Brooks v. Department of the Army

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _________________________________________ ) ANTONIO GREGORY BROOKS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 24-cv-2259 (APM) ) DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ) ) Defendant. ) _________________________________________ ) MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 34 [hereinafter Def.’s Mot.], filed by Defendant Department of the Army (“the Army”). For the reasons stated below, the Army’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. I. BACKGROUND A. FOIA Request to the Army Pro se Plaintiff Antonio Gregory Brooks (“Brooks”) worked as a contractor “for and in connection with various elements and entities between 2016 and 2024, including components of the Department of the Army.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 36, Ex. A [hereinafter Pl.’s Decl.] ¶ 3. “[He] performed work under Army authority and supervision on several occasions during this period.” Id. On or about May 17, 2023, Brooks sent a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Army, seeking “a copy of any records whether electronic or paper about [him] maintained [by the Army],” and requested they perform “a broad and cumulative search.” See Compl., ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Compl.], ¶ 7; Decl. of Marques McIntosh, ECF No. 34-3 [hereinafter McIntosh Decl.], ¶¶ 1–2; McIntosh Decl., Ex. A [hereinafter FOIA Request]. The FOIA Request also included an addendum listing 29 sprawling categories that his Request might “include but [was] not limited to”: Personnel records; Emails while under employment (as a contractor during the periods of 2016-2022); Work related products while under employment (as a contractor during the periods of 2016-2022); Investigative notes and referrals Clearance processing actions; Interagency and external agency referrals or actions; Adverse actions or measures considered (either through referral or under assessments, insider threat reporting, or full investigations); Techniques, measures, devices, and other related means used during surveillance, targeting, and analysis (i.e. usage of novel devices such as cyber operations, usage of aromatic devices, usage of active denial systems, usage of electronic stimuli device or air related device, usage of sting-ray device, usage of industrial control system devices, etc.) and any additional known procurement or usage of devices by the US Army Cl/CID, FBI or related component (Operation Technologies Division/Enterprise Services Division/Emerging Technologies Section or any known component at FBI HQ or whether located at a field office); Usage of vehicle operations measures (transportation surveillance) Usage of confidential informants and human confidential sources; Interviews with known associates and potential associates not related to clearance processing; Any information developed, reported, shared and/or actioned in conjunction with any Army component, to include 1st Information Operations Command; Any information developed, reported, shared and/or actioned in conjunction with any other FBI Division, to include Enterprise Service Division, Criminal Justice Information Services, Operation Technologies Division; Any information reported, shared and/or actioned in conjunction with Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency or related component; Any information developed, reported, shared and/or actioned in conjunction with any AF OSI Office; Any information developed, reported, shared and/or actioned in conjunction with any Navy NCIS Office; Any information developed, reported, shared and/or actioned in conjunction with ODNI Any information developed, reported, shared and/or actioned in conjunction with any IG office; Any information developed, reported, shared and/or actioned in conjunction with any US Attorney Office; Any information developed, reported, shared and/or actioned in conjunction with any FBI Field Office; Any information developed, reported, shared and/or actioned in conjunction with any Army Cl/ClD Office; Referrals from IG or other agency FBI tips notifications and reporting; Information related to external agency actions or referrals or task force developments concerning the above named; Information developed and maintained through other repositories not explicitly stated or mentioned above concerning the above named; Information cross-referenced with other agencies that may be held in their data enclaves and actions taken to review 2  or not review that data and analyze such information Decisions and actions taken on previous submitted FOIA and Privacy Act requests and personnel involved (i.e. DCSA, US Army, DOD, US