Full Opinion

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS No. 20-AA-0759 ALICIA ECKENRODE, PETITIONER, V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA POLICE AND FIREFIGHTERS RETIREMENT AND RELIEF BOARD, RESPONDENT. Petition for Review from the District of Columbia Police and Firefighters Retirement and Relief Board (PD20-1111) (Argued March 9, 2023 Decided July 16, 2026) Paul A. Fenn for petitioner. Alexandra Lichtenstein, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent. Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia at the time, Loren L. AliKhan, Solicitor General at the time, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Graham E. Phillips, Deputy Solicitor General, Megan D. Browder, Assistant Attorney General at the time, and Marcella Coburn, Assistant Attorney General, were on the briefs for respondent. Before EASTERLY and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and RUIZ, Senior Judge. Opinion for the court PER CURIAM. Dissenting opinion by Senior Judge RUIZ at page 26. 2 PER CURIAM: Petitioner Alicia Eckenrode seeks review of the denial of her request for enhanced survivor benefits after the death of her husband, who was a Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Sergeant. We hold that we lack jurisdiction, and we therefore dismiss the petition for review. I. Factual and Procedural Background Except as noted, the following appears to be undisputed. Sergeant Eckenrode was an MPD officer for over twenty years. In 2006, he injured his left knee while on duty. He underwent two knee surgeries as a result of that injury. In 2019, his left knee buckled while on duty. He underwent a third knee surgery in September 2019. Shortly thereafter, he felt pain in his left leg that was diagnosed as having been caused by deep vein thrombosis, i.e., a blood clot in a vein in his leg. Deep vein thrombosis can be caused by leg surgery. Sergeant Eckenrode received treatment, and he was informed in January 2020 that his deep vein thrombosis had resolved. In March 2020, Sergeant Eckenrode felt pain in his right calf. That pain was diagnosed as being caused by a slight muscle tear. The pain was gone by April 1, 2020. 3 On April 6, 2020, Sergeant Eckenrode, while on duty, suddenly was short of breath and felt chest pain. He was taken to the hospital, where he passed away approximately three hours later. The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner conducted an autopsy and determined that Sergeant Eckenrode’s death was caused by a pulmonary embolus, i.e., a blood clot in the lungs, due to deep vein thrombosis. Pulmonary embolism is a rare complication of deep vein thrombosis. The autopsy listed hypertensive cardiovascular disease (i.e., chronic high blood pressure) and hepatic steatosis (i.e., fatty liver disease) as “other significant conditions.” The autopsy stated that the manner of death was “NATURAL.” The director of the Police and Fire Clinic concluded that Sergeant Eckenrode’s death was in the line of duty. Respondent, the District of Columbia Police and Firefighters Retirement and Relief Board (Board), awarded Ms. Eckenrode a survivor annuity pursuant to D.C. Code § 5-716(b) (providing for annuity of 40% of officer’s pay). MPD then asked the Board to determine whether Ms. Eckenrode was instead entitled to enhanced survivor benefits pursuant to D.C. Code § 5-716(a). Such benefits are given to an eligible surviving spouse if an officer “dies in the performance of duty” and the death “was the sole and direct result of a personal injury sustained while performing such 4 duty.” D.C. Code § 5-716(a)(1)(A). Enhanced survivor benefits consist of a $50,000 lump-sum payment and an annuity equal to the full amount of the officer’s pay at the time of death. D.C. Code § 5-716(a)(2), (a-1). To be eligible for enhanced survivor benefits, the surviving spouse must have received more than half of the survivor’s support from the officer. D.C. Code § 5-716(a)(2). After obtaining additional medical records, the Board issued an order determining that Ms. Eckenrode was not entitled to enhanced survivor benefits. The Board concluded that there was insufficient evidence that Sergeant Eckenrode’s death was the sole and direct result of his knee injury. In support of that conclusion, the Board reasoned, among other things, that (1) death is a “sole and direct result” of an injury only if there are no “intervening factors”; (2) although a doctor at the Police and Fire Clinic opined that Sergeant Eckenrode’s death was more likely than not a complication of Sergeant Eckenrode’s knee injury, the Board determined that the autopsy report and the conclusions of the deputy medical examiner who conducted the autopsy were “particularly important”; and (3) the deputy medical examiner did not believe that Sergeant Eckenrode’s death was the sole and direct result of the knee injury because there were several other contributing factors—heart disease, “fatty liver,” and that Sergeant Eckenrode was fairly sedentary after his most recent knee surgery. 