Ricketts v. Westwood Condo. Ass'n
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-1556-cv
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
25-1556-cv
Ricketts v. Westwood Condo. Ass’n
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 18th day of November, two thousand twenty-six.
PRESENT:
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
DENNIS JACOBS,
JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
ROBERT RICKETTS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 25-1556-cv
WESTWOOD CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,
INC., FRANCIS O’GORMAN, JONATHAN
CHAPPELL, ERIC JUDGE, MICHELLE
ANDERSON, XIOMARA PAGAN, JUDY CARR,
FELDMAN, PERLSTEIN & GREENE, LLC,
WESTFORD REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT,
LLC, ROSA BUSTAMANTE,
Defendants-Appellees.
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Robert Ricketts, pro se, Hartford, Connecticut.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES Ryan V. Nobile (Michael C. Barbarula, on the
WESTWOOD CONDOMINIUM brief), Ryan Ryan Deluca LLP, Bridgeport,
ASSOCIATION, INC., FRANCIS Connecticut.
O’GORMAN, ERIC JUDGE, MICHELLE
ANDERSON, XIOMARA PAGAN, JUDY
CARR, WESTFORD REAL ESTATE
MANAGEMENT, ROSA BUSTAMANTE:
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES Michael Feldman, Feldman, Perlstein,
JONATHAN CHAPPELL, FELDMAN, Burchman & Freitas, LLC, Farmington,
PERLSTEIN & GREENE, LLC: Connecticut.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
(Sarala V. Nagala, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the appeal is DISMISSED.
Robert Ricketts, an attorney proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s
judgment, entered March 31, 2025, dismissing his third amended complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) and
12(b)(6), respectively. Ricketts commenced this action, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, among other federal statutes, and state law, against a
condominium association and several of its members, an attorney and his firm, and a property
manager and her company. The district court dismissed Ricketts’s second amended complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that he failed to plausibly allege a federal claim. In his third
amended complaint, Ricketts brought claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), and state law. The defendants moved to dismiss
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the third amended complaint under Rules 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6). The district court granted the
motions, determining that Ricketts failed to serve several of the defendants, and that he failed to
state a plausible FDCPA or FHA claim against those who had been served. See generally
Ricketts v. Westwood Condo. Ass’n, No. 23-CV-1079 (SVN), 2025 WL 969547 (D. Conn. Mar.
31, 2025). The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ricketts’s state
law claims and denied further leave to amend. See id. at *10–11.
On March 31, 2025, the district court entered judgment, and on May 30, 2025, Ricketts
moved for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. The district court denied the motion
without prejudice to renewal. On June 3, 2025, Ricketts filed a second extension motion, which
the district court granted. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,
procedural history of the case, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to
explain our decision to dismiss the appeal.
“Although neither party expressly argues that we lack appellate jurisdiction to hear this
appeal, we have an independent obligation to consider the presence or absence of subject matter
jurisdiction nostra sponte.” Franco v. Gunsalus, 972 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2020) (alterations
adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In civil cases, the timely filing of a
notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
We lack appellate jurisdiction because Ricketts did not timely file a notice of appeal.
The district court entered judgment on March 31, 2025. Ricketts thus had 30 days—i.e., until
April 30, 2025—to file a notice of appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2107; Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). He
did not do so. Instead, on May 30, 2025, Ricketts sought an extension of time to appeal under
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5).
Under Rule 4(a)(5), “the district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good
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cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days
after the expiration of the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a).” Cohen v. Empire Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 142 F.3d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1998); see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2107(c). The deadline to file a Rule 4(a)(5) motion is set by statute and therefore
jurisdictional. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c); Cohen, 142 F.3d at 118–19; see also Hamer v.
Neighborhood Hous. Servs., 583 U.S. 17, 25 (2017) (“If a time prescription governing the
transfer of adjudicatory authority from one Article III court to another appears in a statute, the
limitation is jurisdictional.”).
Here, Ricketts filed two extension motions: the first timely (on May 30, 2025, i.e., 60
days after entry of judgment), and the second untimely (on June 3, 2025, i.e., 64 days after entry
of judgment). The district court denied the first (timely) motion, without prejudice, on June 2,
2025, because Ricketts did not certify that he had provided notice to the other parties to the
lawsuit, as required under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(B). On June 4, 2025,
the district court granted Ricketts’s second (untimely) extension motion, and gave Ricketts until
June 18, 2025, to file the notice of appeal. Ricketts subsequently filed a notice of appeal by the
district court’s extended deadline. However, the district court did not have the authority to grant
the latter extension motion—filed on June 3, 2025—because it had not been filed within “30
days after the expiration of the time otherwise set for bringing appeal,” namely, by May 30,
2025. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c); see Cohen, 142 F.3d at 118 (reasoning that district court “lack[ed]
jurisdiction to grant” extension motion “not filed within Rule 4(a)(5)’s 30-day grace period”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 1
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Even though the district court intended to give Ricketts an opportunity to re-file the motion for an
extension of time by denying the first motion without prejudice, and may not have realized that the time
to file another motion had already passed when it denied the motion, the Supreme Court has made clear
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Thus, we lack jurisdiction because Ricketts did not timely file a notice of appeal. See
28 U.S.C. § 2107(c); Cohen, 142 F.3d at 118–19; see also Hamer, 583 U.S. at 25.
Additionally, our review of Ricketts’s opening brief revealed evidence that Ricketts cited
to a non-existent case. In particular, Ricketts cites “Serebin v. Healthsource Corp.,” represented
to be a 1998 decision of the Seventh Circuit. Appellant’s Br. at 6, 34. However, we could not
locate a decision by that name, and the citation for that case led us to a different, unpublished
case from the Sixth Circuit irrelevant to the issue for which “Serebin” was cited. Elsewhere,
Ricketts cited cases for propositions that they do not support. See, e.g., id. at 22 (citing Int’l
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 986 F.2d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 1993) for the proposition that “an
attorney’s representation regarding authority to accept service is binding absent extraordinary
circumstances,” even though no such proposition is contained in that case); id. at 33 (citing
Horgan v. Simmons, 704 F. Supp. 2d 814, 818 (N.D. Ill. 2010), and McBride v. BIC Consumer
Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009), for the proposition that “[a]sthma has long been
recognized as a disability under the ADA where it substantially limits the major life activity of
breathing,” although neither case involved asthma).
“At the very least, the duties imposed by Rule 11 require that attorneys read, and thereby
confirm the existence and validity of, the legal authorities on which they rely.” Park v. Kim, 91
F.4th 610, 615 (2d Cir. 2024). Therefore, we conclude that a referral to the Court’s Grievance
Panel pursuant to Local Rule 46.2 is warranted for further investigation, and for consideration
of a referral to the Committee on Admissions and Grievances. See 2d Cir. R. 46.2.
that we have “no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.” Bowles, 551
U.S. at 214 (holding there was no appellate jurisdiction even though the appellant filed a notice of appeal
by the district court’s re-opened deadline, but the district court had erroneously provided a deadline that
was beyond the jurisdictionally prescribed time).
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* * *
Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, and REFER
Attorney Robert A. Ricketts to the Court’s Grievance Panel pursuant to Local Rule 46.2 for
further investigation, and for consideration of a referral to the Committee on Admissions and
Grievances. See 2d Cir. R. 46.2.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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