Attorney, DoJ, DNI, etc.); Personnel, investigators, and support staff associated known to be coworkers, associates, supervisors (government employees and contract staff); Personnel, investigators, and support staff known to be tasked and assigned to any known assessments, insider threat reporting, or full investigations concerning the above named. See FOIA Request. The Army’s Office of Chief Information Officer (“OCIO”), see McIntosh Decl. ¶ 1, responded on June 20, 2023, explaining that Brooks was required to narrow his FOIA Request to a more “limited purview,” Compl. ¶ 8, but Brooks declined to do so, see id. ¶ 9. In May 2024, Brooks requested an update and did not receive one. See id. ¶ 10. Brooks then filed this lawsuit on July 29, 2024, see Compl., and on January 28, 2025, the OCIO sent a renewed acknowledgement letter to Brooks in response to the same FOIA Request, see McIntosh Decl. ¶¶ 4–5; McIntosh Decl., Exhibit B [hereinafter Ack. Ltr.]. That letter again notified Brooks that at least 17 categories of his FOIA Request were overbroad and did not reasonably describe the records sought, and it asked that he clarify them within seven days, providing a timeframe and better defining the types of documents requested. See McIntosh Decl. ¶ 5; Ack. Ltr. Insofar as the FOIA Request sought email correspondence, OCIO asked Brooks specifically to “provide the to and from email addresses to be searched, personnel name, and timeframe.” Ack. Ltr. The letter also notified Brooks that the Army was referring certain portions of his Request to the Army Criminal Investigation Division (“CID”), to Army Intelligence and Security Command (“ISC”), and to the Army Inspector General (“Inspector General”), as they were the most likely components to possess responsive records. See id.; McIntosh Decl. ¶ 4. Finally, OCIO explained that some portions of his FOIA Request did not fall under the purview of 3 the Army and directed Brooks to contact the applicable outside agencies and contracting companies directly. McIntosh Decl. ¶ 5; Ack Letter. Around the same time, the Army also referred Brooks’s FOIA Request to Army Cyber Command (“Cyber Command”) at Fort Gordon, Georgia, which holds historical records of the “1st Information Operations Command,” the only specific Army “unit” referenced in his FOIA Request. Decl. of Syreeta Owens Chiles, ECF No. 37-1 [hereinafter Chiles Decl.], ¶¶ 3–4. On January 29, 2025, OCIO received a letter from Brooks, expressing potential willingness to “narrow the scope and provide keywords or parameters,” but providing purported clarifying information for only three of the 17 categories. See McIntosh Decl. ¶ 6; McIntosh Decl., Ex. C [hereinafter Pl.’s Jan. 29 Ltr.]. Brooks’s “clarification” for those three categories was to stress that he sought “emails and communications involving Army personnel relevant to [his] role (2016- 2022); work products related to [his] assignments and associated interagency operations[, and]; reports, referrals, and interagency communications between Army components and external agencies like the FBI, DCSA, NCIS, or AF OSI.” See Pl.’s Jan. 29 Ltr. However, Brooks did not, as requested, (1) provide email addresses to be searched or personnel names; (2) explain what “work products” meant; (3) submit date ranges for two of those three categories; or (4) narrow or explain the broad phrasing of “referrals, and interagency communications between Army components and external agencies.” See id.; McIntosh Decl. ¶ 6. OCIO followed up with Brooks on February 4, 2025, notifying him that “after extensive research” it was referring portions of his FOIA Request to the Army Reserve Command (“Reserve Command”) and the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (“DCSA”), as they were the most likely to possess responsive records. See McIntosh Decl. ¶ 7; McIntosh Decl., Ex. D. 4  B. The Army’s Referrals 1. CID On May 22, 2023, CID received referral of the FOIA Request from the Department of the Navy, which itself had received an identical FOIA request previously. See Decl. of Michelle Kardelis, ECF No. 34-4 [hereinafter Kardelis Decl.], ¶ 9; Kardelis Decl., Ex. A. The following day, CID searched its system of records. See Kardelis Decl. ¶ 3. CID retrieved one responsive document and partially released that document to Brooks on May 31, 2023, redacting the names of third parties under FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C). See id. ¶ 4–5; Kardelis Decl., Ex. B [hereinafter CID Dec. Ltr.]