Villagomez v. Sablan
CourtSupreme Court of The Commonwealth of The Northern Mariana Islands
Date FiledJune 12, 1996
Docket94-037
JudgeTaylor
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Villagomez v. Sablan, 4 N.M.I. 396 (1996)
Manuel S. Villagomez,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Antonio P. Sablan, Gabriel P.
Sablan, and Gregorio P. Sablan,
Defendants/Appellants.
Appeal No. 94-037
Civil Action No. 93-0822
Order of Dismissal
June 12, 1996
Counsel for appellants: Antonio P. Sablan, Gabriel P. Sablan and Gregorio P. Sablan, pro se, Saipan.
Counsel for appellee: John A. M anglona, Saipan.
BEFORE: TAYLOR, Chief Justice, and LAM ORENA and M ACK, Special Judges.
TAYLOR, Chief Justice:
On M arch 29, 1996, the appellee, M anuel S. Villagom ez, moved for dism issal of this action pursuant to
Com . R. App. P. 42(c). The motion is based on the failure of the appellants, Antonio P. Sablan, Gregorio P.
Sablan and Gabriel P. Sablan, to prosecute this appeal, despite the Court’s repeated warnings and repeated
opportunities for the appellants to correct past procedural m istakes. W e grant the motion for dism issal.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The appellants are acting pro se. This appeal was filed on Septem ber 26, 1994. Thereafter, the appellants
filed a “M otion for Retrial at the Superior Court.” This Court denied the m otion, explaining that the Rules of
Appellate Procedure m ust be followed for all appeals. The Court’s order denying the motion states: “The Court
realizes that appellants are not represented by counsel and m ay not be fam iliar with the Court rules; these facts,
however, do not excuse them from com pliance.” Villagomez v. Sablan, App. No. 94-037 (N.M .I. Sup. Ct. Nov. 29,
1994) (Order Denying M otion for Retrial at Superior Court at 1-2).
On April 11, 1995, the appellee, M anuel S. Villagom ez, moved to dismiss this appeal for failure of the
appellants to order a transcript of proceedings in the Superior Court or certify that none was necessary under Com .
R. App. P. 10(b)(1). On the same date, this Court issued its first order to show cause, asking the parties why the
appeal should not be dism issed for failure to prosecute under Com . R. App. P. 42(c). Villagomez, supra (Apr. 11,
1995) (Order to Show Cause W hy the Appeal Should not be Dismissed). That order reiterated the Court’s caution
to the appellants regarding failure to com ply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id. On M ay 3, 1995, the
appellants responded to the m otion to dismiss and the order to show cause by filing a “Transcript Designation and
Order Form” designating “the whole testimony” of the two-day trial in this m atter for transcription. Response to
M otion to Dismiss (attaching Transcript Designation and Order Form ). The Superior Court filed a certificate of
record with this Court on June 26, 1995. However, the appellants took no further steps to ensure that the transcript
was actually prepared.
On Decem ber 22, 1995, it appearing that the transcript had still not been prepared, this Court issued a
second order to show cause. Villagomez, supra (Dec. 22, 1995) (Second Order to Show Cause W hy the Appeal
Should Not Be Dism issed). The Court took pains to explain to the appellants the seriousness of their repeated
failure to assem ble an appropriate record on appeal:
Under Com m onwealth law, violations of Com . R. App. [P]. 10(b)(2) are grounds for
sanctions, including, in extrem e cases, dism issal of an appeal. In re Estate of Deleon Castro, [4
N.M .I. 102, 108 (1994)]. Likewise, Federal courts interpreting counterpart Federal Rules of
Appellate procedure have dism issed appeals where an appellant challenges a trial court’s
findings but does not provide a transcript on appeal. Syncom Capital Corp. v. Wade, 924 F.2d
167, 169 (9th Cir. 1991); Guam Sasaki Corp. v. Diana’s, Inc., 881 F.2d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 1989).
Appellants here are proceeding pro se. This Court has twice cautioned them that the
Rules of Appellate Procedure must be followed by all parties, regardless of whether they have an
attorney. See Order Denying M otion for Retrial at Superior Court (Nov. 29, 1994); Order to
Show Cause W hy the Appeal Should not be Dism issed (Apr. 11, 1995).
