, if she’s now claiming that he lived in New York at the marital residence. See id. Wife stated “that was something that the domestic violence advocate put in there. She asked me where was he living and I said I don’t know, I’m assuming with his parents. And she said where is that, and I said like five hours away in Pennsylvania.” Id. The court again noted “apparently there’s no dispute that husband has resided in Pennsylvania for the requisite amount of time so that’s not the issue here anymore …” Id. at 17-18. Wife’s counsel clarified that the intention was to prove that Husband had not been a resident of Pennsylvania for six months -6- J-S31001-26 prior to the filing of the complaint itself. See id. at 18. The court indicated it got the years mixed up and that according to Wife’s argument, it would be less than six months. See id. After Husband’s counsel insisted that Husband was going back and forth to New York, but his legal residence was in Pennsylvania, as that is where his driver’s license and his mail went to since 2022, the court indicated it needed more testimony from Husband regarding his living arrangement. See id. at 18-19. Specifically, the court noted it would need testimony that Husband lived in Pennsylvania prior to August 2024 to meet the six-month requirement. See id. at 19. Husband testified that the parties were married on April 28, 2018 in Berks County, Pennsylvania. See id. They lived in Pennsylvania for six months before they moved to Costa Rica. See id. Husband stated they started having marital difficulties prior to moving to Costa Rica. See id. at 20. When asked when he moved to New York, Husband stated he “never really moved to New York. I was going back and forth. At no point did I live in New York from a legal standpoint.” Id. Husband claimed he “did the math” and was in New York less than 40% of the time. Husband confirmed for the court that his residence was 5 hours away from Wife’s residence and that he would go back for 2 days at a time because he was committed to making the marriage work. See id. at 20-21. When the court asked why Husband did not -7- J-S31001-26 just stay in New York, Husband responded that Wife kept kicking him out. See id. at 21. Husband’s counsel then provided the court with Husband’s original Pennsylvania driver’s license that was issued in 2022, as well as the documents for Husband’s vehicle, including registration, and insurance from March 2024, to show that he was residing in Pennsylvania. See id. at 21-22. Husband confirmed that the only marital property owned by both parties was currently in New York, explaining that he was not able to bring any marital property with him due to being served with a restraining order. See id. at 24. Husband also explained that the house where Wife is residing is a marital asset, although his name is not on the deed. See id. Husband confirmed that he and Wife do not have any children together. See id. The court then took the matter under advisement for the parties to submit briefs. Husband subsequently submitted a brief, in which he asserted that he moved out of the marital residence to Berks County, Pennsylvania in late 2022, and he only visited New York intermittently after that while they attempted reconciliation. See Brief for Dismissal of Preliminary Objections, 1/27/26, at 1. Husband again highlighted his driver’s license and vehicle documentation showing he lived in Pennsylvania since 2022, and that Wife herself had alleged in her PFA petition that Husband was residing 5 hours away, and had testified that Husband was “visiting” New York on the weekends. Id. -8- J-S31001-26 Husband argued that because Wife lived outside of Pennsylvania, Husband had 90 days to effect service of his complaint on Wife pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1930.4(e)(2); he reinstated the complaint pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 401(b) on January 17, 2025 “out of an abundance of caution”; and service was completed on January 24, 2025, “well within the ninety (90) days permitted by Pa.R.C.P. 1930.4(e)(2).” Id. at 1-2. Husband argued that Pennsylvania is the proper jurisdiction for disposition of the parties’ divorce, because the evidence conclusively demonstrates that he satisfied the requirement of being a bona fide resident of the Commonwealth for at least six months immediately preceding commencement of the action, under 23 Pa.C.S.A. 3104(b). See id. at 2. Husband argued that jurisdiction attached upon the filing of his valid complaint, and that jurisdiction was not defeated by the timing of service, which was completed within the period permitted by Section 1930.4(e)(2). See id. In sum, Husband argued that “Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction attached first, service was timely under Rule 1930.4(e)(2), and the later-filed New York action cannot divest [the trial court] of jurisdiction.” Id. at 3. On January 30, 2026, the court entered an order sustaining Wife’s preliminary objections. The court directed that the divorce case filed in New York by Wife “shall be permitted to proceed” and dismissed Husband’s Pennsylvania case, reasoning, in pertinent part, as follows: The divorce case filed by [Husband] in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is hereby dismissed, this