. CID also informed Brooks of his right to appeal and the possibility of additional redress through the Office of Government Information Services (“OGIS”), but Brooks did not pursue these avenues. See Kardelis Decl. ¶ 8; CID Dec. Ltr. On January 28, 2025, the Army submitted its own referral of Brooks’s same FOIA Request to CID. See Kardelis Decl. ¶ 9. CID “attempted to request clarification from Mr. Brooks as to certain portions of the request that may have aided” their ability to search once again for responsive records. See id. CID requested that Brooks provide the email addresses that he used at the time he was a contractor––because he was not employed by CID, CID was not privy to his email addresses. See id. ¶¶ 10–11; Kardelis Decl., Exs. C–D [hereinafter CID Emails]. On April 4, 2025, Brooks replied, declining to provide his email addresses. See Kardelis Decl. ¶¶ 12–13; CID Emails. CID then responded that, without this information, it could not conduct a search, and it also requested specific clarification regarding other portions of the Request. See Kardelis Decl. ¶ 14; CID Emails. Brooks never responded. See id. 5  2. ISC On January 10, 2025, ISC received the Army’s referral of Brooks’s FOIA Request. See Decl. of Michael T. Heaton, ECF No. 34-5 [hereinafter Heaton Decl.], ¶¶ 1, 3; Heaton Decl., Ex. D. ISC then conducted a search of several records systems, but found no responsive records, and it so notified Brooks by letter on January 26, 2025. See Heaton Decl. ¶¶ 7, 13–18. The letter also advised Brooks of his appeal rights and of additional assistance available through OGIS and the National Archives and Record Administration, and it pointed out several other Army components or outside agencies that might have records responsive to his FOIA Request. See id. ¶ 7; Heaton Decl., Ex. E. On February 3, 2025, the Office of the Judge Advocate General, Litigation Division, notified ISC that Brooks had provided additional information relating to his FOIA Request and it requested that ISC conduct another search. See Heaton Decl. ¶ 8; Heaton Decl., Ex. F. ISC conducted another search of several records systems but again found no responsive records. See Heaton Decl. ¶¶ 10, 13–18; Heaton Decl., Ex. H. Brooks was again notified of his right to appeal and his options for administrative assistance. See id. On March 18, 2025, ISC received a referral from DCSA regarding the same FOIA Request, and identifying a two-page document that DCSA determined fell under ISC’s purview. See Heaton Decl. ¶¶ 11–12; Heaton Decl., Ex. I. Upon review, ISC partially released that record to Brooks, redacting third-party identifying information under FOIA Exemption 6. See id. ¶ 12; Heaton Decl., Ex. J. ISC also again advised Brooks of his right to appeal and of the options for administrative assistance, but Brooks did not pursue those avenues. See Heaton Decl. ¶¶ 12, 19. 6  3. Cyber Command Cyber Command received referral of Brooks’s FOIA Request on January 10, 2025. See Chiles Decl. ¶ 3. On May 14, 2025, Cyber Command emailed Brooks requesting clarification of his FOIA Request to better enable a search for responsive records. See id. ¶ 5; Chiles Decl., Ex. A [hereinafter CC Emails I]. More specifically, Cyber Command informed Brooks that, to search for the communications he requested, it would require the email addresses that he used during that time. See id. It also asked Brooks to more specifically describe his requests for (1) “work products” that were created during employment, and (2) “information developed” by the Army involving him. See Chiles Decl. ¶¶ 6–7; CC Emails I. Cyber Command also informed Brooks that “any clearance documents would be in the possession of his employer,” but nonetheless, he should list any documents that he was seeking, just in case Cyber Command might possess them. See Chiles Decl. ¶ 8; CC Emails I. Brooks never responded to that email. See Chiles Decl. ¶ 9. On May 27, 2025, Cyber Command sent a follow-up email, advising Brooks that it could not respond to his FOIA Request without the clarifying information it had requested, and it set forth more specific requests for clarification. See id. ¶ 10; Chiles Decl., Ex. B. Brooks did not respond to that email either. See Chiles Decl. ¶ 11. 4. Inspector General In mid-January 2025, the Inspector General received referral of Brooks’s FOIA Request. See Decl. of Ashley Ingram, ECF No. 37-2 [hereinafter Ingram Decl.], ¶ 5. On January 15, 2025, the Inspector General searched its records system and retrieved seven responsive documents consisting of 14 pages, which it released to Brooks on February 6, 2025, save for redactions made under FOIA Exemptions 5, 6, and 7(c). See id. ¶¶ 5–6; Ingram Decl., Ex. A; Def.’s Mot., Ex. 6, 7 ECF No. 34-8. Brooks was advised of his right to appeal and to seek administrative assistance from OGIS, though there is no indication that he pursued those avenues. See id. 5. Reserve Command On February 5, 2025, Reserve Command