6172 Ridge Holdings v. Holloway, C.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket285 EDA 2026
JudgeNeuman
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
J-A21032-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
6172 RIDGE HOLDINGS, LLC : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CHRISTINA HOLLOWAY, AND PATRICK :
MEGRAW :
: No. 285 EDA 2026
:
APPEAL OF: CHRISTINA HOLLOWAY :
Appeal from the Order Entered January 16, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): 241003854
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BECK, J., and NEUMAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NEUMAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2026
Appellant, Christina Holloway, appeals pro se from the trial court’s
January 16, 2026 order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee,
6172 Ridge Holdings, LLC (“Ridge Holdings”), in this landlord-tenant action. 1
Due to briefing deficiencies, we dismiss Ms. Holloway’s appeal.
The trial court summarized the background of this matter, in relevant
part, as follows:
On November 1, 2023, Ridge Holdings initiated a landlord-tenant
action against Ms. Holloway and Mr. Megraw in Municipal Court
seeking unpaid rent, late fees, and attorney’s fees (LT-23-11-01-
3042). Ridge Holdings has maintained both in the Municipal Court
and in this [c]ourt that Ms. Holloway and Mr. Megraw did not
provide 60 days’ notice of their intent to vacate, as required in the
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1 As discussed infra, a default judgment was entered against Appellant’s co-
defendant, Patrick Megraw. Mr. Megraw subsequently took no action in the
trial court and has not filed an appeal.
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lease. At the Municipal Court hearing, Ms. Holloway apparently
provided an email printout, dated May 6, 2023, providing the
notice to vacate the property at the end of August 2023. Ridge
Holdings claimed, and continues to claim, that the email was
falsified and/or is not authentic. The Municipal Court found in
favor of Ms. Holloway and Mr. Megraw. Ridge Holdings appealed
to this [c]ourt.[2]
On appeal, Ridge Holdings again raised the issue that the alleged
email sent by Ms. Holloway was not authentic. [3] Ridge Holdings
contends that Ms. Holloway altered the email. Ridge Holdings
served discovery on Ms. Holloway[,] seeking the original May 6th
email, including the email metadata. When Ms. Holloway failed to
respond, Ridge Holdings filed a Motion to Compel, which this
[c]ourt granted as unopposed.
Ridge Holdings next filed a Motion for Sanctions, alleging … Ms.
Holloway had still not provided a response to the requests, in
violation of this [c]ourt’s prior [o]rder. In response, Ms. Holloway
claimed … she no longer had access to the May 6, 2023 email.
After oral argument on the motion, this [c]ourt issued an order
granting the Motion for Sanctions and ordering … “at trial, the
factfinder is permitted to draw an adverse inference that [Ms.]
Holloway’s failure to produce the disputed email and metadata
supports a finding that she did not provide the requisite notice to
vacate under the lease.”
Ms. Holloway subsequently filed a Motion to Vacate on the grounds
that Ridge Holdings did not have a valid rental license during the
first month of her lease from November 28, 2021 to December
27, 2021. This was the first time Ms. Holloway made such a claim
in this matter. This [c]ourt denied the Motion to Vacate. On
December 11, 2025, Ridge Holdings filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment. Ms. Holloway … did not file a response. This [c]ourt
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2 We note default judgments were entered against Ms. Holloway and Mr.
Megraw in the trial court, after they failed to respond to Ridge Holdings’
complaint. Ms. Holloway subsequently filed a petition to open the default
judgment entered against her, which the trial court granted. Mr. Megraw did
not take any action after the default judgment in the amount of $3,200.00,
plus attorneys’ fees and costs, was entered against him on March 21, 2025.
3 Ms. Holloway had counsel during some of the trial court proceedings, but
otherwise proceeded pro se.
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granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of Ridge
Holdings [and against Ms. Holloway] on January 16, 2026[,] in the
amount of $3,000[,] plus attorney’s fees to be assessed via
separate motion.
Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 3/16/26, at 2-3.
On January 21, 2026, Ms. Holloway filed a notice of appeal from the trial
court’s summary judgment order. The trial court ordered Ms. Holloway to file
a concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and she timely complied.
The trial court then issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion.
On appeal, Ms. Holloway raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
where genuine issues of material fact existed.
2. Whether the trial court erred in enforcing a residential lease
that was illegal and unenforceable due to the absence of a valid
rental license and absence of required occupancy-related
documents at the inception of the tenancy.
3. Whether the trial court violated [Ms. Holloway’s] due process
rights by resolving disputed issues without affording a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.
4. Whether the trial court erred in disregarding [Ms. Holloway’s]
documented communications and evidence regarding notice.
5. Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees where
such fees were unsupported by law, contract, or competent
evidence.
6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion through prejudicial
and improper characterizations of [Ms. Holloway’s] filings and
conduct.
Ms. Holloway’s Brief at 1-2 (unnumbered).
