Full Opinion

J-A21032-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 6172 RIDGE HOLDINGS, LLC : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHRISTINA HOLLOWAY, AND PATRICK : MEGRAW : : No. 285 EDA 2026 : APPEAL OF: CHRISTINA HOLLOWAY : Appeal from the Order Entered January 16, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 241003854 BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BECK, J., and NEUMAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY NEUMAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2026 Appellant, Christina Holloway, appeals pro se from the trial court’s January 16, 2026 order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, 6172 Ridge Holdings, LLC (“Ridge Holdings”), in this landlord-tenant action. 1 Due to briefing deficiencies, we dismiss Ms. Holloway’s appeal. The trial court summarized the background of this matter, in relevant part, as follows: On November 1, 2023, Ridge Holdings initiated a landlord-tenant action against Ms. Holloway and Mr. Megraw in Municipal Court seeking unpaid rent, late fees, and attorney’s fees (LT-23-11-01- 3042). Ridge Holdings has maintained both in the Municipal Court and in this [c]ourt that Ms. Holloway and Mr. Megraw did not provide 60 days’ notice of their intent to vacate, as required in the ____________________________________________ 1 As discussed infra, a default judgment was entered against Appellant’s co- defendant, Patrick Megraw. Mr. Megraw subsequently took no action in the trial court and has not filed an appeal. J-A21032-26 lease. At the Municipal Court hearing, Ms. Holloway apparently provided an email printout, dated May 6, 2023, providing the notice to vacate the property at the end of August 2023. Ridge Holdings claimed, and continues to claim, that the email was falsified and/or is not authentic. The Municipal Court found in favor of Ms. Holloway and Mr. Megraw. Ridge Holdings appealed to this [c]ourt.[2] On appeal, Ridge Holdings again raised the issue that the alleged email sent by Ms. Holloway was not authentic. [3] Ridge Holdings contends that Ms. Holloway altered the email. Ridge Holdings served discovery on Ms. Holloway[,] seeking the original May 6th email, including the email metadata. When Ms. Holloway failed to respond, Ridge Holdings filed a Motion to Compel, which this [c]ourt granted as unopposed. Ridge Holdings next filed a Motion for Sanctions, alleging … Ms. Holloway had still not provided a response to the requests, in violation of this [c]ourt’s prior [o]rder. In response, Ms. Holloway claimed … she no longer had access to the May 6, 2023 email. After oral argument on the motion, this [c]ourt issued an order granting the Motion for Sanctions and ordering … “at trial, the factfinder is permitted to draw an adverse inference that [Ms.] Holloway’s failure to produce the disputed email and metadata supports a finding that she did not provide the requisite notice to vacate under the lease.” Ms. Holloway subsequently filed a Motion to Vacate on the grounds that Ridge Holdings did not have a valid rental license during the first month of her lease from November 28, 2021 to December 27, 2021. This was the first time Ms. Holloway made such a claim in this matter. This [c]ourt denied the Motion to Vacate. On December 11, 2025, Ridge Holdings filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Ms. Holloway … did not file a response. This [c]ourt ____________________________________________ 2 We note default judgments were entered against Ms. Holloway and Mr. Megraw in the trial court, after they failed to respond to Ridge Holdings’ complaint. Ms. Holloway subsequently filed a petition to open the default judgment entered against her, which the trial court granted. Mr. Megraw did not take any action after the default judgment in the amount of $3,200.00, plus attorneys’ fees and costs, was entered against him on March 21, 2025. 3 Ms. Holloway had counsel during some of the trial court proceedings, but otherwise proceeded pro se. -2- J-A21032-26 granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of Ridge Holdings [and against Ms. Holloway] on January 16, 2026[,] in the amount of $3,000[,] plus attorney’s fees to be assessed via separate motion. Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 3/16/26, at 2-3. On January 21, 2026, Ms. Holloway filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s summary judgment order. The trial court ordered Ms. Holloway to file a concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and she timely complied. The trial court then issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion. On appeal, Ms. Holloway raises the following issues for our review: 1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment where genuine issues of material fact existed. 2. Whether the trial court erred in enforcing a residential lease that was illegal and unenforceable due to the absence of a valid rental license and absence of required occupancy-related documents at the inception of the tenancy. 3. Whether the trial court violated [Ms. Holloway’s] due process rights by resolving disputed issues without affording a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 4. Whether the trial court erred in disregarding [Ms. Holloway’s] documented communications and evidence regarding notice. 5. Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees where such fees were unsupported by law, contract, or competent evidence. 6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion through prejudicial and improper characterizations of [Ms. Holloway’s] filings and conduct. Ms. Holloway’s Brief at 1-2 (unnumbered). We are constrained to dismiss Ms. Holloway’s appeal due to substantial briefing defects that impede our appellate review of this matter. To begin, although Ms. Holloway claimed in her notice of appeal to be appealing from -3- J-A21032-26 the trial court’s January 16, 2026 order granting summary judgment in favor of Ridge Holdings, she states in her brief that she “appeals from the underlying grant of summary judgement [sic] as well as the Order dated March 24, 2025 [sic], awarding attorney’s fees in the amount of $12,880.00.” Id. at 1 (unnumbered).4 Ms. Holloway, however, does not adequately explain how her appeal, filed on January 21, 2026, can encompass both orders, nor does she set forth what the orders stated. See Pa.R.A.P. 2114 (“The statement of jurisdiction shall contain a precise citation to the statutory provision, general rule or other authority believed to confer on the appellate court jurisdiction to review the order or other determination in question.”); Pa.R.A.P. 2115(a) (“The text of the order or other determination from which an appeal has been taken or which is otherwise sought to be reviewed shall be set forth verbatim immediately following the statement of jurisdiction.”