Heenan v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PALMER HEENAN, et al., : : Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 25-3343 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 10 : U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING : AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, et al., : : Defendants. : MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs are federal employee attorneys who formerly worked in the Office of Fair Housing within the Office of General Counsel at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Following a change in presidential administration, the Department of Housing and Urban Development reassigned Plaintiffs to positions outside the Office of Fair Housing. Plaintiffs contend that the reassignments were unlawful retaliation under the Fair Housing Act for their work enforcing the Act. They ask the Court to declare the reassignments unlawful and to enjoin the Department of Housing and Urban Development to reinstate them to their former positions in the Office of Fair Housing, “so they can get back to work delivering on the promise of fair housing for all.” Defendants (collectively, the “Government”) have moved to dismiss, asserting that the Civil Service Reform Act provides the exclusive remedial scheme governing the challenged reassignments. In the alternative, the Government contends that Plaintiffs have failed to state a retaliation claim under § 3617 of the Fair Housing Act. While the Court disagrees with the Government’s contention that the Civil Service Reform Act precludes Plaintiffs’ Fair Housing Act claim, it nevertheless agrees that Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege a claim for retaliation under the Act. The Court therefore grants the Government’s motion to dismiss. II. BACKGROUND A. Legal Background This action implicates two federal statutory schemes: the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”) and the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”). The CSRA establishes a comprehensive framework for regulating federal employment and addressing prohibited personnel practices. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 455 (1988). Among other things, the CSRA identifies specific personnel practices that federal agencies may not take against employees and establishes administrative procedures for challenging those practices. Bloom v. McHugh, 828 F. Supp. 2d 43, 51 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2302). The CSRA generally channels challenges to covered personnel actions through the administrative and remedial mechanisms it provides. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Whipple, 636 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69–70 (D.D.C. 2009). For actions within its purview, the CSRA “removes the jurisdiction given to the federal courts” by the federal-question statute. See Whitman v. Dep't of Transp., 547 U.S. 512, 514 (2006) (per curiam). The FHA, by contrast, is a federal anti-discrimination statute that prohibits discrimination in housing and protects individuals who assist others in exercising their fair-housing rights. Linkletter v. W. & S. Fin. Grp., Inc., 851 F.3d 632, 639 (6th Cir. 2017). As relevant here, the FHA’s retaliation provision makes it unlawful to “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of” rights protected by the Act, or to retaliate against a person for having aided or encouraged another in exercising such rights. 42 U.S.C. § 3617. The 2 FHA provides an independent private right of action for persons aggrieved by a discriminatory housing practice and expressly authorizes suit in federal district court. Id. § 3613(a)(1)(A). B. Factual Background 1. Plaintiffs Plaintiffs are five attorneys who, until July 2025, worked in the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (“HUD”) Office of Fair Housing (“OFH”), a division of the Office of General Counsel (“OGC”) responsible for affirmative fair-housing work. Compl. ¶¶ 28, 33, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs Palmer Heenan, Paul Osadebe, Julia Dykstra, and Ashley Vazquez worked in OFH’s Enforcement Division, where their responsibilities included investigating and prosecuting housing-discrimination complaints, issuing charges and subpoenas, assisting with litigation and conciliation, and providing legal advice concerning compliance with the FHA. Id. ¶¶ 34–37. Plaintiff Hannah Gordon worked in OFH’s Compliance Division and served as Deputy Assistant General Counsel of Compliance. Id. ¶ 38. Her responsibilities included advising on FHA investigations, developing guidance and investigative tools, and reviewing agency policies for compliance with the FHA. Id. All five Plaintiffs allege that their work primarily involved affirmative fair-housing enforcement and that their supervisors and senior OGC officials were aware of the nature of that work. Id. ¶ 39. 