Garner, D. v. Mendelsohn, S.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket352 EDA 2026
JudgeNeuman
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
DIANA R. GARNER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
SCOTT MENDELSOHN - TYSON REALTY : No. 352 EDA 2026
Appeal from the Order Entered January 16, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): 250702502
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BECK, J., and NEUMAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NEUMAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2026
Appellant, Diana R. Garner, appeals pro se from the trial court’s January
16, 2026 order granting Appellee’s, Scott Mendelsohn – Tyson Realty, motion
for judgment on the pleadings. Upon review, we are compelled to dismiss her
appeal due to substantial briefing deficiencies.
The trial court summarized the background of this matter, in relevant
part, as follows:
[Ms.] Garner commenced this action seeking to quiet title via
adverse possession with respect to the property located at 2706
West George Street in Philadelphia.[1] Ms. Garner claimed that
she had occupied the property, which she found abandoned, since
around 2003. [Appellee] has held title to the property since 2017.
[Appellee] filed preliminary objections in the nature of demurrer.
Ms. Garner did not file an answer to the preliminary objections.
On October 17, 2025, the [trial court] entered an order sustaining
the preliminary objections and dismissing the case without
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1 Ms. Garner proceeded pro se throughout this litigation.
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prejudice for Ms. Garner to file an amended complaint within
twenty days.[2]
On December 8, 2025, [Appellee] filed his motion for judgment
on the pleadings.[3] As of that date, Ms. Garner had not filed an
amended complaint. Ms. Garner also did not file a response to
[Appellee’s] motion. On January 7, 2026, Ms. Garner filed an
untimely amended complaint, without first seeking leave of court,
well outside the time established in [the trial court’s] order. [4]
On January 16, 2026, th[e trial c]ourt, after reviewing the
unopposed motion, entered an order granting [Appellee’s] motion
and entering judgment in favor of [Appellee]. Ms. Garner filed her
timely appeal to the Superior Court on January 25, 2026.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/26, at 1-2 (some capitalization modified).
The trial court ordered Ms. Garner to file a concise statement pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and she timely complied. The trial court then issued its
Rule 1925(a) opinion, in which it explained that Ms. Garner failed to timely file
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2 Notice of this order was given pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(b) on October 20,
2025.
3 In the motion for judgment on the pleadings, Appellee asserted,
“Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1034 provides … after the relevant
pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay …
trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. … The time for [Ms.
Garner] to plead has expired and the pleadings … are closed.” Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, 12/8/25, at ¶¶ 7-8; see also id. at ¶ 6 (claiming
Appellee had not been served with an amended complaint and the docket
entries do not reflect an amended complaint was filed).
4 Our own review of the record shows Ms. Garner attached to the amended
complaint a motion for leave to file amended complaint nunc pro tunc, but she
never separately filed that motion. In the attached motion seeking nunc pro
tunc relief that was not independently filed, she claimed she submitted her
amended complaint through the electronic filing system on December 5, 2025,
but it was rejected due to her failure to attach a notice to defend. She, thus,
sought leave to file the amended complaint nunc pro tunc and have it deemed
filed as of December 5, 2025. We observe the amended complaint would have
still been untimely even if filed on December 5, 2025.
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an amended complaint, failed to seek leave to file a late amended complaint,
and did not respond to Appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id.
at 3-4. On appeal, Ms. Garner raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting judgment on the
pleadings where material issues of fact existed regarding [Ms.
Garner’s] continuous possession and use of the property?
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing [Ms.
Garner’s] action based on procedural technicalities rather than
considering the merits of the case?
3. Whether the trial court erred in treating [Appellee’s] motion as
unopposed and entering judgment without addressing [Ms.
Garner’s] substantive claims?
4. Whether the trial court improperly denied [Ms. Garner] the
opportunity to proceed after dismissing the case without
prejudice?
Ms. Garner’s Brief at 4 (some capitalization modified).
Due to briefing deficiencies that hamper our appellate review, we are
compelled to dismiss Ms. Garner’s appeal. Rule of Appellate Procedure
2119(a) mandates the argument section of an appellant’s brief contain “such
discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a). This Court has explained:
When briefing the various issues that have been preserved, it is
an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently
developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with
pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with
citations to legal authorities. Citations to authorities must
articulate the principles for which they are cited.
This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments
on behalf of an appellant. Moreover, when defects in a brief
impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we
may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be
waived.
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Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (cleaned
up). See also In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“It
is well-settled that this Court will not review a claim unless it is developed in
the argument section of an appellant’s brief, and supported by citations to
relevant authority.”) (citations omitted); Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080,
1088 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“We need not reach the merits of this issue because
the argument section of [the a]ppellant’s brief merely consists of general
statements unsupported by any discussion and analysis of relevant legal
authority.”); In re S.T.S., Jr., 76 A.3d 24, 42 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[M]ere
issue spotting without analysis or legal citation to support an assertion
precludes our appellate review of a matter.”) (cleaned up); Commonwealth
v. Rush, 959 A.2d 945, 950-51 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[I]t is the appellant’s
obligation to present developed arguments and, in so doing, apply the relevant
law to the facts of the case, persuade us there were errors, and convince us
relief is due because of those errors. If an appellant fails to do so, we may
find the argument waived.”) (cleaned up).