5 Ms. Eckenrode sought reconsideration and provided additional medical records. The Board denied reconsideration. II. Analysis Ms. Eckenrode seeks direct review in this court of the Board’s denial of enhanced survivor’s benefits. We hold that we lack jurisdiction. Under the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, this court has direct jurisdiction to review agency action only in a “contested case.” D.C. Code § 2-510(a). A proceeding is a contested case if a party to the proceeding is entitled by law to an administrative “adjudicative, trial-type hearing to determine the party’s legal rights, duties, or privileges.” Farrell v. D.C. Police & Firefighters Ret. & Relief Bd., 151 A.3d 490, 492 (D.C. 2017) (citation modified); see also D.C. Code § 2-502(8) (generally defining “contested case” as “a proceeding before the Mayor or any agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by any law . . . or by constitutional right, to be determined after a hearing before the Mayor or before an agency”). If an administrative decision is not reviewable directly in this court, then review, unless precluded altogether, is available in the first instance in the Superior Court. See, e.g., Nunnally v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep’t, 80 A.3d 1004, 1008 (D.C. 2013) (“[I]f a claim falls outside of the definition of a contested case, any party aggrieved by an agency’s decision may 6 initiate an appropriate equitable action in the Superior Court to seek redress.”) (citation modified). “[A] trial-type hearing is one that incorporates due-process protections such as representation by counsel, cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and fact-finding by an impartial adjudicator.” Mathis v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 124 A.3d 1089, 1099 (D.C. 2015) (citation modified). “The right to obtain pre-hearing discovery, and to make opening and closing arguments[,] are other accoutrements of a trial-type hearing.” Id. (citation modified). Although survivor-benefit proceedings before the Board are adjudicative, we have already held that persons seeking survivor benefits do not have a statutory or regulatory right to a trial-type hearing before the Board. Farrell, 151 A.3d at 492-96. Whether we have jurisdiction to directly review the Board’s decision in this case thus turns on whether Ms. Eckenrode has a constitutional right to a trial-type hearing before the Board. We hold that she does not. Ms. Eckenrode argues that (1) she has a protected property interest in receiving enhanced survivor benefits, (2) she therefore has a constitutional right to due process with respect to the Board’s determination of her claim, and (3) due process entitles her to a trial-type hearing before the Board. The Board appropriately does not dispute that Ms. Eckenrode has a protected property interest in the enhanced 7 survivor benefits that she seeks and that she therefore is constitutionally entitled to due process before the Board. See, e.g., Baltimore v. District of Columbia, 10 A.3d 1141, 1154 (D.C. 2011) (“To have a [constitutionally protected] property interest in a government benefit, a person clearly must . . . have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Entitlements derive from an independent source such as state law, i.e., statutes or regulations that secure certain benefits and that support claims or entitlements to those benefits.”) (citation modified); D.C. Code § 5-716(a) & (a-1) (providing that survivor “shall” receive enhanced survivor benefits if statutory requirements are met); cf. Jackson v. D.C. Police & Firefighters Ret. & Relief Bd., 717 A.2d 904, 906-07 (D.C. 1998) (for purposes of interpreting separation agreement, finding that survivor had property interest in annuity because survivor was “automatically . . . entitled to annuity benefits” “upon the happening of a contingency”). We thus must decide whether Ms. Eckenrode was constitutionally entitled to a trial-type hearing before the Board decided her claim of entitlement to enhanced survivor benefits. See generally, e.g., Richard Milburn Pub. Charter Alt. High Sch. v. Cafritz, 798 A.2d 531, 541 (D.C. 2002) (“[I]f [constitutionally] protected interests are at issue, we must then determine what procedures are required to satisfy due process.”). “Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). To 8 determine what procedural protections are constitutionally required we must balance: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). “The ordinary principle, established by Supreme Court decisions, [is] that something less than a trial-type hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.” Donnelly Assocs. v. D.C. Hist. Pres. Rev. Bd., 520 A.2d 270, 279 (D.C. 1987) (citation modified; quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343); see also, e.g., Rones v. D.C. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., 500 A.2d 998, 1001 (D.C. 1985) (“A trial-type hearing is rarely required prior to the termination of governmental benefits. All that is required is the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner.”) (citation modified). “The burden is on petitioner to persuade us to depart from” that ordinary principle. Donnelly, 520 A.2d at 279. We conclude that Ms. Eckenrode has failed to demonstrate that she had a constitutional right to a trial-type hearing before the Board ruled as to whether she was entitled to enhanced survivor benefits. 