Nevertheless, this Court will provide Appellants one m ore opportunity to explain or
correct the procedural errors in their appeal. Accordingly, Appellants are ordered to show this
Court why it should not dism iss this appeal for failure to comply with the Comm onwealth Rules
of Appellate Procedure as described herein. Appellants’ response to this Order to Show Cause
shall be due on January 8, 1996. Appellee shall have an opportunity to file an opposition
m em orandum , which shall be due on January 12, 1996. Both parties’ subm issions shall be
confined to the m atters raised by Appellant’s M otion to Dism iss and this Order to Show Cause;
they shall not discuss the merits of this appeal.
Id. at 3-4. In response, on January 2, 1996, the appellants sought and obtained from the Superior Court a sixty-day
extension of time in which to file a transcript.1
A hearing on the Court’s second order to show cause was held on January 15, 1996. At the hearing, the
Court agreed to give the appellants a final opportunity to cure their past failures to assem ble the record on appeal.
The Court issued an order on that sam e date, sum m arizing its ruling from the bench:
Appellants have repeatedly professed reliance on Court personnel as the basis for their failure to
follow the applicable Rules of Appellate Procedure in this m atter. The Court cautions
Appellants that it is their responsibility to becom e aware of the applicable Rules and ensure
com pliance with them . Their pro se status does not excuse failure to com ply with the Rules. In
particular, Com . R App. P. 11(a) requires an appellant to take all actions necessary to assem ble
the record on appeal. Appellants here have not discharged this duty. Nevertheless, despite
Appellants’ repeated failures to com ply with the Rules, the Court will grant them one final,
limited opportunity to assem ble the record on appeal.
. . . The Superior Court is authorized to supplem ent the record with the transcript of the
trial in this m atter, provided that the transcript is com pleted within the sixty day period
established by that Court’s Extension of Time to File Transcript. Appellants shall ensure that a
supplem entary Certificate of Record is filed by the Superior Court by M arch 4, 1996.
. . . Appellants m ust also com ply strictly with Com . R. App. P. 30 in subm itting
excerpts of record containing the relevant portions (and only the relevant portions) of the
transcript to this Court by M arch 4, 1996. No further briefing by Appellants is authorized.
. . . Appellee m ay, if desired, subm it supplemental excerpts of record and/or file a
supplem ental brief concerning the newly-supplem ented record. Such supplem ental subm issions
shall be due on M arch 15, 1996.
1
Villagomez v. Sablan, Civ. No. 93-0822 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 1996) (Extension of Time to File
Transcript); Answer: W hy the Appeal Should Not Be Dismissed?, Appeal No. 94-037 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 5,
1996). The appellants’ memorandum, despite the order’s clear instruction not to address the merits of the appeal,
was largely devoted to the appellants’ view of the merits, and did not provide any valid excuse for the lengthy delay
in preparing the transcript. At the hearing, the Court ordered that the improper portions of the memorandum be
stricken.
Villagomez v. Sablan, 4 N.M.I. 396 (1996)
. . . This Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter during the period of rem and. In
the event that Appellants fail to carry out in a tim ely fashion any of the actions required of them
by this Order, this m atter will again be considered for dismissal for failure to prosecute the
appeal, pursuant to Com . R. App. P. 42(c).
Villagomez, supra (Jan. 15, 1996) (Order at 1-2) (“January 15 order”). On M arch 5, 1996, the Superior Court filed
its new certificate of record, which showed that the transcript of proceedings had been com pleted and filed at the
Superior Court on February 9, 1996.
To date, no excerpts of record have been filed with this Court. Instead, on M arch 7, 1996, the appellants
filed an “Extension of Time to File Transcript,” requesting an additional seven days to complete this filing. As
grounds for this request, the appellants state:
Both M arian D. Calvo and I (Antonio) misunderstood of where to file the transcript. The
transcript was filed since February 9, 1996 at the Superior Court which was supposed to be at the
Suprem e Court.
Another thing, we did not quite understand that only the relevant parts to be filed so we
would like to apologize for that error.
Extension of Tim e to File Transcript. The appellee’s renewed m otion for dismissal followed on M arch 29, 1996.