2. Facts In early 2025, with the change in presidential administration, OGC began considering changes to OFH’s staffing and structure. Id. ¶ 41. In May, OGC officials told OFH employees that the office was too large and needed to be “right sized,” citing changes in the administration’s priorities. Id. ¶ 47. On May 29, an OGC official told an OFH attorney “that OFH attorneys had been selected to address staffing needs across OGC because “fair housing is not a priority of this 3 administration and OFH would not have as much work to do.” Id. ¶ 48. OGC subsequently began identifying staffing needs in other divisions and seeking volunteers from OFH to transfer to those offices. Id. ¶ 50. On June 4, 2025, OGC held a meeting at which officials identified staffing needs in other OGC divisions and sought volunteers from OFH to transfer to those offices. Id. OGC identified a specific number of positions it sought to fill in each division and advised that involuntary reassignments would follow if there were insufficient volunteers. Id. Meanwhile, OFH attorneys proposed an alternative under which attorneys could temporarily rotate to other divisions or assist those divisions while remaining in OFH. Id. ¶ 51. OGC rejected that proposal, however. Id. ¶ 52. Only one OFH attorney volunteered to transfer. Id. ¶ 53. As the staffing process continued, OGC determined which OFH employees would be reassigned to other divisions. Id. ¶¶ 54, 64. On June 23, OGC informed OFH leadership that ten line attorneys, including Plaintiffs Heenan, Osadebe, Dykstra, and Vazquez, would be involuntarily transferred out of OFH, and that two OFH supervisors, including Plaintiff Gordon, would be transferred. Id. ¶ 54. OGC subsequently provided the affected employees with reassignment notices identifying their new positions and duties. Id. ¶¶ 82, 89, 96, 102, 108. The reassignments took effect in July 2025 and October 2025. Id. ¶ 79. The staffing changes occurred against the backdrop of changes in the administration’s priorities concerning fair housing. OGC officials repeatedly stated that “fair housing is not a priority” of the administration and that OFH would have less fair-housing enforcement work as a result. Id. ¶ 60. OGC officials also referred to “an optics problem” with OFH being OGC’s largest office and stated that OFH should be “right sized.” Id. At the same time, Plaintiffs allege that OFH continued to have a significant backlog of statutorily mandated enforcement work, 4 received increased requests for assistance from regional counsel, and experienced increased workloads resulting from staffing shortages elsewhere in the agency. Id. ¶ 61. The Complaint further alleges that the number of investigations and complaints requiring processing had not decreased and that OFH had assumed new responsibilities associated with administration priorities, including implementing Executive Orders and reviewing applications for fair-housing assistance grants. Id. ¶ 62. The Complaint alleges that, as OGC assessed staffing needs across its offices, the number and allocation of positions continued to develop during the reassignment process. Id. ¶¶ 64, 67. OGC identified particular positions in other divisions that needed to be filled, while also determining which OFH employees would fill those positions. Id. ¶ 64. For example, the Office of Ethics and Appeals initially requested two to three attorneys, while the Office of Litigation initially requested four to five attorneys. Id. ¶ 67. The Complaint alleges that the number of attorneys ultimately transferred to those offices differed from those initial requests. Id. The Complaint further alleges that OFH’s staffing declined substantially during this period. According to the Complaint, OFH had 31 employees before the change in presidential administration and 24 employees before the challenged reassignments. Id. ¶ 78. After the reassignments, OFH had 11 employees, including six line attorneys. Id. Plaintiffs allege that OGC targeted them because of their work enforcing the FHA and that the reassignments were intended to retaliate against them and interfere with that work. Id. ¶¶ 58–60. The Complaint alleges that OGC’s stated reasons for reducing OFH were pretextual and that the decision to reassign Plaintiffs was motivated by their FHA enforcement activities. Id. ¶¶ 59–60. 5  C. Procedural Background Plaintiffs filed this action in September 2025, shortly after their reassignments. See Compl. The Complaint asserts a retaliation claim under § 3617 of the FHA, alleging that the Government retaliated against Plaintiffs for their work “aiding, assisting, and/or encouraging other people in the exercise or enjoyment of their fair housing rights under the FHA.” Id. ¶¶ 126– 135. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, including an order directing the Government to cancel their reassignments and reinstate them to their former positions in the OFH, as well as a declaration that the reassignments violated the FHA. Id. at 136–37. The Government moves to dismiss, contending that the CSRA precludes Plaintiffs’ FHA claim and, alternatively, that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for retaliation under the FHA. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 6–13, ECF No. 10. On August 21, 2026, the Court ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the FHA provides a private right of action against the United States or its agencies. See Min. Order (Aug. 21, 2026). The parties timely submitted their supplemental briefing. Defs.’ Suppl. Mem. (“Defs.’ Suppl.”), ECF No. 14; Pls.’ Suppl. Mem. (“Pls.’ Suppl.”), ECF No. 15. The Government’s motion is thus fully briefed and ripe for the Court’s consideration. III. LEGAL STANDARD A. Rule 12(b)(1) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1), a claim must be dismissed if a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Rule 12(b)(6), on the other hand, requires a court to dismiss “a claim upon which relief can[not] be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When a defendant files a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), a court must first examine the Rule 12(b)(1) challenges, U.S. ex rel. 6 Settlemire v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 913, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1999), because “if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the accompanying defenses and objections become moot and do not need to be determined,” Epps v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 719 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Ala.Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 896 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (holding that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be decided only after finding subject-matter jurisdiction). Because Rule 12(b)(1) concerns a court’s ability to hear a particular claim, the court must scrutinize the plaintiff’s allegations more closely when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than it would under Rule 12(b)(6). Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Epps, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 11–12; Grand Lodge of Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), a court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint” and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 2008), but courts are “not required . . . to accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual allegations,” Rann v. Chao, 154 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2001). Ultimately, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the Court’s jurisdiction, McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182–83 (1936), and where subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist, “the court cannot proceed at all in any cause,” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868). 7  B. Rule 12(b)(6) A complaint will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it contains a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and while “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary, the plaintiff must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63 (2007). Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63. Courts “must treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true[,] . . . and must grant [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citation modified). A claim is considered plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Plausibility “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. IV. ANALYSIS Plaintiffs principally challenge the Government’s decision to reassign them from the OFH to positions outside that office. They contend that they were “targeted” because of the nature of their work—“helping other people vindicate their rights under the Fair Housing Act”— and that their reassignments constituted retaliation under § 3617 of the FHA. Section 3617 prohibits “coerc[ing], intimidat[ing], threaten[ing], or interfer[ing] with any person . . . on 8 account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of[] any right granted or protected by” the FHA. 42 U.S.C. § 3617. The parties disagree over whether the FHA’s private right of action at § 3613 applies to the federal government and whether Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by sovereign immunity. The Court concludes the FHA’s private right of enforcement contains no limitation that it may not apply to the federal government or its agencies and that sovereign immunity does not bar Plaintiffs’ claims for non-monetary relief and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The Government also objects that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because the CSRA provides the exclusive remedial scheme governing Plaintiffs’ allegations. The Court disagrees. Although this case arises in the federal employment context, the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly declined to apply a categorical jurisdiction rule to federal employee claims brought under other federal statutory schemes. Instead, where the CSRA and another statutory scheme overlap, courts must determine whether both schemes can be accommodated without eviscerating the rights conferred by the non-CSRA statute. Applying that framework, the Court concludes that the CSRA does not preclude Plaintiffs’ FHA retaliation claim. The Court therefore assesses the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Through that analysis, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege the requisite causal connection between their alleged protected activity and the challenged reassignments, even under the more forgiving motivating-factor standard. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ FHA claim must be dismissed. 9 A. The FHA’s Private Right of Action Applies Against the United States and Its Agencies. Plaintiffs do not contend that the FHA contains an implied right of action under § 3617. 1 Pls.’ Suppl. at 1. Rather, they claim that the FHA’s express private right of enforcement by civil suit at § 3613(a)(1)(A), which encompasses violations of § 3617, applies against the federal government. Id. at 1, 4–6. The Government argues the federal government is not an intended defendant of a § 3613 action. Defs.’ Suppl. at 2–4. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the text and structure of the FHA do not preclude a § 3613 action from applying to the federal government. 1 Courts have been reluctant to find in the FHA implied rights of action against the federal government for failing in its duties under § 3608 “affirmatively to further the purposes” of the FHA because courts can typically hear such claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). NAACP. v. Sec'y of HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 152 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding no implied right of action and noting “[A federal] statute typically provides that the federal government will enforce the obligations against the nonfederal person. The ‘private right of action’ issue is whether Congress meant to give an injured person a right himself to enforce the federal statute directly against the nonfederal person or whether the injured person can do no more than ask the federal government to enforce the statute.”); Latinos Unidos De Chelsea En Accion (Lucha) v. Sec'y of HUD., 799 F.2d 774, 793 (1st Cir. 1986) (“We therefore hold that a remedy against HUD for failure to comply with section 3608(d) is available only pursuant to the APA.”). Jones v. Off. of Comptroller of Currency, 983 F. Supp. 197, 203 (D.D.C. 1997), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 97-5341, 1998 WL 315581 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 1998) (“This Court also concludes that plaintiff may not assert jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) through an implied private right of action.”). Following the logic of NAACP v. HUD, the D.C. Circuit has found there is no implied private right of action under § 3610 for review of the HUD Secretary’s decision to dismiss a complaint filed with HUD. Godwin v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 356 F.3d 310, 312 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“Given Congress's presumed awareness of the APA's provisions, we believe-in accordance with the holdings of other circuits-that Congress would make explicit any intent to create a cause of action in these circumstances.”). But Plaintiffs’ claim is not brought under § 3608 or § 3610 or any implied right to review the Government’s actions in carrying out its duties under the FHA, but rather as a discriminatory housing practice claim under § 3617 for which the FHA provides an express right of action at § 3613(a)(1)(A). Pls.’ Suppl. at 1–2; see id. at 6 (contrasting Plaintiff’s claim with those brought under implied rights of action). 10  “Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (citation omitted). “The question whether a statute creates a cause of action, either expressly or by implication, is basically a matter of statutory construction.” Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979) (citations omitted). In matters of statutory interpretation, “we begin with the text.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 113 F.4th 943, 948 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). Section 3613(a)(1)(A) of the FHA provides a private right of action for an alleged “discriminatory housing practice”: An aggrieved person may commence a civil action in an appropriate United States district court or State court not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice, or the breach of a conciliation agreement entered into under this subchapter, whichever occurs last, to obtain appropriate relief with respect to such discriminatory housing practice or breach. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). A “[d]iscriminatory housing practice” is defined as “an act that is unlawful under section 3604, 3605, 3606, of 3617 of this title.” Id. § 3602(f). And an “‘[a]ggrieved person’ includes any person who—(1) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i). Thus, a § 3617 interference or retaliation claim—as alleged here—is included as a discriminatory housing practice claim alongside claims of discriminatory sales and rentals (§ 3604), residential real estate-related transactions (§ 3605), and brokerage services (§ 3606) as grounds for a private civil action. See, e.g., Webb v. U.S. Veterans Initiative, 993 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“Any person who claims to have been injured by conduct prohibited by section 3604 is an aggrieved person who may commence a civil action.” (simplified)). 