9 A. The Private Interest As a threshold matter, we note that in assessing the private interest for purposes of determining what process is constitutionally due, we must focus generally on the class of people as to whom such determinations would be made, not on a given claimant. See, e.g., Donnelly, 520 A.2d at 282 (“The Mathews v. Eldridge test . . . is applied to the generality of cases; the fundamental fairness of a particular procedure does not turn on the result obtained in any individual case.”) (citation modified). We therefore consider the private interest of the general class of persons seeking enhanced survivor benefits, not the private interest of Ms. Eckenrode in particular given her circumstances. See id. Persons seeking an enhanced survivor benefit will have already received an annuity of forty percent of their spouse’s salary, although the precise way of calculating the relevant salary varies. D.C. Code § 5-716(b). At issue will be whether they are entitled instead to a lump sum of $50,000 and full replacement of their spouse’s salary. D.C. Code § 5-716(a)(2), (a-1). The interest in obtaining enhanced survivor benefits thus is substantial. We conclude, however, that Ms. Eckenrode has not demonstrated that it is the type of interest that constitutionally requires a predetermination trial-type hearing. 10 “In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), has the [Supreme] Court required a full adversarial evidentiary hearing prior to adverse governmental action.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545 (1985). Goldberg involved a decision to cut off public-assistance benefits. 397 U.S. at 255. In holding that a pretermination evidentiary hearing was required, the Supreme Court emphasized that, “For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care.” Id. at 264. The Court explained that the “crucial factor in this context” was that “termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while [the recipient] waits.” Id. As the Court further explained, that factor is “not present in the case of the blacklisted government contractor, the discharged government employee, the taxpayer denied a tax exemption, or virtually anyone else whose governmental entitlements are ended.” Id. This court has also only once held that due process required a predetermination trial-type hearing. Powell v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 818 A.2d 188 (D.C. 2003). Powell involved termination of housing subsidies under a public housing program “designed to assist lower income families in obtaining the necessities of life.” Id. at 194. We concluded that permanent termination from the program based on an allegation of fraud required a pretermination trial-type hearing. Id. at 194-96. 11 No showing has been made in this case that the Board’s decision to deny applications for enhanced survivor benefits typically would present a risk that applicants would be unable to obtain the necessities of life during the pendency of a post-determination challenge to the denial. To the contrary, eligibility for enhanced survivor benefits is not limited to persons whose access to the necessities of life is at stake. An applicant with substantial assets (such as equity in a home or investment principal) would apparently be eligible, as long as the applicant received more than half of the applicant’s “support” from the officer. D.C. Code § 5-716(a)(2), (a-1); cf., e.g., In re Marriage of Pearlstein, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 910, 919 (Ct. App. 2006) (distinguishing between “support payments,” which “usually are paid from present earnings,” and assets such as equity in home or investment principal). Moreover, eligibility does not depend on whether the officer’s “support” was based solely on the officer’s salary. D.C. Code § 5-716(a)(2) (referring generally to amount of support from officer, with no limitation as to source of support). Thus, an officer’s support could be based in part on other sources of income that would survive the officer’s death (e.g., income from a rental property). In other words, an applicant could theoretically be eligible even if the officer’s salary contributed less than half of the overall support the officer had provided to the applicant. On the other hand, the worst-case scenario would be an applicant who had no assets and no income other than the officer’s salary. In such a case, a standard 12 forty-percent annuity would be a very substantial reduction in household income. It is certainly at least possible that in some instances such a reduction could create concerns about an applicant’s ability to maintain access to the necessities of life while awaiting resolution of a judicial challenge to the Board’s determination. As previously noted, however, we must assess the nature of the private interest at stake by considering “the generality of cases,” not a worst-case scenario. Donnelly, 520 A.2d at 282. We do not minimize the significance of enhanced survivor benefits to surviving spouses. We also acknowledge this court’s statement in dicta that although “full procedural protections” have been constitutionally required before “adverse administrative action” that deprives people of “the very means by which to live, . . . we do not say that [such] extreme adverse consequences must always be present.” Donnelly, 520 A.2d at 282 (citation modified). We therefore turn to the decisions of the Supreme Court, this court, and other courts addressing the private interest of persons who seem comparably situated to applicants for enhanced survivor benefits. Those decisions consistently hold that the private interests at issue did not suffice to confer a constitutional right to a predetermination trial-type hearing. 