received referral of Brooks’s FOIA Request. See Decl. of Kimberly Pettaway, ECF No. 34-6 [hereinafter Pettaway Decl.], ¶¶ 1–2; Pettaway Decl., Ex. A. The following day, Reserve Command searched its own system of records and then consulted with the Reserve Command Office of the Staff Judge Advocate but found nothing responsive. See Pettaway Decl. ¶¶ 3–5. On February 13, 2025, Reserve Command issued a no records response to Brooks and explained his appeal rights. See id. ¶ 6; Pettaway Decl., Ex. B. On September 11, 2025, Reserve Command emailed Brooks to inquire if he had ever been a contractor at Reserve Command, and if so, requested that he provide the timeframe and command where he was employed as a contractor and the email address that he used at that time. See id. ¶ 7; Pettaway Decl., Ex. C. Brooks never responded. See Pettaway Decl. ¶ 8. 6. DCSA On February 11, 2025, the DCSA received referral of Brooks’s FOIA Request. See Def.’s Mot., Ex. 5, ECF No. 34-7 [hereinafter DCSA Ltr.]. The DCSA is not an Army component––it is a sub-agency of the Department of Defense. See Def.’s Mot., Def.’s Mem. in Support of Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 34-1 [hereinafter Def.’s Mem.], at 4. On June 18, 2025, the DCSA sent Brooks a letter notifying him that the FOIA Request was a duplicate of a request that it had previously received from him on July 18, 2024, and that it had already completed and closed that Request on March 18, 2025. See DCSA Ltr. 8  C. The Instant Lawsuit On July 29, 2024, Brooks filed this lawsuit, alleging that the Army was unlawfully withholding records responsive to his FOIA Request submitted on May 17, 2023, and demanding immediate release of such records. See Compl. at 4–5. On January 13, 2025, the Army filed an Answer, ECF No. 15, and shortly thereafter, the parties began filing rolling Status Reports, while the Army continued reprocessing Brooks’s FOIA Request. See Def.’s Status Rep., ECF No. 17. On November 24, 2025, the Army filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. See Def.’s Mot. The following day, the court issued an Order, ECF No. 35, directing Brooks to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment by no later than December 24, 2025, and advising him of the consequences of failing to do so, see id. at 1–3. On January 14, 2026, Brooks filed his Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, albeit 21 days late, and with no explanation for the delay. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n. On March 13, 2026, the Army filed its Reply in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 37. II. LEGAL STANDARD Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[a] party is entitled to summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment in the movant’s favor is proper as a matter of law.” Soundboard Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 888 F.3d 1261, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). However, the mere existence of a factual dispute is insufficient to preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” only if a reasonable fact-finder could find for the non-moving party; a fact is “material” only if it is capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 248; Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam). 9  The “vast majority of FOIA cases can be resolved on summary judgment.” Brayton v. Off. of U.S. Trade Rep., 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In a FOIA case, the district court reviews the agency’s decisions de novo and “the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Mil. Audit Proj. v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Summary judgment in a FOIA case “may be granted on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.” Aguiar v. DEA, 865 F.3d 730, 734–35 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Secret Serv., 726 F.3d 208, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2013)); see also Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 833 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“An agency is entitled to summary judgment if no material facts are in dispute and if it demonstrates that each document that falls within the class requested either has been produced or is wholly exempt from the Act’s inspection requirements.”) (cleaned up). An agency’s declarations are accorded “a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents.” Shapiro v. Dep’t of Justice, 40 F.4th 609, 613 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Furthermore, “to satisfy FOIA’s aims of providing more transparency into the workings of the government,” an agency must generally demonstrate that it made an “adequate search” for records responsive to a FOIA request. See Montgomery v. IRS, 40 F.4th 702, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2022). This demonstration “entails a ‘show[ing] that [the agency] made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested.’” Id. (quoting Oglesby v. