Perales v. City of Los Angeles
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
Date FiledSeptember 18, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2026-3206
JudgeJudge Jia M. Cobb
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
AZAEL DYTHIAN PERALES,
Plaintiff, Case No. 26-cv-3206 (JMC)
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff Azael Dythian Perales has filed yet another lawsuit against a government
entity claiming that a government defendant is “emit[ting] violent electrical prods to [his] body”
and sending “powerful and dangerous radio signals to [his] brain.” ECF 1 at 2; see also, e.g.,
Perales v. 119th United States Senate, 26-cv-2525; Perales v. 119th U.S. House of
Representatives, 26-cv-2195; Perales v. U.S. Secret Service, et al., 25-cv-3008. This time, Plaintiff
purports to sue the City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Police Department. The Court
DISMISSES his complaint and this action sua sponte.1
It is well-settled that “federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within
their jurisdiction if they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,
wholly insubstantial, [or] obviously frivolous . . . .” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37
(1974). A complaint will be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) when
it is “‘patently insubstantial,’ presenting no federal question suitable for decision.” Best v. Kelly,
1
Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of quoted materials has been modified throughout this opinion, for
example, by omitting internal quotation marks and citations, and by incorporating emphases, changes to capitalization,
and other bracketed alterations therein. All pincites to documents filed on the docket are to the automatically generated
ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page.
1
39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 n.6 (1989)).
Claims are patently insubstantial if they are “essentially fictitious,” for example, advancing
“bizarre conspiracy theories,” “fantastic government manipulations of [one’s] will or mind,” or
some type of “supernatural intervention.” Id. In such cases, a district court may dismiss the case
sua sponte. See Lewis v. Bayh, 577 F. Supp. 2d 47, 54 (D.D.C. 2008).
Perales’ allegations fall squarely in the “fanciful” category. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325;
see also Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1307–08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“A court may dismiss as
frivolous complaints . . . postulating events and circumstances of a wholly fanciful kind.”). His
complaint, which is laced with slurs and profanity, alleges that the City of Los Angeles and its
police department are torturing him and sending “a live streaming feed of [his] thoughts” through
electrical prods and other mechanisms. ECF 1 at 2. These allegations do not present a substantial
legal question for this Court to resolve. Accordingly, upon sua sponte review, this action is
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
DATE: September 18, 2026
Jia M. Cobb
U.S. District Court Judge
2