American Academy of Pediatrics v. James Uthmeier
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date FiledSeptember 14, 2026
Docket26-2238
JudgeScudderconcurs and dissents
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 26-2238
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAMES UTHMEIER, Attorney General of the State of Florida,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:26-cv-02401 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.
____________________
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 14, 2026
____________________
Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK,
HAMILTON, SCUDDER, ST. EVE, KIRSCH, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, LEE,
PRYOR, KOLAR, MALDONADO, and TAIBLESON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Plaintiff-Appellee moved to dismiss its com-
plaint in the district court, which was granted. Dist. Ct. D.E.
65 at 10. That court has indicated a willingness to vacate the
preliminary injunction it previously entered. Id. at 11. The dis-
trict court has this court’s permission to do so on remand. See
FED. R. APP. P. 12.1(b); Chicago Headline Club v. Noem, 168 F.4th
2 No. 26-2238
1033, 1039–42 (7th Cir. 2026) (per curiam). Once the injunction
has been vacated, there will no longer be an appealable order,
and this appeal will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
So ordered.
No. 26-2238 3
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, joined by JACKSON-AKIWUMI,
Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur in the court’s remand order
to ensure dismissal of this now-moot appeal. Because the
appeal is moot, it is best to resist the temptation to engage
now in a full debate over the merits of the underlying case or
the district court’s preliminary injunction. When this case was
still a live controversy, those issues were aired more fully, but
still provisionally, in the motions panel opinion and dissent
on denial of a stay pending appeal, American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Uthmeier, 178 F.4th 1113 (7th Cir. 2026), a decision
vacated on an en banc vote. The following opinion by Judge
Scudder, dissenting in part from a dismissal that all judges
agree is needed, expresses strongly-felt views on how this
appeal ultimately should have been decided after full en banc
consideration—if it were not moot. In the absence of a live
case or controversy, I don’t think it makes sense to engage
fully, but I offer three brief points to put matters in context:
First, federalism concerns are at stake here, of course, but
so are First Amendment rights. The district court made
detailed and sound factual findings supporting application of
the long-recognized bad-faith exception to Younger
abstention. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Uthmeier, 2026
WL 1552734, *17–25 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2026). No one seriously
challenges those facts. As the panel majority explained,
federal courts do not apply the bad-faith exception lightly, or
often. The exception is, however, a critical feature—a
constitutional safety valve, if you will—in the federalism
balance in Younger doctrine. American Academy of Pediatrics,
178 F.4th at 1123–24; see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53–54
(1971).
4 No. 26-2238
Second, the bad-faith exception is not an empty set or a
dead letter. The lower federal courts have needed to invoke it
from time to time to protect federal rights. See 17B Charles
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 4255 n.28 (3d ed. 2026) (collecting cases applying exception,
many to protect First Amendment rights from state and local
officials’ clear violations); see generally Midwestern Gas
Transmission Co. v. McCarty, 270 F.3d 536 (7th Cir. 2001)
(invoking related “flagrantly and patently” unconstitutional
exception to reverse Younger abstention and block state
proceedings); Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1382–83 (5th
Cir. 1979) (invoking bad-faith exception to reverse Younger
abstention).
Third, just as we owe respect to state courts, we also owe
respect to our colleagues in the district court, to their fact-
finding efforts, to their equitable judgments, and to applicable
standards of review in fast-moving cases.
On these challenging issues, I respectfully suggest we can
and should save further commentary in the pages of the
Federal Reporter for cases that are not moot.
No. 26-2238 5
KOLAR, Circuit Judge, concurring in the remand order. My
colleague’s partial dissent appropriately stresses the central
nature of federalism in our constitutional republic. Another
colleague’s concurrence makes a compelling case that
Younger’s bad-faith exception must remain as a constitutional
safety valve protecting First Amendment rights. These writ-
ings weigh two principles that have towered over the Ameri-
can experiment since our founding: federalism and the pro-
tection of constitutional rights. The concurrence and partial
dissent eloquently make the case that one principle or the
other might rise a bit higher in this case.
I
At its core, federalism protects state sovereignty against
an overbearing national government. See The Federalist No.
45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal
Government are few and defined … [and] will be exercised
principally on external objects as war, peace, negotiation, and
foreign commerce.”); The Federalist No. 51, at 322 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing federal sep-
aration of powers and state sovereignty as a “double security”
for “the rights of the people”). And Younger abstention flows
from the constitutional requirement that state government ac-
tion is not subject to an override from any branch of the fed-
eral government. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42–45 (1971)
(noting that “the National Government, anxious though it
may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal in-
terests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not un-
duly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States”).
This does not mean federal courts are powerless to protect
constitutional rights against rogue state prosecutors. And this
6 No. 26-2238
is where Younger’s bad-faith exception comes in, which as my
colleagues note finds its roots in an earlier Supreme Court
case, Dombrowski v. Pfister, which involved state officials’
egregious threats to bring charges against civil rights activists
even after evidence was suppressed and arrest warrants were
quashed. 389 U.S. 479, 487–89 (1965). It also finds support in
Younger itself, which did not purport to impose a blanket ban
against all injunctions of state enforcement actions, but rather
only against “good-faith attempts to enforce” a state statute.
