Harper v. United States of America
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
Date FiledJuly 16, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2026-1975
JudgeJudge Randolph D. Moss
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DARRELL J. HARPER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 26-01975 (UNA)
)
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This action brought pro se is before the Court on review of Plaintiff’s complaint and
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court grants the
application and dismisses the complaint.
Plaintiff, a resident of Houston, Texas, alleges that on August 31, 2022, he “was sanctioned
by U.S. District Judge Lynn N. Hughes in the amount of $100 . . . in retaliation for” exercising
“his First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances.” Compl., ECF
No. 1 at 3 ¶ 1. On October 25, 2024, moreover, “U.S. District Judge Drew B. Tipton entered an
order striking Plaintiff’s motion,” which “further infringed upon his First Amendment rights and
constituted judicial bias.” Id. Plaintiff sues the United States “and the Donald J. Trump
Administration.” Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1. He seeks damages and a judgment declaring
“Defendants’ actions unconstitutional and unlawful.” Id. at 4.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes a suit against the United States without its
consent, United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983), which “must be unequivocally
expressed in statutory text,” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (cleaned up). Article III
judges performing, as alleged here, their official acts are considered “part of the United States
government for the purposes of sovereign immunity.” Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d 28, 38
(D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, No. 14-5180 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 14, 2015) (per curiam).
Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that Congress has “expressly waived” the United
States’ immunity for the claims asserted. Id. Moreover, neither the President nor “the Donald J.
Trump Administration” is a proper defendant. Among other difficulties, Plaintiff fails to allege
the President took any action relating to his case, and his assertion that the “Trump Administration
has “act[ed] through . . . judicial officers,” ECF No. 1 at 3, misunderstands the separation of
powers. See Patchak v. Zinke, 583 U.S. 244, 250 (2018), quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168, 191 (1881) (under the separation-of-powers doctrine, “[e]ach branch” of Government
“‘exercise[s] . . . the powers appropriate to its own department,’ and no branch can ‘encroach upon
the powers confided to the others.’”). Therefore, this case will be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see Smith, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 38 (“If sovereign immunity
applies, the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the offending suit.”) (collecting cases)).
A separate order accompanies this opinion.
_________/s/______________
RANDOLPH D. MOSS
Date: July 16, 2026 United States District Judge
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