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). Finally, while the “pleadings of pro se parties must be liberally construed,” a pro se plaintiff “is held to the same evidentiary burdens” on a motion for summary judgment “as those represented 10 by counsel,” and must therefore “provide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” Rodriguez v. FTC, No. 25-cv-2401 (LLA), 2026 WL 2349862, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2026) (internal quotation marks omitted). III. DISCUSSION Brooks does not challenge any of the Army’s withholdings, nor does he seek disclosure of any exempt material. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n. He contests only the sufficiency of the searches; more specifically, he finds it implausible that “no responsive records exist across multiple Army components[.]” See Pl.’s Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8; Pl.’s Opp’n at 1–3. The Army raises two arguments supporting the sufficiency of its searches and responses. First, it argues that Brooks’s FOIA Request did not reasonably describe the records that he was requesting. See Def.’s Mem. at 7–9. Second, it argues that, even though the FOIA Request was not reasonably described, the Army’s components attempted to conduct searches calculated to uncover responsive documents, to the extent that they understood the FOIA Request. See id. at 9– 16. For the reasons explained below, the court is persuaded by both arguments. A. The Records As-Sought FOIA “requires agencies to make records available in response to any request ‘made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed.’” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 146, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A)). In “the absence of any evidence that plaintiff submitted a proper FOIA request” in accordance with these rules, summary judgment is warranted. See Thomas v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d 144, 146 (D.D.C. 2008). As pertinent here, a FOIA request must “reasonably describe[]” the records being requested. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). A FOIA request reasonably describes the records sought 11 “if the agency is able to determine precisely what records are being requested.” Evans v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 951 F.3d 578, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2020). The standard is that a “professional employee of the agency who [is] familiar with the subject area of the request” should be able to “locate the record with a reasonable amount of effort.” Truitt v. Dep’t of State, 897 F.2d 540, 545 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1990). To that same end, the Army’s FOIA regulations require a requester to “provide a description of the desired record that enables the Government to locate the record with a reasonable amount of effort.” Def’s Mem. at 8 (citing Dep’t of the Army, Reg. 25-55, Department of the Army Freedom of Information Act, para 3-6a (Oct. 19, 2020) (“AR 25-55”)); see also 32 CFR § 286.5(a) (FOIA requests to the Army “must reasonably describe the records sought and provide sufficient detail to enable personnel to locate those records with a reasonable amount of effort. To the extent possible, requesters should include specific information that may assist personnel in identifying the requested records, such as the date, title or name, author, recipient, subject matter of the record, case number, file designation, or reference number” and requesters “are encouraged to make every effort to reasonably describe the requested records in order to avoid any delays in the processing of their requests.”). FOIA requests lacking specificity do not reasonably describe records, as required, and are therefore insufficient to trigger any agency obligation. See Gun Owners of Am., Inc. v. Fed. Bureau of Invest., 594 F. Supp. 3d 37, 42 (D.D.C. 2022). Nor must an agency “honor a request that requires an unreasonably burdensome search,” including where the requester seeks “a vast quantity of material,” see Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Loc. 2782 v. Dep’t of Comm., 907 F.2d 203, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted), “not tailored to the requester’s purpose for requesting the material,” Bennett v. U.S. Postal Service, No. 24-cv-3668 (LLA), 2026 WL 686128, 12 at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2026). It is “the requester’s responsibility to frame” a FOIA request “with sufficient particularity to ensure that searches are not unreasonably burdensome, and to enable the searching agency to determine precisely what records are being requested.” See SAI v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 315 F. Supp. 3d 218, 248 (D.D.C. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Brooks’s FOIA Request does not reasonably describe the records sought. At root, he asks for “any records” “about” and “concerning” him, both within and outside the entire agency. See FOIA Request. Courts have repeatedly “found that FOIA requests for all documents concerning a requester are too broad.” Dale v. IRS, 238 F. Supp. 2d 99, 104 (D.D.C. 2002) (collecting cases and concluding that a plaintiff’s request for “any and all documents, including but not limited to files, that refer or relate in any way to [himself]” did not reasonably describe the records sought) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also McKinley v. FDIC, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2011) (awarding summary judgment to the agency where the plaintiff, a government advisor, requested “any information available” regarding three policy decisions, because the request’s “language [was] analogous to requests for records that relate ‘in any way’ to a person or event, which courts have repeatedly found to be overly broad and unreasonable”). Although Brooks’s FOIA Request sought records in 29 categories, those categories are mostly defective and do not provide much in the way of clarification; in fact, they mostly create additional confusion. These categories are largely facially vague and burdensome: Brooks repeats requests for “any information developed, reported, shared,” “related to,” “maintained,” or “cross- referenced,” by the Army and others, about numerous far-reaching topics. See FOIA Request. But FOIA requests that “seek records ‘pertaining to,’ ‘relating to,’ or ‘concerning’ broad subject areas” are often impermissible. See Bader Fam. Found. v. Equal Empl. Opportunity Comm’n, No. 23-cv-976 (JMC), 2025 WL 915563, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2025); Freedom Watch v. Dep’t of 13 State, 925 F. Supp. 2d 55, 61–63 (D.D.C. 2013) (same). Accordingly, courts in this jurisdiction have routinely dismissed similarly phrased FOIA requests. See, e.g., Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of State, No. 23-cv-2964 (JMC), 2025 WL 915533, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2025) (finding that “the problem” with the plaintiff’s FOIA request was not only that it used “the phrase ‘related to,’” but also it did “not impose sufficient limitations to give the agency adequate guidance in locating responsive documents”) (cleaned up). What’s more, Brooks’s FOIA Request includes queries, not only broadly for “information,” but also for “personnel, investigators, and support staff associated known to be coworkers, associates, supervisors (government employees and contract staff),” “usage of vehicle operations measures (transportation surveillance), “usage of confidential informants and human confidential sources,” “techniques, measures, devices, and other related means used during surveillance, targeting, and analysis,” and “adverse actions or measures considered.” See FOIA Request. But, to the extent they can be understood, these are requests for names, facts, data, and statistics, not agency records, and such requests are improper. See Jordan v. DEA, No. 22-cv-2195 (JEB), 2023 WL 2809132, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 2023); see also Tokar v. Dep’t of Justice, 304 F. Supp. 3d 81, 91 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that “requests for information rather than records are not considered proper FOIA requests”) (collecting cases). With these queries, Brooks is, in essence, asking the Army to answer questions, and courts in this district have consistently held that FOIA does not “require[ ] an agency to answer questions disguised as a FOIA request.” Hudgins v. IRS, 620 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D.D.C. 1985); see also Powell v. IRS, 255 F. Supp. 3d 33, 43 (D.D.C. 2017) (explaining that FOIA does not require an agency to “provide a requestor with specific information or answer questions”); Maydak v. Dep’t of Justice, 254 F. Supp. 2d 23, 46 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding that a request consisting of “a series of questions or requests for 14 information . . . [is] beyond the scope of the FOIA”); Frank v. Dep’t of Justice, 941 F. Supp. 4, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that agencies are “not required, by FOIA or by any other statute, to dig out all the information that