11  Notably, the text of § 3613(a)(1)(A) does not explicitly say whether the federal government is or is not an intended defendant in a private action, and in fact, does not itself mention defendants at all. Plaintiffs argue that, absent an express limitation in the text, they “may use § 3613 to sue any defendant that has plausibly violated § 3617, including the United States.” Pls.’ Suppl. at 6 (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs contrast the FHA’s silence on the status of federal government defendants with § 3607 which exempts “religious organizations and certain private clubs” from certain FHA requirements. Pls.’ Suppl. at 6. They argue that the absence of a similar exemption for the federal government indicates that no such limitation on defendants should be read into the statute. Id. at 7 (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 20 (2001) (“Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.”)). The Government concedes this basic point that § 3613(a) “does not specify the defendants whom the action may be brought against.” Defs.’ Suppl. at 2. The Government looks to other sections of the FHA to argue the federal government is not an intended defendant of a § 3613 action. It argues that the FHA does not contemplate the federal government as a “respondent.” Id. at 2–3. Unlike the private person enforcement section (§ 3613), the HUD Secretary enforcement section (§ 3612) and the Attorney General enforcement section (§ 3614) both mention a “respondent.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612–3614. As relevant here, a respondent is defined as “the person or other entity accused in a complaint of an unfair housing practice.” Id. § 3602(n)(1). A “[p]erson’ includes one or more individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under Title 11, receivers, and fiduciaries.” Id. § 3602(d). The Government argues that neither “person” nor 12 “other entity” in the definition of “respondent” refers to the federal government. Defs.’ Suppl. at 2–3. First, it notes a “person” generally does not include the sovereign. Id. at 3 (citing Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 766 (2000) (noting the “[Supreme] Court's longstanding interpretive presumption that ‘person’ does not include the sovereign”). Then, they correctly point out that typically, when Congress uses a catchall term (like “other entity”) after a list of terms (like entities listed in the definition of “person”), the catchall term is read to include terms similar to those listed. Defs.’ Suppl. at 3; Castaneira v. Noem, 138 F.4th 540, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (“Generally, when Congress defines a broad, final category preceded by an enumerated list of categories, that catchall clause is to be read as bringing within a statute categories similar in type to those specifically enumerated.” (simplified)). Thus, they conclude, the federal government is not an “other entity” contemplated as a respondent because the entities in the definition of “person” are “entirely . . . private and nonfederal actors.” Defs.’ Suppl. at 3. Even assuming the Government’s interpretation of respondent is correct, the argument does not have much force. As previously noted, the term “respondent” is perhaps conspicuously absent from the private enforcement section at issue, though it appears in both public enforcement sections. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612–3614. In fact, the remedies subsection of § 3613 provides for injunctive relief, not as to a “respondent,” but as to an undefined “defendant.” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (“[T]he court . . . may grant as relief, as the court deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order (including an order enjoining the defendant from engaging in such practice or ordering such affirmative action as may be appropriate).”) (emphasis added). 2 The term “defendant” does not appear in either of 2 Section 3613(b) which provides for court appointment of an attorney refers to “a person against whom such a [discriminatory housing] practice is alleged.” Even if “person” in this 13 the public enforcement sections. Id. §§ 3612, 3614. Thus, even if the definition of respondent were a limitation on defendants, in order for it to bar the federal government as a § 3613 defendant, the Court would have to read that limitation into the public enforcement section where it does not appear—and where the statute uses another term instead. See Orozco v. Garland, 60 F.4th 684, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (finding incorporation of “remedies, procedures, and rights” in the Rehabilitation Act did not tacitly incorporate a limitation found elsewhere). The Court sees no reason to do so. For their part, Plaintiffs rely on a memorandum produced by the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) to make two additional textual arguments that the FHA contemplates the federal government as an intended defendant of a § 3613 action. First, they note that one of the discriminatory housing practice sections actionable under § 3613, § 3604 (discriminatory sales and rentals), applies “to dwellings owned or operated by the Federal Government” under § 3603(a)(1)(A). See Authority of USDA to Award Monetary Relief for Discrimination, 18 U.S. Op. O.L.C. 52, 57 (1994) (“It