13 For example, in Mathews, the Supreme Court held that a person whose social-security disability benefits were terminated did not have a right to a pretermination evidentiary hearing. 424 U.S. at 349. In assessing the private interest at issue, the Supreme Court explained that eligibility for social-security disability benefits is “not based upon financial need” and instead is wholly unrelated to the worker’s income or support from many other sources, such as earnings of other family members, [workers’] compensation awards, tort claims awards, savings, private insurance, public or private pensions, veterans’ benefits, food stamps, public assistance, or the many other important programs, both public and private, which contain provisions for disability payments affecting a substantial portion of the work force. Id. at 341 (citation modified). The Court in Mathews therefore concluded that the potential deprivation as a result of the termination of social-security disability benefits was “generally likely to be less than” the loss of welfare benefits in Goldberg. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341. The Court acknowledged that persons are eligible for social-security disability benefits only if they are “unable to engage in substantial gainful activity.” Id. (citation modified). Thus, even temporary loss of disability benefits could impose significant “hardship . . . upon the erroneously terminated disability recipient.” Id. at 342. The Court emphasized, however, both the possibility of “access to private resources” and the availability of alternate forms of government assistance if “the termination of disability benefits places a worker or his family below the subsistence 14 level.” Id. The Court concluded, “In view of these potential sources of temporary income, there is less reason here than in Goldberg to depart from the ordinary principle, established by our decisions, that something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.” Id. at 343. The disability benefit at issue in Mathews differs in several respects from the enhanced survivor benefits at issue in the present case. For example, unlike social-security disability benefits, eligibility for enhanced survivor benefits is not wholly unrelated to income, given the requirement that the applicant have received more than half of the applicant’s support from the officer. D.C. Code § 5-716(a)(2). On the other hand, to be eligible for social-security disability benefits, the claimant must be unable to supplement income through “substantial gainful activity,” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341 (citation modified), whereas there is no requirement that an applicant for enhanced survivor benefits be unable to supplement the lost income from the officer by increasing the applicant’s income through other means. Moreover, for reasons already noted, Ms. Eckenrode has failed to show that the Board’s denial of enhanced survivor benefits is likely to deprive applicants of the necessities of life pending review of the Board’s decision. On balance, we conclude that the reasoning and holding of Mathews point strongly against the claim that applicants for enhanced survivor benefits have a constitutional right to a trial-type hearing before the Board decides on their applications. 15 Other Supreme Court cases and cases from this court also point against the conclusion that applicants for enhanced survivor benefits have a private interest of the kind that constitutionally requires a predetermination trial-type hearing. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 333 (1985) (holding that veterans applying for service-connected death or disability benefits do not have due-process right to be represented by counsel; veterans’ interests are “more akin to the Social Security benefits involved in Mathews than they are to the welfare payments upon which the recipients in Goldberg depended for their daily subsistence”); Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545 (holding that full evidentiary hearing not required before government employee is terminated; distinguishing Goldberg); Walker v. D.C. Off. of Emp. Appeals, 310 A.3d 597, 604 (D.C. 2024) (same; “While termination of employment undeniably has a profound effect on someone’s life, the Supreme Court’s decision in Goldberg was focused on the distinct and dire situation that someone reliant on public benefits, by definition low-income and often already without employment, would face if those benefits were unjustly terminated, and the Court specifically distinguished this scenario from that of the discharged government employee . . . .”) (citation modified); District of Columbia v. Jones, 442 A.2d 512, 523 (D.C. 1982) (holding that police officer injured in line of duty was not constitutionally entitled to call witnesses and to cross-examine government witnesses with respect to determination of claim for paid sick leave). 