Full Opinion

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A26-1426 Elvin Smith, et al., Relators, vs. Iona Township Board of Supervisors, Respondent. Filed October 26, 2026 Motion granted; appeal dismissed Frisch, Chief Judge Iona Township Board of Supervisors Gregory F. Donahue, Swenson Lervick Syverson Trosvig Jacobson Cass Donahue Spangrud, P.A., Alexandria, Minnesota (for relators) Scott A. Witty, Jesse W. Smith, Hanft Fride, P.A., Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent) Considered and decided by Frisch, Chief Judge; Harris, Judge; and Rasmusson, Judge. SYLLABUS A decision of a town board under Minn. Stat. § 164.07 (2024) denying a petition to vacate a public road segment is not a quasi-judicial decision reviewable by petition for a writ of certiorari under Minn. Stat. § 606.01 (2024). SPECIAL TERM OPINION FRISCH, Chief Judge Relators Elvin Smith and June Smith filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to seek review of a July 13, 2026 decision of respondent Iona Township Board of Supervisors denying their petition to vacate a public road segment. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Relators filed a response opposing the motion. Respondent filed a reply. On October 1, 2026, we filed a special term order dismissing the appeal, with an opinion to follow. We now explain that we dismiss this appeal because respondent’s decision denying relators’ petition to vacate the public road segment is not a quasi-judicial decision that is reviewable by petitioning for a writ of certiorari. DECISION A party may seek review of a local government unit’s quasi-judicial decision for which no other avenue of judicial review is available by petitioning for a writ of certiorari under Minn. Stat. § 606.01. In re Haymes, 444 N.W.2d 257, 259 (Minn. 1989); Lam v. City of St. Paul, 714 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Minn. App. 2006). “Certiorari is an ‘extraordinary remedy’ only available to review judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and actions; conversely, it is not available to review legislative or administrative actions.” Minn. Ctr. for Env’t Advocacy v. Metro. Council, 587 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Minn. 1999) (MCEA) (quoting Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409, 414 (Minn. 1981)). In moving to dismiss, respondent contends that the decision denying relators’ petition to vacate the public road segment is not appealable by writ of certiorari because it is not a quasi-judicial decision. Respondent argues that relators can obtain review of respondent’s denial of the petition to vacate the public road segment “by declaratory judgment action in district court.” Respondent relies on Rolf v. Town of Hancock, 208 N.W. 757, 757-58 (Minn. 1926), in support of its argument. 2 Relators contend that the township’s decision denying their petition to vacate the public road segment is appealable to this court by writ of certiorari because it is a quasi- judicial decision. Relators assert that the supreme court has clarified that “certiorari is the appropriate method to appeal the vacation of public streets.” In support of their argument, relators rely on Beck v. Council of City of St. Paul, 50 N.W.2d 81, 82 (Minn. 1951), and County of Washington v. City of Oak Park Heights, 818 N.W.2d 533, 539-40 (Minn. 2012). Appellate decisions are not authority on the issue of appealability if “the issue of appealability was never raised or called to the attention of the [appellate] court.” Chapman v. Dorsey, 41 N.W.2d 438, 443 (Minn. 1950). We thus must determine whether the cases cited by the parties directly address the jurisdictional issue of whether a town board’s decision on a petition to vacate a public road segment is a quasi-judicial decision reviewable by petition for a writ of certiorari. Rolf involved an appeal to district court of a town board’s decision vacating a highway, and the issue of whether an appellate court would have jurisdiction over a certiorari appeal of that decision was not presented to the supreme court in that case. See 208 N.W. at 757-58. Beck was a certiorari appeal of a city’s resolution vacating a road. 50 N.W.2d at 81. The supreme court stated that “certiorari lies to review the quasi-judicial acts and proceedings of a municipal body to determine—through an inspection of the record—if the body had jurisdiction, kept within it, and to examine the evidence” in order to “ascertain whether it furnished any legal and substantial basis for the action taken.” Id. at 82. But the supreme court did not analyze whether the city’s resolution was a quasi- judicial decision. See id.at 82-83. County of Washington involved a city council’s denial of 3 a request for a refund of an alleged overpayment for sewer and water services. 