is possible to infer from the fact that § 3603 expressly subjects the United States to the discrimination provisions of § 3604 that Congress intended that the cause of action established by § 3613 would also apply to the United States.”). Second, Plaintiffs argue that the federal government is an intended defendant of a § 3613 action because § 3613(c)(2), which allows a court to award attorney fees and costs, provides that “The United States shall be liable for such fees and costs to the same extent as a private person.” See id. at 58 (“The presence, in a provision authorizing the bringing of suits by private parties, of language indicating that the United States may be liable for attorneys’ fees and costs certainly instance excludes the federal government, that only indicates that the federal government is not entitled to court appointed counsel. 14 indicates a recognition that the United States may be subject to suits under the provision.”). Not necessarily. Section 3613’s provision for attorney fees and costs against the United States does clearly indicate that the federal government is an intended defendant in a § 3613 action. Those attorney fees and costs against the United States could as easily arise from the government’s role as intervenor, a role which § 3613 expressly contemplates for the federal government. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(e) (“Upon timely application, the Attorney General may intervene in such civil action, if the Attorney General certifies that the case is of general public importance.”); Gregory v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 289 F. Supp. 2d 721, 726 (D.S.C. 2003), aff'd, 114 F. App'x 87 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Section 3613(c)(2) only relates to attorney's fees and court costs, not liability costs. These fees and costs could be awarded when the United States intervenes as a plaintiff, as the FHA allows, not necessarily implying that the United States could be a defendant.”); Phifer v. Sec'y of HUD, No. CIV S-08-0299 LKK, 2009 WL 8706810, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV S-08-0299 LKK, 2009 WL 8706811 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2009) (“Section 3613 does not include an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity except as to liability for attorney's fees and costs in the event that the United States Attorney General intervenes and is not a prevailing party.”). The fact that the provision for the United States’s liability appears only in the attorney fees and costs remedies (§ 3613(c)(2)), but not in the monetary and injunctive remedies (§ 3613(c)(1)), tends to support the view that § 3613 envisions the federal government as intervenor, not as defendant. Either way, the provision for attorney’s fees is not a clear indicator of the federal government’s role. And an equivocal indicator is less than a clear limitation, which the plain text does not include. See Orozco, 60 F.4th at 368 (“If Congress had meant also to incorporate Section 794a’s limits on who may sue, Congress would have said so.”). 15  The Government also advances the structural argument that the FHA treats the federal government as “the enforcer of fair-housing rights” under the FHA, “not as . . . subject to suit under it.” Defs.’ Suppl. at 3–4. It notes the FHA “charges the Secretary with receiving, investigation, and prosecuting complaints of discriminatory housing practices . . . and a related provision authorizes the Attorney General to bring civil actions to enforce the Act.” Id. at 4. In that vein, the Government points out that the filing period for a § 3613 action is “largely centered around the status of an administrative proceeding” which an aggrieved person may file with the Secretary under § 3610(a). Defs.’ Suppl. at 2; 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(B). No doubt the FHA treats the Secretary and Attorney General as enforcers. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612, 3614. But it also creates a private right of enforcement which may operate independently of federal government enforcement: an aggrieved person may file a § 3613 action with or without also filing a complaint with the Secretary under certain circumstances. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(3) (“An aggrieved person may commence a civil action under this subsection whether or not a complaint has been filed under section 3610(a) of this title and without regard to the status of any such complaint. . . .”). Even assuming the FHA treats the federal government primarily as enforcer, the statute’s inclusion of an independent private right of action and silence on the intended defendants of that action tend to indicate that the government’s role is not exclusively enforcer. Ultimately, neither the Government’s structural nor textual arguments overcome the fact that the plain text of § 3613(a) includes no limitation on defendants. The D.C. Circuit confronted a similar situation in Orozco, where it found that no “structural or textual feature confine[d] [a Rehabilitation Act] cause of action” to exclude federal employees as plaintiffs. 