16 Cases from other jurisdictions overwhelmingly support the conclusion that applicants for enhanced survivor benefits do not have a private interest of the kind that constitutionally requires a predetermination trial-type hearing. Most directly on point are decisions involving police or firefighter disability determinations. See, e.g., McDarby v. Dinkins, 907 F.2d 1334, 1337-39 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that police officer seeking enhanced accident-disability benefits did not have constitutional due-process right to predetermination trial-type hearing; citing cases); Rosenthal v. Bd. of Trs. of N.Y.C. Police Pension Fund, 999 F. Supp. 498, 504-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that police officer seeking enhanced disability benefits was not constitutionally entitled to predetermination trial-type hearing; although officer had “a property interest in receiving a higher monetary pension, this interest is far less compelling than that of an individual denied by government action the very means by which to live”) (citation modified). Many courts have reached the same conclusion with respect to other administrative decisions that cause loss of income or denial of government benefits intended to compensate for loss of income. See, e.g., Pagan v. Carey Wiping Materials Corp., 73 A.3d 784, 790-91 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (holding that workers’ compensation benefits could be terminated without predetermination evidentiary hearing; “Although there is little possibility that an injured worker will be able to find even temporary employment to ameliorate the interim loss, a claimant may have 17 other resources to sustain [the claimant] during the post-termination period or may qualify for public assistance.”) (citation modified); Sauceda v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 917 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that worker’s compensation benefits could be suspended without pre-suspension evidentiary hearing; “[A]ppellants’ desire for uninterrupted disability payments pending final administrative decision on their cases[] does not require an evidentiary hearing prior to suspension. While this interest may, in some cases, be significant, disability claimants do not necessarily live on the very margin of subsistence.”) (citation modified); Campo v. N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that spouse of government employee did not have due-process right to agency evidentiary hearing relating to employee’s retirement benefits, given that spouse had right of judicial review); Basciano v. Herkimer, 605 F.2d 605, 609-11 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that public employee seeking accident-disability retirement benefit did not have constitutional due-process right to predetermination trial-type hearing; “While [the employee] had a substantial interest in the outcome of the proceeding, his interest was less compelling than that of an individual denied by government action the very means by which to live . . . .”) (citation modified); Graves v. Meystrik, 425 F. Supp. 40, 48 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (holding that unemployment-compensation claim could be denied without predetermination evidentiary hearing; “Neither the termination of disability benefits in Mathews nor 18 the termination of unemployment benefits in the case at bar would deprive a claimant of the very means by which to live while [the claimant] waits for a post-termination evidentiary hearing. Here, as in the case of disability benefits, there is a possibility of access to private resources[,] and[] other forms of government assistance will become available where the termination of disability benefits places a worker or [the worker’s] family below the subsistence level. Further, eligibility for welfare benefits is based on financial need, but eligibility for unemployment benefits [is] not. An individual could have $1,000,000 in a savings account and nonetheless be entitled to unemployment benefits.”). In sum, we conclude that the private interest of applicants for enhanced survivor benefits, although clearly substantial, is not of a nature so as to constitutionally require a predetermination trial-type hearing before the Board. B. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation/Additional Procedural Safeguards To decide on an application for enhanced survivor benefits, the Board must determine several issues: whether the officer suffered an injury while performing the officer’s duties, whether the officer’s death “was the sole and direct result of” that injury, and whether the claimant received more than half of the claimant’s support from the officer. D.C. Code § 5-716(a), (a-1). We take as a given that a trial-type hearing would reduce the risk that the Board would resolve those issues incorrectly. 