court finding that [Wife’s] -9- J-S31001-26 complaint in New York was filed prior to the reinstated divorce complaint filed by [Husband]. The original Pennsylvania divorce complaint became stale, with no proof of service of the original complaint being established to the satisfaction of this court. Further, the marital assets owned by the parties are situated in the state of New York and additionally there are other actions between the parties pending in the state of New York. [Husband’s] divorce complaint [] is hereby dismissed. Order, 1/30/26 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Accordingly, the court’s dismissal was based on (1) its finding that Wife’s complaint had jurisdictional priority over Husband’s complaint, and (2) convenience supporting the case being heard in New York. Notably, despite the fact that Wife’s preliminary objections were based solely on the court’s lack of jurisdiction due to Husband not meeting the bona fide resident requirement of Rule 3104(b), the court’s order did not mention the status of Husband’s domicile. Husband thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, in which he took issue with the court’s characterization in its order that his divorce complaint had “become stale” due to the absence of proof of service. See Motion for Reconsideration, 2/2/26, at 2. Husband argued “Pennsylvania law is clear that a divorce action does not become stale merely because service was not completed within thirty (30) days. Pa.R.C.P. 401(b) expressly permits reinstatement without the filing of a new action.” Id. Husband argued that “[r]einstatement pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 401(b) does not reset the filing date, does not create a new action, and does not affect jurisdictional priority.” Id. Accordingly, Husband argued (1) his divorce complaint remained valid and pending from its original filing date of December 16, 2024, (2) the complaint - 10 - J-S31001-26 was timely served pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1930.4(e)(2), and (3) the timing of service did not defeat jurisdiction or priority. See id. Husband concluded that because his divorce complaint was “first-filed, valid, pending, and served within the period permitted by rule, [Wife]’s subsequently filed New York action cannot divest [the trial court] of jurisdiction as a matter of law.” Id. at 3. The court subsequently denied Husband’s motion for reconsideration. This timely appeal followed. Husband raises the following issues on appeal: 1. Whether the trial court committed error by concluding that [Husband]’s divorce complaint became “stale” despite service being completed within the ninety-day service period expressly authorized by Pa.R.C.P. 1930.4(e)(2). 2. Whether the trial court erred in treating reinstatement pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 401(b) as altering jurisdictional priority despite acknowledging that reinstatement did not alter the original filing date and where [Husband]’s complaint was both filed and served first. 3. Whether the trial court improperly conflated distinct legal doctrines relating to service, reinstatement, domicile, subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, divisible divorce, and judicial economy. 4. Whether the trial court improperly elevated domicile findings in its [] opinion after expressly indicating during the hearing that residency was “not the issue here anymore[,”] there was clear evidence presented that [Husband] resided in Pennsylvania for the requisite six (6) months and the court did not mention a lack of domicile in its order dismissing the divorce complaint. 5. Whether the trial court improperly relied upon convenience considerations, marital asset location, and judicial economy in dismissing a valid first-filed and first served Pennsylvania divorce action. - 11 - J-S31001-26 Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). We first note “[i]t is well-established that any issue not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived for appellate review. Further, an appellant’s concise statement must identify the errors with sufficient specificity for the trial court to identify and address the issues the appellant wishes to raise on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 239 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations omitted). Upon review, it appears Husband’s issues as presented in his appellate brief differ in part from the issues presented in his Rule 1925(b) concise statement, as he has raised some issues with the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion submitted in response to the concise statement. Notably, while the trial court’s opinion may provide clarity on the issues on appeal, it is not a substitute for the court’s judgment or order that is on appeal. The order itself remains the pertinent document for this Court’s consideration. However, we find that Husband’s main arguments on appeal remain essentially the same: • The court misapplied Rule 1930.4(e)(2) by characterizing Husband’s divorce complaint as “stale” despite service being completed within the 90-day period permitted by the rule. • The court erred in concluding reinstatement pursuant to Rule 401(b) reset jurisdictional priority, and in dismissing