Perales v. Harris
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
Date FiledMay 29, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2025-2032
JudgeJudge Jia M. Cobb
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ROMAN PERALES,
Plaintiff, Case No. 25-cv-2032 (JMC)
v.
SCOTT S. HARRIS, in his official capacity as
Clerk of the United States Supreme Court, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff Roman Perales sues over his failure to successfully file a petition for writ
of certiorari and an emergency motion at the United States Supreme Court. He seeks an order
compelling Defendants—the Clerk of the Supreme Court and a case manager in the Clerk’s
office—to accept and docket his filings. Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over his claims for
mandamus or other equitable relief against Defendants, the Court will GRANT their motion to
dismiss. 1
Perales is a resident of Texas. ECF 1 ¶ 4. On September 7, 2023, he sent a document to the
Supreme Court of Texas which requested that the Court issue an order admitting him to the Texas
state bar as a licensed attorney. ECF 1-2 at 15. The Supreme Court of Texas denied the request in
a November 17, 2023 letter to Perales. Id. Perales then attempted to file a petition for a writ of
certiorari at the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the denial. ECF 1 ¶ 8. But the Clerk’s office refused
1
Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by
omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to
documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the
top of each page.
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to file and docket the petition on the grounds that it “fail[ed] to comply with the Rules of th[e]
Court,” including that the “letter appended” from the Supreme Court of Texas “d[id] not appear to
be an order from the Supreme Court of Texas denying discretionary review.” Id. ¶ 9. In response,
Perales filed a document styled as an “Emergency Motion” with the Supreme Court arguing that
the Clerk’s office had committed misconduct and that his certiorari petition complied with the
Court’s rules. Id. ¶ 10. This motion was also rejected for “fail[ure] to comply with the Rules of
th[e] Court.” Id. ¶ 12.
Thus stymied, Perales filed a lawsuit in this Court against Scott Harris, the Clerk of the
United States Supreme Court, and one of Harris’s employees in the Clerk’s office. ECF 1 ¶¶ 5–6.
Perales seeks an order compelling Defendants to docket his motion, or, alternatively, an order
compelling Defendants to file and docket the petition for writ of certiorari. ECF 1 at 9. Defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint. ECF 9. Defendants argue that they were improperly served, and
that this Court lacks jurisdiction over a lawsuit to compel the Clerk of the Supreme Court to take
any action. See id.
The Court agrees on both points. Perales is not proceeding in forma pauperis and is
therefore responsible for serving Defendants with process, consisting of the summons and a copy
of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c). But a party cannot personally serve a summons and
complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (“Any person who is at least 18 years old and not a party may
serve a summons and complaint.”). Moreover, a plaintiff has 90 days after filing a complaint to
effect Rule 4 service on a defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Perales has admitted that he personally
served the summonses in this case, see ECF 6 at 2–3; ECF 12 at 1, which rendered service
improper, Olson v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 256 F.R.D. 8, 10 (D.D.C. 2009). Additionally, because
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Perales did not accomplish proper service before the 90-day deadline to serve elapsed, dismissal
is also proper under Rule 4(m).
Attempting to remedy this error, Perales has moved to extend the deadline to serve. See
ECF 12. The Court may decline to grant a motion to dismiss for insufficient process when a
plaintiff is “pro se and could still serve process consistent with the Federal Rules,” Bullock v. Hana
Indus., Inc., No. 22-cv-2608, 2024 WL 620440, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2024), and is required to
extend the deadline to accomplish service if the failure to do so was for “good cause,” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(m). But in this case, the Court will DENY the motion for extension of time to perfect service,
ECF 12, because allowing Perales to properly serve Defendants would be an exercise in futility.
Regardless of the resolution of service issues, this case must be dismissed because the Court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction over any of Perales’s claims against Defendants.
It is the “right and duty of the Supreme Court to correct the irregularities of its officer and
compel him to perform his duty.” In re Marin, 956 F.2d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Griffin
v. Thompson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 244, 257 (1844)). “[T]his supervisory responsibility is exclusive
to the Supreme Court and . . . neither a district court nor a circuit court of appeals has jurisdiction
to interfere with it by mandamus or otherwise.” Id. As such, the lower courts lack “subject matter
jurisdiction to review any decision of the Supreme Court or its Clerk.” Id. Perales’s attempt to
distinguish this case from the rule of In re Marin on the ground that In re Marin dealt with only a
petition for certiorari, whereas Perales’s suit involves an emergency motion, is unpersuasive.
Because the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Perales’s claims, the Court must dismiss
the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Finally, Perales’s motion for leave to file a surreply is also pending with the Court. See
ECF 19. “[S]urreplies are generally disfavored, . . . and the determination of whether to grant or
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deny leave is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court.” Crummey v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
794 F. Supp. 2d 46, 62 (D.D.C. 2011). Even considering Perales’s pro se status, the Court does
not find that Perales has met the requirements for filing a surreply, in that his brief simply rehashes
arguments already made to the Court. See id. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a surreply, ECF 19, is
DENIED. Plaintiff’s motion to extend the time to serve, ECF 12, is DENIED. Defendants’ motion
to dismiss, ECF 9, is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF 1, is DISMISSED.
A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
JIA M. COBB
United States District Judge
Date: May 29, 2026
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