Here, the argument section of Ms. Garner’s brief is completely devoid of
legal authority to support her claims. She does not provide a single citation
to legal authority in her argument. See Ms. Garner’s Brief at 6-8 (claiming,
without any legal support, that the trial court improperly resolved factual
issues in favor of Appellee at the pleadings stage; abused its discretion by
dismissing the case on procedural grounds where the underlying claims
presented substantial issues of fact and law; improperly treated the motion as
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unopposed, as the absence of a response does not permit the court to
disregard well-pleaded allegations or resolve factual disputes; denied Ms.
Garner a meaningful opportunity to proceed and converted a non-final
dismissal into a final judgment; and failed to properly apply adverse
possession law).5 While Ms. Garner includes two rule citations and two case
citations in the table of authorities of her brief, they oddly do not appear
anywhere in her brief.6 With respect to the two cases she references in her
table of authorities, we were unable to find these cases with the citations Ms.
Garner provided and suspect these cases are hallucinated legal authority. See
id. at 3 (citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 123 A.3d 456 (Pa. Super.) and
Brubaker v. Reading Eagle Co., 422 A.2d 673 (Pa. Super.)).7 Further, one
of the rules she includes in her table of authorities seems irrelevant to the
issues she raises on appeal. Id. (citing Pa.R.A.P. 2111, which pertains to the
requirements for an appellant’s brief).
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5 We observe Ms. Garner raises no argument that Appellee’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings was procedurally improper because there were no
pleadings at the time it was filed and/or the pleadings were not closed. Cf.
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1037(a) (“If an action is not commenced by a complaint, the
prothonotary, upon praecipe of the defendant, shall enter a rule upon the
plaintiff to file a complaint. If a complaint is not filed within twenty days after
service of the rule, the prothonotary, upon praecipe of the defendant, shall
enter a judgment of non pros.”).
6 Ms. Garner’s table of authorities also includes one statutory citation to 42
Pa.C.S. § 742, which she references in her statement of jurisdiction to support
our jurisdiction.
7 Ms. Garner did not provide the year in which these cases were purportedly
decided.
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Ms. Garner’s brief also contains no citations to the record. See Pa.R.A.P.
2119(c) (“If reference is made to the pleadings, evidence, charge, opinion or
order, or any other matter appearing in the record, the argument must set
forth, in immediate connection therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference
to the place in the record where the matter referred to appears….”); Pa.R.A.P.
2117(a)(4) (requiring that the statement of the case contain “[a] closely
condensed chronological statement, in narrative form, of all the facts which
are necessary to be known in order to determine the points in controversy,
with an appropriate reference in each instance to the place in the record where
the evidence substantiating the fact relied on may be found”); Milby v. Pote,
189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2018) (stating this Court will not scour the
record to find support for an argument). She further provides scant
explanation on how the record supports her assertions. See Ms. Garner’s
Brief at 6, 7-8 (claiming her allegations support the elements required for
adverse possession but discussing none of the specific allegations in her
pleadings); id. at 7, 8 (stating she “made a good faith effort to comply with
court procedures, including filing an amended complaint[,]” and suggesting
the trial court did not give her a meaningful opportunity to proceed after
initially dismissing her complaint without prejudice, but providing no
explanation as to why her amended complaint was late and filed without leave,
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or why she did not file a response to Appellee’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings).8
Our appellate review is precluded by Ms. Garner’s failure to provide any
legal authority to support her claims and lack of regard for the record. While
this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by pro se appellants,
pro se appellants are not entitled to special treatment by virtue of the fact
they lack legal training. Commonwealth v. Maris, 629 A.2d 1014, 1017 n.1
(Pa. Super. 1993) (citation omitted). “When issues are not properly raised
and developed in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present
specific issues for review[,] a [c]ourt will not consider the merits thereof.” Id.
at 1017 (citation and footnote omitted). Further, we reiterate this Court is
unable to act as Ms. Garner’s appellate counsel by developing legal arguments
for her. Hardy, supra; see also In re S.T.S., Jr., 76 A.3d at 42 (“This Court
is neither obliged, nor even particularly equipped, to develop an argument for
a party. To do so places the Court in the conflicting roles of advocate and
neutral arbiter.”) (citations omitted); Smathers v. Smathers, 670 A.2d
1159, 1160 (Pa. Super. 1996) (observing a pro se appellant cannot expect
this Court to act as her attorney). Accordingly, we are constrained to dismiss
Ms. Garner’s appeal.
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8 Ms. Garner also never mentions that she attached to her amended complaint
a motion for leave to file her amended complaint nunc pro tunc, asking that
the amended complaint be deemed filed on December 5, 2025 (which still
would have been untimely). Again, Ms. Garner did not independently file this
motion.
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Appeal dismissed.
Date: 11/20/2026
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