Husband’s complaint based on Wife’s subsequently filed New York divorce complaint. • The court erred in dismissing the divorce complaint without mentioning a lack of domicile and despite clear evidence - 12 - J-S31001-26 presented that Husband resided in Pennsylvania for the requisite six (6) months. To the degree that any issues were preserved for this Court’s review, we proceed to address them below. First, Husband takes issue with the court characterizing his complaint as “stale,” despite the fact that service was completed within the ninety-day period expressly authorized by Pa.R.C.P. 1930.4(e)(2). In the order appealed from, the trial court stated, “[t]he original Pennsylvania Divorce Complaint became stale, with no proof of service of the original Complaint being established to the satisfaction of this court.” Order, 2/2/26. In its opinion on appeal, the trial court highlights that “Husband’s counsel admitted that the original complaint had become stale and had to be reinstated.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/16/25, at 2 (citing N.T., Motion to Dismiss Hearing, 1/7/26, at 5); see also id. at 3 (“Husband’s counsel admitted that she considered the complaint stale after 30 days and as a precautionary matter reinstated it even though she thought the complaint had been validly served because the first-class mailing had not been returned.”). The court emphasized that it found Wife to be credible that she did not receive service of the original complaint, and therefore the court found Husband failed to prove to the court’s satisfaction that the original complaint had been served on Wife. See id. at 3. Accordingly, the court concluded “Husband’s - 13 - J-S31001-26 reinstatement of the complaint supports the conclusion that the complaint was stale.” Id. at 4. While the court seems to rely on counsel “admitting” that the complaint was stale in support of its finding, we do not necessarily read the transcript as such. Rather, it appears counsel was simply responding affirmatively to the procedural timeline that the complaint had been reinstated, as opposed to making any definitive statement about the court’s use of the word “stale.” Notably, the court places emphasis on its characterization of the complaint as “stale,” without ever defining what it means for the divorce complaint to become “stale” or citing to what legal effect that status had on the validity of the divorce complaint, or more importantly, its jurisdiction over the divorce complaint, which was the issue in front of the court. As far as we can discern, the court seems to imply that the apparent staleness of the complaint, based on an issue with service, means that the original filing of the complaint was null and void. Importantly, we note that Wife did not raise this claim herself. Rather, it appears the court itself raised the issue of “filing” sua sponte, despite the issue raised by the parties being whether Husband met the domicile requirements to file a complaint in Pennsylvania. “[U]nder the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, an objection to personal jurisdiction may be waived, if preliminary objections to a complaint raising the issue are not filed within twenty days after service.” Wagner v. Wagner, 768 A.2d 1112, 1119 (Pa. - 14 - J-S31001-26 2001); see Silver v. Thompson, 26 A.3d 514, 517 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“A party who fails to object to service of process in preliminary objections waives that claim.”); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1032(a) (same). Our rules allow a respondent to file preliminary objections to any pleading based on “lack of jurisdiction over ... the person of the defendant, ... or service of ... a complaint[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(1). “Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure[,] the exclusive method by which a party may raise ‘jurisdictional’ objections is by preliminary objections.” Monaco v. Montgomery Cab Co., 208 A.2d 252, 255 (Pa. 1965) (citations omitted); Bergere v. Bergere, 527 A.2d 171, 173 (Pa. Super. 1987) (“[P]reliminary objections are the exclusive means by which to raise the question of in personam jurisdiction and the failure to so raise the question of personal jurisdiction constitutes a waiver of that defense.” (citations omitted)). Here, Wife filed preliminary objections, in the nature of a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, based on Husband not meeting the domicile requirements under 23 Pa.C.S.A. 3104(b) for filing a divorce action in Pennsylvania. Wife did not file any preliminary objections based on jurisdictional priority or improper service of process. While Wife noted that she had filed a divorce complaint in New York on January 21, 2025, she made no argument regarding the priority or validity of that complaint, and in fact conceded that while service of her New York complaint had been attempted, service had not been successful. See id. at ¶ 3 (simply noting the existence - 15 - J-S31001-26 of her New York complaint); but see id. at ¶ 5 (not mentioning her New York complaint or inadequate service as a factor for dismissal of Husband’s Pennsylvania complaint). Accordingly, Wife waived any challenge to improper service of original process that would affect jurisdictional priority. See Wagner, 768 A.2d at 1119; Silver, 26 A.3d at 517 n.6; Pa.R.C.P. 1032(a). Even if such an issue were preserved, we do not find the court’s rules support its conclusion. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1930.4 provides, in relevant part, as follows: (e) Time for Service. (1) Service Within the Commonwealth. Within 30 days of filing the original process, a person or party shall serve the original process on a defendant located within the Commonwealth. (2) Service Outside the Commonwealth (i) Within 90 days of filing the original process, a person or party shall serve the original process on a defendant located outside the Commonwealth … Pa.R.C.P. 1930.4(e)(1)-(2). Similarly, Rule 404 provides that “[o]riginal process shall be served outside the Commonwealth within ninety days of the … filing of the complaint or the reissuance or the reinstatement thereof.” Pa.R.C.P. 404. The Rules of Civil Procedure further provide that if service outside the Commonwealth is not made within the time prescribed by Rule 404, “the prothonotary upon praecipe and upon presentation of the original process, or a copy thereof, shall continue its validity by designating … the complaint as reinstated.” Pa.R.C.P. 401(b)(1) (emphasis added). - 16 - J-S31001-26 Here, Husband filed his complaint on December 16, 2024. Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, he originally had until March 16, 2025 to effectuate service on Wife. Accordingly, Husband was not required to reinstate the complaint prior to that time. However, he was fully permitted by the rules to do so, without affecting the validity of the complaint’s filing. Based on the reinstatement, which has not been challenged, Husband had until April 16, 2024, to complete service. Therefore, Husband properly effected service on Wife well before either permissible time frame pursuant to Rule 1930.4(e)(2). Accordingly, we cannot find any support for the court’s characterization of the complaint as “stale.” Next, Husband argues the court erred in concluding reinstatement reset the jurisdictional priority of his complaint, under Rule 401(b). In its opinion, the court states that it “correctly observed that Wife’s complaint was filed before Husband’s reinstated complaint.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/16/26, at 4. The court suggests Under the relevant provisions of Rule 1930.4, Husband had 90 days from the date his complaint was originally filed−December 16, 2024−to serve Wife in New York. However, by reinstating the complaint Husband thereby had a new 90-day period within which to effect service. We did not conclude that reinstatement altered the original filing date which is a matter of record. However, we did conclude that reinstatement altered the jurisdictional priority of Husband’s complaint such that Wife’s filing in New York prior to Husband’s reinstatement awarded her priority. Id. at 4-5. Based on the above reasoning, it appears the court confused the distinct concepts of filing a complaint and service of a complaint. The court - 17 - J-S31001-26 provides no citation or authority for its conclusion that reinstatement of a complaint—in order to properly effect service—alters the jurisdictional priority of the complaint. A reading of the relevant rules cited above indicates the opposite. Rule 401(b) permits a complainant to praecipe for reinstatement of a complaint “any number of times” in order to effectuate service in the proper time, all the while maintaining the validity of the filing of the complaint. See Pa.R.C.P. 401(b)(1)-(2).1 ____________________________________________ 1 Importantly, this rule does not go unchecked, as a complainant must make a good faith effort to effectuate proper service before and after reinstatement: “In the seminal case of Lamp v. Heyman, [] 366 A.2d 882 ([Pa.] 1976), [the Supreme] Court sought to end abuses of process by plaintiffs who tolled the statute of limitations by filing a writ of summons, had the writ of summons repeatedly reissued, and deliberately failed to notify the defendant of the pending litigation.” McCreesh v. City of Philadelphia, [] 888 A.2d 664, 665 ([Pa.] 2005). “This process, while technically compliant with the Rules of Civil Procedure, nonetheless defeated the purpose of the statute of limitations, which is to protect defendants from stale claims.” Thus, in Lamp, [the Supreme] Court held that “a writ of summons shall remain effective to commence an action only if the plaintiff then refrains from a course of conduct which serves to stall in its tracks the legal machinery he has just set in motion.” This “Lamp rule” applies equally to actions commenced by way of the filing of a complaint. [The Supreme Court] refined the Lamp rule in Farinacci v. Beaver County Industrial Development Authority, [] 511 A.2d 757, 759 ([Pa.] 1986), holding that “Lamp requires of plaintiffs a good-faith effort to effectuate notice of commencement of the action.” In addition, Farinacci clarified that: (1) the plaintiff carries an evidentiary burden of proving that she made a good- faith effort to ensure that notice of the commencement of an action was served on the defendant; and (2) “[i]n each case, (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 18 - J-S31001-26 Accordingly, we find the court erred in concluding that reinstatement altered the jurisdictional priority of Husband’s complaint. Finally, we address the issue of domicile. Husband has continued to argue, including in his motion for reconsideration, that the court erred in dismissing the complaint despite evidence that Husband satisfied the domicile requirement for filing a divorce complaint in Pennsylvania pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104(b). Section 3104(b) of the Pennsylvania Divorce Code requires one of the parties to a divorce action to be a bona fide resident of Pennsylvania for at least six months immediately prior to the commencement of the action. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104(b); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1920.12(a)(4) (stating a divorce complaint shall set forth “an averment that the plaintiff, defendant or both have resided in the Commonwealth for at least six months immediately previous to the commencement of the action”). “Bona fide residence means domicile; i.e., actual residence coupled with the intention to remain there permanently or indefinitely.” Sinha v. Sinha, 834 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. Super. 2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[D]omiciliary intent is inferred ____________________________________________ where noncompliance with Lamp is alleged, the [trial] court must determine in its sound discretion whether a good-faith effort to effectuate notice was made[,]” Farinacci, 511 A.2d at 759. Gussom v. Teagle, 247 A.3d 1046, 1048 (Pa. 2021) (some citations omitted). Notably, no “good faith effort” inquiry was necessary here, as no one has alleged noncompliance with the Lamp rule or alleged that Husband’s reinstatement was not properly sought and granted. - 19 - J-S31001-26 from the residency.” Gaboury v. Gaboury, 988 A.2d 672, 675 (Pa. Super. 2009). We reiterate that the court’s dismissal of the complaint was not based on the domicile requirement, despite that being the only issue in front of it. Instead, the court’s dismissal was based on the court’s mistaken consideration of the complaint’s reinstatement and Wife’s subsequently filed New York complaint, and its legally erroneous findings related to those matters. Notwithstanding the above, the court belatedly addresses the matter of domicile in its opinion on appeal, and states that Husband did not establish domicile in Pennsylvania to its satisfaction because (1) Husband admitted to “spending time” in New York, (2) Husband admitted there is no marital property in Pennsylvania, (3) Husband did not deny “traveling” between the two states to spend 2 days at a time with Wife, and (4) Husband’s exhibits were insufficient to establish Pennsylvania domicile because despite the exhibits bearing a Pennsylvania address, “there is no proof he owns or leases a residence in Berks County.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/16/26, at 7-8. The court cites no authority for its conclusions that marital property in Pennsylvania or owning or leasing property in Pennsylvania is required to establish the residency requirement for filing a divorce complaint in Pennsylvania. We know of no such requirements. However, “it is well settled that where the result is correct, an appellate court may affirm a lower court’s decision on any ground without regard to the - 20 - J-S31001-26 ground relied upon by the lower court itself.” Commonwealth v. Lehman, 275 A.3d 513, 520 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Notably, the court made it clear that it found Wife’s testimony credible, including that the marital residence has always been in New York, Husband was at the marital residence on a regular basis, and Husband’s personal effects remain in the marital home. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/16/26, at 8. “[T]his Court defers to the credibility determinations of the trial court with regard to the witnesses who appeared before it, as that court has had the opportunity to observe their demeanor.” Habjan v. Habjan, 73 A.3d 630, 644 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). As we defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations, we cannot find the court erred in finding Husband did not establish domicile in Pennsylvania for the requisite time frame. The testimony credited by the court was sufficient to dispel that Husband intended to remain in Pennsylvania indefinitely, let alone permanently. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the divorce complaint, albeit on different grounds.2 ____________________________________________ 2 We note that half of the trial court’s opinion is spent raising, sua sponte, the issues of in rem jurisdiction over specific counts in Husband’s divorce complaint and personal jurisdiction over Wife pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Long-Arm Statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322, for the first time. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/16/26, at 8-13. These issues were not raised by either party and have not been discussed previous to this appeal. Accordingly, we do not reach these issues. - 21 - J-S31001-26 Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/20/2026 - 22 -