We are constrained to dismiss Ms. Holloway’s appeal due to substantial
briefing defects that impede our appellate review of this matter. To begin,
although Ms. Holloway claimed in her notice of appeal to be appealing from
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the trial court’s January 16, 2026 order granting summary judgment in favor
of Ridge Holdings, she states in her brief that she “appeals from the underlying
grant of summary judgement [sic] as well as the Order dated March 24, 2025
[sic], awarding attorney’s fees in the amount of $12,880.00.” Id. at 1
(unnumbered).4 Ms. Holloway, however, does not adequately explain how her
appeal, filed on January 21, 2026, can encompass both orders, nor does she
set forth what the orders stated. See Pa.R.A.P. 2114 (“The statement of
jurisdiction shall contain a precise citation to the statutory provision, general
rule or other authority believed to confer on the appellate court jurisdiction to
review the order or other determination in question.”); Pa.R.A.P. 2115(a)
(“The text of the order or other determination from which an appeal has been
taken or which is otherwise sought to be reviewed shall be set forth verbatim
immediately following the statement of jurisdiction.”); see also Pa.R.A.P.
903(a) (“Except as otherwise prescribed by this rule, the notice of appeal
required by Pa.R.A.P. 902 (manner of taking appeal) shall be filed within 30
days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.”); Ms.
Holloway’s Brief at 1 (stating only that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
42 Pa.C.S. § 742).
Ms. Holloway’s brief also fails to include any citations to the record in
contravention of Pa.R.A.P. 2117 and 2119. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4) (stating
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4 We believe Ms. Holloway means the order dated March 24, 2026, as the trial
court indicated attorney’s fees would be assessed by separate motion in its
January 16, 2026 summary judgment order. See Order, 1/16/26. We also
observe no order was entered on the docket on March 24, 2025.
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the statement of the case shall contain “[a] closely condensed chronological
statement, in narrative form, of all the facts which are necessary to be known
in order to determine the points in controversy, with an appropriate reference
in each instance to the place in the record where the evidence substantiating
the fact relied on may be found”); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (“If reference is made to
the pleadings, evidence, charge, opinion or order, or any other matter
appearing in the record, the argument must set forth, in immediate connection
therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference to the place in the record where
the matter referred to appears….”); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(d) (“When the finding of,
or the refusal to find, a fact is argued, the argument must contain a synopsis
of all the evidence on the point, with a reference to the place in the record
where the evidence may be found.”). It is well-established “[t]his Court
cannot and will not serve as counsel for any party; it is not our role to scour
the record to find support for the claims raised.” Feldman v. CP
Acquisitions 25, L.P., 325 A.3d 691, 702 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation
omitted).
Ms. Holloway likewise fails to state how her issues were preserved
below. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c) (requiring a statement of place of raising or
preservation of issues); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e) (“Where under the applicable law
an issue is not reviewable on appeal unless raised or preserved below, the
argument must set forth, in immediate connection therewith or in a footnote
thereto, either a specific cross-reference to the page or pages of the statement
of the case which set forth the information relating thereto as required by
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Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c), or substantially the same information.”). “[I]t is not the
responsibility of this Court to scour the record to prove that an appellant has
raised an issue before the trial court, thereby preserving it for appellate
review.” Matthews v. Erie Ins. Group, 244 A.3d 844, 851 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(citation omitted); see also id. (“Our appellate courts have long held that an
[appellant] who does not follow Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c) and Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e)
waives the related issues due to the defects in his brief.”) (citation omitted).
In addition to the lack of citations to the record, Ms. Holloway’s
argument spans only four pages and contains no citations to, or discussion of,
legal authority. See Ms. Holloway’s Brief at 3-6; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)
(stating the argument shall include “such discussion and citation of authorities
as are deemed pertinent”).5, 6 This Court has explained:
When briefing the various issues that have been preserved, it is
an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently
developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with
pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with
citations to legal authorities. Citations to authorities must
articulate the principles for which they are cited.
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5 While Ms. Holloway raised six issues in her statement of questions involved,
her argument is divided into seven parts. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating the
argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be
argued); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be considered unless
it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested
thereby.”).
6 To the extent Ms. Holloway provides a couple citations to legal authority in
her reply brief, “a reply brief cannot be a vehicle to argue issues raised but
inadequately developed in [an] appellant’s original brief.” Riverview Carpet
& Flooring, Inc. v. Presbyterian SeniorCare, 299 A.3d 937, 969 n.20 (Pa.
Super. 2023) (citation omitted).
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This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments
on behalf of an appellant. Moreover, when defects in a brief
impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we
may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be
waived.
Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (cleaned
up); see also In re S.T.S., Jr., 76 A.3d 24, 42 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“This Court
is neither obliged, nor even particularly equipped, to develop an argument for
a party. To do so places the Court in the conflicting roles of advocate and
neutral arbiter. When an appellant fails to develop his issue in an argument
and fails to cite any legal authority, the issue is waived. … [M]ere issue
spotting without analysis or legal citation to support an assertion precludes
our appellate review of a matter.”) (cleaned up).
We recognize Ms. Holloway is proceeding pro se. However, even though
this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by pro se appellants,
pro se appellants are not entitled to special treatment by virtue of the fact
they lack legal training. Commonwealth v. Maris, 629 A.2d 1014, 1017 n.1
(Pa. Super. 1993) (citation omitted). “When issues are not properly raised
and developed in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present
specific issues for review[,] a [c]ourt will not consider the merits thereof.” Id.
at 1017 (citation and footnote omitted). Because of the substantial defects in
Ms. Holloway’s brief, we are precluded from conducting any meaningful
appellate review. We therefore dismiss this appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
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Date: 11/19/2026
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