Younger, 401 U.S. at 54 (emphasis added).
II
Of course, the bad-faith exception cannot swallow
Younger’s general prohibition against federal encroachment
on state enforcement actions without eviscerating federalism
protections and enfeebling state courts. This case demon-
strates the need for a limiting principle to Younger’s bad-faith
exception that accounts for the federalism concerns set forth
in the partial dissent. One such principle may be to cabin
Dombrowski to its facts. But this is not the way we typically
apply Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., City of Timber Lake
v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 557 (8th Cir. 1993)
(“Federal courts ... are not ‘free to limit Supreme Court opin-
ions precisely to the facts of each case’”) (quoting McCoy v.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir.
1991)), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 910 (1992); Jones v. St. Paul Compa-
nies, Inc., 495 F.3d 888, 893 (8th Cir. 2007). To be sure, such a
narrow reading is sometimes appropriate, especially when
the Supreme Court historically refuses to extend a principle
and later admonishes that such expansion is a “disfavored ju-
dicial activity.” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 491 (2022) (cita-
tion omitted).
No. 26-2238 7
The Supreme Court has neither indicated that Dombrowski
is limited to its facts, nor labeled application of the bad-faith
exception to Younger a disfavored judicial activity. Yet it has
not applied the bad-faith exception in over 60 years. See 17B
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure § 4255 (3d ed. 2026). Perhaps this decades-long hiatus
suggests that Younger’s bad-faith exception is withering on
the vine. Or perhaps it is simply laying fallow, remaining
available to protect against bad-faith state prosecutions when
the need arises.
III
When the Supreme Court decided Dombrowski, and fash-
ioned Younger to require abstention only when there are
“good-faith attempts” to enforce a state statute, Justice Robert
Jackson’s observations about prosecutors would have been
well known:
The prosecutor has more control over life, lib-
erty, and reputation than any other person in
America. His discretion is tremendous. He can
have citizens investigated and, if he is that kind
of person, he can have this done to the tune of
public statements and veiled or unveiled inti-
mations. Or the prosecutor may choose a more
subtle course and simply have a citizen’s friends
interviewed. The prosecutor can order arrests,
present cases to the grand jury in secret session,
and on the basis of his one-sided presentation of
the facts, can cause the citizen to be indicted and
held for trial. He may dismiss the case before
trial, in which case the defense never has a
chance to be heard. Or he may go on with a
8 No. 26-2238
public trial …. While the prosecutor at his best
is one of the most beneficent forces in our soci-
ety, when he acts from malice or other base mo-
tives, he is one of the worst. †
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address Deliv-
ered at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attor-
neys (Apr. 1, 1940).
Federal courts are not in the business of drafting perfor-
mance reviews for prosecutors. Rather, we apply constitu-
tional and legislative mandates, and I do not suggest that Jus-
tice Robert Jackson’s view of a prosecutor is such a legal man-
date. That said, Justice Jackson’s observations ring as true to-
day as they did in the 1940s. And while those comments pri-
marily centered on the application of criminal law, with all of
its attendant safeguards, today’s state prosecutors also have
at their disposal a litany of civil enforcement options. These
civil enforcement options are often aimed at organizations,
and appropriately so. See, e.g., LG Display Co. v. Madigan, 665
F.3d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 2011)
Without a live controversy, I hesitate to come to any con-
clusion on the proper scope of Younger’s bad-faith exception.
We are starting to see more cases involving allegations that
state prosectors are acting in bad faith. See Yelp Inc. v. Paxton,
137 F.4th 944, 951–52 (9th Cir. 2025); Netflix, Inc. v. Babin, 88
F.4th 1080, 1099–1100 (5th Cir. 2023). Perhaps this is because
of a change in how state prosecutors operate. Or maybe these
† While Justice Robert Jackson’s speech was aimed at federal prosecu-
tors and he delivered it as the United States Attorney General in 1940, it
was known to hang on the walls of state and federal prosecutors for dec-
ades to come.
No. 26-2238 9
allegations are nothing more than litigants’ last-ditch efforts
to convince federal courts to intrude on the province of state
courts. Whatever the proper limiting principle for determin-
ing bad faith, we must consider that prosecutors can use ex-
pensive litigation to impose a heckler’s veto. In the right case,
after all, a court could conclude that a state prosecutor has
gone too far. See Babin, 88 F.4th at 1100.
IV
The partial dissent and concurrence agree this case is moot
and the injunction below should be vacated. For today, we
need say no more. Certainly, as the partial dissent argues, we
could provide more detail about where our court stands on the
current scope of the bad-faith exception to Younger absten-
tion. And should the issue come before us in a live contro-
versy, we will no doubt do so. In the meantime, while prose-
cutors must at times strike hard blows and take on challeng-
ing cases, adherence to Justice Robert Jackson’s view of the
model prosecutor can steer them far away from the line where
we might question their good faith.
