Cuyler v. Freedom Mortgage Corporation
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJune 5, 2026
Docket2D2025-2101
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
JAMES M. CUYLER,
Appellant,
v.
FREEDOM MORTGAGE
CORPORATION,
Appellee.
No. 2D2025-2101
June 5, 2026
Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for
Hillsborough County; Helene Daniel, Judge.
James M. Cuyler, pro se.
Gavin MacMillan of Brock & Scott, PLLC, Winston Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
MORRIS, Judge.
James M. Cuyler appeals four nonfinal orders entered in a
mortgage foreclosure action filed against him by Freedom Mortgage
Corporation. We dismiss the appeal for the reasons explained below.
Cuyler first appeals an order dismissing without prejudice his
counterclaim for fraud with leave to file an amended counterclaim within
ten days. "Generally, when an order dismisses a complaint 'without
prejudice,' that language signifies that the order is not a final order." Al-
Hakim v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 161 So. 3d 568, 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
"An exception to this general rule arises when a dismissal is without
prejudice but when it is clear from the context that the plaintiff's right to
pursue the case requires the filing of a completely new case." Id. (citing
Philip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice ยง 23.2 (2013)); accord U.S.
Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Rodriguez, 206 So. 3d 734, 736 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
("If a dismissal is 'without prejudice' but it is clear from the context of the
record that the plaintiff's right to pursue the case requires the filing of a
new case, the order is final."). The dismissal here is without prejudice
and does not require Cuyler to file a new case. Therefore, the order is
nonfinal. And the order does not fall within the category of nonfinal
orders appealable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3).
See Keck v. Eminisor, 104 So. 3d 359, 363-64 (Fla. 2012) ("Generally, an
appellate court may not review interlocutory orders unless the order falls
within the ambit of non-final orders appealable to a district court as set
forth in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130.").
Cuyler next appeals an order granting Freedom's motion to dismiss
Cuyler's request for punitive damages, finding that Cuyler failed to
comply with section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes (2025), and failed to
obtain leave of court to seek punitive damages. Orders that "grant or
deny a motion for leave to amend to assert a claim for punitive damages"
are nonfinal orders that are subject to interlocutory appeal under rule
9.130(a)(3)(G). There is no indication that Cuyler filed a motion for leave
to amend to assert a claim for punitive damages, as contemplated by rule
9.130(a)(3)(G) and as required by section 768.72. See ยง 768.72(1) ("In
any civil action, no claim for punitive damages shall be permitted unless
there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by
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the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such
damages. The claimant may move to amend her or his complaint to
assert a claim for punitive damages as allowed by the rules of civil
procedure.").
Last, Cuyler appeals an order on Freedom's motion for extension of
time and an order granting Freedom's motion to strike Cuyler's jury trial
demand. These orders are nonfinal orders and do not fall within the list
of appealable nonfinal orders in rule 9.130(a)(3).
Dismissed.
SILBERMAN and BLACK, JJ., Concur.
Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
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