ANALYSIS
As the Court has repeatedly stressed to the appellants, Com . R. App. P. 11 places upon them the duty to
assem ble the record on appeal. M oreover, violations of Com . R. App. P. 10(b)(2) may in extrem e cases warrant
dism issal. In re Estate of Deleon Castro, 4 N.M .I. 102, 108 (1994); see also Syncom Capital Corp. v. Wade, 924
F.2d 167, 169 (9th Cir. 1991); Guam Sasaki Corp. v. Diana’s, Inc., 881 F.2d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 1989). At this
juncture, the tim e lim its set forth in this Court’s January 15 order have passed, and the appellants have still not
provided us with the excerpts of record which are necessary to any meaningful review of the merits of this appeal.
Their m ost recent request for an extension of time com es after the M arch 4 deadline clearly set forth in the Court’s
January 15 order.
Any one of the appellants’ failures to com ply with particular deadlines or adhere to particular orders,
taken in isolation, would not warrant dismissal. Certain other errors, such as the im proper filing of a motion for
retrial, or arguing the merits in a brief when expressly instructed not to, am ount to technical errors which, standing
alone, do not affect the validity of the appeal. See Lucky Dev. Co., Ltd. v. Tokai U.S.A., Inc., 2 N.M .I. 81, 86-87
(1991). Nevertheless, there com es a tim e when the Court must view the appellants’ actions as a whole and must
address repeated, unexcused and prejudicial violations of our rules.
The appellants were cautioned in the Court’s January 15 order that they were being given “one final,
lim ited opportunity” to present an adequate record on appeal. Id. at 2. The order listed the actions the appellants
were to take and provided clear deadlines by which they were to be taken, am ong them that they must “com ply
strictly with Com . R. App. P. 30 in subm itting excerpts of record containing the relevant portions (and only the
relevant portions) of the transcript to this Court by M arch 4, 1996.” Id. In justifying their failure to do so,
appellants claim that “we did not quite understand that only the relevant parts to be filed.” Extension of Time to
File Transcript. The fact that the appellants are acting pro se does not explain or justify this failure to follow the
plain, express language of the Court’s January 15 order. M oreover, com ing on the heels of the appellants’ series
of other procedural lapses, this latest error creates grave doubts in our mind that appellants will follow future
procedural requirem ents relating to prosecuting this appeal.
An additional factor in favor of dism issal is that the appellants’ failure to meet the deadline, like other
past failures in this case, is prejudicial to the appellee, who was required by the Court’s January 15 order to file a
responsive brief in this m atter by M arch 15, 1996. Allowing the extension requested by the appellants would have
afforded the appellee only one day to do so. In a more fundamental sense, the appellants’ conduct of this appeal
has created one delay after another in the final disposition of this m atter. According to the unsworn statem ent of
appellee’s counsel (unrebutted by the appellants), the appellants have continued to occupy the land which is the
subject of this lawsuit. M em orandum in Support of M otion to Dism iss Appeal at 7. Regardless of which party
now occupies the land, the appellants have unreasonably frustrated the ultimate resolution of the question of its
ownership. It may be said that another seven days will not change significantly the positions of the parties. But
the appellants’ unwillingness or inability to follow the m ost express orders of this Court gives us grave doubts that
the seven days’ delay sought here will be the end of the m atter. M oreover, repeated and unexcused rule violations
are disruptive and prejudicial to the Court itself. See Guam Sasaki Corp., 881 F.2d at 717. Com. R. App. P. 42(c)
authorizes dismissal in extrem e cases. W e regretfully conclude that the appellants’ failure to move this case along
has become extreme.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is hereby DISM ISSED with prejudice.
M ACK, Special Judge, dissenting:
I concur with the m ajority’s holding that dism issal of this action is com pletely justified under the circum -
stances of this case. However, despite the appellants’ repeated failures to com ply with the Rules of Appellate
Procedure, I would nevertheless allow their appeal to proceed on the m erits. Filing the excerpts of record is the
last step required of appellants before the appeal would be ready for hearing. This is a relatively simple task
which I believe the appellants can do. I would not close the door when we have been patient this far. Therefore, I
respectfully dissent from the order of dism issal.