10 No. 26-2238
SCUDDER, Circuit Judge, joined by BRENNAN, Chief Judge,
and ST. EVE, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges, concurring in part and
dissenting in part. This case ends with a single line in a single
docket entry, as everyone agrees the controversy is moot and
that the district court’s preliminary injunction should be va-
cated. So it may be tempting to see the appeal as a short-lived
blip of little consequence. Law and life move on.
Yes and no. I agree that we should close the book on this
appeal. But our mistake, in my respectful view, is not saying
a few words about what brought the appeal to us in the first
instance: a district court in Illinois preliminarily enjoined Flor-
ida’s Attorney General from litigating claims under Florida
law in a Florida state court. The injunction worked a grievous
blow to a cornerstone principle of our constitutional design—
federalism—and all but cast a vote of no confidence in state
courts. We have clear authority to say this and have bypassed
an important opportunity to do so, all at a time when the fed-
eral judiciary’s enforcement of neutral structural constitu-
tional principles remains as important as ever.
I
My dissent at the panel level conveys these views in much
more depth. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Uthmeier,
178 F.4th 1113, 1127–32 (7th Cir. 2026) (Scudder, J., dissent-
ing). Only a few points warrant underscoring today.
Recall that the district court attempted to justify the entry
of a preliminary injunction by relying on the so-called “bad
faith” exception to the abstention doctrine recognized in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). That exception is “nar-
row.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 602 (1975). So nar-
row, in fact, that “[t]here is no case since Younger was decided
No. 26-2238 11
in which the Court has” applied it. 17B Charles Alan Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4255 (3d ed.
2026).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has found an occurrence of
bad faith just once—in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 492
(1965). The situation there was night-and-day different than
the one here. In 1963 Louisiana police repeatedly “raided and
ransacked” the homes and offices of civil rights activists “[a]t
gunpoint,” and threatened charges even after a state judge
had quashed the arrest warrants and suppressed the seized
evidence. Id. at 487–88 & n.4. The reinstitution of similar crim-
inal charges, brought under a state statute “unconstitutional
on its face,” led the Supreme Court to prescribe the unusually
strong medicine of a federal court injunction. Id. at 496–97.
In Dombrowski’s wake, “commentators have observed that
‘the universe of bad-faith-harassment claims that can be es-
tablished is virtually empty.’” Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Ju-
risdiction § 13.5 (9th ed. 2025). The bad-faith doctrine “appears
limited to facts such as those present in Dombrowski,” id., and
the Supreme Court’s clear commitment to rigorous enforce-
ment of principles of federalism in the decades since Younger
can only further curtail this eye-of-the-needle exception. It
cannot support the preliminary injunction entered by the dis-
trict court here.
Our mistake today is not saying so as a full court. The
Academy made a strategic and calculated decision to volun-
tarily dismiss this case. That decision rendered this appeal
moot, but we had the choice to vacate the injunction ourselves
after highlighting the extraordinary federalism infringement
wrought by the preliminary injunction. See Sinochem Intern.
Co. v. Malaysia Intern. Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007)
12 No. 26-2238
(citing Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 433–34 (1975)) (recognizing
that a federal court can address the propriety of Younger ab-
stention even before deciding “whether the parties present an
Article III case or controversy”). I worry that forgoing this op-
portunity will prove constitutionally expensive another time.
II
In no way is the Academy’s position lost on me. Repre-
sented by very able counsel, the Academy has been crystal
clear from the beginning that it believes the Florida Attorney
General’s state court claims violate the organization’s First
Amendment rights. The Academy deserves its day in court on
that defense, and the record shows it is receiving it. The state
court proceedings in St. Lucie County, Florida, if once stalled,
are now moving forward. Indeed, the state court recently de-
nied the Academy’s motion to dismiss the state claims.
Time will tell whether the Academy prevails on its defense
or falls short. All we can observe today is that, if the Academy
does not prevail at the trial court level, it can seek further re-
view in the Florida appellate courts, even the Florida Su-
preme Court. The U.S. Constitution presumes parity and
comity between the federal and state courts. As Justice Bren-
nan explained more than 50 years ago for a unanimous Su-
preme Court, “a pending state proceeding, in all but unusual
cases, would provide the federal plaintiff with the necessary
vehicle for vindicating his constitutional rights.” Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460 (1974). Remember, too, that “all
executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and
of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to
support this Constitution.” U.S. Const. art. VI cl. 3; see also
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 346 (1816)
(emphasizing that “the judges of the state courts are, and
No. 26-2238 13
always will be, of as much learning, integrity, and wisdom, as
those of the courts of the United States”). The Florida courts,
in short, are fully and equally capable of resolving the Acad-
emy’s First Amendment defense. Much of our judicial design
rests on that structural view.
***
Our order granting initial hearing en banc reflected the
gravity of the federalism interests at stake. In dismissing this
appeal, we should have taken one more step by vacating the
preliminary injunction ourselves and articulating why it
never should have issued in the first place. Because the court
today rejects the opportunity to do so, I respectfully dissent
from this aspect of the court’s order.