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (“Except as otherwise prescribed by this rule, the notice of appeal required by Pa.R.A.P. 902 (manner of taking appeal) shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.”); Ms. Holloway’s Brief at 1 (stating only that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 742). Ms. Holloway’s brief also fails to include any citations to the record in contravention of Pa.R.A.P. 2117 and 2119. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4) (stating ____________________________________________ 4 We believe Ms. Holloway means the order dated March 24, 2026, as the trial court indicated attorney’s fees would be assessed by separate motion in its January 16, 2026 summary judgment order. See Order, 1/16/26. We also observe no order was entered on the docket on March 24, 2025. -4- J-A21032-26 the statement of the case shall contain “[a] closely condensed chronological statement, in narrative form, of all the facts which are necessary to be known in order to determine the points in controversy, with an appropriate reference in each instance to the place in the record where the evidence substantiating the fact relied on may be found”); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (“If reference is made to the pleadings, evidence, charge, opinion or order, or any other matter appearing in the record, the argument must set forth, in immediate connection therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference to the place in the record where the matter referred to appears….”); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(d) (“When the finding of, or the refusal to find, a fact is argued, the argument must contain a synopsis of all the evidence on the point, with a reference to the place in the record where the evidence may be found.”). It is well-established “[t]his Court cannot and will not serve as counsel for any party; it is not our role to scour the record to find support for the claims raised.” Feldman v. CP Acquisitions 25, L.P., 325 A.3d 691, 702 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted). Ms. Holloway likewise fails to state how her issues were preserved below. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c) (requiring a statement of place of raising or preservation of issues); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e) (“Where under the applicable law an issue is not reviewable on appeal unless raised or preserved below, the argument must set forth, in immediate connection therewith or in a footnote thereto, either a specific cross-reference to the page or pages of the statement of the case which set forth the information relating thereto as required by -5- J-A21032-26 Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c), or substantially the same information.”). “[I]t is not the responsibility of this Court to scour the record to prove that an appellant has raised an issue before the trial court, thereby preserving it for appellate review.” Matthews v. Erie Ins. Group, 244 A.3d 844, 851 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted); see also id. (“Our appellate courts have long held that an [appellant] who does not follow Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c) and Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e) waives the related issues due to the defects in his brief.”) (citation omitted). In addition to the lack of citations to the record, Ms. Holloway’s argument spans only four pages and contains no citations to, or discussion of, legal authority. See Ms. Holloway’s Brief at 3-6; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating the argument shall include “such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent”).5, 6 This Court has explained: When briefing the various issues that have been preserved, it is an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal authorities. Citations to authorities must articulate the principles for which they are cited. ____________________________________________ 5 While Ms. Holloway raised six issues in her statement of questions involved, her argument is divided into seven parts. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating the argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”). 6 To the extent Ms. Holloway provides a couple citations to legal authority in her reply brief, “a reply brief cannot be a vehicle to argue issues raised but inadequately developed in [an] appellant’s original brief.” Riverview Carpet & Flooring, Inc. v. Presbyterian SeniorCare, 299 A.3d 937, 969 n.20 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). -6- J-A21032-26 This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. Moreover, when defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived. Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (cleaned up); see also In re S.T.S., Jr., 76 A.3d 24, 42 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“This Court is neither obliged, nor even particularly equipped, to develop an argument for a party. To do so places the Court in the conflicting roles of advocate and neutral arbiter. When an appellant fails to develop his issue in an argument and fails to cite any legal authority, the issue is waived. … [M]ere issue spotting without analysis or legal citation to support an assertion precludes our appellate review of a matter.”) (cleaned up). We recognize Ms. Holloway is proceeding pro se. However, even though this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by pro se appellants, pro se appellants are not entitled to special treatment by virtue of the fact they lack legal training. Commonwealth v. Maris, 629 A.2d 1014, 1017 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citation omitted). “When issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review[,] a [c]ourt will not consider the merits thereof.” Id. at 1017 (citation and footnote omitted). Because of the substantial defects in Ms. Holloway’s brief, we are precluded from conducting any meaningful appellate review. We therefore dismiss this appeal. Appeal dismissed. -7- J-A21032-26 Date: 11/19/2026 -8-