19 In determining whether the absence of a trial-type hearing before the Board creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk of erroneous deprivation, however, we must consider the availability of post-determination judicial review. See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 (in concluding that disability claimant was not entitled to pretermination trial-type hearing before agency, Court relies in part on availability of “subsequent judicial review”); Burkhardt v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm’n, 198 A.3d 183, 192 (D.C. 2018) (in holding that tenants are not entitled to trial-type hearings before Rent Administrator’s determination of temporary-eviction applications, court relies on availability of judicial remedies); Campo, 843 F.2d at 100 (in holding that spouse of government employee did not have due-process right to agency evidentiary hearing relating to employee’s retirement benefits, court relies in part on spouse’s right of judicial review); Rosenthal, 999 F. Supp. at 506 (in holding that police officer seeking enhanced disability benefits was not constitutionally entitled to predetermination trial-type hearing, court relies in part on availability of meaningful post-determination judicial review); cf., e.g., Cloutier v. Town of Epping, 714 F.2d 1184, 1192 (1st Cir. 1983) (in context of denial of development permit, court holds that “prompt, informal proceedings . . . coupled with the judicial review provided by the state courts satisfied the requirements of the due process clause”). As noted earlier, supra at 5-6, if applications for enhanced survivor benefits are not contested cases, then applicants whose claims are denied by the Board have 20 the right to seek judicial review in the Superior Court. See, e.g., Nunnally, 80 A.3d at 1008. Given the availability of judicial review, we conclude that concerns about the risk of an erroneous determination do not require that the Board provide a trial-type proceeding before deciding claims for enhanced survivor benefits. That was the conclusion of the cases we have just cited in their various contexts, and we see no adequate basis for reaching a different conclusion in the present case. In reaching this conclusion, we express no view on two related issues. First, we have no occasion to decide whether the procedural rights afforded by the Board are constitutionally adequate in all respects. We decide only that the Due Process Clause does not compel the Board to provide applicants for enhanced survivor benefits with a trial-type hearing. Given our conclusion that this is not a contested case, we lack jurisdiction to address any claim that the procedures before the Board otherwise fell short of what the Due Process Clause requires. If such a claim is to be raised, it would need to be presented first to the Superior Court. Second, we have no occasion to decide what procedural protections applicants for enhanced survivor benefits are entitled to in Superior Court. For current purposes, we can assume without deciding that the Due Process Clause entitles applicants for enhanced survivor benefits to a trial-type hearing as part of post-determination judicial review in Superior Court. If that is the case, then the 21 Superior Court will necessarily provide such a hearing, which is something that the Superior Court is obviously well suited to provide given that it is a trial court. “We therefore can leave for another day,” and in the first instance for another court, “the question of precisely what protections the Due Process Clause requires in an action” in Superior Court seeking judicial review of a decision by the Board denying an application for enhanced survivor benefits. Burkhardt, 198 A.3d at 191. C. Governmental Interest Although the Board argues that it would be burdensome to require the Board to conduct trial-type hearings before deciding applications for enhanced survivor benefits, we are skeptical of that argument. The Board already provides such hearings to certain applicants for benefits. See Farrell, 151 A.3d at 493; 7 D.C.M.R. § 2505. It appears to be undisputed that the number of applications for enhanced survivor benefits would likely be rather small. We do not view this factor as favoring the Board. D. Balancing Although we do not believe that a heavy administrative burden would be imposed if the Board provided trial-type hearings to applicants for enhanced survivor benefits, we conclude that the Due Process Clause does not require the 22 Board to provide such hearings. Applicants’ interest in obtaining enhanced survivor benefits, though substantial, is not the kind of immediately critical interest that constitutionally mandates a predetermination trial-type hearing. Rather, as the cases we have cited have held, administrative determination of such interests can permissibly rest on less formal procedures subject to subsequent judicial review, including post-determination trial-type hearings if those are constitutionally required. In other words, we hold that this case is governed by “the ordinary principle . . . that something less than a trial-type hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.” Donnelly, 520 A.2d at 279 (citation modified). We therefore conclude that this is not a contested case and that we lack jurisdiction to directly review the order of the Board. Ms. Eckenrode instead must seek review in the Superior Court in the first instance. We note that the Board’s regulations incorrectly directed Ms. Eckenrode to seek review in this court. 