might exist, in whatever form or place it might be found, and to create a document that answers plaintiff’s question”). Nor does FOIA, as proposed by portions of Brooks’s FOIA Request, require an agency to “conduct research,” see Nat’l Sec. Couns. v. CIA, 898 F. Supp. 2d 233, 269 (D.D.C. 2012), or entertain a “general request for data, information and statistics,” see Krohn v. Dep’t of Justice, 628 F.2d 195, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1980). “FOIA does not provide individuals with the right to demand an all-encompassing fishing expedition[.]” Bloeser v. Dep’t. of Justice, 811 F. Supp. 2d 316, 321 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent that Brooks contends that his FOIA Request is reasonably described because it includes “date ranges,” see Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 5, the court is unpersuaded. A limited timeframe “does not necessarily cure an overly broad description of the records.” See Am. Ctr. for Law and Justice v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 573 F. Supp. 3d 78, 84, 87–88 (D.D.C. 2021) (finding that the plaintiff’s request for “any and all records, communications, or briefings” related “in any way” to eight categories involving the government’s immigration enforcement actions for specific six- month period was overbroad and unduly burdensome); Jud. Watch, 2025 WL 915533 at *3 (same). Brooks also argues that his Request was reasonably described because it provided the Army with “agency contexts[] and categories of records reasonably expected to exist under ordinary Army recordkeeping practices.” Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 5. The court has already described the defects inherent to the “categories” and, if “agency contexts” means proposed search locations, this argument still falls short. Brooks’s FOIA Request references numerous Army components where records might exist. On top of that, he asks the agency to search all of its files within any potential 15 other “related components,” and to then additionally conduct searches of outside agencies, see FOIA Request, all of which is definitionally burdensome, see Wright v. Dep’t Health and Human Srvs., No. 22-cv-1378 (RC), 2022 WL 18024624, at *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 2022) (finding that the plaintiff’s claim that he limited his FOIA request “by proposing search locations [was] unpersuasive,” because these “likely” locations “were just suggestions,” and nothing indicated that he “agreed to narrow the search to only these locations. Quite the opposite: [the plaintiff] acknowledged that responsive records ‘might be elsewhere,’” and these “suggestions, short of actual restrictions, do nothing to support the reasonableness” of the request). By his own admission, Brooks did not narrow or clarify his Request because he feared that the Army’s requests for him to do so were part of an attempt to “unlawfully withhold information” from him. See Compl. ¶ 8–9. As noted, the OCIO, CID, Cyber Command, and Reserve Command all reached out to Brooks multiple times to clarify or narrow the terms of the FOIA Request and obtain specific and necessary information, and he only engaged on one of those occasions and, even then, in only a perfunctory manner. See Pl. Jan. 29 Ltr. He cannot now complain about the agency’s response. Because Brooks points to no evidence suggesting a reason to doubt the Army’s evidence and Declarations, the court finds that his FOIA Request failed to reasonably describe the records that he was seeking, therefore triggering no obligation for the Army. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). B. Reasonably Calculated Searches The court also finds that the Army attempted to or actually conducted searches that were reasonably calculated to retrieve responsive documents, based on its best interpretation of the FOIA Request as drafted. An agency responding to a valid FOIA request must “conduct a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents, and, if challenged, must demonstrate 16 beyond material doubt that the search was reasonable.” Truitt, 897 F.2d at 542 (cleaned up). The adequacy of an agency’s search is measured by a standard of reasonableness under the circumstances. Id. “A search need not be exhaustive, and the adequacy of a search is not determined by its results, but by the method of the search itself.” Brown v. FBI, 675 F. Supp. 2d 122, 125 (D.D.C. 2009) (internal citation omitted). An agency may base its showing of reasonableness on declarations submitted in good faith, see id., provided that the declarations explain in sufficient detail the scope and method of the search, see Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Once