Full Opinion

Opinion issued September 15, 2026. In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00776-CV ——————————— GILBERT PENA, CYNTHIA H. PENA, AND MARK A. PENA, Appellants V. FLEXSTEEL PIPELINE TECHNOLOGIES INC. “FLEXSTEEL”, TRAVELERS “THE PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY”, ESURANCE INSURANCE COMPANY AND MARCO A. DUNON-SIGISMONDI, Appellees On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1 Waller County, Texas Trial Court Case No. CV24-02-1030 MEMORANDUM OPINION This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed in connection with a multi-vehicle car accident. Gilbert Pena, Cynthia Pena, and Mark Pena (“the Penas”) filed suit against multiple defendants, including Esurance Insurance Company (“Esurance”), Flexsteel Pipeline Technologies, Inc. (“Flexsteel”), Travelers “The Phoenix Insurance Company”, and Marco A. Dunon-Sigismondi. Esurance filed a no evidence motion for summary judgment against the Penas, and the trial court granted the motion on October 3, 2024. The Penas attempted to appeal that order. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It is well settled that, “[u]nless specifically authorized by statute, Texas appellate courts only have jurisdiction to review final judgments.” Johns v. Fox Hall, Ltd., No. 01-22-00403-CV, 2022 WL 16756369, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 8, 2022, no pet.). A judgment is final and appealable if it disposes of all parties and claims. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. 2001). Here, the trial court’s October 3, 2024 order disposes only of the Penas’ claims against Esurance; it does not dispose of the Penas’ claims against the other defendants. The October 3, 2024 order is thus interlocutory. See Schlumberger Ltd. v. Rutherford, 472 S.W.3d 881, 890 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (noting that “any order other than a final order” is interlocutory). This court generally lacks jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order unless “a statute explicitly confers jurisdiction.” Omoregie v. TPS Will Clayton, LLC, No. 01-25-00853-CV, 2026 WL 232803, *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 29, 2026, no pet.). The Penas do not argue that a statute confers jurisdiction here. One does not. 2 The Texas Supreme Court has also held that “the language of an order or judgment can make it final, even though it should have been interlocutory, if that language expressly disposes of all claims and all parties.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 200 (emphasis omitted). As the Court explained, an interlocutory order may be rendered final if “[t]he intent to finally dispose of the case” is “unequivocally expressed in the words of the order itself.” Id. But the trial court’s October 3, 2024 order contains no such language of finality with respect to all claims and parties in this case. That law does not apply. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over the Penas’ attempted appeal of the trial court’s October 3, 2024 order. See In re M.G., No. 01-05-00426-CV, 2006 WL 1549754, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 8, 2006, no pet.) (“When a party attempts to appeal a non-appealable interlocutory order, appellate courts have no jurisdiction except to declare the interlocutory nature of the order and to dismiss the appeal.”). On August 20, 2026, the Clerk of this Court notified the Penas that their appeal was subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction unless a written response was provided within ten days demonstrating that this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). 3 The Penas did not respond. Thus, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See id. Any pending motions are dismissed as moot. Jennifer Caughey Justice Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Morgan, and Dokupil. 4