7 D.C.M.R. § 2529.2. The Board therefore appropriately acknowledges that it would be impermissible for the Board to argue that Ms. Eckenrode is time-barred from seeking review in Superior Court. See Farrell, 151 A.3d at 496 (noting similar acknowledgment). 23 E. Response to the Dissenting Opinion 1. The dissenting opinion accurately notes that the availability of post-determination judicial review was not raised in the Board’s brief. Post at 30 n.1. As the dissenting opinion elsewhere acknowledges, id. at 26, however, we have a sua sponte duty to determine our jurisdiction. See, e.g., Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 596 U.S. 199, 203 (2022) (“Jurisdictional requirements cannot be waived or forfeited [and] must be raised by courts sua sponte . . . .”). The dissenting opinion also notes that we have not asked for supplemental briefing on the significance of post-determination judicial review. Post at 30 n.1. We see no reason to ask for supplemental briefing on that point. When the point was raised at oral argument, counsel for Ms. Eckenrode acknowledged that it was her burden to show that she had a right to a predetermination trial-type hearing, relied on cases cited in her supplemental brief in support of her argument, did not object that the point had not been properly raised, and did not request supplemental briefing. 2. The dissenting opinion takes the view that the Superior Court would be required by existing law to conduct only limited judicial review of the Board’s decision. Post at 30-31 & n.2. That suggestion is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, if the Due Process Clause entitles Ms. Eckenrode to more robust judicial 24 review of the Board’s action, then the non-constitutional principles that the dissenting opinion relies upon would have to yield to the requirements of the Constitution. Second, as we have already noted, the Superior Court is obviously well suited to provide whatever process the Due Process Clause requires, given that it is a trial court. Third, it is less clear than the dissenting opinion suggests that the Superior Court’s review of agency decisions must always be limited to the type of review that is given to agency action in contested cases under the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, D.C. Code § 2-501 et seq. See, e.g., Am. Univ. in Dubai v. D.C. Educ. Licensure Comm’n, 930 A.2d 200, 204 (D.C. 2007) (plaintiff filed declaratory-judgment action one year after agency action and parties conducted discovery before court granted summary judgment); see generally District of Columbia v. Sierra Club, 670 A.2d 354, 359 (D.C. 1996) (“The availability of review by this court of agency decisions in contested cases—those in which trial-type proceedings are required at the agency level—does not preclude judicial review in other matters, because any party aggrieved by an agency’s decision may initiate an appropriate equitable action in the Superior Court to seek redress.”) (citation modified). 3. The dissenting opinion criticizes the opinion for the court for failing to lay out precisely what form of post-determination judicial review Ms. Eckenrode is entitled to in the Superior Court. Post at 30. Our failure to be more specific, however, 25 is dictated by our conclusion that we lack jurisdiction over this case. Given that conclusion, it is impermissible for us at this time to express views about what Ms. Eckenrode’s rights are in the Superior Court. See, e.g., Builta v. Guzman, 324 A.3d 269, 293 (D.C. 2024) (“Lacking jurisdiction, we must refrain from addressing the merits . . . .”). That question would have to be decided in the first instance by the Superior Court, which would have jurisdiction over the case. Of course, this court would have appellate jurisdiction to address the question if a party appealed the ruling of the Superior Court. 4. The dissenting opinion states that enhanced-survivor benefits are “conditioned on a showing of financial need.” Post at 33-34. We disagree. Eligibility for enhanced survivor benefits is conditioned on several things, one of which is that the decedent’s salary constituted more than half of the applicant’s “support.” D.C. Code § 5-716(a)(2). As we have explained, supra at 11-12, showing a diminution in support does not necessarily establish financial need. 5. Finally, we note that the dissent does not cite a single case holding that a claimant seeking comparable government benefits was entitled under the Due Process Clause to a predetermination trial-type hearing. To the contrary, numerous decisions have held that claimants seeking similar government benefits intended to 26 address loss of income were not entitled to a predetermination trial-type hearing. See supra at 13-22. For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Ms. Eckenrode’s petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. So ordered. 27 RUIZ, Senior Judge, dissenting: I find myself unable to join the majority opinion which, in my view, proceeds from a flawed analytical framework that upends this court’s obligation to determine and exercise its jurisdiction and misapplies Supreme Court precedent. This case concerns one of the legal system’s foundational underpinnings, which is that courts must assure