60 F.4th at 692. It found the statute’s “own definition of qualifying plaintiff”—a definition which did not exclude federal employees—“controls,” meaning federal employees could sue the government as 16 employer. Id. at 689. 3 Likewise here, nothing in the plain text of § 3613 or the defined statutory terms it employs excludes suits against the federal government. Plaintiffs’ position that a § 3613 discriminatory housing practice claim may be brought against the federal government also finds modest support in other courts’ handling of similar FHA claims. A few courts have at least analyzed discriminatory housing practice claims against the federal government that were not viable for other reasons. See, e.g., Sandpiper Residents Ass'n v. HUD, No. CV 20-1783 (RDM), 2022 WL 1604717, at *14–*16 (D.D.C. May 21, 2022), aff'd on other grounds, 106 F.4th 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (finding § 3604-based claim against HUD for injunctive relief for failing to provide housing vouchers was not barred by sovereign immunity, but dismissing as moot); Jones v. Off. of Comptroller of Currency, 983 F. Supp. 197, 202 (D.D.C. 1997), aff'd summarily sub nom. Jones v. Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 97-5341, 1998 WL 315581 (D.C. Cir. May 12, 1998) (finding the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency was not a provisioner of housing subject to § 3604 such that “plaintiff [could] not proceed against the OCC under 42. U.S.C. § 3613”); Peet v. Sidney, No. 17-CV-1870 (ECT/TNL), 2019 WL 542939, at *3–*4 (D. Minn. Jan. 24, 2019), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Peet v. Smith, No. 17-CV-1870 (ECT/TNL), 2019 WL 699962 (D. Minn. Feb. 20, 2019) (recommending § 3604- and § 3617-based monetary claims against HUD defendants be dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds, but recommending that injunctive claims against HUD defendants, though not barred by sovereign immunity, be dismissed as untimely). 3 In so holding, the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument that such a cause of action would be foreclosed because “any ambiguity” must be construed “against waiver” of sovereign immunity. 60 F.4th at 691–92. First, it noted that the there was no ambiguity because the plain text of the statute did not incorporate the government’s suggested limitation on plaintiffs. And second, it found that the APA supplied the necessary unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity even though the claim was not brought under the APA. 17  Relatedly, Plaintiffs’ sovereign immunity does not bar Plaintiffs’ particular claims. “It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (citations omitted). “A party bringing suit against the United States bears the burden of proving that the government has unequivocally waived its immunity.” Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs have met that burden for the relief they request. Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief as well as “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” Compl. at 36. First, as to the injunctive and declaratory relief, the FHA does not contain a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity. See Boyd v. Browner, 897 F. Supp. 590, 595 (D.D.C. 1995), aff'd, 107 F.3d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Because the Fair Housing Act does not ‘unambiguously waive’ the government's sovereign immunity defense, plaintiffs may not have a monetary recovery.”). However, Plaintiffs do not rely on the FHA for waiver of sovereign immunity for the non-monetary relief they seek, nor do they need to. Section 702 of the APA waives sovereign immunity in “[a]n action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages” when the claim is against “an agency or an officer or employee” of the United States for “act[ing] or fail[ing] to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. This waiver applies regardless of whether the claim is made under the APA or another statute. Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 456 F.3d 178, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“We have previously, and repeatedly . . . expressly h[eld] that the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity applies to any suit whether under the APA or not. . . . There is nothing in the language of the second sentence of § 702 that restricts its waiver to suits brought under the APA. The 18 sentence waives sovereign immunity for an action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages, not for an action brought under the APA.” (simplified)). Therefore, sovereign immunity is waived as to Plaintiffs’ non-monetary claims. Second, § 3613 of the FHA, under which Plaintiffs bring this action, provides an express waiver of immunity for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (“In a civil action under subsection (a), the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee and costs. The United States shall be liable for such fees and costs to the same extent as a private person.”). The Court therefore concludes that sovereign immunity does not bar Plaintiffs’ claims. B. The CSRA Does Not Preclude Plaintiffs’ FHA Claim. Although no court in this Circuit has addressed whether the CSRA preclud