the agency has provided a reasonably detailed affidavit, the burden shifts to the FOIA requester to produce “countervailing evidence” suggesting that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to the adequacy of the search. Id. at 1116. “In the absence of contrary evidence,” an agency’s reasonably detailed “declarations are sufficient to demonstrate [its] compliance[.]” North v. Dep’t of Justice, 774 F. Supp. 2d 217, 222 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam)). At the outset, the court finds that the Army’s own Declarant, Marques McIntosh, a Government Information Specialist at OCIO, submitted in good faith a reasonably detailed Declaration. See generally McIntosh Decl. McIntosh possesses FOIA expertise, as well as insight and experience with the entirety of the Army’s FOIA processes. See id. ¶ 1. He is thus qualified to testify as to the propriety of the Army’s handling of Brooks’s FOIA Request, and its respective referrals. He also personally handled Brooks’s FOIA Request, evincing personal knowledge. See generally id. 17  The court also finds that the Army’s components 1 have all also met their burden to provide good faith, reasonably detailed declarations supporting the sufficiency of their respective searches, or attempted searches, as explained below. 1. Component Declarations a. CID CID’s declarant is Michelle Kardelis, the FOIA Chief of CID, who possesses decades of FOIA supervisory experience, see Kardelis Decl. ¶ 1, and personal knowledge of Brooks’s FOIA Request, see generally id. Her declaration is therefore made in good faith. CID conducted its first search in response to the FOIA Request on May 23, 2023. See id. ¶ 3. FOIA technicians searched for Brooks’s name, date of birth, and social security number in the Army Law Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System database (“ALERTS”). See id. Kardelis explains that ALERTS “is the sole Army law enforcement report writing and tracking system” and it “provides the Army with an integrated case management system for law enforcement, supporting both the Military Police and the Criminal Investigation Command.” Id. Although Brooks “did not reasonably describe the records he was seeking,” CID “understood his request to be asking for any investigative files pertaining to him kept within CID databases. As ALERTS is the sole law enforcement report database for the Army, it is the only system that would contain any records responsive to Mr. Brooks’[s] request for records about him maintained in [the CID] office.” See id. Kardelis attests that, after searching ALERTS, CID retrieved one responsive document, a report of investigation (“ROI”) about an incident where Brooks “reported unknown associates for 1 The court need not address DCSA’s response to the FOIA Request because Brooks only challenges the Army’s “position that no responsive records exist across multiple Army components,” see Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 6 (emphasis added), and DCSA is not an Army component, see Def.’s Mem. at 4. 18 conducting cyber activity against U.S. persons. The ROI was compiled in furtherance of CID’s investigation of Mr. Brooks’[s] complaint to the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Hotline.” See id. at 4. On May 31, 2023, CID released the ROI to Brooks via a secure download link and sent him a letter explaining that the document was partially redacted pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C). See id. ¶ 5; CID Dec. Ltr. On January 28, 2025, CID again received the same FOIA Request by way of referral. See Kardelis Decl. ¶ 9. Per Kardelis, CID could have treated it as a duplicate request, but instead reached out to Brooks to “request clarification . . . that may have aided [their] ability to assess whether CID had any additional responsive documents.” See id. On March 4, 2025, Kardelis emailed Brooks, seeking additional information to assist CID in searching for “email communications while [he was] employed as a contractor.” See id. ¶ 10; CID Emails. “Because Mr. Brooks was never a CID employee, CID would not have been the originating agency for the email communications requested by Mr. Brooks. However, because the Army uses a central search application to search for emails under the Army domain, [CID] has the ability to submit a search for responsive emails, which [CID] could then refer to the originating agency for review and release” to Brooks. See Kardelis Decl. ¶ 10. She explained to Brooks that “to proceed on his request for e-mails and communications made while under employment involving the US Army, [CID] needed all his e-mail addresses that he had,” because the Army’s search system “for emails requires a specific, valid em