818 N.W.2d at 535. In analyzing whether the city council’s decision was quasi-judicial, the supreme court listed examples of quasi-judicial decisions appealable by writ of certiorari, including the “vacation of public streets.” Id. at 540 & n.7 (citing Beck, 50 N.W.2d at 82). None of the cases cited by the parties directly address or analyze the jurisdictional issue of whether a town board’s decision on a petition to vacate a public road segment is a quasi-judicial decision reviewable by petition for a writ of certiorari under Minn. Stat. § 606.01. We therefore apply the general criteria of MCEA to a town board’s decision on a petition to vacate a public road segment. 587 N.W.2d at 842. The three requirements of quasi-judicial decision-making are “(1) investigation into a disputed claim and weighing of evidentiary facts; (2) application of those facts to a prescribed standard; and (3) a binding decision regarding the disputed claim.” MCEA, 587 N.W.2d at 842. The failure to satisfy any of these three requirements is fatal to a conclusion that the proceedings are quasi-judicial. Citizens Concerned for Kids v. Yellow Med. E. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2190, 703 N.W.2d 582, 585 (Minn. App. 2005). Relators argue that respondent’s decision to deny their petition to vacate the public road segment is a quasi-judicial decision because respondent held “a hearing to investigate the petition and weigh evidence,” “considered whether the facts established a public need or purpose for the portion of road at issue,” and “issued a binding decision denying the Petition.” Respondent asserts that “[t]he vacation of a town road affects the right of the public generally to use a public road for property access and travel.” Respondent argues that there was “no disputed claim at issue before [it]” and that “the decision to grant or 4 deny a vacation petition is subject to the discretion of a town board, with no specific standards or elements that a town board must consider or apply in deciding whether to grant or deny the petition.” To satisfy the second requirement for a quasi-judicial decision, the decision-maker must apply the facts to a prescribed standard. Broad guidelines are not sufficiently specific to constitute a prescribed standard. MCEA, 587 N.W.2d at 843; see also Anderson v. County of Lyon, 784 N.W.2d 77, 82 (Minn. App. 2010) (concluding that “broad goal” did not constitute a prescribed standard), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2010). The guidelines must establish specific criteria that circumscribe the decision-maker’s discretion. See, e.g., County of Washington, 818 N.W.2d at 541 (holding that decision by city council satisfied second requirement for quasi-judicial decision because city council applied reasonableness standard prescribed by statute); Handicraft Block Ltd. P’ship v. City of Minneapolis, 611 N.W.2d 16, 21-24 (Minn. 2000) (holding that decision by city satisfied second requirement for quasi-judicial decision because city’s decision was governed by guidelines in city’s comprehensive plan). The statute governing the establishment and vacation of a public road by a town board, Minn. Stat. § 164.07, does not set forth a standard for a determination as to whether to grant or deny a petition to vacate a public road segment. Because a town board’s decision whether to vacate a public road segment does not involve the application of facts to a prescribed standard, it is not a quasi-judicial decision, and we need not address whether the decision satisfies the other two requirements of quasi-judicial decision-making. See Citizens Concerned for Kids, 703 N.W.2d at 585 (observing that failure to meet any of the 5 requirements set forth in MCEA is “fatal” to a determination that a decision is quasi- judicial). We note that our conclusion that a town board’s decision on a petition to vacate a public road is not a quasi-judicial decision is consistent with supreme court caselaw that has categorized such a decision as a legislative action. See, e.g., Rolf, 208 N.W. at 757-58 (stating that “[t]he question whether a public highway should be vacated is legislative” and concluding that a town board’s action in vacating a highway “was within its legislative discretion”); Kangas v. Blueberry Township, 264 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn. 1978) (acknowledging that a town board’s decision whether to vacate a public road is legislative); cf. Lieser v. Town of St. Martin, 96 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1959) (“It is well established in this state that a town board acting on a petition for the establishment of a town road acts in a legislative capacity . . . .”). We therefore hold that a decision of a town board under Minn. Stat. § 164.07 denying a petition to vacate a public road segment is not a quasi-judicial decision reviewable by petition for a writ of certiorari under Minn. Stat. § 606.01. And here, we conclude that respondent’s decision denying relators’ petition to vacate the public road segment is not a quasi-judicial decision appealable by petitioning for a writ of certiorari. See MCEA, 587 N.W.2d at 842. We therefore dismiss this certiorari appeal as unauthorized. Motion granted; appeal dismissed. 6